O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 44-1-7 (2019)

Possession of personalty

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Personalty is deemed to be in the possession of a party when that party’s right to the property is accompanied by immediate actual or constructive possession.

History

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2218; Code 1868, § 2212; Code 1873, § 2238; Code 1882, § 2238; Civil Code 1895, § 3071; Civil Code 1910, § 3647; Code 1933, § 85-1702.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS tive possession of a thing, possession is sole. If two or more persons share actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is joint. Thomas v. State, 153 Ga. App. 686, 266 S.E.2d 335 (1980). Presumption of constructive possession arises from status as lessee of premises and head of household. Murray v. State, 155 Ga. App. 816, 273 S.E.2d 219 (1980). Possession of money may be actual or constructive. DeFoor v. State, 233 Ga. 190, 210 S.E.2d 707 (1974). Cited in Brewer v. State, 129 Ga. App. 118, 199 S.E.2d 109 (1973); Graham v. State, 152 Ga. App. 233, 262 S.E.2d 465 (1979); Chan-

What constitutes actual possession. - Person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a given time is in actual possession of the thing. Thomas v. State, 153 Ga. App. 686, 266 S.E.2d 335 (1980). What constitutes constructive possession. - Person who, though not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing is then in constructive possession of the thing. Thomas v. State, 153 Ga. App. 686, 266 S.E.2d 335 (1980). Sole and joint possession distinguished. - If one person alone has actual or construc-

cellor v. Gateway Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 38, 502 S.E.2d 799 (1998). RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Animals, § 13. 63A Am. Jur. 2d, Property, § 28 et seq. C.J.S. - 73 C.J.S., Property, § 49 et seq. ALR. - Larceny by finder of property, 36 ALR 372.

Construction of statute or ordinance making it an offense to possess or have alcoholic beverages in opened package in motor vehicle, 35 ALR3d 1418.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 3 cases, 2010–2019 · leading case: Amaechi v. State, 702 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
Amaechi v. State, 702 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “See also OCGA § 44-1-7 (“Personalty is deemed to be in the possession of a party when that party’s right to the property is accompanied by immediate actual or constructive possession.”
Bell v. State, 824 S.E.2d 552 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “") (citation and punctuation omitted); see also OCGA § 44-1-7. It follows that there was no variance between the allegation in the accusation and the evidence presented at trial, and the trial court did not err in denying Bell a new trial on this ground.”
Fabian Bell v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “”) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also OCGA § 44-1-7. It follows that there was no variance between the allegation in the accusation and the evidence presented at trial, and the trial court did not err in denying Bell a new trial on this ground.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.