Successful intervenor retains status as mere "intervenor."

- One who successfully seeks to intervene in an agency proceeding pursuant to the general provisions of O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50 retains status of a mere "intervenor" throughout. Campaign for a Prosperous Georgia v. Georgia Power Co., 174 Ga. App. 263, 329 S.E.2d 570, aff'd, 255 Ga. 253, 336 S.E.2d 790 (1985).

Department manual not "rule" subject to review in declaratory judgment action.

- Department of Medical Assistance (now Department of Community Health) manual, which contained "the terms and conditions for receipt of medical assistance reimbursement in Georgia," was not a "rule" and therefore could not be reviewed in a declaratory judgment action. Georgia Dep't of Medical Assistance v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 261 Ga. 59, 401 S.E.2d 499 (1991).

Commissioner's requirement not rule.

- Insurance commissioner's requirement that an insurer include an interest assumption in calculating the insurers' loss projections, when applying for a rate increase, was a statement of policy or an interpretation made in the context of a contested case, which was an exception to the definition of a rule under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2(6)(D). United Am. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Dep't of Ga., 258 Ga. App. 735, 574 S.E.2d 830 (2002).

Challenged practice was not a rule.

- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the two associations on the associations' declaratory judgment action and finding that the state revenue department's prohibition of the practice of "split deliveries" was improper as the challenged practice was not a rule under the Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 et seq., and was not subject to a declaratory judgment action. Ga. Oilmen's Ass'n v. Ga. Dep't of Revenue, 261 Ga. App. 393, 582 S.E.2d 549 (2003).

Notice requirements.

- Healthcare provider did not show that the state community health department committed an error of law in issuing a cease and desist letter directing the healthcare provider to stop operating the provider's diagnostic imaging center until the healthcare provider obtained a certificate of need; the letter of nonreviewability the healthcare provider cited was not a form of permission required by law and, thus, the revocation of the letter, which triggered the need for the certificate of need, was not subject to the notice requirements of O.C.G.A. § 50-13-18(c). N. Atlanta Scan Assocs. v. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 277 Ga. App. 583, 627 S.E.2d 67 (2006).

Judicial Council of Georgia and Board of Court Reporting were part of the judiciary and therefore excluded from coverage.

- Judicial Council of Georgia and the Board of Court Reporting of the Judicial Council of Georgia fell within "the judiciary," as that term was used in O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore were exempt from the coverage of the Act and immune from a suit challenging a court reporter ethics rule the board adopted. Judicial Council v. Brown & Gallo, LLC, 288 Ga. 294, 702 S.E.2d 894 (2010).

Cited in Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Blackmon, 229 Ga. 146, 190 S.E.2d 43 (1972); Georgia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Bennett, 126 Ga. App. 307, 190 S.E.2d 788 (1972); Pope v. Cokinos, 231 Ga. 79, 200 S.E.2d 275 (1973); Wall v. American Optometric Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Cantrell v. Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement Sys., 135 Ga. App. 445, 218 S.E.2d 97 (1975); Kirton v. Biggers, 135 Ga. App. 416, 218 S.E.2d 113 (1975); Georgia State Bd. of Dental Exmrs. v. Daniels, 137 Ga. App. 706, 224 S.E.2d 820 (1976); Allen v. State Personnel Bd., 140 Ga. App. 747, 231 S.E.2d 826 (1976); Department of Pub. Safety v. Murphy, 145 Ga. App. 824, 245 S.E.2d 169 (1978); Keramidas v. Department of Human Resources, 147 Ga. App. 820, 250 S.E.2d 560 (1978); Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491, 254 S.E.2d 822 (1979); Bradford v. Davidson, 150 Ga. App. 625, 258 S.E.2d 235 (1979); Dix v. State, 156 Ga. App. 868, 275 S.E.2d 807 (1981); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 158 Ga. App. 739, 282 S.E.2d 198 (1981); Caldwell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 248 Ga. 282, 282 S.E.2d 885 (1981); North Fulton Community Hosp. v. State Health Planning & Dev. Agency, 168 Ga. App. 801, 310 S.E.2d 764 (1983); Schieffelin & Co. v. Strickland, 253 Ga. 385, 320 S.E.2d 358 (1984); State v. Strickman, 173 Ga. App. 1, 325 S.E.2d 775 (1984); Georgia Power Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 196 Ga. App. 572, 396 S.E.2d 562 (1990); Tompkins v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., 262 Ga. 208, 417 S.E.2d 153 (1992); Scarborough v. Hunter, 293 Ga. 431, 746 S.E.2d 119 (2013); State of Ga. v. International Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 299 Ga. 392, 788 S.E.2d 455 (2016).

