Timeliness.

- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a judgment debtor in a judgment creditor's action, seeking to revive an original judgment, or to declare that a prior revival action was proper for purposes of reviving that original judgment as the original judgment became dormant seven years after the judgment was entered when the creditor had not caused execution to issue, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60, but the creditor had filed the revival action under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-61 within three years of the dormancy, which was timely; pursuant to applicable rules of statutory construction, O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(b), the Court of Appeals of Georgia, Fourth Division, concluded that the General Assembly intended that dormant judgments could be revived during a three-year period thereafter by bringing an action into existence, i.e., filing an action. Magnum Communs. Ltd. v. Samoluk, 275 Ga. App. 177, 620 S.E.2d 439 (2005).

Foreign judgments.

- Dormant judgments may be revived under this section, but this section does not authorize the revival of a foreign judgment. Retirement Credit Plan, Inc. v. Melnick, 139 Ga. App. 570, 228 S.E.2d 740 (1976).

Trial court properly found that an action to enforce a Florida judgment entered against a judgment debtor was time-barred under Georgia law, granting the judgment debtor's motion to stay enforcement of that judgment as the statute of limitations on enforcement of the Florida judgment had ran under the law of Georgia, the receiving state, when viewed from the date of rendition of the judgment in the State of Florida, the state in which the judgment originated; moreover, to run the Georgia time limitation from the date of the filing of the judgment rather than from the date of rendition of the judgment would be contrary to the language of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-130 et seq., and of Georgia's dormancy-of-judgment and judgment-renewal statutes, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-60 and9-12-61. Corzo Trucking Corp. v. West, 281 Ga. App. 361, 636 S.E.2d 39 (2006).

Corporation and two individuals could not enforce a 1985 Florida judgment, which was renewed in 2006, in Georgia pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-130 et seq., because by their opera- tion in tandem, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-60(a)(1) and9-12-61 created a ten year statute of limitation for the enforcement of Georgia judgments and O.C.G.A. § 9-12-132 did not allow a Florida judgment to have a longer life than a Georgia judgment. Corzo Trucking Corp. v. West, 296 Ga. App. 399, 674 S.E.2d 414 (2009).

Trial court erred in denying the appellant's petition to domesticate and enforce a judgment that was entered by a Michigan court in its favor against the appellee because, under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-130 et seq., the trial court was required to treat the August 3, 2007, Michigan judgment as if it had been entered in Georgia, and, although the judgment became dormant seven years after it was entered, the trial court overlooked the fact that the appellant had an additional three years after the judgment became dormant to revive it; thus, the Michigan judgment was enforceable in Georgia because the appellant sought domestication and enforcement of the Michigan judgment in November 2016, less than 10 years after the judgment's entry. Auto. Credit Corp. v. White, 344 Ga. App. 321, 810 S.E.2d 166 (2018).

Section applicable to federal judgment.

- Ever since the effective date of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-130 et seq., the provision of O.C.G.A. § 9-12-61 for revival of a dormant judgment is applicable to revive a dormant federal judgment. Smith v. State, 218 Ga. App. 429, 461 S.E.2d 553 (1995).

Writ should have been issued after revival of dormant judgment in workers' compensation case.

- In an action wherein a workers' compensation claimant revived a lump-sum judgment of $37,747.08 plus accrued interest, which had become dormant against an employer, the trial court properly refused to amend the 2006 judgment that revived it to provide for weekly disability payments as the term of court ended and, therefore, the trial court had no authority to amend or alter that 2006 judgment. However, the trial court should have issued a writ of execution for the payments that became due after July 27, 2000, as those payment had not become dormant. Taylor v. Peachbelt Props., 293 Ga. App. 335, 667 S.E.2d 117 (2008).

Action to revive dormant tax execution.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 110-1001 - 110-1003 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-60 and9-12-61) have no application to an action to revive a "dormant tax execution" under former Code 1933, §§ 92-7701 and 92-7702 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 48-3-21 and48-3-22). Oxford v. Generator Exch., Inc., 99 Ga. App. 290, 108 S.E.2d 174 (1959).

Application to bankruptcy proceeding.

