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O.C.G.A.Title 9Chapter 3

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73 (2023)

Certain disabilities and exceptions applicable

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2023 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest cited 1987–2025 60citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 60 opinions since 1987, 7 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (b) (8 cases).

(a) Except as provided in this Code section, the disabilities and exceptions prescribed in Article 5 of this chapter in limiting actions on contracts shall be allowed and held applicable to actions, whether in tort or contract, for medical malpractice.

(b) Notwithstanding Article 5 of this chapter, all persons who are legally incompetent because of intellectual disability or mental illness and all minors who have attained the age of five years shall be subject to the periods of limitation for actions for medical malpractice provided in this article. A minor who has not attained the age of five years shall have two years from the date of such minor’s fifth birthday within which to bring a medical malpractice action if the cause of action arose before such minor attained the age of five years.

(c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section, in no event may an action for medical malpractice be brought by or on behalf of:

(1) A person who is legally incompetent because of intellectual disability or mental illness more than five years after the date on which the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred; or

(2) A minor:

(A) After the tenth birthday of the minor if such minor was under the age of five years on the date on which the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred; or

(B) After five years from the date on which the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred if such minor was age five or older on the date of such act or omission.

(d) Subsection (b) of this Code section is intended to create a statute of limitations and subsection (c) of this Code section is intended to create a statute of repose.

(e) The limitations of subsections (b) and (c) of this Code section shall not apply where a foreign object has been left in a patient’s body. Such cases shall be governed by Code Section 9-3-72.

(f) The findings of the General Assembly under this Code section include, without limitation, that a reasonable relationship exists between the provisions, goals, and classifications of this Code section and the rational, legitimate state objectives of providing quality health care, assuring the availability of physicians, preventing the curtailment of medical services, stabilizing insurance and medical costs, preventing stale medical malpractice claims, and providing for the public safety, health, and welfare as a whole.

(g) No action which, prior to July 1, 1987, has been barred by provisions relating to limitations of actions shall be revived by this article, as amended. No action which would be barred before July 1, 1987, by the provisions of this article, as amended, but which would not be so barred by the provisions of this article and Article 5 of this chapter in force immediately prior to July 1, 1987, shall be barred until July 1, 1989.

History

Code 1933, § 3-1104, enacted by Ga. L. 1976, p. 1363, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 887, § 2; Ga. L. 2015, p. 385, § 4-15/HB 252.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 2015, p. 385, § 1-1/HB 252, not codified by the General Assembly, pro-

vides that: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘J. Calvin Hill, Jr., Act.’” Law reviews. For annual survey of law on trial practice and procedure, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 339 (2010).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Constitutionality. - The 1987 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73 should be construed as constitutional, rational, and consistent with the intent of the legislature. It was clearly the legislative intent that medical malpractice claimants whose claims were affected by the amendment be given a grace period within which to bring suit. Mansfield v. Pannell, 261

Ga. 243, 404 S.E.2d 104, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 224 (1991); Crowe v. Humana, 263 Ga. 833, 439 S.E.2d 654, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 75 (1994). Subsections (b) and (g) of O.C.G.A. § 93-73 should be construed as meaning that no action will be barred before two years from the effective date. The result of that construction is that no action will be