Applicability of judicial review.

- Manner of judicial review provided by the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. L. 1964, p. 338, § 1 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50) is made applicable to the "several public entities" as defined by Ga. L. 1973, p. 512, § 2 (see O.C.G.A. § 22-4-2) as well as to those entities defined as an "agency" by Ga. L. 1975, p. 404, § 3 (see O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2). Wirt v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 139 Ga. App. 592, 229 S.E.2d 100 (1976).

Required judicial notice.

- Neither the Department of Motor Vehicle Safety (DMVS) nor the Public Service Commission (PSC) fall within the group of government entities explicitly excluded by O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2(1) from the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) provisions; thus, the rules and the regulations promulgated pursuant to the APA by DMVS or the PSC and thereafter properly adopted by DMVS are required to be judicially noticed by the courts. State v. Ponce, 279 Ga. 651, 619 S.E.2d 682 (2005).

Changes in definition of "agency."

- "Several public entities" and the "agency" being alternative categories, amendments to the definition of "agency" will not influence the applicability of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. L. 1964, p. 338, § 1 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50) to an entity which falls within the "several public entities" category. Wirt v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 139 Ga. App. 592, 229 S.E.2d 100 (1976).

Department of Human Resources is "agency" within meaning of this section. Department of Human Resources v. Williams, 130 Ga. App. 149, 202 S.E.2d 504 (1973).

Methods of chemical analysis of person arrested for DUI.

- In light of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55(a), implementation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(a)(1) concerns and affects both the internal management of the Division of Forensic Sciences and private rights and procedures available to the public, despite the apparent exemption from coverage by the Administrative Procedure Act pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2(6)(A). State v. Holton, 173 Ga. App. 241, 326 S.E.2d 235 (1984).

Educational administrative bodies.

- Exclusion of "any school, college, hospital, or other such educational, eleemosynary, or charitable institution" from the definition of "agency" was intended to apply only to those institutions which provide educational or charitable services directly and not to the administrative bodies through which they are regulated. Department of Educ. v. Kitchens, 193 Ga. App. 229, 387 S.E.2d 579 (1989) (decided prior to 1990 amendment).

Georgia Institute of Technology as a "school or college," is an agency within the meaning of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2(1). Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Houston, 282 Ga. App. 412, 638 S.E.2d 750 (2006).

State Board of Education and Department of Education are included within the definition of "agency" and are not included within the list of exclusions. Department of Educ. v. Kitchens, 193 Ga. App. 229, 387 S.E.2d 579 (1989) (decided prior to 1990 amendment).

Decision of state university dismissing tenured professor.

- Trial court properly dismissed a tenured professor's petition for writ of certiorari challenging the professor's dismissal from a state university because the hearing committee process resulting in the professor's dismissal was administrative, not judicial in nature; therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Laskar v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 320 Ga. App. 414, 740 S.E.2d 179 (2013).

Inapplicability when State Board of Education sits as appellate body.

- Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. L. 1964, p. 338, § 1 et seq., does not apply to the State Board of Education when the board sits as an appellate body and does not decide the controversy de novo but bases its appellate decision on the evidence heard by the local board. Palmer v. State Bd. of Educ., 143 Ga. App. 315, 238 S.E.2d 255 (1977), cert. dismissed, 240 Ga. 591, 241 S.E.2d 837 (1978) (decided prior to 1990 amendment).

Local board of education is not included within any of the definitions of "agency" contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50, and is thus outside its scope. Lansford v. Cook, 252 Ga. 414, 314 S.E.2d 103 (1984).

