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(Code 1981, §42-1-15, enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 680, § 4/SB 1; Ga. L. 2010, p. 168, § 13/HB 571; Ga. L. 2017, p. 347, § 1/SB 250.)
The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, inserted "or for any person who is or should be registered on another state's sexual offender registry" in the middle of subsection (d).
- This Code section formerly pertained to restriction on registered offenders residing, working, or loitering within certain distance of child care facilities, churches, schools, or areas where minors congregate; penalty for violations; civil causes of action. The former Code section was based on Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 24/HB 1059.
- For survey article on criminal law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 85 (2008). For summary review article on zoning and land use law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 457 (2008). For annual survey on criminal law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 73 (2017). For comment, "'An Era of Human Zoning': Banning Sex Offenders from Communities Through Residence and Work Restrictions," see 57 Emory L.J. 1347 (2008).
- In light of the similarity of the subject matter, decisions under former Code 1981, § 42-1-13, enacted by Ga. L. 2003, p. 878, § 1 and former O.C.G.A. § 42-1-15, are included in the annotations for this Code section.
- Even though former O.C.G.A. § 42-1-13 was passed after a sex offender's statutory rape conviction, and used the prior conviction as an element of a future offense, it was not an ex post facto law since it only punished a future offense, which punishment was enhanced by the prior conviction, and the sex offender could only have been punished under former § 42-1-13 if the offender prospectively chose to violate the statute by continuing to live at the offender's current home; the fact that the prior conviction subjected the sex offender to possible punishment under former § 42-1-13 did not make the statute into an unconstitutional ex post facto law. Denson v. State of Ga., 267 Ga. App. 528, 600 S.E.2d 645 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 42-1-13).
- In a declaratory action suit brought by a registered sex offender, former O.C.G.A. § 42-1-15(a) was held unconstitutional as to the sex offender's residence, which was acquired prior to a child care facility locating itself within 1,000 feet of the property as forcing the sex offender from the home was a regulatory taking of the property without just and adequate compensation. However, no regulatory taking occurred with regard to prohibiting the sex offender from physically working at a business, pursuant to former § 42-1-15(b)(1), in which the sex offender held an ownership interest in as there existed no prohibition on owning a business within 1,000 feet of any child care facility, church, school, or other area where minors congregated and the sex offender failed to show that physically working at the premises was necessary. Mann v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 282 Ga. 754, 653 S.E.2d 740 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 42-1-15).
- Imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment imposed against a defendant, who was a second time offender, for failing to register as a sexual offender was held unconstitutional as grossly disproportionate to the crime of failing to register. Bradshaw v. State, 284 Ga. 675, 671 S.E.2d 485 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 42-1-15).
- Defendant's conviction under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 for failing to register as a sex offender was reversed because the record showed that the state has never contested the evidence showing the defendant's homeless status nor had the state ever alleged, either in the indictment or at trial, that, despite the defendant's homelessness, the defendant had a street or route address which the defendant failed to register with the sheriff's office. Chestnut v. State, 331 Ga. App. 69, 769 S.E.2d 779 (2015).
Cited in Stephens v. State, 305 Ga. App. 339, 699 S.E.2d 558 (2010); Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 698 S.E.2d 384 (2010).
- Validity of statutes imposing residency restrictions on registered sex offenders, 25 A.L.R.6th 227.
Validity, construction, and application of statutory and municipal enactments and conditions of release prohibiting sex offenders from parks, 40 A.L.R.6th 419.
Validity, construction, and application of federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 et seq., its enforcement provision, 18 U.S.C.A § 2250, and associated regulations, 30 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 213.
Validity, construction, and application of state sex offender statutes prohibiting use of computers and internet as conditions of probation or sentence, 89 A.L.R.6th 261.
Total Results: 6
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-03-04
Citation: 825 S.E.2d 147
Snippet: which certain sexual offenders may go (OCGA § 42-1-15 ). It may also be possible for the General Assembly
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-03-21
Citation: 298 Ga. 675, 784 S.E.2d 392, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 242
Snippet: where minors congregate,” 11 see OCGA § 42-1-15 (b), 12 and from working or volunteering
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2010-03-15
Citation: 690 S.E.2d 827, 286 Ga. 675, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 762, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 229
Snippet: offender can live, work, and congregate, OCGA § 42-1-15, and is not a requirement that should be imposed
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2008-11-25
Citation: 671 S.E.2d 485, 284 Ga. 675, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 3868, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 1022
Snippet: children’s recreation center. OCGA §§ 42-1-12 (a) (3); 42-1-15 (b). Bradshaw then provided his aunt’s address
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2007-11-21
Citation: 653 S.E.2d 740, 282 Ga. 754, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 3615, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 849
Snippet: involves a constitutional takings challenge to OCGA § 42-1-15, which prohibits registered sex offenders from
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2007-10-26
Citation: 652 S.E.2d 501, 282 Ga. 520
Snippet: 42-1-12 (f) (7). See OCGA §42-1-12©. OCGA §42-1-15. Wilson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 459 (631 SE2d