barred before July 1, 1989. Thus construed, the statute is constitutional. Mansfield v. Pannell, 261 Ga. 243, 404 S.E.2d 104, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 224 (1991); Kumar v. Hall, 262 Ga. 639, 423 S.E.2d 653, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 997 (1992). The 1987 amendment of O.C.G.A. § 93-73, which altered the tolling provisions otherwise applicable to tort claims by injured minors in cases in which tort claims arose from health care professionals’ malpractice, did not violate a brain-damaged childs’ right to equal protection or right of access to the courts. Smith v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 262 Ga. 566, 423 S.E.2d 235, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 987 (1992); Crowe v. Humana, 263 Ga. 833, 439 S.E.2d 654, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 75 (1994). Application of subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73 to patient who was incompetent due to traumatic brain injury did not violate equal protection or due process. Kumar v. Hall, 262 Ga. 639, 423 S.E.2d 653, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 997 (1992). Provision of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73(b) making tolling unavailable for legally incompetent persons in medical malpractice cases does not violate the equal protection clause, U.S. Const., amend. 14. The legislature had a rational basis for distinguishing between the legally incompetent and parties who are permitted tolling: foreign object plaintiffs, unrepresented estates, and contribution plaintiffs. Deen v. Egleston, 597 F.3d 1223, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4172 (11th Cir. 2010). Construction with § 9-3-71. - In a medical malpractice action, because the trial court erroneously applied the fiveyear statute of repose contained in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(b), and not O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73, in finding that the parents’ amended negligence complaint against certain doctors and nurses was timebarred, the trial court erred in entering summary judgment against the parents; further, the trial court also erred in finding that the doctors and nurses were rendering care to only the mother, and not the mother and the newborn child. Johnson v. Thompson, 286 Ga. App. 810, 650 S.E.2d 322, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 799 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1840, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 90 (Ga. Jan. 7, 2008).

Retroactivity of amendment. - The 1987 amendment of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73 could be applied retroactively to cause of action which arose prior to amendment’s effective date. Smith v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 262 Ga. 566, 423 S.E.2d 235, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 987 (1992); Crowe v. Humana, 263 Ga. 833, 439 S.E.2d 654, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 75 (1994). Legislative purpose. - When a patient and the patient’s spouse filed a medical malpractice complaint, which the spouse amended after the patient’s death to add a wrongful death claim, the wrongful death claim was not barred by the statute of repose as the wrongful death claim did not initiate legal proceedings, but was filed as an amendment to a pending suit that timely asserted other claims arising out of the same alleged malpractice; this result was consistent with the legislative purpose of the statute of repose set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73(f), as the original medical malpractice allegations had been brought less than two years after the alleged negligence, and the wrongful death claim was based on the same alleged acts and omissions as the earlier claims. Wesley Chapel Foot & Ankle Ctr., LLC v. Johnson, 286 Ga. App. 881, 650 S.E.2d 387, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 834 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1879, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 820 (Ga. Oct. 29, 2007). Minors. - Even though O.C.G.A. § 93-73 permits tolling the statute of limitations for disabilities in medical malpractice actions, under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90 a minor child must wait until reaching the age of 18 before tolling the two-year limitations period under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71 barring a medical malpractice action because under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-2 such actions are vested exclusively in the parents until the minor reaches 18. Rose v. Hamilton Medical Ctr., Inc., 184 Ga. App. 182, 361 S.E.2d 1, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2175 (1987). Right to recover the medical expenses of a minor is vested with the parents. Traylor v. Moyer, 199 Ga. App. 112, 404 S.E.2d 320, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 399 (1991). Provisions of subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73 pertaining to minors applies not only to suits brought on behalf of a minor, but also to suits brought personally by an

injured minor upon reaching majority. Barnes v. Sabatino, 205 Ga. App. 774, 423 S.E.2d 686 (1992). In a medical malpractice action against a hospital and physician for injury to an infant patient, the cause of action accrued, for limitations purposes, when the parents and patient discovered that the alleged negligence of the hospital and physicians caused the injuries, rather than when the alleged negligence was first discovered. Crowe v. Humana, 263 Ga. 833, 439 S.E.2d 654, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 75 (1994). Dismissal of minor’s wrongful death claims with prejudice was upheld because trial court judge approved consent order based on representations of both parties, and father failed to cite any legal authority to support assertion that trial court had independent duty to verify the parties’ joint statement that the statute of limitation had run on minor’s claims against defendants. Parrish v. St. Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., Inc., 364 Ga. App. 228, 874 S.E.2d 413, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 288 (2022), overruled in part, Hamon v. Connell, 315 Ga. 760, 883 S.E.2d 785, 2023 Ga. LEXIS 24 (2023). Parents. - In a medical malpractice lawsuit, the defendants’ motion for a partial summary judgment on all claims for damages that the parents incurred on behalf of their minor child was granted as those claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitation because the five-year statute of limitation extension applied only to the claims of the minor child and did not apply to the parents’ claims; thus, any of the parents’ claims for damages for their minor child’s medical expenses, and the parents’ ancillary claims such as their own loss of income, were subject to the two-year statute of limitation applicable to medical malpractice actions generally, and were barred. Swallows v. Adams-Pickett, 344 Ga. App. 647, 811 S.E.2d 445, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 106 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C0922, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 558 (Ga. Aug. 20, 2018). Wrongful death claim for intentional termination of patient’s life support tolled due to infancy of patient’s child. - Two year statute of limitations for wrongful death applied to a

