O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-21 (2019)

Meaning of traffic signals

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) The following meanings shall be given to highway traffic signal indications, except those on pedestrian signals: (1) Green indications shall have the following meanings: (A) Traffic, except pedestrians, facing a CIRCULAR GREEN signal may proceed straight through or turn right or left unless a sign at such place prohibits either such turn. Vehicular traffic turning shall yield the right of way to approaching vehicles. Vehicular traffic must stop and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian to cross the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian lawfully within the intersection or an adjacent crosswalk at the

time such signal is exhibited is upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling, or when the pedestrian is approaching and is within one lane of the half of the roadway on which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is turning. For the purposes of this subparagraph, ‘‘half of the roadway’’ means all traffic lanes carrying traffic in one direction of travel; (B) Traffic, except pedestrians, facing a GREEN ARROW signal, shown alone or in combination with another indication, may cautiously enter the intersection only to make the movement indicated by such arrow or such other movement as is permitted by other indications shown at the same time. Such vehicular traffic shall stop and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk to cross the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling, or when the pedestrian is approaching and is within one lane of the half of the roadway on which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is turning. For the purposes of this subparagraph, ‘‘half of the roadway’’ means all traffic lanes carrying traffic in one direction of travel. Vehicular traffic shall yield the right of way to other traffic lawfully using the intersection; and (C) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian signal, pedestrians facing any green indication, except when the sole green indication is a turn arrow, may proceed across the roadway within any marked or unmarked crosswalk; (2) Yellow indications shall have the following meanings: (A) Traffic, except pedestrians, facing a steady CIRCULAR YELLOW or YELLOW ARROW signal is thereby warned that the related green movement is being terminated or that a red indication will be exhibited immediately thereafter when vehicular traffic shall not enter the intersection; (B) Pedestrians facing a steady CIRCULAR YELLOW or YELLOW ARROW signal, unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian signal, are thereby advised that there is insufficient time to cross the roadway before a red indication is shown, and no pedestrian shall then start to cross the roadway; and (C) Traffic, except pedestrians, facing a flashing YELLOW ARROW signal may proceed in the direction of the arrow. Vehicular traffic turning shall yield the right of way to approaching vehicles. Vehicular traffic shall stop and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian to cross the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian is lawfully within the intersection or an adjacent crosswalk at the time such signal is exhibited, when the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling, or when the

pedestrian is approaching and is within one lane of the half of the roadway on which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is turning. For the purposes of this subparagraph, ‘‘half of the roadway’’ means all traffic lanes carrying traffic in one direction of travel; and (3) Red indications shall have the following meanings: (A) Traffic, except pedestrians, facing a steady CIRCULAR RED signal alone shall stop at a clearly marked stop line or, if there is no stop line, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if there is no crosswalk, before entering the intersection, and shall remain standing until an indication to proceed is shown, except as provided in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) of this paragraph; (B) Vehicular traffic facing a steady CIRCULAR RED signal may cautiously enter the intersection to make a right turn after stopping as provided in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph. Such vehicular traffic shall stop and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian to cross the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling, or when the pedestrian is approaching and is within one lane of the half of the roadway on which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is turning. For the purposes of this subparagraph, ‘‘half of the roadway’’ means all traffic lanes carrying traffic in one direction of travel. Vehicular traffic shall yield the right of way to other traffic lawfully using the intersection; (C) Traffic, except pedestrians, facing a steady CIRCULAR RED signal, after stopping as provided in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, may make a right turn but shall stop and remain stopped for pedestrians and yield the right of way to other traffic proceeding as directed by the signal at such intersection. Such vehicular traffic shall not make a right turn against a steady CIRCULAR RED signal at any intersection where a sign is erected prohibiting such right turn; (D) Traffic, except pedestrians, facing a steady CIRCULAR RED signal, after stopping as provided in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, may make a left turn from the left-hand lane of a one-way street onto a one-way street on which the traffic moves toward the driver’s left but shall stop and remain stopped for pedestrians and yield the right of way to other traffic proceeding as directed by the signal at such intersection. Such vehicular traffic shall not make a left turn against a steady CIRCULAR RED signal at any intersection where a sign is erected prohibiting such left turn;