- Debtor's objection to the creditor's amended proof of claim was sustained and the creditor's claim was allowed as general unsecured since: (1) the creditor admitted that over seven years elapsed since the judgment was recorded and that the state court judgment was dormant when the debtor filed for bankruptcy; (2) by stipulation of the parties, the judgment became dormant nearly one full year before the debtor sought bankruptcy relief; (3) because the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition after the seven-year period established by O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60 expired, the creditor's judgment lien was invalid and unenforceable on the filing date; (4) the automatic stay barred the creditor from renewing or reviving the creditor's lien post-petition; and (5) relief from the stay would not have resurrected the creditor's secured status because the law was clear that the lien as revived attached only as of the date of the revival. Beckham v. A & W Oil & Tire Co. (In re Beckham), Bankr. (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2004)(Unpublished).

While an order of a court for insolvent costs was a judgment when placed on the minutes of the court, it was not such a judgment as contemplated under former Code 1933, §§ 110-1001 - 110-1003 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-60 and9-12-61). Walden v. Bale, 78 Ga. App. 226, 50 S.E.2d 844 (1948).

Unrecorded judgment as well as recorded judgment may be renewed by action or by scire facias within three years from the time it becomes dormant. Watkins v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 163 Ga. App. 468, 294 S.E.2d 703 (1982), aff'd sub nom. Watkins v. C. & S. Emory Bank, 250 Ga. 29, 301 S.E.2d 892 (1983).

Applicability of law regarding entry of judgments.

- Except for determining whether or not a judgment has been dormant, the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58, pertaining to entry of judgment, are immaterial in an action for renewal of a dormant judgment. Watkins v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 163 Ga. App. 468, 294 S.E.2d 703 (1982), aff'd sub nom. Watkins v. C. & S. Emory Bank, 250 Ga. 29, 301 S.E.2d 892 (1983).

Judgment rendered in this state becomes dormant and cannot be enforced if seven years elapse before execution is issued thereon and entered on the general execution docket of the court wherein such judgment is rendered. Odum v. Peterson, 170 Ga. 666, 153 S.E. 757 (1930).

Entry on execution must be made by authorized officers.

- Judgment likewise becomes dormant if seven years shall elapse at any time after the execution is issued thereon without an entry on the execution by an officer authorized to execute and return the execution and such entry recorded on the docket. Odum v. Peterson, 170 Ga. 666, 153 S.E. 757 (1930).

Second record of entry on the execution shall be made on the general execution docket of the date the return is filed, with the date of such record entered by the clerk, in addition to the entry which is made on the docket of the date that the execution was originally entered; but no such second return shall be made on the general execution docket if the date that the entry is filed is less than seven years from the date of the execution. Odum v. Peterson, 170 Ga. 666, 153 S.E. 757 (1930).

Dormant judgment renewable as matter of right.

- Although a judgment is dormant and has, therefore, lost its lien, it is still a subsisting debt and the judgment can be renewed as a matter of right by scire facias or by suit. Hagins v. Blitch, 6 Ga. App. 839, 65 S.E. 1082 (1909).

Renewed suit fileable despite laches.

- Although the defendants may have been guilty of laches for belated service in the original suit, that suit was merely voidable rather than void, such that a renewed suit was fileable following voluntary dismissal of the original suit. Wells v. Faust, 206 Ga. App. 818, 426 S.E.2d 655 (1992).

Scire facias to revive a judgment is not an original action, but the continuation of the suit in which the judgment was obtained, and may be used by a plaintiff to revive a dormant judgment. Fielding v. M. Rich & Bros. Co., 46 Ga. App. 785, 169 S.E. 383 (1933).

Scire facias to be used to revive judgment.

- If the right to revive a judgment is barred by this section, that issue should be raised by an appropriate plea to the scire facias. Walker v. Turner, 203 Ga. 525, 47 S.E.2d 504 (1948).

Defending against scire facias.

- Defendant is absolutely precluded from going behind the judgment and offering in defense to the scire facias any matter which existed before rendition of the original judgment and which might have been presented in the former proceeding. Mitchell v. Chastain Fin. Co., 141 Ga. App. 512, 233 S.E.2d 829 (1977).

