Standard in motion to set aside foreign judgment.

- In a motion to set aside a foreign judgment, the standard is identical to that of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d). The defendant must show that the judgment is defective due to lack of jurisdiction over the person or subject matter due to fraud, accident, or mistake, or due to a nonamendable defect on the face of the pleadings. Arnold v. Brundidge Banking Co., 209 Ga. App. 278, 433 S.E.2d 388 (1993).

Collateral attack on foreign judgment.

- When suit is brought to domesticate a foreign judgment, that judgment may be attacked collaterally on the ground that the foreign court in which the judgment was obtained lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. If the foreign judgment was obtained by default, no presumption of personal jurisdiction exists, and the burden is on the party seeking to domesticate the judgment to negate the defense of lack of jurisdiction. Sanwa Leasing Corp. v. Stan Hunt Constr. Co., 214 Ga. App. 837, 449 S.E.2d 347 (1994).

Plaintiff's judgment obtained in Texas by default against a Georgia resident was properly set aside after the plaintiff failed to negate the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. Chambers v. Navare, 231 Ga. App. 318, 498 S.E.2d 173 (1998).

Because a trial court was required by O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-60 and9-12-132 to accord a foreign judgment full faith and credit if the judgment was proper under the law in which the judgment was rendered, the court erred in holding that Georgia law governed the filing of the debtors' answer in a New York case; the trial court erred in granting a motion to set aside the judgment since the debtors were in default for failing to timely serve an answer upon counsel in accordance with N.Y. C.P.L.R. 320(a), 2103(b). LeRoy Vill. Green Residential Health Care Facility, Inc. v. Downs, 310 Ga. App. 754, 713 S.E.2d 728 (2011).

Stipulation for extension of time was not appearance.

- Trial court erred in denying a corporation's motion to set aside a New Jersey judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-12-132 because New Jersey lacked personal jurisdiction; a stipulation for an extension of time to answer the complaint filed with the New Jersey court did not constitute an appearance so as to submit the corporation to that court's jurisdiction. Homeowners Mortg. of Am., Inc. v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 294 Ga. App. 153, 668 S.E.2d 561 (2008).

Retroactive application warranted.

- Because O.C.G.A. § 9-12-132 is a law that acts upon remedies alone, the trial court erred by failing to apply the statute retroactively. Kaylor v. Turner, 210 Ga. App. 2, 435 S.E.2d 233 (1993).

Domestication prior to modification.

- Georgia permits modification of a foreign divorce decree only after domestication of that judgment, and since a final divorce decree remained a Texas judgment, the court had no authority to modify its provision for permanent child support. Pearson v. Pearson, 263 Ga. 400, 435 S.E.2d 40 (1993).

Power of court to set aside judgment in same term does not extend to domesticated foreign judgment.

- Inherent power of a Georgia court to set aside a judgment within the same term of court in which it was entered does not extend to a foreign judgment domesticated under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-130 et seq. Lemcon USA Corp. v. Icon Tech. Consulting, Inc., 301 Ga. 888, 804 S.E.2d 347 (2017).

Stay of enforcement of foreign judgment proper.

- Trial court properly stayed enforcement of an original South Carolina judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-134 because an appeal was pending, and once the South Carolina appellate court issued a remittitur and the lower court entered a revised judgment, the appellee properly filed the revised South Carolina judgment and moved to lift the stay, and once the revised South Carolina judgment was filed, that judgment, like the original, had the same effect as a Georgia judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-132. The revised judgment had the same effect a Georgia judgment would have if the judgment had been revised in accordance with a remittitur received from a Georgia appellate court, and the stay was, therefore, properly lifted to allow enforcement of that revised judgment. Noaha, LLC v. Vista Antiques & Persian Rugs, Inc., 306 Ga. App. 323, 702 S.E.2d 660 (2010).

Venue.

- Although O.C.G.A. § 9-12-132 of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-130 et seq., did not contain a venue provision, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(1) provided that venue was in the county where the corporation maintained the corporation's registered office; therefore, the Superior Court of Cobb County erred in denying the corporation's motion to set aside a foreign judgment when the corporation's registered office was in Henry County. Cherwood, Inc. v. Marlin Leasing Corp., 268 Ga. App. 64, 601 S.E.2d 356 (2004).

Action time-barred.

- Trial court properly found that an action to enforce a Florida judgment entered against a judgment debtor was time-barred under Georgia law, granting the judgment debtor's motion to stay enforcement of that judgment as the statute of limitations on enforcement of the Florida judgment had run under the law of Georgia, the receiving state, when viewed from the date of rendition of the judgment in the State of Florida, the state in which the judgment originated; moreover, to run the Georgia time limitation from the date of the filing of the judgment rather than from the date of rendition of the judgment would be contrary to the language of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-130 et seq., and of Georgia's dormancy-of-judgment and judgment-renewal statutes, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-60 and9-12-61. Corzo Trucking Corp. v. West, 281 Ga. App. 361, 636 S.E.2d 39 (2006).

Corporation and two individuals could not enforce a 1985 Florida judgment, which was renewed in 2006, in Georgia pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-130 et seq., because by their operation in tandem, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-60(a)(1) and9-12-61 created a 10-year statute of limitation for the enforcement of Georgia judgments and O.C.G.A. § 9-12-132 did not allow a Florida judgment to have a longer life than a Georgia judgment. Corzo Trucking Corp. v. West, 296 Ga. App. 399, 674 S.E.2d 414 (2009).

Appeal.

- Denial of a motion to set aside a judgment filed under O.C.G.A. Art. 6, Ch. 12, T. 9 is treated no differently for appeal purposes than any other judgment. Okekpke v. Commerce Funding Corp., 218 Ga. App. 705, 463 S.E.2d 23 (1995).

Proper method for attacking a foreign judgment filed in Georgia under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-130 et seq., is a motion to set aside under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d), and the only appealable judgment in a case where a creditor sought to domesticate a New Jersey judgment in Georgia was the order denying the motion to set aside; because the corporation and the individual failed to appeal the denial of the motion to set aside by application, the order directing the corporation and the individual to pay in accordance with the New Jersey judgment was a nullity and provided no basis for review so the appellate court had no jurisdictional basis for the appeal and the appeal was dismissed. Arrowhead Alternator, Inc. v. CIT Communs. Fin. Corp., 268 Ga. App. 464, 602 S.E.2d 231 (2004).

Appeal of an order denying the appellants' motion to vacate a foreign judgment was dismissed because the appellants failed to follow the correct procedure for appealing the trial court's decision; appellants never filed a motion to set aside the judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d), which was the proper method for attacking a foreign judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-130 et seq.; the underlying subject matter of the appellants' motions was an attempt to set aside a judgment, and the denial of the appellants' motions was subject to discretionary appeal because the underlying subject matter generally controlled over the relief sought in determining the proper procedure to follow to appeal. Noaha, LLC v. Vista Antiques & Persian Rugs, Inc., 306 Ga. App. 323, 702 S.E.2d 660 (2010).