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Call Now: 904-383-7448(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 35; Ga. L. 1973, p. 474, § 1; Code 1933, § 68A-202, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1975, p. 496, § 1; Ga. L. 1977, p. 278, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 40; Ga. L. 1990, p. 8, § 40; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5; Ga. L. 1995, p. 229, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 143, § 40; Ga. L. 2014, p. 851, § 6/HB 774.)
- Intent of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-21 is only to define the meaning to be given to traffic control signals and the statute could not be the basis for a charge of vehicular homicide or failure to yield the right of way. State v. Nix, 220 Ga. App. 651, 469 S.E.2d 497 (1996).
- When a case arose from an intersection collision between a car driven by the defendant and another car and since the defense's contentions at trial were that the defendant thought the light was green, that the defendant had no intention of running a red light or of causing the victim's death, and that if the defendant did run the red light, it was the result of legal mistake or accident, the trial court did not err by charging the jury on the intent required to commit the offenses charged; the state was required to prove the intent to do the act which resulted in the violation of the law and not the intent to commit the crime itself. Hoffer v. State, 192 Ga. App. 378, 384 S.E.2d 902, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 902, 384 S.E.2d 902 (1989).
- After the defendant was charged with disobeying a traffic control device, the court properly rejected an instruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2, that a person shall not be found guilty of any crime committed by misfortune or accident because the charge was a strict liability offense. Arnold v. State, 228 Ga. App. 470, 491 S.E.2d 819 (1997).
- Interpretation of signs and signals as provided by the manual of the State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board) is not a matter of which the court can take judicial cognizance, nor one which the court can presume that every motorist is familiar with to the extent of imposing penal sanctions for disobedience thereof. Maxwell v. State, 97 Ga. App. 334, 103 S.E.2d 162 (1958).
- Trial court erred in instructing the jury as to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-21 and omitting language providing that vehicles which enter an intersection by virtue of a "circular green" signal must nonetheless yield to vehicles lawfully within the intersection. Steele v. Blickstein, 170 Ga. App. 177, 316 S.E.2d 767 (1984).
- O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-21 and40-6-22 mandate that the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way to a pedestrian lawfully crossing an intersection, however, those statutes do not abrogate a pedestrian's duties to exercise ordinary care for the pedestrian's own safety and avoid the consequences of any negligence on the part of others. Gaffron v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 229 Ga. App. 426, 494 S.E.2d 54 (1997).
When the plaintiff represented that the plaintiff safely entered a crosswalk, although admitting that the last time plaintiff saw the defendant's vehicle was when the vehicle was slowing down, and that the plaintiff entered the crosswalk when faced solely with a green arrow, and when the defendant's testimony was that the plaintiff "jetted out" into the path of the defendant's vehicle as the defendant made a right turn on red, the jury's verdict in favor of the defendant was authorized by the evidence and the trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff's motion for new trial. Sampson v. Jones, 236 Ga. App. 57, 510 S.E.2d 902 (1999).
- When the case arose from an intersection collision between a car which defendant drove and another car, because the trial court correctly and repeatedly charged that the defendant could be convicted only if the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the stop light facing the defendant was red, any defense based upon the light being green when the defendant went through the light, was not an accident defense; logically, one cannot be convicted of running a red light if the light was, in fact, green; accordingly, defendant's contention that a malfunction of the light showing green lights in both directions did not give rise to the defense of accident. Hoffer v. State, 192 Ga. App. 378, 384 S.E.2d 902, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 902, 384 S.E.2d 902 (1989).
- Instruction on subparagraph (a)(1)(A) (meaning of traffic signals) of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-21, rather than O.C.G.A. § 40-6-71 (turning left), held proper. Corley v. Harris, 171 Ga. App. 688, 320 S.E.2d 833 (1984); Bailey v. Bartee, 205 Ga. App. 463, 422 S.E.2d 319 (1992).
Cited in Washington v. Washington, 181 Ga. App. 848, 354 S.E.2d 25 (1987); United States v. Benitez-Macedo, 129 Fed. Appx. 506 (11th Cir. 2005); State v. Shabazz, 291 Ga. App. 751, 662 S.E.2d 828 (2008); Brogdon v. State, 299 Ga. App. 547, 683 S.E.2d 99 (2009), aff'd, 287 Ga. 528, 697 S.E.2d 211 (2010).
- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 240.
- 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 838 et seq., 896.
- Liability for automobile accident, other than direct collision with pedestrian, as affected by reliance upon or disregard of stop-and-go signal, 2 A.L.R.3d 12.
Liability for collision of automobile with pedestrian at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of stop-and-go signal, 2 A.L.R.3d 155.
Liability for automobile accident at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of unchanging stop signal or sign, 3 A.L.R.3d 180.
Liability for automobile accident at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of unchanging caution, slow, danger, or like sign or signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 507.
Liability for collision of automobile with pedestrian at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of traffic sign or signal other than stop-and-go signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 557.
No results found for Georgia Code 40-6-21.