During dormancy there is no presumption in favor of defendant that the judgment has been paid, but such presumption exists only as to third persons. Hagins v. Blitch, 6 Ga. App. 839, 65 S.E. 1082 (1909).

Action of debt will lie upon a dormant judgment in this state. Lockwood v. Barefield, 7 Ga. 393 (1849).

Garnishment will also lie upon a dormant judgment. Bridges v. North, 22 Ga. 52 (1857).

In reviving a dormant judgment, interest is to be counted during the period of dormancy as well as for the rest of the time. Wilcher v. Hamilton, 15 Ga. 435 (1854).

Proof of execution not necessary.

- It is not necessary, in a suit to revive a dormant judgment, for the plaintiff to prove that an execution issued thereon is not vital and effective. If such is the fact, it is a matter of defense. Reynolds v. Lyon, 20 Ga. 225 (1856).

Bank was not required to make a bona fide effort to collect a judgment against the bank's debtor as a condition precedent to the filing of a proceeding to revive or renew the judgment. Mallory v. First Ga. Bank, 178 Ga. App. 797, 344 S.E.2d 679 (1986).

Justice of the peace courts may revive their judgments. In reviving a judgment in a justice of the peace court, it is not necessary that the justice presiding should be the same justice who presided when the judgment was rendered. It is not necessary that the applicant to revive a justice of the peace court judgment should accompany the application with an affidavit that the judgment has not been satisfied. Wilcher v. Hamilton, 15 Ga. 435 (1854).

Issuance of alias execution not sufficient to revive dormant judgment.

- When a judgment is dormant or dead, issuance of an alias execution in lieu of the lost original execution which issued on the judgment does not revive the judgment. U-Driv-It Sys. v. Lyles, 71 Ga. App. 70, 30 S.E.2d 111 (1944).

Order granting leave to sue is not an order of revival of a judgment, whether or not the plaintiff had a right to revive. It may be a final order but it is not a final foreign money judgment which the plaintiff is seeking to have made into a judgment in this state. Retirement Credit Plan, Inc. v. Melnick, 139 Ga. App. 570, 228 S.E.2d 740 (1976).

Nunc pro tunc orders cannot rescue judgments from dormancy.

- After a judgment becomes dormant for any reason, although the judgment may be revived in a proper action for that purpose brought within the time prescribed by this section it cannot be rescued from dormancy by mere nunc pro tunc orders entered upon the execution. Georgia Sec. Co. v. Sanders, 74 Ga. App. 295, 39 S.E.2d 570 (1946).

If a judgment creditor seeks by scire facias to keep a judgment in force then the judgment creditor must proceed against all the defendants and revive the specific judgment. If the judgment creditor selects the other method, namely, a new action on the judgment, the judgment creditor need join only such as the judgment creditor elects to join. American Nat'l Bank v. Hodges, 41 Ga. App 717, 154 S.E. 653 (1930).

Decree for alimony, payable in installments, was not a judgment within the meaning of former Code 1933, § 110-1001 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60) fixing a time when judgments shall become dormant unless an execution was issued thereon; nor was it a judgment within the meaning of former Code 1933, §§ 110-1002 and 110-1003 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-12-61) limiting the time within which a dormant judgment may be revived by scire facias. Cleveland v. Cleveland, 197 Ga. 746, 30 S.E.2d 605 (1944). (But see Bryant v. Bryant, 232 Ga. 160, 205 S.E.2d 223 (1974); O'Neil v. Williams, 232 Ga. 170, 205 S.E.2d 226 (1974)).

Revival of dormant installment payments of settlement agreement in final divorce decree.

- When, pursuant to a settlement agreement incorporated into the final divorce decree, the husband would pay the wife 50% percent of the husband's Armed Services retirement pay per month after the husband was no longer obligated to pay child support, the trial court's ruling that any and all installment payments due to the wife could not be enforced was reversed because the dormancy period did not begin to run until each installment was due as each installment payment was treated as a new and separate judgment; thus, the installments that became due within seven years preceding the issuance and recording of the execution were collectible and enforceable; and the installments that were dormant remained subject to revival. Holmes-Bracy v. Bracy, 302 Ga. 714, 808 S.E.2d 669 (2017).