suit alleging tortious termination of life support of a parent and that limitations period was tolled based on the infancy of the parent’s child, who was born to the parent prior to the defendant terminating the parent’s life support. DeKalb Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Hawkins, 288 Ga. App. 840, 655 S.E.2d 823, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1269 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0710, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 477 (Ga. May 19, 2008), overruled in part, Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393, 788 S.E.2d 872, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 417 (2016). Applicability of subsection (b). - Statute of limitations embodied in subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73 was intended to compel legally incompetent person to file suit within two years of its effective date. Kumar v. Hall, 262 Ga. 639, 423 S.E.2d 653, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 997 (1992). Tolling provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90 during periods of legal incapacity does not apply in actions for medical malpractice. Dowling v. Lopez, 211 Ga. App. 578, 440 S.E.2d 205, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1586 (1993), cert. denied, No. S94C0525, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 531 (Ga. Feb. 22, 1994). In a medical malpractice action by parents and child against an obstetrician and a medical association, there was a material question of fact as to whether the failure of the defendants to inform the parents of the etiology of the child’s condition, or the alleged intentional misrepresentation as to the cause of the child’s problems, were sufficient to toll the statute of limitations as a matter of law. Bynum v. Gregory, 215 Ga. App. 431, 450 S.E.2d 840, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1260 (1994), cert. denied, No. S95C0542, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 418 (Ga. Mar. 10, 1995). Traumatic brain injury. - Term “legally incompetent because of mental retardation or mental illness” has the same meaning in subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 93-73 as in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90 and applied to an action brought on behalf of a patient who was incompetent due to traumatic brain injury. Kumar v. Hall, 262 Ga. 639, 423 S.E.2d 653, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 997 (1992). Term “legally incompetent because of mental retardation or mental illness” includes those suffering from brain injury; thus, the tolling provisions of O.C.G.A.

§ 9-3-90 do not apply even when such mental incapacity exists. Robinson v. Williamson, 245 Ga. App. 17, 537 S.E.2d 159, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 895 (2000), cert. denied, No. S00C1805, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 95 (Ga. Jan. 19, 2001). Mental retardation or mental illness. - Even though the plaintiff may have been mentally ill, the plaintiff was not legally incompetent within the meaning of subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73 when the plaintiff’s testimony did not show that the plaintiff was incapable of carrying out the plaintiff’s day-to-day life activities and making decisions. Charter Peachford Behavioral Health Sys. v. Kohout, 233 Ga. App. 452, 504 S.E.2d 514. Applicability of subsection (g). - It was the intent of the legislature to enact subsection (g) of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73 exactly as the subsection is drafted. Subsection (g) does not contain any express exceptions for actions which would not have been barred before July 1, 1987, but which would subsequently become barred within two years of the effective date of § 9-3-73, as amended in 1987. Mansfield v. Pannell, 194 Ga. App. 549, 390 S.E.2d 913, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 172 (1990). When the complaint was filed after the effective date of the 1987 amendment of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73, no issue of retroactivity was involved. Mansfield v. Pannell, 194 Ga. App. 549, 390 S.E.2d 913, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 172 (1990). Applicability to optometrist. - Statute setting limitation and repose for medical malpractice actions applied to alleged professional negligence by an optometrist. Zechmann v. Thigpen, 210 Ga. App. 726, 437 S.E.2d 475, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1335 (1993), cert. denied, No. S94C0215, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 159 (Ga. Jan. 21, 1994). Applicability to statute of repose. - Pursuant to a question certified by the federal appellate court, the Supreme Court of Georgia finds that since the tolling of the ultimate statute of repose for medical malpractice cases is not required by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(d) or O.C.G.A. § 93-73(a) and it would contravene the mandatory language of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(b), the unrepresented estate statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-92, does not toll the stat-

