O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-3 (2019)

Chapter refers to operation of vehicles on highways; exceptions; vehicle accident reports and private property

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer to the operation of vehicles upon highways except: (1) Where a different place is specifically referred to in a given Code section; (2) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to a vehicle operated at shopping centers or parking lots or similar areas which although privately owned are customarily used by the public as through streets or connector streets; (3) The provisions of this chapter relating to reckless driving, driving in violation of Code Section 40-6-391, and homicide by vehicle shall apply to vehicles operated upon highways and elsewhere throughout the state; (4) The provisions of Code Sections 40-6-270, 40-6-271, and 40-6-272 shall apply upon the highways of this state, in all parking areas, and in all areas which are customarily open to the public and within 200 feet of all such highways, parking areas, and areas customarily open to the public; (5)(A) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to a vehicle operated on any private property of this state which fronts on coastal marshlands or estuarine area as defined in Code Section 12-5-282, provided the owner of the private property files with the local law enforcement agency having primary jurisdiction to enforce the uniform rules of the road in such area: (i) A petition requesting such local law enforcement agency to enforce the uniform rules of the road on such private property; and (ii) Simultaneously files a plat with the petition delineating the location of the roads, streets, and common areas on such private property.

(B) The local law enforcement agency having primary jurisdiction to enforce the uniform rules of the road in such area shall enforce the uniform rules of the road on said private property at no cost to the owner of the private property or enter into a contractual agreement with the owner of the private property whereby the owner of the private property consents to pay part or all of the law enforcement expenses to such law enforcement agency. (C) All persons operating vehicles on said roads, streets, and common areas shall be subject to all state and local traffic laws and regulations the same as if said private roads and streets were public roads and streets. (D) Any state or local law enforcement agency empowered to enforce the uniform rules of the road in such area shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the primary local law enforcement agency to enforce the rules of the road on said private property. (E) At least 30 days’ prior notice shall be given to users of said private roads, streets, and common areas by publication in the newspapers of general circulation in the area and by posting signs along the private roads and streets specifying that state and local law enforcement agencies will be enforcing the uniform rules of the road on said private roads, streets, and common areas; and (6)(A) Subject to the approval of the governing authority of the county or municipality, the provisions of this chapter shall apply to a vehicle operated within a privately owned residential area located within the corporate boundaries of a municipality or located within the boundaries of a county, provided the owner of the privately owned residential area files with the governing authority of such county or municipality: (i) A petition signed by 50 percent of the property owners located in said subdivision requesting the law enforcement agency of the county or municipality to enforce the uniform rules of the road within such privately owned residential area; and (ii) A plat delineating the location of roads, streets, and common areas within the privately owned residential area. (B) Upon approval by the governing authority of the county or municipality, the law enforcement agency of such county or municipality shall enforce the uniform rules of the road within said privately owned residential area. (C) All persons operating vehicles on the roads, streets, and common areas of said privately owned residential property shall be subject to all state and local traffic laws and regulations the same

as if such private roads, streets, and common areas were public roads and streets. (D) At least 30 days’ prior notice shall be given to users of said private roads, streets, and common areas by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the area and by posting signs along the private road, streets, and common areas specifying that the county law enforcement agency or municipal law enforcement agency will be enforcing the uniform rules of the roads on said private roads, streets, and common areas. (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this Code section, any law enforcement officer shall be authorized to write an accident report regarding any motor vehicle accident occurring on private property.

History

(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 22; Code 1933, § 68A-103, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 1000, § 11; Ga. L. 1985, p. 758, § 15; Ga. L. 1986, p. 834, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1000, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2294, § 2.)

Annotations

Cross references. - Off-road vehicles, T. 40, C. 7. Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, ‘‘and’’ was inserted at the end of division (a)(6)(A)(i).

Law reviews. - For note on the 1991 amendment of this Code section, see 8 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 152 (1992).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Exact location of operating motor vehicle under influence of an intoxicant is not a material element of this offense and the accusation is sufficiently certain if the accusation charges that the offense was committed in a particular county. Felchlin v. State, 159 Ga. App. 120, 282 S.E.2d 743 (1981); Russell v. State, 174 Ga. App. 436, 330 S.E.2d 175 (1985). Exact location is not a material element of the offense of reckless driving and a fatal variance did not exist as to the charge even though the state failed to prove that the defendant drove recklessly in a certain block of road as alleged in the indictment. Chavous v. State, 205 Ga. App. 455, 422 S.E.2d 327 (1992). Applicability of chapter. - Uniform Act Regulating Traffic or Highways applies to streets and highways within corporate limits of municipalities as well as without. Richards & Assocs. v. Studstill, 92 Ga. App. 853, 90 S.E.2d 56 (1955), rev’d on other grounds, 212 Ga. 375, 93 S.E.2d 3 (1956). It is criminal offense to operate a motor

vehicle under influence of intoxicants anywhere in state, and the place is, therefore, no longer a material element of the offense. Flanders v. State, 97 Ga. App. 779, 104 S.E.2d 538 (1958); Walker v. State, 201 Ga. App. 672, 411 S.E.2d 734, cert. denied, 201 Ga. App. 904, 411 S.E.2d 734 (1991). Because: (1) O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a), by the statute’s plain language, applied to any moving vehicle, and a golf cart was a ‘‘vehicle’’ within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(75); (2) the defendant stipulated at trial to driving the golf cart in Fayette County, making such a ‘‘moving vehicle’’ within the scope of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a), and to being under the influence of alcohol while doing so; and (3) under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-3(a)(3), the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 applied anywhere in Georgia, whether on a street, highway, or private property, the defendant’s DUI conviction was upheld on appeal. Simmons v. State, 281 Ga. App. 252, 635 S.E.2d 849 (2006). In convictions of driving while under

