CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 8, 2009 | 285 Ga. 514, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 1925
...Supreme Court of Georgia. June 8, 2009. Benjamin D. Goldberg, Dalton, for appellant. Kermit N. McManus, Dist. Atty., Susan A. Beck, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee. HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice. This appeal involves a constitutional challenge to OCGA §
40-6-120(a)(2), the traffic statute addressing left-hand turns....
...McNair properly activated his left-turn signal and then turned his vehicle into the outer, right-hand lane of the two lanes heading east. Officer Bowen of the Dalton Police Department stopped McNair and charged him, inter alia, with making an improper turn on the basis that McNair was required by OCGA §
40-6-120(a)(2) *70 to turn his vehicle into the left-hand lane of the two lanes moving east. After the trial court rejected McNair's assertion that OCGA §
40-6-120(a)(2) was unconstitutionally vague, McNair was tried and convicted of violating that statute....
...ines to govern the conduct of law enforcement authorities, thus making the law susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. (Footnote omitted.) In re D.H.,
283 Ga. 556-557(2),
663 S.E.2d 139 (2008). The statute challenged by McNair, OCGA §
40-6-120(a)(2), addresses the required position and method of turning left at intersections....
...Even though the rules of statutory construction require this Court to presume that a statute is constitutional and to construe it as valid when possible, see generally Rodriguez v. State,
284 Ga. 803(1),
671 S.E.2d 497 (2009), we agree with McNair for the following reasons that OCGA §
40-6-120(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague. The vagueness arises in the second half of the second sentence of OCGA §
40-6-120(a)(2)....
...me left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the same direction as such vehicle on the roadway being entered." It is the use of the verb "leave" and its interplay with "lawfully available to traffic moving in the same direction" in OCGA §
40-6-120(a)(2) that creates the ambiguity in the statute because of the two diametrically-opposite interpretations that can be given this word....
...[2] This interpretation applies "leave" in the context of its definition as "to permit to remain undisturbed... to permit to remain unoccupied *71 ... to let be without interference." Webster's Third New International Dictionary (3rd ed.), p. 1287. [3] Under this interpretation, OCGA §
40-6-120(a)(2) requires the driver to move into the right lane and leave the extreme left-hand lane available to other vehicles so they can travel unencumbered by the turning vehicle's presence....
...to "be driven in the right-hand lane then available for traffic" when they are "proceeding at less than the normal speed of traffic," a category that would include most vehicles that have just executed a left turn. The second interpretation of OCGA §
40-6-120(a)(2) is that a driver who wants to make a left turn onto a roadway with multiple lanes must make the turn so that, when the driver departs from or "leaves" the intersection or other location, the turning vehicle is itself located in the...
...Hence, under this interpretation, the statute requires the driver making the left turn to exit, i.e., leave, the intersection or other location while the turning vehicle then proceeds to travel in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the same direction. It was this interpretation of OCGA §
40-6-120(a)(2) that the State asserts as warranting McNair's conviction....
...642, 645(3),
670 S.E.2d 425 (2008). Although a criminal statute must be read according to the natural and obvious import of its language, see Foster v. State,
273 Ga. 555(1),
544 S.E.2d 153 (2001), our analysis above establishes that the language in OCGA §
40-6-120(a)(2) can be read as setting forth two directly contradictory ways for executing a left-hand turn onto a multi-lane roadway....
...The law is well established that a statute violates due process if it is so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. See Franklin v. State,
279 Ga. 150(1),
611 S.E.2d 21 (2005). In light of the conflict in the language of OCGA §
40-6-120(a)(2), we conclude that a person of common intelligence could not determine with reasonable definiteness that the statute prohibits the making of a left turn into the right lane of a multi-lane roadway....
...See generally Briggs v. State,
281 Ga. 329, 330(1),
638 S.E.2d 292 (2006) (statute unconstitutionally vague when it is "so uncertain that it cannot be determined with reasonable definiteness that any particular act is disapproved"). Accordingly, we hold that OCGA §
40-6-120(a)(2) is too vague to be enforced against McNair, i.e., a driver of a vehicle making a left turn into a multi-lane roadway that lacks official traffic-control devices directing the driver into which lane to turn, see id....
...the roadway to be entered. [2] Notwithstanding the use of the "extreme left-hand lane" phrase in the first sentence, this phrase in the second sentence cannot be read as referencing the lane from which the driver is making the left turn because OCGA §
40-6-120(a)(2) expressly requires the driver to leave this lane available to traffic "moving in the same direction as [the driver's] vehicle on the roadway being entered....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 13, 2024 | 319 Ga. 607
...NEWSOM.
BOGGS, Chief Justice.
