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(Code 1981, §40-6-14, enacted by Ga. L. 1991, p. 417, § 1.)
- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, the paragraph (1) designation of subsection (a) was deleted, and related stylistic changes made.
- For note on the 1991 enactment of this Code section, see 8 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 143 (1992).
- O.C.G.A. § 40-6-14 is not unconstitutionally vague because the plain language of subsection (a) provides clear notice of what conduct is prohibited. Davis v. State, 272 Ga. 818, 537 S.E.2d 327 (2000).
Plaintiff had no standing to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-14 as a violation of the due process clause claiming it is void for vagueness and is unenforceable due to the Department of Public Safety's failure to promulgate rules defining "plainly audible" or to establish standards regarding measurement of sound by law enforcement personnel as mandated by O.C.G.A. § 40-6-14(d). Patterson v. State, 242 Ga. App. 131, 528 S.E.2d 884 (2000).
- Trial court properly denied suppression of drug evidence obtained from a search of the defendant's person after a police officer conducted an investigatory stop of the defendant's vehicle and noted a strong odor of marijuana as the officer stopped the vehicle based on a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-14(a) by the loud music emanating from the defendant's vehicle while parked in a convenience store parking lot pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-3(a)(2). Jackson v. State, 297 Ga. App. 615, 677 S.E.2d 782 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1461, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 409 (Ga. 2009).
In a case in which the defendant appealed a conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the defendant unsuccessfully argued that the district court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from the defendant's automobile after being stopped by a police officer for violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-14(a). The officer testified at the suppression hearing that the officer heard a loud thumping sound coming from the radio in defendant's automobile when the officer was located one block away from the defendant and that the officer heard the automobile before seeing it; a reasonable officer in the officer's position could have believed that the music was audible more than one-hundred feet away on the basis of those observations, and any mistake of fact by the officer in evaluating the distance from defendant's car was a reasonable one, and the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment by stopping defendant for violation of the noise statute. United States v. Smalls, F.3d (11th Cir. Jan. 19, 2012)(Unpublished).
Cited in State v. Bute, 250 Ga. App. 479, 552 S.E.2d 465 (2001).
For an update of crimes and offenses for which the Georgia Crime Information Center is authorized to collect and file identifying data, see 1991 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 91-35.
Total Results: 2
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2011-09-12
Citation: 715 S.E.2d 148, 289 Ga. 726, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 2844, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 653
Snippet: Looking to the State's vehicle-noise statute, OCGA § 40-6-14(a), for guidance, the County reduced the 300-foot
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2000-10-02
Citation: 537 S.E.2d 327, 272 Ga. 818, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 3802, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 683
Snippet: accusation harmed him. McCrary, supra. 2. OCGA § 40-6-14(a) prohibits amplified sound from a vehicle that