Negligence per se.

- After the defendant was charged with crossing the centerline in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-40(a) at the time the defendant hit the plaintiff's automobile head-on, it was held that a violation of the Uniform Rules of the Road prima facie establishes negligence per se in the absence of a valid defense, and the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the violation was unintentional and in the exercise of ordinary care. Cox v. Cantrell, 181 Ga. App. 722, 353 S.E.2d 582 (1987).

Sufficient evidence supported conviction.

- Sufficient evidence supported a defendant's conviction of driving on the wrong side of the road in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-40; while the defendant claimed that, when the collision occurred, the defendant was swerving to avoid another car, an eyewitness disputed this claim, testifying that no other vehicle caused the defendant to swerve, and the jury, as arbiter of fact, was entitled to believe the eyewitness. Dotson v. State, 276 Ga. App. 418, 623 S.E.2d 252 (2005).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for driving on the wrong side of the roadway because the defendant, who was traveling southbound on a highway, veered off the west shoulder, then veered back onto the roadway and traveled across the southbound and northbound lanes, left the roadway on the east shoulder, rotated clockwise, and struck a tree, resulting in a fatality and other serious injuries. Crowe v. State, 314 Ga. App. 527, 724 S.E.2d 831 (2012).

Offense justified stop.

- Investigating officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle based on a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-40 for driving on the wrong side of the road; hence, the defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied on this ground. Dunbar v. State, 283 Ga. App. 872, 643 S.E.2d 292 (2007).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress because the officer was authorized to perform a traffic stop since the officer saw the defendant cross the solid double yellow line and then drive on the wrong side of the road; because driving on the wrong side of the road was itself a traffic offense, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-40, the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic offense had occurred. Parker v. State, 317 Ga. App. 93, 730 S.E.2d 717 (2012).

Trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to suppress because the undisputed facts showed that the officer observed the defendant veer into and drive on the wrong side of the road and because driving on the wrong side was a traffic offense under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-40, the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic offense had occurred. State v. Zeth, 320 Ga. App. 140, 739 S.E.2d 443 (2013).

Obstructions.

- Object need not be stationary in order to be an obstruction. Smith v. Lott, 246 Ga. 366, 271 S.E.2d 463 (1980).

Motor vehicle may be an obstruction when the vehicle is operated on a public road in a manner which could not be generally or reasonably anticipated, taking into account all of the circumstances and conditions present at the time and place, and thereby hinders or impedes the proper travel on the road. Except in clear and palpable cases, the issue of when a vehicle is so operated is one for the jury. Smith v. Lott, 246 Ga. 366, 271 S.E.2d 463 (1980).

Combine driven at eight to 18 miles per hour, the width of which was such that the combine's left hand portion protruded across the center line of the highway, could not be said as a matter of law not to amount to an obstruction. Smith v. Lott, 246 Ga. 366, 271 S.E.2d 463 (1980).

When read together, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-46(c) and paragraph (a)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-40 provide that there is no violation of the no-passing zone statute when an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left of the center of the highway, provided that any person so doing must yield the right of way to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portion of the highway within such distance as to constitute an immediate hazard. Smith v. State, 237 Ga. App. 77, 514 S.E.2d 710 (1999).

Whether the trash truck that the defendant passed in a no-passing zone posed an obstruction allowing the defendant to cross the double yellow centerline in order to pass the vehicle was a question for the trier of fact to resolve; there was evidence to support the defendant's conviction under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-46. Parker v. State, 276 Ga. App. 9, 622 S.E.2d 403 (Oct. 18, 2005).

Because the defendant committed a traffic violation by crossing a solid yellow line in the roadway, and was not legitimately faced with an obstruction, despite claiming that it was undoubtedly convenient to pass the slow moving van driving ahead, a police officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle. Przyjemski v. State, 290 Ga. App. 22, 658 S.E.2d 807 (2008).

Jury question as to obstruction.

- Slow-moving farm vehicle could constitute a roadway obstruction, and whether the vehicle does so is a jury question. The trial court's charge was authorized when the instruction was that a vehicle driver can cross over the centerline to avoid an obstruction, providing any person so doing shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portion of the highway within such distance as to constitute an immediate hazard. This does not amount to authority to violate the law as to "passing zones." Foskey v. Williams Bros. Trucking Co., 197 Ga. App. 715, 399 S.E.2d 484 (1990).