A Georgia State Patrol trooper observed Christopher James
Newsom complete an illegal left turn into the right lane of Georgia
Highway 61 southbound and pulled Newsom over. The trial court
ruled that OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B), the statute the trooper observed
Newsom violate, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Newsom
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and dismissed an accusation filed
against Newsom arising out of the traffic stop. On appeal, the State
contends that OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) is not unconstitutionally
vague; that the trial court erred by examining whether the traffic
stop underlying the accusation in this case was supported by
probable cause, instead of asking whether the trooper had
reasonable suspicion for the stop; and that even if the statute is
vague, the trooper made a reasonable mistake of law such that the
stop was lawful.
We hold that OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) as applied to Newsom
does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment....
... Newsom was driving under the influence of alcohol.
The State filed an accusation charging Newsom with DUI less
safe, DUI per se, and improper turn at an intersection. Newsom filed
a “Motion to Suppress and Motion in Limine,” in which he argued
that OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) is unconstitutionally vague “for the
same reasons” that this Court invalidated a previous version of
OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) in McNair v....
...514 (678 SE2d
69) (2009); he further argued that the area where he turned included
multiple “intersections” within the meaning of Title 40, so it was
unclear at which intersection he had to comply with OCGA § 40-6-
120 (2) (B), or whether he had to comply with OCGA §
40-6-120 (2)
(B) in areas where crosswalks or stop lines crossed. The motion did
not specify whether he was raising his claim under the United
States or Georgia Constitution.1 Furthermore, Newsom argued that
because OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) is unconstitutionally vague, the
trooper pulled him over illegally....
...So I’ll grant the
motion.
The trial court implicitly treated Georgia Highway 61 as a single
roadway within the meaning of Title 40 when it noted that OCGA §
40-6-40 (c) generally prohibits driving “to the left of the center of the
roadway.” That statute, the trial court ruled, is inconsistent with
OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B)’s command to exit an intersection in the left
lane of traffic traveling in the same direction on the roadway onto
4
which the driver turned....
...The
Court of Appeals transferred the case here, recognizing that this
Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases involving novel
constitutional challenges to statutes. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI,
Sec. VI, Par. II.
The State argues that the trial court erred in concluding that
OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) is unconstitutionally vague....
...“Vagueness challenges to statutes which do not
involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of
the facts of the case at hand.” Smallwood v. State,
310 Ga. 445, 447
(851 SE2d 595) (2020) (cleaned up). Here, Newsom raises only an
as-applied challenge to OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) under the United
States Constitution based on the statute’s alleged failure to provide
fair notice.2
2 Newsom’s arguments focus on the facts at hand here, which show that
he argues the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him....
...Additionally,
because Newsom does not argue that the statute is unconstitutionally vague
under the Georgia Constitution, we analyze the statute under the United
States Constitution only. See id. at 447 n.2 (declining to analyze void-for-
6
OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) states:
The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left shall
approach the turn in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully
available to traffic moving in the direction of travel of the
turning vehicle....
...Whenever practicable, the left turn shall be
made to the left of the center of the intersection and so as
to leave the intersection or other location in the extreme
left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the
same direction as such vehicle on the roadway being
entered.
OCGA §
40-6-120 (a) (2) (effective until 2010).
vagueness argument under the Georgia Constitution where the defendant
“cite[d] in passing the due process clause of the Georgia Constitution” but made
“no separate argument and cite[d] no cases regarding the Georgia
Constitution”)....
...arguments as to each).
7
In 2010, among other changes not relevant here, the General
Assembly amended the former statute to use the word “exit” instead
of “leave.” See Ga. L. 2010, p. 256, § 1.
OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) is not unconstitutionally vague as
applied to Newsom, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In McNair,
285 Ga. at 515-517, we held that the
previous version of the statute was unconstitutionally vague
because a driver making a left turn would not know in which lane
he should “leave” an intersection. See id. (concluding that OCGA §
40-6-120 (a) (2) (effective until 2010) was “too vague to be enforced
against ....
...lay between the
word “leave” and the rest of the statutory language. See id. When
the word “leave” was read together with the rest of the statute, the
previous version could have two, diametrically opposed meanings.
See id. See also OCGA §
40-6-120 (a) (2) (effective until 2010)
8
(providing that “the left turn shall be made to the left of the center
of the intersection and so as to leave the intersection or other
location in the extreme left...
...The current version of the statute
eliminates the first possible meaning that McNair identified,
9
because the current version cannot be interpreted to mean that a
driver making a left turn must permit the left lane to remain open.
Compare OCGA §
40-6-120 (a) (2) (effective until 2010)....
