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Call Now: 904-383-7448(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 22; Code 1933, § 68A-103, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 1000, § 11; Ga. L. 1985, p. 758, § 15; Ga. L. 1986, p. 834, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1000, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2294, § 2.)
- Off-road vehicles, T. 40, C. 7.
- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, "and" was inserted at the end of division (a)(6)(A)(i).
- For note on the 1991 amendment of this Code section, see 8 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 152 (1992).
Exact location of operating motor vehicle under influence of an intoxicant is not a material element of this offense and the accusation is sufficiently certain if the accusation charges that the offense was committed in a particular county. Felchlin v. State, 159 Ga. App. 120, 282 S.E.2d 743 (1981); Russell v. State, 174 Ga. App. 436, 330 S.E.2d 175 (1985).
Exact location is not a material element of the offense of reckless driving and a fatal variance did not exist as to the charge even though the state failed to prove that the defendant drove recklessly in a certain block of road as alleged in the indictment. Chavous v. State, 205 Ga. App. 455, 422 S.E.2d 327 (1992).
- Uniform Act Regulating Traffic or Highways applies to streets and highways within corporate limits of municipalities as well as without. Richards & Assocs. v. Studstill, 92 Ga. App. 853, 90 S.E.2d 56 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 212 Ga. 375, 93 S.E.2d 3 (1956).
It is criminal offense to operate a motor vehicle under influence of intoxicants anywhere in state, and the place is, therefore, no longer a material element of the offense. Flanders v. State, 97 Ga. App. 779, 104 S.E.2d 538 (1958); Walker v. State, 201 Ga. App. 672, 411 S.E.2d 734, cert. denied, 201 Ga. App. 904, 411 S.E.2d 734 (1991).
Because: (1) O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a), by the statute's plain language, applied to any moving vehicle, and a golf cart was a "vehicle" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(75); (2) the defendant stipulated at trial to driving the golf cart in Fayette County, making such a "moving vehicle" within the scope of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a), and to being under the influence of alcohol while doing so; and (3) under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-3(a)(3), the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 applied anywhere in Georgia, whether on a street, highway, or private property, the defendant's DUI conviction was upheld on appeal. Simmons v. State, 281 Ga. App. 252, 635 S.E.2d 849 (2006).
In convictions of driving while under the influence, a jury charge did not create ambiguity and confusion, requiring reversal, by using the word "anywhere" rather than the word "elsewhere" because under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-3(a)(3), the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 applied anywhere in Georgia. Duprel v. State, 301 Ga. App. 469, 687 S.E.2d 863 (2009), overruled on other grounds by Zilke v. State, 299 Ga. 232, 787 S.E.2d 745 (2016).
- To prove that a "highway" is a "public highway," there must be proof that it was established in one of the ways enumerated in the case of Southern Ry. v. Combs, 124 Ga. 1004, 53 S.E. 508 (1906). Baker v. State, 92 Ga. App. 60, 87 S.E.2d 644 (1955).
- Trial court properly denied suppression of drug evidence obtained from a search of the defendant's person after a police officer conducted an investigatory stop of the defendant's vehicle and noted a strong odor of marijuana as the officer stopped the vehicle based on a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-14(a) by the loud music emanating from the defendant's vehicle while parked in a convenience store parking lot pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-3(a)(2). Jackson v. State, 297 Ga. App. 615, 677 S.E.2d 782 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1461, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 409 (Ga. 2009).
Cited in Madden v. State, 252 Ga. App. 164, 555 S.E.2d 832 (2001); Patton v. State, 287 Ga. App. 18, 650 S.E.2d 733 (2007).
- Applicability of regulations or rules governing vehicular traffic to driveways or other places not legal highways, 80 A.L.R. 469.
Applicability, to operation of motor vehicle on private property, of legislation making drunken driving a criminal offense, 29 A.L.R.3d 938.
Motorist's liability for signaling other vehicle or pedestrian to proceed, or to pass signaling vehicle, 14 A.L.R.5th 193.
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