Limits on judicial notice.

- In the absence of a specific designation of a drug, the courts cannot "notice" whether a certain substance falls within the prohibitive scope of a broad category of drugs. Martin v. State, 135 Ga. App. 4, 217 S.E.2d 312 (1975).

Court cannot take judicial notice of regulation not part of the record. Allen v. State Personnel Bd., 140 Ga. App. 747, 231 S.E.2d 826 (1976).

Only when rules or regulations are adopted pursuant to O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50 can the rules or regulations be judicially noticed. Dix v. State, 156 Ga. App. 868, 275 S.E.2d 807 (1981).

Defendant was improperly convicted of violating Georgia's Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., by distributing a Schedule IV drug, Zolpidem, which was commonly known as Ambien, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-28(a)(33) and16-13-30(b), because the state failed to prove that the drug Ambien was regulated by law, and the trade name of a statutorily designated controlled substance was not the proper subject of judicial notice; while the state presented evidence that the defendant admitted to distributing Ambien and produced testimony that "Ambien" was a Schedule IV controlled substance, the state was required to identify "Ambien" as a trade name for Zolpidem through admissible evidence. DeLong v. State, 310 Ga. App. 518, 714 S.E.2d 98 (2011).

Ultimate responsibility for statutory construction.

- Although weight will be given to administrative interpretation in case of doubtful statutes, the ultimate responsibility for statutory construction rests with the courts. Bradford v. Davidson, 150 Ga. App. 625, 258 S.E.2d 235 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 245 Ga. 8, 262 S.E.2d 780 (1980).

Administrative rulings are adopted only after the court has made an independent determination that the rulings correctly reflect the meaning of the statute. Bradford v. Davidson, 150 Ga. App. 625, 258 S.E.2d 235 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 245 Ga. 8, 262 S.E.2d 780 (1980).

Methods for blood alcohol breath tests.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-8, the courts take judicial notice of any rule which has become effective pursuant to the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 et seq., and Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. Rule 92-3-.06 embodies methods for blood alcohol breath tests approved by the Division of Forensic Sciences of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation; a trial court erred in suppressing the results of a blood alcohol content breath test when the test was conducted in accordance with methods adopted by the Division of Forensic Sciences. State v. Palmaka, 266 Ga. App. 595, 597 S.E.2d 630 (2004).

Required judicial notice.

- Neither the Department of Motor Vehicle Safety (DMVS) nor the Public Service Commission (PSC) fall within the group of government entities explicitly excluded by O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2(1) from the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) provisions; thus, the rules and the regulations promulgated pursuant to the APA by DMVS or the PSC and thereafter properly adopted by DMVS are required to be judicially noticed by the courts. State v. Ponce, 279 Ga. 651, 619 S.E.2d 682 (2005).

To the extent that language in Lemon v. Martin, 232 Ga. App. 579 (1998), or cases such as Joel Properties v. Reed, 203 Ga. App. 257 (1992), can be read as authority for the proposition that the courts cannot take judicial notice of the rules and the regulations of those state agencies that promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 et seq., that language is disapproved by the Supreme Court of Georgia. State v. Ponce, 279 Ga. 651, 619 S.E.2d 682 (2005).

Judicial notice of public transportation commission's transportation rules was unavailable.

- Appellate court, on remand from the Supreme Court of Georgia, was unable to take judicial notice of the Public Service Commission's transportation rules, as those rules had not been filed with the Secretary of State, so the rules had not become effective under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (APA), O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 et seq., and were not part of the record; since the state was unable to alert the appellate court to any rule or regulation which served as a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant, the original decision, that a warrantless search of the defendant's commercial truck was improper, stood. Ponce v. State, 279 Ga. App. 207, 630 S.E.2d 840 (2006).

Denial of judicial notice motion proper.

- Trial court did not err in denying the buyers' motion asking the court to take judicial notice of Rule 110-11-1-.11 of the Georgia Department of Community Affairs (DCA), which related to the applicable building code for one- and two-family dwellings, because the trial court correctly found that the DCA exceeded the DCA's authority in adopting the International Residential Code for One and Two Family Dwellings (IRC) as a later edition of the Council of American Building Officials One- and Two-Family Dwelling Code (CABO); by its own terms, the IRC was not a subsequent or new edition of the CABO but an entirely new code based upon a study of a number of existing building codes. Lumsden v. Williams, 307 Ga. App. 163, 704 S.E.2d 458 (2010).

Cited in Weil Bros. Cotton v. Harrold Bros., 118 Ga. App. 8, 162 S.E.2d 309 (1968); Employers Com. Union Cos. v. Waldrop, 124 Ga. App. 746, 186 S.E.2d 134 (1971); Cullers v. Home Credit Co., 130 Ga. App. 441, 203 S.E.2d 544 (1973); Tischmak v. State, 133 Ga. App. 534, 211 S.E.2d 587 (1974); Wielgorecki v. White, 133 Ga. App. 834, 212 S.E.2d 480 (1975); Department of Human Resources v. Sims, 137 Ga. App. 72, 222 S.E.2d 832 (1975); Blossman Gas Co. v. Williams, 189 Ga. App. 195, 375 S.E.2d 117 (1988); Owens v. Georgia Underwriting Ass'n, 223 Ga. App. 29, 476 S.E.2d 810 (1996); Enchanted Valley RV Resort, Ltd. v. Weese, 241 Ga. App. 415, 526 S.E.2d 124 (1999); Scara v. State, 259 Ga. App. 510, 577 S.E.2d 796 (2003).

ALR.

- Judicial notice of banking customs or other matters relating to banks or trust companies, 89 A.L.R. 1336; 94 A.L.R. 1352; 96 A.L.R. 853; 97 A.L.R. 1123; 104 A.L.R. 375.