(E) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian signal, pedestrians facing a steady CIRCULAR RED signal alone shall not enter the roadway; (F) Traffic, except pedestrians, facing a steady RED ARROW signal may not enter the intersection to make the movement indicated by such arrow and, unless entering the intersection to make such other movement as is permitted by other indications shown at the same time, shall stop at a clearly marked stop line or, if there is no stop line, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if there is no crosswalk, before entering the intersection, and shall remain standing until an indication to make the movement indicated by such arrow is shown; (G) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian signal, pedestrians facing a steady RED ARROW signal shall not enter the roadway; and (H) Traffic, except pedestrians, facing a flashing RED ARROW signal, after stopping as provided in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, may make a right turn but shall stop and remain stopped for pedestrians and yield the right of way to other traffic proceeding as directed by the signal at such intersection. (b) In the event an official traffic-control device signal is erected and maintained at a place other than an intersection, the provisions of this Code section shall be applicable except as to those provisions which by their nature can have no application. Any stop required shall be made at a sign or marking on the pavement indicating where the stop shall be made, but, in the absence of any such sign or marking, the stop shall be made at the signal.

History

(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 35; Ga. L. 1973, p. 474, § 1; Code 1933, § 68A-202, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1975, p. 496, § 1; Ga. L. 1977, p. 278, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 40; Ga. L. 1990, p. 8, § 40; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5; Ga. L. 1995, p. 229, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 143, § 40; Ga. L. 2014, p. 851, § 6/HB 774.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Offenses not chargeable under Code section. - Intent of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-21 is only to define the meaning to be given to traffic control signals and the statute could not be the basis for a charge of vehicular homicide or failure to yield the right of way. State v. Nix, 220 Ga. App. 651, 469 S.E.2d 497 (1996). Trial court did not err by charging that intent was required. - When a case arose from an intersection collision between a car driven by the defendant and

another car and since the defense’s contentions at trial were that the defendant thought the light was green, that the defendant had no intention of running a red light or of causing the victim’s death, and that if the defendant did run the red light, it was the result of legal mistake or accident, the trial court did not err by charging the jury on the intent required to commit the offenses charged; the state was required to prove the intent to do the act which resulted in the violation of the

law and not the intent to commit the crime itself. Hoffer v. State, 192 Ga. App. 378, 384 S.E.2d 902, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 902, 384 S.E.2d 902 (1989). Strict liability offense. - After the defendant was charged with disobeying a traffic control device, the court properly rejected an instruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2, that a person shall not be found guilty of any crime committed by misfortune or accident because the charge was a strict liability offense. Arnold v. State, 228 Ga. App. 470, 491 S.E.2d 819 (1997). No judicial notice of familiarity with highway manual. - Interpretation of signs and signals as provided by the manual of the State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board) is not a matter of which the court can take judicial cognizance, nor one which the court can presume that every motorist is familiar with to the extent of imposing penal sanctions for disobedience thereof. Maxwell v. State, 97 Ga. App. 334, 103 S.E.2d 162 (1958). Jury instruction as to procedure under green light. - Trial court erred in instructing the jury as to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-21 and omitting language providing that vehicles which enter an intersection by virtue of a ‘‘circular green’’ signal must nonetheless yield to vehicles lawfully within the intersection. Steele v. Blickstein, 170 Ga. App. 177, 316 S.E.2d 767 (1984). Pedestrian’s duty to exercise ordinary care. - O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-21 and 40-6-22 mandate that the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way to a pedestrian lawfully crossing an intersection, however, those statutes do not abrogate a pedestrian’s duties to exercise ordinary care for the pedestrian’s own safety and avoid the consequences of any negligence on the part of others. Gaffron v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 229 Ga. App. 426, 494 S.E.2d 54 (1997). When the plaintiff represented that the plaintiff safely entered a crosswalk, al-

though admitting that the last time plaintiff saw the defendant’s vehicle was when the vehicle was slowing down, and that the plaintiff entered the crosswalk when faced solely with a green arrow, and when the defendant’s testimony was that the plaintiff ‘‘jetted out’’ into the path of the defendant’s vehicle as the defendant made a right turn on red, the jury’s verdict in favor of the defendant was authorized by the evidence and the trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff ’s motion for new trial. Sampson v. Jones, 236 Ga. App. 57, 510 S.E.2d 902 (1999). Stoplight showing green lights in both directions. - When the case arose from an intersection collision between a car which defendant drove and another car, because the trial court correctly and repeatedly charged that the defendant could be convicted only if the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the stop light facing the defendant was red, any defense based upon the light being green when the defendant went through the light, was not an accident defense; logically, one cannot be convicted of running a red light if the light was, in fact, green; accordingly, defendant’s contention that a malfunction of the light showing green lights in both directions did not give rise to the defense of accident. Hoffer v. State, 192 Ga. App. 378, 384 S.E.2d 902, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 902, 384 S.E.2d 902 (1989). Jury instructions upheld. - Instruction on subparagraph (a)(1)(A) (meaning of traffic signals) of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-21, rather than O.C.G.A. § 40-6-71 (turning left), held proper. Corley v. Harris, 171 Ga. App. 688, 320 S.E.2d 833 (1984); Bailey v. Bartee, 205 Ga. App. 463, 422 S.E.2d 319 (1992). Cited in Washington v. Washington, 181 Ga. App. 848, 354 S.E.2d 25 (1987); United States v. Benitez-Macedo, 129 Fed. Appx. 506 (11th Cir. 2005); State v. Shabazz, 291 Ga. App. 751, 662 S.E.2d 828 (2008); Brogdon v. State, 299 Ga. App. 547, 683 S.E.2d 99 (2009).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 240.

