O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-91 (2019)

Right of way in crosswalks

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section GA-LEGlegis.ga.gov (official) JustiaJustia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

(a) The driver of a vehicle shall stop and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian to cross the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling, or when the pedestrian is approaching and is within one lane of the half of the roadway on which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is turning. For the purposes of this subsection, ‘‘half of the roadway’’ means all traffic lanes carrying traffic in one direction of travel. (b) No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impractical for the driver to yield. (c) Subsection (a) of this Code section shall not apply under the conditions stated in subsection (b) of Code Section 40-6-92. (d) Whenever any vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk or at any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the driver of any other vehicle approaching from the rear shall not overtake and pass such stopped vehicle.

History

(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 78; Code 1933, § 68A-502, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5; Ga. L. 1995, p. 229, § 3.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Pedestrian in crosswalk is entitled to assume that approaching vehicle would yield right of way and not pass the other stopped vehicles. Greene v. Helms, 115 Ga. App. 447, 154 S.E.2d 892 (1967). When the pedestrian plaintiff entered the roadway in the crosswalk and in accordance with the

pedestrian-control signal, it was error to charge the jury on the ‘‘dart-out’’ provision of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-91. Gaffron v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 229 Ga. App. 426, 494 S.E.2d 54 (1997). When the plaintiff represented that the plaintiff safely entered a crosswalk, although admitting that the last time the

plaintiff saw the defendant’s vehicle was when the vehicle was slowing down, and that plaintiff entered the crosswalk when faced solely with a green arrow, and when the defendant’s testimony was that the plaintiff ‘‘jetted out’’ into the path of the defendant’s vehicle as the defendant made a right turn on red, the jury’s verdict in favor of the defendant was authorized by the evidence and the trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff ’s motion for new trial. Sampson v. Jones, 236 Ga. App. 57, 510 S.E.2d 902 (1999). Pedestrian not in crosswalk. - Grant of summary judgment to the driver and the insurer was affirmed because the evidence showed that the plaintiff was dressed in black clothing, was drunk, crossed a major roadway at night outside of an available crosswalk, and there was no evidence that the driver was speeding

nor was violating any rules of the road, or even saw the pedestrian; therefore, the driver did not fail to exercise due diligence to avoid striking the pedestrian. Politzer v. Xiaoyan, 801 S.E.2d 114 (2017). Instruction on accident. - Appellate court erred in reversing the defendant’s conviction for vehicular homicide based on the defendant’s failure to stop for a pedestrian in a crosswalk because those charges were strict liability offenses to which the accident defense did not apply since it was undisputed the defendant voluntarily drove into the crosswalk and struck the child. State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6, 734 S.E.2d 50 (2012). Cited in Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Federick, 187 Ga. App. 696, 371 S.E.2d 204 (1988); Weathers v. Foote & Davies Transp. Co., 189 Ga. App. 134, 375 S.E.2d 97 (1988).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 302. C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 895. ALR. - Duty of pedestrian before crossing street to look for vehicles approaching on intersecting street, 9 A.L.R. 1248; 44 A.L.R. 1299. Liability for injury to pedestrian colliding with side of automobile, 25 A.L.R. 1513.

Contributory negligence of pedestrian at street crossing as affected by statute or ordinance, 96 A.L.R. 786. Liability for collision of automobile with pedestrian at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of traffic sign or signal other than stop-and-go signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 557.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 11 cases, 1984–2017 · leading case: State v. Ogilvie, 734 S.E.2d 50 (Ga. 2012).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
State v. Ogilvie, 734 S.E.2d 50 (Ga. 2012). · cites it 12× “1 Ogilvie was convicted of second degree vehicular homicide, see OCGA § 40-6-393 (c), based on her failure to stop for a pedestrian in a crosswalk, see OCGA § 40-6-91 (a). The trial court had declined to give Ogilvie’s requested jury charge on the defense of accident.”
Torres Ex Rel. Torres v. Tandy Corp., 592 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 6× “Under OCGA § 40-6-91 (d): “Whenever any vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk or at any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the driver of any other vehicle approaching from the rear shall not overtake and pass such stopped…”
Glass v. State, 598 S.E.2d 857 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 12× “Following a bench trial in the City Court of Atlanta, David John Glass was convicted of the offense of failure to yield to a pedestrian (OCGA § 40-6-91 (a)). He was granted leave to file an out-of-time appeal, and he appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered…”
Smith v. Phillips, 323 S.E.2d 669 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 4× “Specifically, appellant questions the exclusion of his requested instruction which embodied OCGA § 40-6-91 (b), and the inclusion of a charge which stated that “the character of a motor vehicle and its capacity for doing injury imposes on the operator a greater amount of care…”
Ogilvie v. State, 721 S.E.2d 549 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 6× “Shirley Ogilvie appeals from her convictions of vehicular homicide in the second degree (OCGA § 40-6-393 (c)) and failing to stop for a pedestrian in a crosswalk (OCGA § 40-6-91 (a)). She contends that the accusation was fatally defective and that the trial court erred in its…”
Gaffron v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 494 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 6× “OCGA § 40-6-91 (b), commonly known as the “dart out” statute, states that “[n]o pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close *431 that it is impractical for the driver to yield.”
Politzer v. Xiaoyan Et Al., 801 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “4 OCGA § 40-6-91 (b) (“No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impractical for the driver to yield.”
Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Federick, 371 S.E.2d 204 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 2× “Next, MARTA contends the trial court erred in failing to give its written request to charge that “[n]o pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impractical for the driver to yield.”
Weathers v. Foote & Davies Transp. Co., 375 S.E.2d 97 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 2× “It was not error to give in charge the language of OCGA § 40-6-91 *136 (b) even though the vehicle was not 'moving when the pedestrians attempted to cross.”
Feinberg v. Durga, 377 S.E.2d 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 2× “The trial transcript shows that, contrary to appellant’s allegation, the court did charge the jury on contributory negligence and, moreover, in conjunction with this instruction, also charged OCGA §§ 40-6-91 (B) and 40-6-92, which deal with the duties of a pedestrian entering a…”
Sampson v. Jones, 510 S.E.2d 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 2× “Finally, plaintiff’s admission that the last time he saw defendant’s vehicle before it hit him was while it was slowing down to stop at the intersection could have been viewed by the jury as suggesting a lack of due care for his own safety and could have been viewed as…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.