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2018 Georgia Code 42-1-13 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 42-1-13 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 42-1-13

TITLE 42 PENAL INSTITUTIONS

Section 1. General Provisions, 42-1-1 through 42-1-19.

ARTICLE 2 SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION REVIEW BOARD

42-1-13. Sexual Offender Registration Review Board; composition; appointment; administration and duties; immunity from liability.

  1. The Sexual Offender Registration Review Board shall be composed of three professionals licensed under Title 43 and knowledgeable in the field of the behavior and treatment of sexual offenders; at least one representative from a victims' rights advocacy group or agency; and at least two representatives from law enforcement, each of whom is either employed by a law enforcement agency as a certified peace officer under Title 35 or retired from such employment. The members of the board shall be appointed by the commissioner of behavioral health and developmental disabilities for terms of four years. On and after July 1, 2006, successors to the members of the board shall be appointed by the Governor. Members of the board shall take office on the first day of September immediately following the expired term of that office and shall serve for a term of four years and until the appointment of their respective successors. No member shall serve on the board more than two consecutive terms. Vacancies occurring on the board, other than those caused by expiration of a term of office, shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment to the position vacated for the remainder of the unexpired term and until a successor is appointed. Members shall be entitled to an expense allowance and travel cost reimbursement the same as members of certain other boards and commissions as provided in Code Section 45-7-21.
  2. The board shall be attached to the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities for administrative purposes and, provided there is adequate funding, shall:
    1. Exercise its quasi-judicial, rule-making, or policy-making functions independently of the department and without approval or control of the department;
    2. Prepare its budget, if any, and submit its budgetary requests, if any, through the department; and
    3. Hire its own personnel, including but not limited to administrative personnel and clinical evaluators.
  3. Any investigator who, as of June 30, 2012, was employed by the board shall be transferred to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation on July 1, 2012, and shall no longer be under the administration or supervision of the board, except as required to provide the board with information as set forth in paragraph (15) of subsection (a) of Code Section 35-3-4. The executive director of the board shall arrange administratively for the transfer of any equipment relating to the transfer of such personnel.
  4. Members of the board shall be immune from liability for good faith conduct under this article.

(Code 1981, §42-1-13, enacted by Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 24/HB 1059; Ga. L. 2009, p. 453, §§ 3-2, 3-3/HB 228; Ga. L. 2012, p. 985, § 2/HB 895.)

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted ", including but not limited to administrative personnel and clinical evaluators" for "if authorized by the Constitution of this state or by statute or if the General Assembly provides or authorizes the expenditure of funds therefor" in paragraph (b)(3); added subsection (c); and redesignated former subsection (c) as present subsection (d).

Code Commission notes.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2012, "paragraph (15) of subsection (a) of Code Section 35-3-4" was substituted for "paragraph (14) of subsection (a) of Code Section 35-3-4" in the first sentence of subsection (c).

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 24/HB 1059, July 1, 2006, repealed the former Code section and enacted the current Code section. The former Code section, pertaining to registered sex offenders residing within areas in which minors congregate, was based on Code 1981, § 42-1-13, enacted by Ga. L. 2003, p. 878, § 1. For present similar provisions, see Code Section42-1-15.

Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 30/HB 1059, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that: "(b) Any person required to register pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 42-1-12, relating to the state sexual offender registry, and any person required not to reside within areas where minors congregate, as prohibited by Code Section 42-1-13, shall not be relieved of the obligation to comply with the provisions of said Code sections by the repeal and reenactment of said Code sections.

"(c) The provisions of this Act shall not affect or abate the status as a crime of any such act or omission which occurred prior to the effective date of the Act repealing, repealing and reenacting, or amending such law, nor shall the prosecution of such crime be abated as a result of such repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment."

Administrative Rules and Regulations.

- The Georgia Sexually Violent Offender Registry, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Georgia Crime Information Center Council, Practice and Procedure, Chapter 140-2.

Law reviews.

