O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-14 (2019)

Sound volume limitations from within the motor vehicle

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) It is unlawful for any person operating or occupying a motor vehicle on a street or highway to operate or amplify the sound produced by a radio, tape player, or other mechanical sound-making device or instrument from within the motor vehicle so that the sound is plainly audible at a distance of 100 feet or more from the motor vehicle. (b) The provisions of this Code section shall not apply to any law enforcement motor vehicle equipped with any communication device necessary in the performance of law enforcement duties or to any emergency vehicle equipped with any communication device necessary in the performance of any emergency procedures. (c) The provisions of this Code section do not apply to motor vehicles used for business or political purposes, which in the normal course of conducting such business use sound-making devices. The provisions of this subsection shall not be deemed to prevent local authorities, with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power, from regulating the time and manner in which such business may be operated. (d) The provisions of this Code section do not apply to the noise made by a horn or other warning device required or permitted by Code Section 40-8-70. The Department of Public Safety shall promulgate rules defining ‘‘plainly audible’’ and establish standards regarding the measurement of sound by law enforcement personnel. (e) A violation of this Code section shall be a misdemeanor.

History

(Code 1981, § 40-6-14, enacted by Ga. L. 1991, p. 417, § 1.)

Annotations

Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, the paragraph (1) designation of subsection (a) was deleted, and related stylistic changes made.

Law reviews. - For note on the 1991 enactment of this Code section, see 8 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 143 (1992).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Constitutionality. - O.C.G.A. § 40-6-14 is not unconstitutionally vague because the plain language of subsection (a) provides clear notice of what conduct is prohibited. Davis v. State, 272 Ga. 818, 537 S.E.2d 327 (2000). Plaintiff had no standing to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-14 as a violation of the due process clause claiming it is void for vagueness and is unenforceable due to the Department of Public Safety’s failure to promulgate rules defining ‘‘plainly audible’’ or to establish standards regarding measurement of sound by law enforcement personnel as mandated by O.C.G.A. § 40-6-14(d). Patterson v. State, 242 Ga. App. 131, 528 S.E.2d 884 (2000). Investigatory stop after officer hears loud music. - Trial court properly denied suppression of drug evidence obtained from a search of the defendant’s person after a police officer conducted an investigatory stop of the defendant’s vehicle and noted a strong odor of marijuana as the officer stopped the vehicle based on a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-14(a) by the loud music emanating from the defendant’s vehicle while parked in a convenience store parking lot pursuant to

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-3(a)(2). Jackson v. State, 297 Ga. App. 615, 677 S.E.2d 782 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1461, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 409 (Ga. 2009). In a case in which the defendant appealed a conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the defendant unsuccessfully argued that the district court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the defendant’s automobile after being stopped by a police officer for violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-14(a). The officer testified at the suppression hearing that the officer heard a loud thumping sound coming from the radio in defendant’s automobile when the officer was located one block away from the defendant and that the officer heard the automobile before seeing it; a reasonable officer in the officer’s position could have believed that the music was audible more than one-hundred feet away on the basis of those observations, and any mistake of fact by the officer in evaluating the distance from defendant’s car was a reasonable one, and the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment by stopping defendant for violation of the noise statute. United States v. Smalls, No. 11-12621, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1203 (11th Cir. Jan. 19, 2012) (Unpublished). Cited in State v. Bute, 250 Ga. App. 479, 552 S.E.2d 465 (2001).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL For an update of crimes and offenses for which the Georgia Crime Information Center is authorized to collect and

file identifying data, see 1991 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 91-35.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1994–2025 · leading case: Thornton v. State, 310 Ga. 460 (Ga. 2020).
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Thornton v. State, 310 Ga. 460 (Ga. 2020). · cites it 14× “In particular, Thornton argued that a game warden has no authority to enforce the Uniform Rules of the Road2 — including OCGA § 40-6-14,3 which limits the volume of sound that can be emitted from a stereo in a motor vehicle — in the parking lot of a gas station.”
Davis v. State, 537 S.E.2d 327 (Ga. 2000). · cites it 10× “OCGA § 40-6-14 (a) prohibits amplified sound from a vehicle that is “plainly audible” at a distance of 100 feet.”
State v. Bute, 552 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 6× “02 percent or more, while under the age of twenty-one; (3) possession of marijuana; (4) interference with control of a vehicle by driving with more than three passengers in the front seat, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-242 (a); and (5) violation of the sound volume limitation…”
Jackson v. State, 677 S.E.2d 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 10× “Jackson was charged with possession of hydrocodone, criminal use of an article with an altered identification mark, possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, and violating OCGA § 40-6-14 (a), which makes it a misdemeanor for anyone ‘‘operating or occupying a motor vehicle…”
Grady v. Unified Gov't of Athens-clarke, 715 S.E.2d 148 (Ga. 2011). · cites it 2× “The County also noted a “marked increase” in concern by neighborhood associations and individual residents on “quality of life issues.”
Patterson v. State, 528 S.E.2d 884 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 6× “Patterson sought a declaration that OCGA § 40-6-14 1 was unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process Clause because it was void for vagueness and was unenforceable due to the Department of Public Safety’s failure to promulgate rules defining “plainly audible” or to…”
Brown v. State, 690 S.E.2d 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “08 grams); 1 possessing marijuana, OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) (1); and violating the sound volume limits for devices within motor vehicles, OCGA § 40-6-14 (a). He appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and contending that the…”
The State v. Shelton, 765 S.E.2d 732 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “, was convicted ofpossession of cocaine (OCGA § 16-13-30 (a)), two counts of obstructing an officer (OCGA § 16-10-24 (a)), and a sound violation (OCGA § 40-6-14 (a)). The trial court granted Shelton’s motion for new trial, finding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing…”
Biffle v. State, 448 S.E.2d 749 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 2× “The initial stop of appellant’s car was authorized since the officer observed the car being operated in violation of OCGA § 40-6-14. Freeman v. State, 195 Ga.”
Christopher M. Thornton v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 4× “6 See OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2) (“The provisions of this chapter shall apply to a vehicle operated at shopping centers or parking lots or similar areas which although privately owned are customarily used by the public as through streets or connector streets”); OCGA § 40-6-14 (a)…”
Corrie D. Norman v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 4× “Norman, who is charged with multiple offenses including playing music too loud from a car, OCGA § 40-6-14 (a), seeks interlocutory review of the trial court’s order denying his amended motion to suppress.”
Lewis v. Medford (N.D. Ga. 2025). · cites it 2× “(Pl.’s Resp. Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ.”
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