No intent to race for annexation.

- Georgia General Assembly did not intend the alternative methods of annexation under O.C.G.A. § 36-36-10 to establish a system for municipalities to race the legislature to annex land that it already had designated for annexation under local law. City of Brookhaven v. City of Chamblee, 329 Ga. App. 346, 765 S.E.2d 33 (2014).

General Assembly is authorized to delegate power of annexation to municipalities under O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21. Cooper v. City of Gainesville, 248 Ga. 269, 282 S.E.2d 322 (1981).

Purpose of this section in delegating limited power of annexation to municipalities is to permit municipalities to make a self-determination in this regard. Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. City of Bremen, 227 Ga. 1, 178 S.E.2d 868 (1970) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21).

Limitations on power of annexation.

- When the municipality exercises the delegated power of annexation the municipality is exercising the legislative power of the General Assembly and is limited only by the terms of the delegation itself and by the rule that the municipality's exercise must be lawful and reasonable and not in violation of any constitutional inhibition. Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. City of Bremen, 227 Ga. 1, 178 S.E.2d 868 (1970).

Municipality without authority to annex property during referendum process.

- Trial court properly held that a municipality did not have the authority under O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21 to annex land that the Georgia General Assembly designated for annexation to another municipality, subject to a referendum, before the referendum took place; thus, a city was prohibited from attempting to annex property during the referendum process. City of Brookhaven v. City of Chamblee, 329 Ga. App. 346, 765 S.E.2d 33 (2014).

Comparison of 100 percent and 60 percent methods of annexation.

- Requirements of the 100 percent method and the 60 percent method are different. In the 100 percent method, the land being annexed need only abut the municipal boundaries. In the 60 percent method, the land being annexed must coincide with the municipal boundaries on one-eighth of the municipality's aggregate external boundary. City of Marietta v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 237 Ga. 518, 228 S.E.2d 894 (1976).

Applicability to counties of 100,000 or more.

- Municipalities either wholly or partly within county having population of 100,000 or more persons cannot annex territory under provisions of this section. Jones v. City of College Park, 223 Ga. 778, 158 S.E.2d 384 (1967) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21).

Limited applicability of definition of contiguous area.

- Obvious purpose of the definition of "contiguous" in Ga. L. 1962, p. 119, § 2 (now O.C.G.A. § 36-36-20) is to explain the provision of Ga. L. 1962, p. 119, § 1 (see O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21) for annexing to the existing corporate limits unincorporated areas "contiguous to the existing corporate limits." This provision has no reference to any lands when the owners sign no application to annex. This provision's sole purpose is to say that although a road, creek, river, interstate highway, railroad, or even other municipal property of another political subdivision passes between the lands of "A" and the corporate boundary, "A's" land is contiguous for the purpose of annexing the land when "A" signs an application therefor. City of Adel v. Georgia Power Co., 224 Ga. 232, 161 S.E.2d 297 (1968).

Word "owner" is defined to mean "the record title holder of the fee simple title, or his legal representative." City of Cartersville v. Bartow County Sch. Dist., 145 Ga. App. 129, 243 S.E.2d 293 (1978).

Failure of annexation voids subsequently related annexation.

- Failure of city's annexation of railroad right of way due to applicant's lack of fee simple ownership also invalidated subsequent annexation of property which became contiguous to city only by virtue of the earlier annexation of the right of way. City of Jefferson v. Town of Pendergrass, 176 Ga. App. 769, 337 S.E.2d 343 (1985).

Annexation voided when procedures not followed.

- Defendants attempt to annex certain properties into the corporate limits of the city and establish a new zoning district was voided because the procedural requirements of O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4 (a) and (b) and O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21 were not met. City of Byron v. Betancourt, 242 Ga. App. 71, 528 S.E.2d 841 (2000).

County estopped to oppose annexation.

- County was estopped from challenging a city's annexation of county roads by the county's failure to oppose the annexation for 20 years. The county had approved the annexation, and the city, with the county's knowledge, maintained the roads, patrolled the roads, set speed limits, and otherwise exercised control over the roads. City of Holly Springs v. Cherokee County, 299 Ga. App. 451, 682 S.E.2d 644 (2009).

Annexation not ultra vires.

- City's failure to finalize the city's annexation of county roads by adopting an ordinance, preparing a survey, and filing the annexation with the Georgia Secretary of State were errors of omission, not ultra vires actions contrary to former O.C.G.A. §§ 36-36-1 and36-36-2 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 36-36-20 and36-36-21) which the city had no power to take. Therefore, O.C.G.A. § 45-6-5 did not preclude the city from contending that the county was estopped from challenging the annexation. City of Holly Springs v. Cherokee County, 299 Ga. App. 451, 682 S.E.2d 644 (2009).

Cited in Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. R.D.C., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Ga. 1971); City of Gainesville v. Hall County Bd. of Educ., 233 Ga. 77, 209 S.E.2d 637 (1974); City of Ft. Oglethorpe v. Boger, 267 Ga. 485, 480 S.E.2d 186 (1997).

Annexation in steps.

- Municipality, utilizing the 100 percent method of annexation may annex a street, then annex tracts abutting upon that street. Such areas of land meet the requirement of being "contiguous to the existing corporate limits" when they adjoin and abut directly on a street or highway which has been made a part of the corporate limits. City of Marietta v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 237 Ga. 518, 228 S.E.2d 894 (1976).

Inclusion of all property.

- This section imposes no requirement that all of the property located within the outer perimeter of such area be included within the annexation. City of Cartersville v. Bartow County Sch. Dist., 145 Ga. App. 129, 243 S.E.2d 293 (1978) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21).