- For article on 2006 amendment of this Code section, see 23 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 11 (2006). For annual survey on administrative law, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 39 (2012). For note, "Banishing Acts: How Far May States Go to Keep Convicted Sex Offenders Away from Children?," see 40 Ga. L. Rev. 961 (2006).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Registration for first offender.

- Georgia superior court properly required a first offender to register as a sex offender pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 as both the 2005 and 2006 amendments to the statute dictated registration, and despite the fact that registration was not part of the first offender's plea agreement, as neither the court nor the prosecutor had the power to exempt the first offender from the adoption of new rules regarding registration entered after the plea. Peters v. Donald, 282 Ga. App. 714, 639 S.E.2d 345 (2006).

Cited in Watson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 635, 642 S.E.2d 328 (2007); State v. Davis, 303 Ga. 684, 814 S.E.2d 701 (2018).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Validity of statutes imposing residency restrictions on registered sex offenders, 25 A.L.R.6th 227.

Validity, construction, and application of federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 et seq., its enforcement provision, 18 U.S.C.A § 2250, and associated regulations, 30 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 213.

Validity of state sex offender registration laws under ex post facto prohibitions, 63 A.L.R. 6th 351.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 42-1-13

Total Results: 6  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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State v. Davis, 303 Ga. 684 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 21, 2018

...“This personal liberty 9 We do not consider other and more stringent requirements of this chapter, which apply by their terms only to offenses committed or persons incarcerated as of a later date and are not applicable to Davis. See OCGA § 42-1-13 et seq. 11 consists in the power of loco-motion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to whatsoever place one’s own inclination may direct.” 1 W....
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State v. Davis, 814 S.E.2d 701 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 21, 2018

...not relevant to our analysis here. We do not consider other and more stringent requirements of this chapter, which apply by their terms only to offenses committed or persons incarcerated as of a later date and are not applicable to Davis. See OCGA § 42-1-13 et seq. In Taylor, the Court of Appeals held that failure to advise a client that a particular guilty plea will require him to register as a sex offender under OCGA § 42-1-12 is constitutionally insufficient performance, 304 Ga....
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Thompson v. State, 603 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 27, 2004 | 278 Ga. 394, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 3130