...506, 506 (397 SE2d 423) (1990) (consulting dictionary definition
10
to decide whether the statute at issue defined “the criminal offense
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited” (cleaned up)). OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B)’s
statutory text provided clear direction to Newsom here. First, he had
to complete his turn in a lane that moved traffic in the same
direction he was driving. See OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) (requiring a
driver to turn consistently with “traffic moving in the same direction
as the turning vehicle on the roadway being entered”). Plainly, he
was not permitted to drive into oncoming traffic. See id.
Furthermore, Georgia Highway 61 southbound has two lanes going
south, so OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B)’s text required Newsom to “exit
the intersection” — that is, complete his turn and travel away from
the place where Georgia Highway 61 southbound and U.S....
...Highway
78 meet — in the left lane of Georgia Highway 61 southbound. Id.
He could not use the right lane. See id. Unlike the previous version
of the statute, nothing about the current statutory language
suggests that a driver should occupy the right lane when completing
a turn. Compare OCGA §
40-6-120 (a) (2) (effective until 2010).
11
Additionally, this clear direction is consistent with OCGA § 40-
6-120 (2) (C) when read in context....
...629, 631 (331 SE2d 551) (1985) (“While [the statute at issue]
standing alone does not meet the constitutional certainty
requirements, we find the statute furnishes sufficient criteria when
read in conjunction with” another statute in the same title.). OCGA
§
40-6-120 (2) (C), which immediately follows OCGA §
40-6-120 (2)
(B), requires a driver making a left turn at an intersection with
multiple left turn lanes to
exit the intersection in the same relative travel lane as
the vehicle entered the intersection....
...extreme left-hand lane. Where there are multiple lanes of
travel in the same direction safe for travel, a vehicle shall
not be permitted to make a lane change once the
intersection has been entered.
12
OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (C). Both OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) and (C)
require a driver making a left turn to start and end that turn in the
left lane.
Finally, tools of statutory interpretation that we commonly use
further support our conclusion....
...And the change is material because the portion of the
statute at issue here no longer has the multiple, contradictory
meanings to which McNair pointed: only the single, clear meaning
that we identified above.
In summary, the language of OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) provided
clear notice to Newsom that he was required to complete his turn in
the left lane of Georgia Highway 61 southbound. See OCGA § 40-6-
120 (2) (B). That clear notice is consistent with other portions of the
statute when read in context, see OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (C), and
confirmed by ordinary tools of statutory interpretation. See McIver,
314 Ga. at 120. Accordingly, OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) as applied to
Newsom is not void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nonetheless, the trial court determined that OCGA §
40-6-120
(2) (B) is unconstitutionally vague when read in conjunction with
OCGA §
40-6-40 (c), reasoning that the statutes provide conflicting
directions to a driver. Pretermitting whether the conflict the trial
14
court believed existed between OCGA §§
40-6-120 (2) (B) and 40-6-
40 (c) could render OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) unconstitutionally
vague, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that
there was a conflict....
...wo-way
movement of traffic.” However, each of Highway 61’s roadways
consists of two lanes that move traffic in the same direction. Because
OCGA §
40-6-40 (c) does not apply here, the trial court erred in
concluding that it could render OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B)
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Newsom.
Newsom further argues that OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) is
unconstitutionally vague when read in context with the definition of
“intersection” in Title 40....
...See OCGA §
40-1-1 (22) (B) (2019).
According to Newsom, the area where he turned has multiple
18
intersections, so it is not clear at which intersection OCGA § 40-6-
120 (2) (B) governed his conduct, or whether OCGA §
40-6-120 (2)
(B) controlled his actions in areas where crosswalks and stop lines
crossed each other.
The trial court did not rule on this argument below because it
concluded that OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) is unconstitutionally vague
when read in conjunction with OCGA §
40-6-40 (c)....
...ch this
matter originated was conducted by law enforcement without Probable Cause”
and used this probable-cause conclusion as a means to effectuate its vagueness
ruling. Specifically, the trial court concluded that, because in its estimation
OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) was unconstitutionally vague, the officer necessarily
lacked probable cause to stop Newsom pursuant to the statute:
STATE: I was also asking on the record if her ruling today would
suppress the probable cause for the s...
...But unlike the trial court’s suggestion, probable cause is not required. See
Rodriguez v. United States,
575 U.S. 348, 365-366 (135 SCt 1609, 191 LE2d
492) (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Moreover, citing Heien,
574 U.S. at 60, the State argues that even if
OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B) is unconstitutionally vague, the trooper made a
reasonable mistake of law in believing that Newsom violated the statute.
Based on our holding reversing the trial court’s ruling against the State and
because the State may have waived this argument by failing to raise it below,
we do not reach this issue.
20
Decided August 13, 2024.
OCGA §
40-6-120 (2) (B); constitutional question....