City board of education is not included within any definition of "agency" contained in this section. Hood v. Rice, 120 Ga. App. 691, 172 S.E.2d 170 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1070, 90 S. Ct. 1514, 25 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1970).

Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. L. 1968, p. 338, § 1 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50), does not apply to State Personnel Board and it appears that no other statute, rule, or regulation requires the Personnel Board to make specific findings and conclusions. Department of Cors. v. Hemphill, 134 Ga. App. 65, 213 S.E.2d 169 (1975).

Regulation of alcoholic beverages.

- Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. L. 1968, p. 338, § 1 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50), is apparently not applicable to regulation of liquor and alcoholic beverages. Blackmon v. Alexander, 233 Ga. 832, 213 S.E.2d 842 (1975).

County boards of health.

- Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50, does not apply to county boards of health as these boards are not included within the definition of "agency." Aldridge v. Georgia Hospitality & Travel Ass'n, 251 Ga. 234, 304 S.E.2d 708 (1983).

Decisions by Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles.

- In a case in which the appropriate way to challenge a decision by the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board) denying parole was to file a writ of mandamus because, under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2(1), the Board was explicitly exempted from the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1, and appellant inmate's state mandamus petition was filed after the one-year limitations period in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), had run, the inmate's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition was untimely. Brown v. Barrow, 512 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2008).

"Standing to challenge" and judicial review in "contested case."

- "Standing to challenge" an administrative decision is what is intended to be established by the requirement in Ga. L. 1980, p. 820, § 1 (see O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19) that the judicial review be of a "contested case"; and that is what is meant to be described by the language of Ga. L. 1980, p. 1573, § 2 (see O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2). National Council on Comp. Ins. v. Caldwell, 154 Ga. App. 528, 268 S.E.2d 793 (1980).

Trial court did not err in dismissing a retailer's petition for judicial review of the orders entered on an investigatory docket proceeding by the Georgia Public Service Commission as it was not a contested case permitting review under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a); further, this disposition did not prevent the retailer in pursuing a remedy in the retailer's rate case against the Georgia Power Company. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Ga. PSC, 278 Ga. App. 239, 628 S.E.2d 658 (2006).

Adoption agency's choice of adoptive parents by child's foster parents is not a "contested case" within the meaning of this section as the choice is entirely discretionary in nature. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 237 Ga. 449, 228 S.E.2d 839 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 905, 97 S. Ct. 2949, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1977).

Landowners not entitled to a hearing regarding neighbors' planned dock.

- Landowners' claims against the state for declaratory judgment, mandamus, an unconstitutional taking, and due process and equal protection violations, all arising out of the issuance of a license to their neighbors to build a private dock in a coastal marshland area, all failed. The Coastal Marshlands Protection Act did not apply to a private dock, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 12-5-295(7); therefore, the landowners were not entitled to a hearing under the Act pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 12-5-283(b) and the Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 et seq.. Hitch v. Vasarhelyi, 302 Ga. App. 381, 691 S.E.2d 286 (2010).

Unemployment benefits.

- Under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50, the adoption of rules relating to benefits by the state or of an agency is expressly exempted by O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2(6)(I) from the strict rule-making procedural requirements of O.C.G.A. § 50-13-4. This includes the promulgation of policies determining eligibility for entitlement and rules for granting unemployment benefits. Caldwell v. Amoco Fabrics Co., 165 Ga. App. 674, 302 S.E.2d 596 (1983).

Indemnities.

- Making of a payment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 4-4-72 (indemnification of owners of livestock destroyed in eradication of diseases) must be classified as a "benefit" - and the rule therefore is within the exception made by O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2, and as to which no permission to sue the state is given under the provisions of O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50. Irvin v. Woodliff, 125 Ga. App. 214, 186 S.E.2d 792 (1971).

Order by the Commissioner of Agriculture as to payment for destroyed herds of swine pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 4-4-72 is a benefit under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2. Irvin v. Woodliff, 125 Ga. App. 214, 186 S.E.2d 792 (1971).

While every benefit is not indemnity, necessarily, every indemnity is a benefit. Irvin v. Woodliff, 125 Ga. App. 214, 186 S.E.2d 792 (1971).