ute of repose during the time that the estate of a claimant is unrepresented; thus, the district court properly dismissed the state court medical malpractice claims brought by the administrator of the estate of the claimant because the claims were time-barred and could not be extended by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-92. Simmons v. United States, 421 F.3d 1199, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 18157 (11th Cir. 2005). In a medical malpractice action, because the undisputed evidence showed that both the personal injury claims and a later-added wrongful death claim were timely filed, both in terms of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71 and the relevant statute of repose, the doctors sued were properly denied summary judgment as to those claims. Moreover, construction of the medical malpractice statute of repose was consistent with the stated purposes of preventing stale medical malpractice claims in recognition of the fact that time eroded evidence, memories, and the availability of witnesses. Cleaveland v. Gannon, 288 Ga. App. 875, 655 S.E.2d 662, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1277 (2007), aff’d, 284 Ga. 376, 667 S.E.2d 366, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 755 (2008). Computation of time of repose. - Time for ultimate repose is not computed from the time the cause of action arises, even in cases in which the injury is subsequent to the time of medical treatment, but rather it occurs in relation to the wrongful act or omission; thus, in an action against an optometrist involving misdiagnosis of a disease which led to glaucoma and enucleation of the plaintiff child’s eye, the time for ultimate repose was calculated not from the time that glaucoma developed, but from the time misdiagnosis occurred, and the action was barred. Zechmann v. Thigpen, 210 Ga. App. 726, 437 S.E.2d 475, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1335 (1993), cert. denied, No. S94C0215, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 159 (Ga. Jan. 21, 1994). Fraud. - In a malpractice action against an optometrist, the statute of repose was not tolled when there was no evidence of fraudulent concealment by the defendant and it could not be presumed that the defendant withheld information fraudulently rather than negligently or

without fault; and, even if there was evidence of fraudulent concealment, the running of the period was not tolled since the plaintiff knew of the correct diagnosis and had time to file suit within such period. Zechmann v. Thigpen, 210 Ga. App. 726, 437 S.E.2d 475, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1335 (1993), cert. denied, No. S94C0215, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 159 (Ga. Jan. 21, 1994). In a medical malpractice action by parents and child against an obstetrician and a medical association, alleged conduct of the defendants in failing to inform the parents of the etiology of the child’s condition, or the intentional misrepresentation as to the cause of the child’s problems, went far beyond simple nondisclosure and would authorize a jury to conclude that they engaged in intentional, deliberate

misrepresentation, or fraud, as opposed to a question of fact as to whether the plaintiff’s action was barred by the statute of ultimate repose. Bynum v. Gregory, 215 Ga. App. 431, 450 S.E.2d 840, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1260 (1994), cert. denied, No. S95C0542, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 418 (Ga. Mar. 10, 1995). Equitable estoppel. - Fraud under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 does not toll the statute of repose; however, if the evidence of defendant’s fraud or other conduct on which the plaintiff reasonably relied in forbearing the bringing of a lawsuit is found by the jury to exist, then the defendant is estopped from raising the defense of the statute of ultimate repose. Esener v. Kinsey, 240 Ga. App. 21, 522 S.E.2d 522.