C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 838 et seq., 896.

ALR. - Liability for automobile accident, other than direct collision with pedestrian, as affected by reliance upon or disregard of stop-and-go signal, 2 A.L.R.3d 12. Liability for collision of automobile with pedestrian at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of stop-and-go signal, 2 A.L.R.3d 155. Liability for automobile accident at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of unchanging stop signal or sign, 3 A.L.R.3d 180.

Liability for automobile accident at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of unchanging caution, slow, danger, or like sign or signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 507. Liability for collision of automobile with pedestrian at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of traffic sign or signal other than stop-and-go signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 557.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 22 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1984–2025 · leading case: State v. Nix, 469 S.E.2d 497 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
State v. Nix, 469 S.E.2d 497 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 32× “The first count of the Accusation charged Nix with vehicular homicide due to failure to yield the right of way as required by OCGA §§ 40-6-21 and 40-6-1. Count 2 charged *652 Nix with vehicular homicide due to failure to yield the right of way as required by OCGA §§ 40-6-71 and…”
Hoffer v. State, 384 S.E.2d 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 40-6-21 (a) (3) (A) requires motorists facing a red light to stop at the intersection until the light turns green.”
Gaffron v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 494 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 6× “This statute should be read in conjunction with OCGA § 40-6-21, which provides in pertinent part, as follows: “(a) The following meanings shall be given to highway traffic signal indications, except those on pedestrian signals: (1) Green indications shall have the following…”
Bailey v. Bartee, 422 S.E.2d 319 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 14× “688 (3) ( 320 SE2d 833 ), the trial court did not commit instructional error when it charged the jury on OCGA § 40-6-21, rather than on OCGA § 40-6-71.”
State v. Shabazz, 662 S.E.2d 828 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “2 See OCGA §§ 40-6-21 (meaning of traffic signal indications); 40-6-23 (meaning of flashing red and yellow signals); 40-6-24 (lane direction control signals).”
Brogdon v. State, 683 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 2× “22 OCGA § 40-6-21 (a) (3) defines the meaning of traffic signals and instructs that a driver facing a red light “shall stop at a clearly marked stop line or, if there is no stop line, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if there is no…”
United States v. Pedro Benitez-Macedo, 129 F. App'x 506 (11th Cir. 2005). · cites it 4× “The district court found that the officers has probable cause to stop the vehicle based on Benitez-Macedo’s violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-21 (a)(3)(A), which required Benitez-Maeedo to stop “at a clearly marked stop line.”
Lyons v. State, 431 S.E.2d 432 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 4× “) Held: OCGA § 40-6-20 (a) requires drivers of vehicles to obey the instructions of traffic-control devices, and OCGA § 40-6-21 (a) (3) requires drivers facing a steady circular red signal to stop.”
Lewis v. Uselton, 480 S.E.2d 856 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 2× “Lewis contends that the trial court erred in admitting Luke’s guilty plea and also maintains the traffic ticket incorrectly cited OCGA § 40-6-71 instead of OCGA § 40-6-21. See Corley v. Harris, 171 Ga.”
Corley v. Harris, 320 S.E.2d 833 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 2× “The appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on OCGA § 40-6-21 (a) (1) (A), rather than OCGA § 40-6-71.”
Steele v. Blickstein, 316 S.E.2d 767 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 12× “633, 691 and the statute in reference thereto now is found in OCGA § 40-6-21 (formerly Code Ann. § 68A-202 (Ga.”
Hefner v. Maiorana, 576 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 2× “8 OCGA §§ 40-6-21; 40-1-1; 40-6-71; 40-6-180.”
— 40-6-21(a)(3)(A) — 1 case
United States v. Pedro Benitez-Macedo, 129 F. App'x 506 (11th Cir. 2005). “The district court found that the officers has probable cause to stop the vehicle based on Benitez-Macedo’s violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-21 (a)(3)(A), which required Benitez-Maeedo to stop “at a clearly marked stop line.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.