Licensee momentarily complying but with history of noncompliance.

- Administrative agency may proceed to revoke license of licensee in conformity with the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. L. 1968, p. 338, § 1 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50), and the fact that the licensee shows at the agency's proceedings that the licensee is momentarily complying with all lawful requirements for the retention of a license would be immaterial; the real question to be resolved by the agency's proceedings would be whether the licensee had been in noncompliance with all lawful requirements for the retention of the license at the time that the licensee is alleged to have been in noncompliance with such requirements. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-73.

Decision not to "grant" a teaching certificate by officials in the certification division of the Department of Education based upon the failure of an applicant to meet certain required criteria is not a "contested case" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2(2). 1991 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 91-10.

Proceedings of Public Service Commission.

- Public Service Commission, being bound by the commission's own regulations, is required by law to afford a hearing on an application for the approval of a loan; such a proceeding is accurately characterized as one in which "the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing," and is, therefore, a contested case within the meaning of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. L. 1968, p. 338, § 1 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50). 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-139.

Board of Pardons and Paroles.

- Board of Pardons and Paroles is not "agency" within the meaning of Ga. L. 1968, p. 338, § 1 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50), and therefore is not subject to the hearing requirements of Ga. L. 1965, p. 283, § 13 (see O.C.G.A. § 50-13-13). 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 78-44.

Georgia Firemen's Pension Fund.

- Georgia Firemen's Pension Fund is not state agency or board within purview of Ga. L. 1968, p. 338, § 1 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50); neither is the Peace Officers Annuity and Benefit Fund. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-72.

Commissioner of Agriculture.

- Commissioner of Agriculture has neither a statutory nor a constitutional obligation to provide a formal means of administratively appealing a decision to bar a person from a state-owned and regulated farmers' market. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-217.

Rules must be properly adopted to be valid.

- Any rule, regulation, resolution, etc., by whatever name called, which falls under the definition of a "rule," as defined by Ga. L. 1965, p. 283, §§ 2-4 (see O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2) must be adopted pursuant to the procedure for adoption of rules, i.e., Ga. L. 1965, p. 283, §§ 6, 7 and 8, and Ga. L. 1964, p. 338, § 6 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 50-13-4 through50-13-7), if it is to be valid against any person or party. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-158.

Certain rules of Department of Human Resources.

- Rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Human Resources in connection with its operation and administration of public assistance programs are expressly excluded from the general filing requirements of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. L. 1968, p. 338, § 1 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50). 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-8.

Rules or regulations of University System.

- Any rules or regulations adopted by any school, college, or hospital, or other educational institution within the University System of Georgia would not be subject to the provisions of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. L. 1968, p. 338, § 1 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50). 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 622.

Rules adopted by Board of Regents.

- Any rules, regulations, or statements of policy adopted by the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia pursuant to the Board's duties, responsibilities, and functions as defined by the Constitution and by statute, and in the exercise of powers granted to the Board would relate to the regulation of a school, a college, or a hospital, or other educational, eleemosynary, or charitable institution, and would, thereby, be excepted from the definition of "agency," or would fall within the exclusions of the definitions of "rule" listed in this section. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 622.

Rules by Department of Audits and Accounts.

- Rules and regulations, procedures, forms, and standards that are issued or prescribed by the Department of Audits and Accounts or the state auditor fall within the exclusions itemized in this section in dealing with the internal fiscal activities of the various state agencies of the state government, and do not come under the provisions of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. L. 1968, p. 338, § 1 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50). 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 637.

Rules of Office of Planning and Budget.

- Rules and regulations, procedures, and standards that are issued or prescribed by the Office of Planning and Budget affect only the internal management of the office and the various agencies of state government, and fall within the exclusion of the definition of "rule"; for these reasons, the office is not subject to the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. L. 1968, p. 338, § 1 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50). 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 631.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 31.

C.J.S.

- 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Law and Procedure, § 1 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Model State Administrative Procedure Act (U.L.A.) § 1-102.

ALR.

- Propriety of hospital's conditioning physician's staff privileges on his carrying professional liability or malpractice insurance, 7 A.L.R.4th 1238.