the influence, a jury charge did not create ambiguity and confusion, requiring reversal, by using the word ‘‘anywhere’’ rather than the word ‘‘elsewhere’’ because under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-3(a)(3), the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 applied anywhere in Georgia. Duprel v. State, 301 Ga. App. 469, 687 S.E.2d 863 (2009), overruled on other grounds by Zilke v. State, 299 Ga. 232, 787 S.E.2d 745 (2016). ‘‘Highway’’ as a ‘‘public highway.’’ - To prove that a ‘‘highway’’ is a ‘‘public highway,’’ there must be proof that it was established in one of the ways enumerated in the case of Southern Ry. v. Combs, 124 Ga. 1004, 53 S.E. 508 (1906). Baker v. State, 92 Ga. App. 60, 87 S.E.2d 644 (1955). Parking lot. - Trial court properly

denied suppression of drug evidence obtained from a search of the defendant’s person after a police officer conducted an investigatory stop of the defendant’s vehicle and noted a strong odor of marijuana as the officer stopped the vehicle based on a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-14(a) by the loud music emanating from the defendant’s vehicle while parked in a convenience store parking lot pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-3(a)(2). Jackson v. State, 297 Ga. App. 615, 677 S.E.2d 782 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1461, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 409 (Ga. 2009). Cited in Madden v. State, 252 Ga. App. 164, 555 S.E.2d 832 (2001); Patton v. State, 287 Ga. App. 18, 650 S.E.2d 733 (2007).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Applicability of regulations or rules governing vehicular traffic to driveways or other places not legal highways, 80 A.L.R. 469. Applicability, to operation of motor vehicle on private property, of legislation

making drunken driving a criminal offense, 29 A.L.R.3d 938. Motorist’s liability for signaling other vehicle or pedestrian to proceed, or to pass signaling vehicle, 14 A.L.R.5th 193.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 17 cases, 1984–2020 · leading case: Thornton v. State, 310 Ga. 460 (Ga. 2020).
Thornton v. State, 310 Ga. 460 (Ga. 2020). · cites it 34× “at 254-255 (1), and it cited OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2) for the proposition that the Rules of the Road apply in parking lots, see 353 Ga.”
Duprel v. State, 687 S.E.2d 863 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “(b) Duprel argues that the trial court created ambiguity and confusion requiring the reversal of his conviction when it interchanged the word “anywhere” with the word “elsewhere” as utilized *474 in OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (3). The statute provides that “[t]he provisions of this…”
Chavous v. State, 422 S.E.2d 327 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 6× “” OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (3). In Russell v. State, 174 Ga.”
Patton v. State, 650 S.E.2d 733 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 4× “OCGA§ 40-6-3 (a) (2) provides that “[t]he provisions of [Chapter 6 — Uniform Rules of the Road] shall apply to a vehicle operated at shopping centers or parking lots or similar areas which although privately owned are customarily used by the public as through streets or…”
Canino v. State, 725 S.E.2d 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 2× “10 See OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2) (providing that the Uniform Rules of the Road “shall apply to a vehicle operated at shopping centers or parking lots or similar areas which although privately owned, are customarily used by the public as through streets or connector streets.”
Spaulding v. State, 394 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 4× “There was scanty evidence, however, that the operation of the van was upon the place alleged in the Uniform Traffic Citation, i.”
Daugherty v. State, 356 S.E.2d 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 2× “First, there is evidence of defendant’s physical control of a moving vehicle in his statement to the arresting officer that he had been testing the motorcycle up and down the street. Secondly, the testimony of the arresting officer that he saw defendant drive the motor *731…”
Jackson v. State, 677 S.E.2d 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2) states that “[t]he provisions of this chapter shall apply to a vehicle operated at shopping centers or parking lots or similar areas which although privately owned are customarily used by the public as through streets or connector streets.”
Madden v. State, 555 S.E.2d 832 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “Initially, we note that Madden bases his argument on OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2), which provides that [t]he provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer to the operation of vehicles upon highways except [that] [t]he provisions of this chapter shall apply to a…”
Russell v. State, 330 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 2× “” An intoximeter test revealed appellant’s blood alcohol content to be .18 percent. Appellant testified on cross-examination that he had consumed three or four drinks of vodka mixed with orange juice over a four to five-hour period.”
Miller v. State, 471 S.E.2d 565 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2). See, as analogous, Daugherty v.”
Jones v. State, 426 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 40-1-1 (33). Moreover, the scope of the OCGA § 40-6-391 is not limited to highways, as defined in OCGA § 40-1-1 (19), but applies elsewhere throughout the state.”
— 40-6-3(a)(2) — 1 case
Patton v. State, 650 S.E.2d 733 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). “OCGA§ 40-6-3 (a) (2) provides that “[t]he provisions of [Chapter 6 — Uniform Rules of the Road] shall apply to a vehicle operated at shopping centers or parking lots or similar areas which although privately owned are customarily used by the public as through streets or…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.