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2018 Georgia Code 40-6-91 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 40-6-91 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 40-6-91

TITLE 40 MOTOR VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC

Section 6. Uniform Rules of the Road, 40-6-1 through 40-6-397.

ARTICLE 5 RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PEDESTRIANS

40-6-91. Right of way in crosswalks.

  1. The driver of a vehicle shall stop and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian to cross the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling, or when the pedestrian is approaching and is within one lane of the half of the roadway on which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is turning. For the purposes of this subsection, "half of the roadway" means all traffic lanes carrying traffic in one direction of travel.
  2. No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impractical for the driver to yield.
  3. Subsection (a) of this Code section shall not apply under the conditions stated in subsection (b) of Code Section 40-6-92.
  4. Whenever any vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk or at any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the driver of any other vehicle approaching from the rear shall not overtake and pass such stopped vehicle.

(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 78; Code 1933, § 68A-502, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5; Ga. L. 1995, p. 229, § 3.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Pedestrian in crosswalk is entitled to assume that approaching vehicle would yield right of way and not pass the other stopped vehicles. Greene v. Helms, 115 Ga. App. 447, 154 S.E.2d 892 (1967).

When the pedestrian plaintiff entered the roadway in the crosswalk and in accordance with the pedestrian-control signal, it was error to charge the jury on the "dart-out" provision of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-91. Gaffron v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 229 Ga. App. 426, 494 S.E.2d 54 (1997).

When the plaintiff represented that the plaintiff safely entered a crosswalk, although admitting that the last time the plaintiff saw the defendant's vehicle was when the vehicle was slowing down, and that plaintiff entered the crosswalk when faced solely with a green arrow, and when the defendant's testimony was that the plaintiff "jetted out" into the path of the defendant's vehicle as the defendant made a right turn on red, the jury's verdict in favor of the defendant was authorized by the evidence and the trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff's motion for new trial. Sampson v. Jones, 236 Ga. App. 57, 510 S.E.2d 902 (1999).

Pedestrian not in crosswalk.

- Grant of summary judgment to the driver and the insurer was affirmed because the evidence showed that the plaintiff was dressed in black clothing, was drunk, crossed a major roadway at night outside of an available crosswalk, and there was no evidence that the driver was speeding nor was violating any rules of the road, or even saw the pedestrian; therefore, the driver did not fail to exercise due diligence to avoid striking the pedestrian. Politzer v. Xiaoyan, 801 S.E.2d 114 (2017).

Instruction on accident.

- Appellate court erred in reversing the defendant's conviction for vehicular homicide based on the defendant's failure to stop for a pedestrian in a crosswalk because those charges were strict liability offenses to which the accident defense did not apply since it was undisputed the defendant voluntarily drove into the crosswalk and struck the child. State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6, 734 S.E.2d 50 (2012).

Cited in Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Federick, 187 Ga. App. 696, 371 S.E.2d 204 (1988); Weathers v. Foote & Davies Transp. Co., 189 Ga. App. 134, 375 S.E.2d 97 (1988).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 302.

C.J.S.

- 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 895.

ALR.

- Duty of pedestrian before crossing street to look for vehicles approaching on intersecting street, 9 A.L.R. 1248; 44 A.L.R. 1299.

Liability for injury to pedestrian colliding with side of automobile, 25 A.L.R. 1513.

Contributory negligence of pedestrian at street crossing as affected by statute or ordinance, 96 A.L.R. 786.

Liability for collision of automobile with pedestrian at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of traffic sign or signal other than stop-and-go signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 557.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 40-6-91

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State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 5, 2012 | 734 S.E.2d 50, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 3459

...Appellee Shirley Ogilvie struck and killed a seven-year-old boy with her car as she drove through a crosswalk while the child was *7crossing the street.1 Ogilvie was convicted of second degree vehicular homicide, see OCGA § 40-6-393 (c), based on her failure to stop for a pedestrian in a crosswalk, see OCGA § 40-6-91 (a)....
...614, 615 (347 SE2d 354) (1986) (holding that a charge on accident was required in a prosecution for obstructing a police officer based on the defendant’s testimony that she obstructed the officer when she fell due to illness). *10(c) In this case, Ogilvie was charged with violatingOCGA § 40-6-91 (a), which directs that [t]he driver of a vehicle shall stop and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian to cross the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling, or when...
...nstead of stopping for a pedestrian who was located in the statutorily protected area. At trial, Ogilvie did not dispute that she voluntarily drove into the crosswalk and struck the child there, so a charge on accident was not warranted for the OCGA § 40-6-91 (a) violation or for the OCGA § 40-6-393 (c) violation, for which the crosswalk offense served as the predicate offense.3 The Court of Appeals concluded that Ogilvie’s testimony that she could not avoid hitting the child because he ran across the street in front of her warranted an accident charge....
...intention.” OCGA § 16-2-2. As explained above, however, that was not the type of intent required to commit a strict liability traffic offense.4 *11(d) Ogilvie’s testimony did, however, warrant a jury charge on proximate cause for the crimes alleged against her. OCGA § 40-6-91 (b), which the trial court charged in this case, provides that “[n]o pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impractical for the driver to yi...
...at 654. In this case, Ogilvie’s testimony that she could not avoid hitting the child because he unexpectedly ran across the street in front of her, giving her only a second or two to stop, presented a proximate cause issue for thejury to decide. In the language of OCGA § 40-6-91 (b), her evidence raised the issue of whether the child “suddenly” ran from “a curb or other place of safety . . . into the path of [Ogilvie’s] vehicle which [was] so close that it [was] impractical for [her] to yield.” In the language of OCGA § 40-6-393 (c), the evidence raised the issue of whether Ogilvie’s alleged violation of OCGA § 40-6-91 was “the cause of [the child’s] death.” The trial court committed no error in this regard, however, giving the jury a full charge on proximate cause, in addition to charging the relevant language of those two statutes. (e) In sum, O...