Construction with other provisions.

- Construing together former Code 1933, § 92-7702 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-3-22) and former Code 1933, §§ 92-7701 and 110-1001 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 48-3-21 and9-12-60, respectively), it was the intention of the General Assembly to provide in effect that the mere entry of a tax execution itself on the general execution docket within the seven-year period would prevent dormancy. Darby v. De Loach, 190 Ga. 499, 9 S.E.2d 626 (1940).

Former Code 1933, §§ 67-2501 and 67-2503 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2), which declare effective from the date of filing "deeds, mortgages, and liens of all kinds," as against third persons acting in good faith and without notice, have no application to claims for taxes. Suttles v. Dickey, 192 Ga. 382, 15 S.E.2d 445 (1941).

Requirement as to actual entry of execution on docket.

- Merely depositing the execution in the office of the clerk and having an entry of filing made thereon is ineffective, unless the execution is actually entered on the docket. Suttles v. Dickey, 192 Ga. 382, 15 S.E.2d 445 (1941).

Date from which period of limitation is measured.

- Claims for taxes should be enforced within seven years from the date due and date when executions could have been issued therefor, unless within such time an execution is issued and entered on the general execution docket, as in the case of judgments. Suttles v. Dickey, 192 Ga. 382, 15 S.E.2d 445 (1941).

Effect of running of period of limitation.

- When execution for collection of taxes is barred by former Code 1933, § 92-7701 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-3-21), the taxpayer is no longer bound for the taxes, and the taxpayer can maintain an action to enjoin enforcement of the execution and for its cancellation. The taxpayer is not estopped from doing so because the taxpayer owned the property for the entire year for which the taxes involved were due, failed to make a return of the property for such year, and had not paid nor offered to pay the taxes. Suttles v. Dickey, 192 Ga. 382, 15 S.E.2d 445 (1941).

Right to revive dormant judgments inapplicable to tax executions.

- Provisions of former Code 1933, Ch. 110-10 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 12, T. 9) relating to dormant judgments and providing a procedure for their revival have no application to an action purportedly attempting to revive a dormant tax execution under former Code 1933, §§ 92-7701 and 92-7702 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 48-3-21 and48-3-22), which might properly be called the Dormant Tax Judgment Act. Oxford v. Generator Exch., Inc., 99 Ga. App. 290, 108 S.E.2d 174 (1959).

Running of seven-year period causes execution to be dead, not merely dormant.

- Unless there is a bona fide effort to enforce a tax fi. fa. by a levy or an attempted levy with entry thereon, and unless the fi. fa., together with such entry or entries, is recorded on the general execution docket of the county of the residence of the defendant in fi. fa. within seven years from the date of the assessment, and unless thereafter there be a new levy or attempted levy with proper entries and recordation within seven years thereof, and subsequently within each seven-year period, such fi. fa. is not merely dormant but is dead, and nothing more can be done to enforce it by the taxing authority. Oxford v. Generator Exch., Inc., 99 Ga. App. 290, 108 S.E.2d 174 (1959).

Loss of lien for failure to intervene in equity.

- Former Code 1933, § 37-410 (see now O.C.G.A. § 23-2-97), relating to intervention in equity by claimants of assets, provides for circumstances under which all creditors may by inaction lose their rights, including creditors holding executions. It is therefore applicable to tax executions. Suttles v. J.B. Withers Cigar Co., 194 Ga. 617, 22 S.E.2d 129 (1942), overruled on other grounds, Johnson v. Mayor of City of Carrollton, 249 Ga. 173, 288 S.E.2d 565 (1982) (holding service by publication on known claimants whose whereabouts are known unconstitutional).

C.J.S.

- 33 C.J.S., Executions, §§ 69, 85 et seq.