No revival based on contempt.

- Filing of wife's citation for contempt did not constitute an "action" under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-61 so as to revive the dormant judgment. Parker v. Eason, 265 Ga. 236, 454 S.E.2d 460 (1995).

Revival of dormant installment payments of alimony judgments.

- Installment payments of alimony judgments that are dormant, having become due seven to ten years prior to the filing of a revival action, are subject to becoming revived through the applicable statutory revival procedure. Bryant v. Bryant, 232 Ga. 160, 205 S.E.2d 223 (1974); O'Neil v. Williams, 232 Ga. 170, 205 S.E.2d 226 (1974). (But see Cleveland v. Cleveland, 197 Ga. 746, 30 S.E.2d 605 (1944)).

Child support.

- Child support judgments are subject to statutes regarding dormancy even though the enforcement of these judgments is by means of a contempt action. Parker v. Eason, 265 Ga. 236, 454 S.E.2d 460 (1995).

Filing of an Alabama child support order in a Georgia court was not viewed as a traditional action on a foreign judgment, but was more appropriately governed by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), O.C.G.A. § 19-11-100 et seq.; in a Georgia arrearage proceeding under UIFSA, the statute of limitation under the laws of Georgia or of the issuing state, whichever was longer, governed, and since the Alabama period for dormancy of judgments was longer than that of Georgia, Alabama law applied. Bodenhamer v. Wooten, 265 Ga. App. 733, 595 S.E.2d 592 (2004).

Child support arrearages which accrued prior to the date of the adoption of the children were revived by a court granting the claimant's application for scire facias and were not eradicated by adoption of the children. Wannamaker v. Carr, 257 Ga. 634, 362 S.E.2d 53 (1987).

Cited in Rawson v. Thornton, 43 Ga. 537 (1871); Latham & Sons v. Hester, 181 Ga. 100, 181 S.E. 573 (1935); James v. Roberts, 55 Ga. App. 755, 191 S.E. 301 (1937); Trust Co. v. Mortgage-Bond Co., 203 Ga. 461, 46 S.E.2d 883 (1948); Rust v. Producers Coop. Exch., Inc., 81 Ga. App. 260, 58 S.E.2d 435 (1950); United States v. Jenkins, 141 F. Supp. 499 (S.D. Ga. 1956); Howard v. Pate, 108 Ga. App. 50, 131 S.E.2d 852 (1963); Hogan v. Scott, 109 Ga. App. 799, 137 S.E.2d 575 (1964); Jeffries v. Federal Employees Credit Union, 113 Ga. App. 673, 149 S.E.2d 417 (1966); Stanley v. Stanley, 141 Ga. App. 411, 233 S.E.2d 454 (1977); Kight v. Behringer, 192 Ga. App. 62, 383 S.E.2d 624 (1989); Bowers v. Jim Rainwater Bldr. & Properties, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 254, 416 S.E.2d 832 (1992); Brown v. Brown, 269 Ga. 724, 506 S.E.2d 108 (1998); Popham v. Jordan, 278 Ga. App. 254, 628 S.E.2d 660 (2006); Sussman v. Sussman, 301 Ga. App. 397, 687 S.E.2d 644 (2009); Barker v. Whittington (In re Barker), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 26, 2010); Heard v. Ruef, Ga. App. , 815 S.E.2d 607 (2018).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, § 331 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 740 et seq.

ALR.

- Suspension, or removal of bar, of statute of limitations as against judgment, 21 A.L.R. 1038; 166 A.L.R. 768.

Running of limitations against proceeding to renew or revive judgment as affected by appeal or right of appeal from judgment, or by motion or right to move for new trial, 123 A.L.R. 565.

Ancillary proceedings as suspending or removing bar of statute of limitations as to judgment, 166 A.L.R. 767.

Validity, and applicability to causes of action not already barred, of a statute enlarging limitation period, 79 A.L.R.2d 1080.