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. Medical malpractice statutes of limitation minority provisions, 62 A.L.R.4th 758; 71 A.L.R.5th 307. When is person, other than one claiming posttraumatic stress syndrome or memory repression, within coverage of

statutory provision tolling running of limitations period on basis of mental disability, 23 A.L.R.6th 697. Estoppel to Assert Statute of Limitations or Statute of Repose in Action for Malpractice of Health Care Provider, 45 A.L.R.7th Art. 3.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENDeen v. Stevens, 698 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. 2010).
cites § 9-3-73 72×subsections: (b) 26× (f) 8× (e) 2×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“See OCGA § 9-3-73 (b) (“Notwithstanding Article 5 of this chapter, all persons who are legally incompetent because of mental retardation or mental illness .”
The case’s holding
A statute prohibiting the tolling of the medical malpractice statute of limitations for mentally incompetent plaintiffs satisfies rational basis review.
Later courts cite it for
“the rule is that administrative, clerical, or routine acts demanding no special expertise fall in the realm of simple negligence rather than medical malpractice.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENKumar v. Hall, 423 S.E.2d 653 (Ga. 1992).
cites § 9-3-73 42×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“Appellants contend that the suit is barred by the statute of limitation for "persons who are legally incompetent because of mental retardation or mental illness," OCGA § 9-3-73 (b). Because we find that the suit is barred by that statute of limitation, we reverse the judgment.”
The case’s holding
The statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims involving legally incompetent persons applies to individuals whose incompetence results from traumatic brain injury.
Later courts cite it for
“hypothetical situations in which an incompetent person might fail to meet the deadline of the statute of limitations because no person took an interest in his case, or because the person or persons who did act on his behalf lacked the ability to bring suit before the deadline.” · 1 citing court
3
GREENSimmons v. Sonyika, 614 S.E.2d 27 (Ga. 2005).
cites § 9-3-73 20×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“271, 274-276 (2) ( 531 SE2d 722 ) (2000) (holding that the provisions of OCGA § 9-3-72, relating to foreign object cases, when construed in light of the judicially created continuing tort doctrine upon which it was based, and in pari materia with OCGA § 9-3-73 (d), (e), plainly…”
The case’s holding
Statutes of repose cannot be tolled for any reason because they serve as absolute barriers to provide certainty to defendants.
Later courts cite it for
“would deprive the defendant of the certainty of the repose deadline and thereby defeat the purpose of a statute of repose.” · 5 citing courts
4
GREENMansfield v. Pannell, 390 S.E.2d 913 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
cites § 9-3-73 46×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“Effective July 31, 1987, OCGA Title 9 was amended as part of a legislative package designed to provide substantive and comprehensive reforms affecting claims for medical malpractice, among those changes were certain amendments to OCGA § 9-3-73; suit subsequently was filed on…”
5
GREENSmith v. Cobb Cnty.-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 423 S.E.2d 235 (Ga. 1992).
cites § 9-3-73 27×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“Smith, contend that the statute of limitation for medical malpractice actions by minors, OCGA § 9-3-73 (b), is unconstitutional as applied to her.”
The case’s holding
A legislative classification passes constitutional muster if the classification serves a legitimate purpose and bears a reasonable relation to furthering that purpose.
Later courts cite it for
“minors and persons who are legally incompetent because of mental retardation or mental illness.” · 1 citing court
6
GREENCanas v. Al-Jabi, 639 S.E.2d 494 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 9-3-73 15×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“OCGA § 9-3-73 (c) (2) (B). If the negligent or *773 wrongful act or omission occurred before the child’s fifth birthday, no action for medical malpractice may be brought after the child’s tenth birthday.”
The case’s holding
A physician may commit separate negligent acts if a patient presents with significant changes in symptoms that require medical reevaluation.
Later courts cite it for
“as a matter of law that 696 a doctor can only misdiagnose a patient once, regardless of the length of the treatment or the course of the patient's illness.” · 1 citing court
7
GREENZechmann v. Thigpen, 437 S.E.2d 475 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 9-3-73 18×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“The issues are whether the statute setting limitation and repose for medical malpractice actions involving a minor, OCGA § 9-3-73, is applicable and whether it is a bar to suit.”
The case’s holding
The statute of repose bars a medical malpractice action filed after a minor’s tenth birthday if the alleged negligence occurred when the minor was under five years old.
8
GREENCrowe v. Humana, Inc., 439 S.E.2d 654 (Ga. 1994).
cites § 9-3-73 16×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“The trial court found that the cause of action was time barred by OCGA § 9-3-73 (b), and dismissed the complaint.”
Later courts cite it for
“initiating the period of limitation in a medical malpractice action when the alleged negligence is first discovered would be contrary to the plain language of 9-3-71 and 9-3-73.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENJones v. Bates, 403 S.E.2d 804 (Ga. 1991).
cites § 9-3-73 12×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the entire complaint, upon Bates’ motion, because it was *241 time-barred by OCGA § 9-3-73, relating to minors’ claims of medical malpractice.”
The case’s holding
Medical malpractice exists only where the act or omission by the professional requires the exercise of expert medical judgment.
Later courts cite it for
“medical malpractice exists only where the act or omission by the professional requires the exercise of expert medical judgment.” · 4 citing courts
10
GREENMansfield v. Pannell, 404 S.E.2d 104 (Ga. 1991).
