O.C.G.A. § 50-14-5 (2019)
Jurisdiction to enforce chapter
(a) The superior courts of this state shall have jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the provisions of this chapter, including the power to grant injunctions or other equitable relief. In addition to any action that may be brought by any person, firm, corporation, or other entity, the Attorney General shall have authority to bring enforcement actions, either civil or criminal, in his or her discretion as may be appropriate to enforce compliance with this chapter. (b) In any action brought to enforce the provisions of this chapter in which the court determines that an agency acted without substantial justification in not complying with this chapter, the court shall, unless it finds that special circumstances exist, assess in favor of the complaining party reasonable attorney’s fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred. Whether the position of the complaining party was substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of the record as a whole which is made in the proceeding for which fees and other expenses are sought. (c) Any agency or person who provides access to information in good faith reliance on the requirements of this chapter shall not be liable in any action on account of having provided access to such information.
History
Code 1981, § 50-14-5, enacted by Ga. L. 1988, p. 235, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1061, § 4; Ga. L. 1998, p. 595, § 1; Ga. L. 2012, p. 218, § 1/HB 397.
Annotations
Law reviews. - For review of 1998
legislation relating to state government, see 15 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 242 (1998). For note on 1992 amendment of this Code section, see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 344 (1992).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Special circumstance. - That no official action is taken at a closed meeting is not necessarily a ‘‘special circumstance’’ for purposes of reducing or eliminating liability for a fee award under O.C.G.A. § 50-14-5(b) of the Open Meetings Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1 et seq., because the need for open government is not limited to meetings in which formal measures are taken. Evans County Bd. of Comm’rs v. Claxton Enter., 255 Ga. App. 656, 566 S.E.2d 399 (2002). One-year limitation period only applied to suits to invalidate acts. - Trial court erred in dismissing an action by the taxpayers alleging violations of the Open Meetings Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1, et seq., by a local airport authority in planning and submitting an FAA application because the limitation period in O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(b)(2) pertained only to suits to invalidate public agency actions, and the taxpayers sought only declaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorney fees, and civil penalties. Avery v. Paulding County Airport Auth., 343 Ga. App. 832, 808 S.E.2d 15 (2017). Attorney’s fees. - If the trial court determines that noncompliance with the Open Meetings Act, O.C.G.A. T. 50, C. 14, lacked substantial justification, the court must award attorney fees; then the court may reduce or eliminate the award completely upon a finding of special circumstances. Claxton Enter. v. Evans County Bd. of Comm’rs, 249 Ga. App. 870, 549 S.E.2d 830 (2001). Acting without substantial justification and acting in bad faith are not synonymous for purposes of an attorney fee award under O.C.G.A. § 50-14-5(b) of the
Open Meetings Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1 et seq. Evans County Bd. of Comm’rs v. Claxton Enter., 255 Ga. App. 656, 566 S.E.2d 399 (2002). City councilmembers’ claims against a mayor under the Open Meetings Act for a civil penalty, O.C.G.A. § 50-14-6, were subject to dismissal because the complaint only named the mayor in the mayor’s official capacity, and § 50-14-6 applied to ‘‘persons’’; the claim for attorney’s fees, O.C.G.A. § 15-14-5(b), was in essence against the city and was not subject to dismissal. Lue v. Eady, 297 Ga. 321, 773 S.E.2d 679 (2015). Complaint stated claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under the act. - Court of appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of a citizen’s action alleging that a city and city counsel members violated the Open Meetings Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(e)(2), because the complaint stated claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-14-5(a), based upon alleged violations of § 50-14-1(e)(2) since the minutes of a counsel meeting omitted the names of council members who voted in the minority to amend certain council rules; the court of appeals erred in interpreting § 50-14-1(e)(2) to allow minutes of an agency meeting to omit the names of persons voting against a proposal or abstaining when the vote was not taken by roll-call and was not unanimous. Cardinale v. City of Atlanta, 290 Ga. 521, 722 S.E.2d 732 (2012). Cited in Schoen v. Cherokee County, 242 Ga. App. 501, 530 S.E.2d 226 (2000); Moon v. Terrell County, 260 Ga. App. 433, 579 S.E.2d 845 (2003); Heiskell v. Roberts, 342 Ga. App. 109, 802 S.E.2d 385 (2017).