Driving on right not absolute.

- Statutory requirements to drive on right side of roadway, on their face, are not absolute and do not prohibit driving on the left at all places and in all circumstances. Davis v. Metzger, 119 Ga. App. 750, 168 S.E.2d 866 (1969).

Failure to drive on correct side of road established.

- Juvenile's adjudication as a delinquent after being charged with delinquency for reckless driving for passing in a no-passing zone, serious injury by motor vehicle, and feticide was upheld on appeal as the testimony and evidence clearly established that although the juvenile may have begun to pass in a passing zone, the juvenile failed to consider how far the passing zone continued and the juvenile continued to pass at a high rate of speed well into the no-passing zone knowing the approach of the crest of a hill and a curve was coming, yet the juvenile never once sought to slow down and return to the right lane behind the vehicle the juvenile was attempting to pass. In the Interest of A.H., 291 Ga. App. 861, 663 S.E.2d 270 (2008).

Evidence of reckless driving supported vehicular homicide conviction.

- Evidence that the defendant drove after the defendant admittedly consumed methadone, Xanax (alprazolam), and Percocet and that the defendant crossed over the center line of the road in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-40(a) and collided with another vehicle, killing the driver, was sufficient to show the defendant drove while impaired and drove recklessly under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-390(a), supporting the defendant's vehicular homicide conviction under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-393(a). Wright v. State, 304 Ga. App. 651, 697 S.E.2d 296 (2010).

Necessity or justification defense not applicable.

- Defendant's apparent claim that the defendant was justified in violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-40(a), the statute regarding driving on the wrong side of the roadway, due to the configuration of the ice cream truck the defendant was driving had to be rejected as the statute did not recognize an exception for necessity or justification. Momodu v. State, (May 21, 2003).

Violation of Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556) is a misdemeanor. Gordy v. State, 93 Ga. App. 743, 92 S.E.2d 737 (1956).

State must prove that road public.

- When the accused was charged with the offense of involuntary manslaughter while in the commission of unlawful acts, in that the accused operated an automobile upon a certain public road at a speed in excess of 60 miles per hour and to the left of the center of the road, it was necessary for the state to prove that the road was, in fact, a public road in order to prove that part of the indictment alleging unlawful acts. Bond v. State, 104 Ga. App. 627, 122 S.E.2d 310 (1961).

Jury instruction held proper.

- Because a challenged jury instruction on the law of obstruction was given directly from O.C.G.A. § 40-6-40(a)(2) and was quoted from an earlier Supreme Court of Georgia opinion, such was a correct statement of the law and was properly adjusted to the circumstances of the case. Decatur's Best Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Smith, 282 Ga. App. 731, 639 S.E.2d 482 (2006).

Cited in Berrian v. State, 139 Ga. App. 571, 228 S.E.2d 737 (1976); Lott v. Smith, 153 Ga. App. 365, 265 S.E.2d 291 (1980); Reed v. Dixon, 153 Ga. App. 604, 266 S.E.2d 286 (1980); Lott v. Smith, 156 Ga. App. 826, 275 S.E.2d 720 (1980); Moore v. State, 160 Ga. App. 870, 288 S.E.2d 585 (1982); Malpass v. State, 173 Ga. App. 690, 327 S.E.2d 753 (1985); Mortimer v. State, 177 Ga. App. 679, 340 S.E.2d 649 (1986); Laymac v. State, 181 Ga. App. 737, 353 S.E.2d 559 (1987); Hendrix v. State, 186 Ga. App. 665, 368 S.E.2d 181 (1988); Arnold v. Arnold, 197 Ga. App. 103, 397 S.E.2d 724 (1990); State v. Tate, 208 Ga. App. 117, 430 S.E.2d 9 (1993); Caffey v. State, 210 Ga. App. 395, 436 S.E.2d 102 (1993); Plemmons v. State, 326 Ga. App. 765, 755 S.E.2d 205 (2014); Dickson v. State, 339 Ga. App. 500, 793 S.E.2d 663 (2016).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 247 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 652, 715, 744, 745.

ALR.

- Right or duty to turn in violation of law of road to avoid traveler, or obstacle, 63 A.L.R. 277; 113 A.L.R. 1328.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur doctrine where motor vehicle leaves road, 79 A.L.R.2d 6.