cites § 9-3-73 10×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“The physician denied all negligence and raised the affirmative defense of statute of limitation under OCGA § 9-3-73. His motion for summary judgment was denied by the trial court.”
The case’s holding
A court may construe a statute of limitations to provide a uniform grace period to prevent unconstitutional disparities that contradict legislative intent.
Later courts cite it for
“constitutional, rational, and consistent with the intent of the legislature,” · 1 citing court
11
GREENCharter Peachford Behavioral Health Sys., Inc. v. Kohout., 504 S.E.2d 514 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 9-3-73 8×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“(d) OCGA § 9-3-73 (b) (“persons who are legally incompetent because of mental retardation or mental illness”) and OCGA § 9-3-90 (a), when construed in pari materia, have the same meaning and require a plaintiff to be “mentally incompetent” during the period of tolling of the…”
The case’s holding
A statute of repose is not delayed by infancy, incompetency, or fraud that might otherwise toll a statute of limitations (finding nothing stops the abrogation by the statute of repose).
Later courts cite it for
“the fraud must conceal the cause of action and cut plaintiff off from suing, preclude him, hinder him, shut him out, or exclude him to debar him from bringing suit . . . .” · 1 citing court
12
GREENAndreana Williams v. Regency Hosp. Co., 897 S.E.2d 466 (Ga. 2024).
cites § 9-3-73 20×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“597 ( 698 SE2d 321 ) (2010), this Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA § 9-3-73 (b), in which the appellant argued that the statute irrationally discriminated against the mentally incompetent in violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth…”
13
GREENAbend v. Klaudt, 531 S.E.2d 722 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 9-3-73 10×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“First, the statutory construction concluding that the statute of repose in OCGA § 9-3-71 does not apply to actions brought under OCGA § 9-3-72 is consistent with the legislative intent expressed in OCGA § 9-3-73, where the legislature set forth a statute of limitation and a…”
The case’s holding
The five-year statute of repose in OCGA § 9-3-71(b) does not bar a foreign object medical malpractice action timely brought within the one-year limitation period of OCGA § 9-3-72.
Later courts cite it for
“plainly states that the five-year statute of repose ... does not apply to foreign object medical malpractice actions.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENSwallows v. Adams-Pickett, 811 S.E.2d 445 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
cites § 9-3-73 16×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“" OCGA § 9-3-73 (b) carves out an exception for minors younger than the age of five years, stating that "[a] minor who has not attained the age of five years shall have two years from the date of such minor's fifth birthday within which to bring a medical malpractice action if…”
Later courts cite it for
“the right to recover damages for a child's medical expenses vests solely in the child's parents, while the right to recover damages for pain and suffering vests in the child, not the parent” · 1 citing court
15
GREENWilson v. Obstetrics & Gynecology of Atlanta, P.C., 696 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 9-3-73 6×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“e statute of limitation and estop the Defendants from asserting the statute of repose; (2) that the trial court erred by implicitly holding that the right to recover medical expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child *301 may be asserted solely by the child’s parents, and not…”
Later courts cite it for
“because parents have this responsibility, the right to recover damages for medical expenses incurred in such treatment is vested exclusively in a minor child's parents.” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENGolden v. Floyd Healthcare Mgmt., Inc, 904 S.E.2d 359 (Ga. 2024).
cites § 9-3-73 8×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“, OCGA § 9-3-73 (c) (2) (A) (tolling the repose period set forth in OCGA § 9-3-71 (b) for children under the age of five until their tenth birthday).”
17
GREENSiler v. Block, 420 S.E.2d 306 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 9-3-73 10×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that this action is barred by OCGA § 9-3-73 (c) (2) (A). 1. Plaintiffs contend that they had a right to dismiss the earlier action and renew it under OCGA § 9-2-61 (a).”
Later courts cite it for
“the renewal provisions of ocga 9-2-61 (a) may not be used to avoid the bar of the statute of repose.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENBynum v. Gregory, 450 S.E.2d 840 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 9-3-73 8×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“Plaintiffs enumerate as error, the ruling that their claims are barred, as a matter of law, by the statute of limitation, OCGA § 9-3-73 (b), and by the statute of repose, OCGA § 9-3-73 (c).”
Later courts cite it for
“told her the diagnosis and its etiology” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENCraven v. Lowndes Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 437 S.E.2d 308 (Ga. 1993).
cites § 9-3-73 4×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“(c) Subsection (a) of this Code section is intended to create a two-year statute of limitations.”
The case’s holding
A medical malpractice statute of repose is constitutional if it bears a rational relationship to legitimate government interests and a mere misdiagnosis does not constitute fraud.
Later courts cite it for
“by offering evidence of a known failure to reveal negligence.” · 1 citing court
20
GREENDeen v. Egleston, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Ga. 2009).
cites § 9-3-73 14×subsections: (b) 4× (c) 2× (e) 2× (f) 2×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 9-3-73
“Because Georgia Code section 9-3-73 is unconstitutional as applied to Kenneth Deen, the motion will be DENIED in part.”
Later courts cite it for
“the supreme court ... demonstrated in cleburne that the courts should undertake a robust, searching form of rational basis review where the challenged law discriminates against the mentally incapacitated.” · 1 citing court