...September 27, 2004. *234 L. Clark Landrum, Sylvester, for Appellant. Paul Bowden, Dist. Atty., Bradford Lee Rigby, Asst. Dist. Atty., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., for Appellee. THOMPSON, Justice. The question for decision in this case is whether OCGA § 42-1-13, which makes it a felony for a person required to register as a sex offender to "reside within 1,000 feet of any child care facility, school, or area where minors congregate," is an unconstitutional ex post facto law when applied to an offender who was convicted before that Code section went into effect. The answer is "no." Tommie Morris Thompson pled guilty to child molestation on August 24, 1999. He was sentenced to serve a probated sentence of ten years. On June 4, 2003, during the term of Thompson's probation, OCGA § 42-1-13 became effective....
...That statute provides that a sex offender commits a felony if he knowingly resides within 1,000 feet of an area where minors congregate. [1] Thompson has lived in the same house since the late 1980's or early 1990's. [2] The house is located within 303 feet of a municipal community center. After OCGA § 42-1-13 was enacted, Thompson's probation officer informed him that he was in violation of that Code section and that he would have to relocate. However, Thompson did not move. Thus, in September 2003, the State sought to revoke Thompson's probation. At the probation revocation hearing, Thompson asserted that OCGA § 42-1-13 was an unconstitutional ex post facto law....
...Instead, it ordered that Thompson's probation be continued, provided that Thompson relocate to a new residence within ten days of the court's decision. [3] Thereupon, Thompson sought, and we granted, discretionary review to determine whether the court properly applied OCGA § 42-1-13 in this case....
...If the effect of the statute is punitive, the statute is deemed ex post facto — even if the statute was intended to be regulatory. See Akins v. Snow, 922 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir.1991). But, again, if the statute is not retrospective we need not determine whether it is punitive. Is OCGA § 42-1-13 retrospective? A penal statute is retrospective if it alters the consequences for crimes committed prior to its enactment. See, e.g., Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987). In our view, OCGA § 42-1-13 does not alter the consequences for the offense of child molestation; rather, it creates a new crime based in part on an offender's status as a child molester....
...Because the Act does not criminalize conduct legal before its enactment, nor deprive Hendricks of any defense that was available to him at the time of his crimes, the Act does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause." As in Hendricks, the new statute in this case, OCGA § 42-1-13, does not increase the punishment meted out to previously convicted sex offenders....
...If a convicted offender violates the statute, he can be prosecuted (or have his probation revoked) for that current violation. See also Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898) (new law criminalizing practice of medicine by convicted felon was not ex post facto). We hold, therefore, that OCGA § 42-1-13 is not being applied to *236 Thompson retrospectively and that it is not an ex post facto law. [4] We note that our Court of Appeals correctly reached this conclusion on nearly identical facts in Denson v. State, 267 Ga.App. 528, 600 S.E.2d 645 (2004). In that case, Denson, a convicted sex offender, argued that OCGA § 42-1-13 was an ex post facto law because he was already living within 1,000 feet of a day care facility when the law was passed. Our appellate court disagreed and ruled: Denson can only be punished under OCGA § 42-1-13 if he prospectively chooses to violate the law by continuing to reside at his current address. The fact that Denson's prior conviction subjects Denson to possible punishment under OCGA § 42-1-13 does not somehow convert the statute into an unconstitutional ex-post-facto law as applied to Denson. Like Denson, Thompson is not being punished again because he is a convicted sex offender. He is being punished because he is currently violating OCGA § 42-1-13, and he refuses to move. Simply put, it is Thompson's new crime which sparked Thompson's probation revocation. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] OCGA § 42-1-13 reads as follows: (a) As used in this Code section, the term: (1) "Area where minors congregate" shall include all public and private parks and recreation facilities, playgrounds, skating rinks, neighborhood centers, gymnasiums, and simila...
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Gregory v. Sexual Offender Reg. Review Bd., 298 Ga. 675 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 21, 2016 | 784 S.E.2d 392

...ights advocacy group or agency; and at least two representatives from law enforcement, each of whom is either employed by a law enforcement agency as a certified peace officer under Title 35 or retired from such employment. OCGA § 42-1-13 (a)....
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Mann v. Georgia Dep't of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 21, 2007 | 282 Ga. 754, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 3615

...being employed by any business or entity located within 1,000 feet of an area where minors congregate. OCGA § 42-1-15(b)(2). [2] Mann pled nolo contendere in 2002 to a North Carolina charge of taking indecent liberties with a child. [3] Former OCGA § 42-1-13, which restricted registered sex offenders from residing within 1,000 feet of a child care facility but which did not affect where registered sex offenders were employed, was repealed in 2006 and its provisions, as amended, were recodified as OCGA § 42-1-15....
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Mann v. State, 603 S.E.2d 283 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 27, 2004 | 278 Ga. 442, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 3148

...*284 Lee Sexton, Joseph Scott Key, Sexton & Morris, P.C., Stockbridge, for Appellant. Hon. Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., J. Jayson Phillips, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Appellee. *285 SEARS, Presiding Justice. Appellant Anthony Mann appeals the denial of his request for declaratory relief that would hold OCGA § 42-1-13, which prohibits registered sex offenders from living within one thousand feet of specified places, unconstitutional....
...a child. He then returned to Georgia, took up residence in his parents' home of thirty-seven years, and began serving a probated sentence. Appellant also registered, as required by law, with the Georgia Sex Offender Registry. [1] In June 2003, OCGA § 42-1-13 took effect, prohibiting convicted sex offenders who are required to register with the Sex Offender Registry from residing within one thousand feet of a child care facility, a school, or any area where minors congregate. In August 2003, appellant's probation officer notified him that because he was living within one thousand feet of a child care facility in violation of section 42-1-13, he would be required to vacate his residence. Appellant filed suit, seeking declaratory relief that would render OCGA § 42-1-13 ("the Residency Statute") unconstitutional, and he appeals from the denial of such relief....