O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-22 (2019)

Pedestrian-control signals

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Whenever special pedestrian-control signals exhibiting the words WALK or DON’T WALK or symbols so directing a pedestrian are in place, such signals shall indicate as follows: (1) Word or symbol message WALK. Pedestrians facing such signal may proceed across the roadway in the direction of the signal. Every driver of a vehicle shall stop and remain stopped for such pedestrians; and (2) Flashing or steady DON’T WALK. No pedestrian shall start to cross the roadway in the direction of such signal, but any pedestrian who has partially completed his crossing on the WALK signal shall proceed to sidewalk or safety island while the DON’T WALK signal is showing.

History

(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 36; Code 1933, § 68A-203, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5; Ga. L. 1995, p. 229, § 2; Ga. L. 2013, p. 141, § 40/HB 79.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS No judicial notice of familiarity with highway manual. - Interpretation of signs and signals as provided by the manual of the State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board) is not a matter of which the court can take judicial cognizance, nor one which the court can presume that every motorist is familiar with, to the extent of imposing penal sanctions for disobedience thereof. Maxwell v. State, 97 Ga. App. 334, 103 S.E.2d 162 (1958). Pedestrian’s duty to exercise ordi-

nary care. - O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-21 and 40-6-22 mandate that the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way to a pedestrian lawfully crossing an intersection; however, those statutes do not abrogate a pedestrian’s duties to exercise ordinary care for the pedestrian’s own safety and avoid the consequences of any negligence on the part of others. Gaffron v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 229 Ga. App. 426, 494 S.E.2d 54 (1997).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 231. ALR. - Liability for collision of auto-

mobile with pedestrian at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of stop-and-go signal, 2 A.L.R.3d 155.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 2 cases, 1997–2004 · leading case: Glass v. State, 598 S.E.2d 857 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
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Glass v. State, 598 S.E.2d 857 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 10× “We stated that the case was “governed by OCGA § 40-6-22,” and that this Code section “was specifically drafted by the legislature to deal with intersections which have pedestrian-control signals.”
Gaffron v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 494 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 4× “This case is governed by OCGA § 40-6-22. This statute was specifically drafted by the legislature to deal with intersections which have pedestrian-control signals.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.