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198720062025

One bar per year. Tallest: 7 cases in 1993. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.38Ga.1611th Cir.3S.D. Ga.2N.D. Ga.1
By subsection
(a)2 cases
Simmons v. Sonyika, 394 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2004).
Sharon Simmons v. United States, 421 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2005).
(b)8 cases
Deen v. Stevens, 698 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. 2010).“See OCGA § 9-3-73 (b) (“Notwithstanding Article 5 of this chapter, all persons who are legally incompetent because of mental retardation or mental illness .”
Braden v. Bell, 473 S.E.2d 523 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
Deen v. Egleston, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Ga. 2009).“Because Georgia Code section 9-3-73 is unconstitutional as applied to Kenneth Deen, the motion will be DENIED in part.”
Oxley v. Kilpatrick, 486 S.E.2d 44 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
Clay v. Rippy, 682 S.E.2d 330 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
Showing the top 5 of 8. More in the list view →
(c)3 cases
Deen v. Egleston, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Ga. 2009).
Johnson v. Thompson, 650 S.E.2d 322 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
Sharon Simmons v. United States, 421 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2005).
(c)(2)(A)1 case
Johnson v. Thompson, 650 S.E.2d 322 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
(e)3 cases
Deen v. Stevens, 698 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. 2010).
Simmons v. Sonyika, 394 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2004).
Deen v. Egleston, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Ga. 2009).
(f)4 cases
Deen v. Stevens, 698 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. 2010).
Wesley Chapel Foot & Ankle Ctr., LLC v. Johnson, 650 S.E.2d 387 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
Cleaveland v. Gannon, 655 S.E.2d 662 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
Deen v. Egleston, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Ga. 2009).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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