Presumption of dedication of land for public streets.

- When the owner of a tract of land subdivides the land into lots, and records a map or plat showing such lots with designated streets, and sells lots with reference to such map or plat, the owner will be presumed to have expressly dedicated the streets designated on the map to the public. Young v. Sweetbriar, Inc., 222 Ga. 262, 149 S.E.2d 474 (1966).

How acceptance by municipality shown.

- When an owner of land makes an express dedication of a particular portion thereof for use as a public street, its acceptance may be shown by any act of the municipality recognizing the existence of the street as such, and treating it as one of the streets of the city. Young v. Sweetbriar, Inc., 222 Ga. 262, 149 S.E.2d 474 (1966).

Grantor estopped to deny grantees right to use streets.

- When a grantor sells lots of land, and in the grantor's deeds describes the lots as bounded by streets, not expressly mentioned in the deeds, but shown upon a plat therein referred to as laid out in a subdivision of the grantor's land, the grantor is estopped to deny the grantee's right to use the streets delineated in such plat. Those claiming under such conveyances are estopped from denying the existence of the streets so delineated upon the plat of the subdivision and given as boundaries of lots acquired by these and others from the grantor or those claiming under the grantor. Young v. Sweetbriar, Inc., 222 Ga. 262, 149 S.E.2d 474 (1966).

Dedication cannot be abandoned by nonuser.

- When land is dedicated to and accepted by a city for street purposes, such dedication inures to the benefit of the public and abutting property owners who bought abutting property by reference to plats showing such streets. Such dedication cannot be abandoned by the dedicatee by mere nonuser. Young v. Sweetbriar, Inc., 222 Ga. 262, 149 S.E.2d 474 (1966).

Validity of proposed annexation not justiciable.

- City's declaratory judgment action seeking to determine the validity of a proposed annexation, to which the county objected based on a local constitutional amendment creating the industrial district sought to be annexed which prohibited annexation, presented no justiciable controversy because the annexation was merely proposed. Fulton County v. City of Atlanta, 299 Ga. 676, 791 S.E.2d 821 (2016).

Sale does not revoke dedication.

- After an owner of land has made a dedication of designated land for public streets, and the public authorities have accepted the dedication, the owner cannot revoke the dedication by a sale of the land. Young v. Sweetbriar, Inc., 222 Ga. 262, 149 S.E.2d 474 (1966).

Preemption based on authority of Public Service Commission.

- Regulation of the construction of electric power substations by municipalities was preempted based on the authority given to the Public Service Commission under O.C.G.A. § 46-2-20. City of Buford v. Ga. Power Co., 276 Ga. 590, 581 S.E.2d 16 (2003).

Property of one owner must abut directly upon municipal boundary.

- Upon consideration of Ga. L. 1962, p. 119, § 2 (now O.C.G.A. § 36-36-20), in conjunction with Ga. L. 1962, p. 119, § 1 (see O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21), in order for a municipal corporation to annex property, at least one of the owners of the property to be annexed must have property which abuts directly on the municipal boundary, or which would otherwise abut directly on the municipal boundary except for the fact that the property is separated by a street, street right of way, creek, river, the right of way of a railroad or other public service corporation, lands owned by the city or some other political subdivision, or lands owned by the state. Right of way for a state-aid road which is owned by the state would qualify as lands owned by the state. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-49.

Annexation of state park.

- Municipality must have specific legislative approval to annex state park. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-211.

Consent referred to in this section would have to come from the General Assembly. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-211 (see O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21).

Signing of petition.

- Neither State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board) nor director of State Highway Department (now commissioner of transportation) has authority to sign petition for annexation of right of way of state-aid road as part of the corporate limits of a municipality of this state. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-217.

Requirements for inclusion of boundary street in annexation ordinance.

- Under the particular annexation ordinances adopted by a city, in which one boundary of the area to be annexed is a public street, such public street is not itself included within the corporate boundaries unless the annexation ordinance specifically includes the street within such boundaries, and the city police are not authorized to patrol or to make cases on any such street which lies outside the municipal boundary. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-64.

"Owners" includes transferors of deeds to secure debt.

- This section providing for the annexation of certain lands includes within "owners" the transferors of deeds to secure debt, rather than the grantees in such deeds. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U72-105 (see O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21).

Use of adjective "public" preceding "streets" necessarily applies to other ways mentioned. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-75.

Filing of copy of annexation ordinance with Secretary of State is for informational purposes only. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-21.

Requirement that copy of annexation ordinance be filed with Secretary of State is ancillary to annexation procedure rather than integral. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-21.

Time of filing ordinance does not affect time annexation takes effect. Municipal annexation of property takes effect even though filing of copy of ordinance with Secretary of State, as required by O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21, is delayed or omitted. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-21.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, § 38 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, §§ 60 et seq., 73, 74, 80.

ALR.

- Power to extend boundaries of municipal corporations, 64 A.L.R. 1335.

Estoppel to question validity of proceedings extending boundaries of municipality, 101 A.L.R. 581.

Power to detach land from municipal corporations, towns, or villages, 117 A.L.R. 267.

Capacity to attack the fixing or extension of municipal limits or boundary, 13 A.L.R.2d 1279, 17 A.L.R.5th 195.

What zoning regulations are applicable to territory annexed to a municipality, 41 A.L.R.2d 1463.

Zoning: validity and construction of provisions of zoning statute or ordinance regarding protest by neighboring property owners, 7 A.L.R.4th 732.

Right of one governmental subdivision to challenge annexation proceedings by another such subdivision, 17 A.L.R.5th 195.