Lawsuits and workers' compensation cases.

- Every party to a lawsuit or a workers' compensation proceeding must be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to present a claim or defense, i.e., to have that party's day in court. Hart v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 165 Ga. App. 681, 302 S.E.2d 701 (1983).

Reviewability of constitutionality claim.

- Because the Court of Appeals of Georgia was bound by the Supreme Court of Georgia's order transferring a personal injury plaintiff's appeal and expressly held that the trial court did not rule on whether O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(d) was constitutional, the Court of Appeals declined to consider the defendants' arguments that the statute was constitutional. Buchan v. Hobby, 288 Ga. App. 478, 654 S.E.2d 444 (2007).

This paragraph does not guarantee to citizen of this state any particular form or method of state procedure.

- Its requirements are satisfied if the citizen has reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard, and to present a claim or defense, due regard being had to the nature of the proceeding and the character of the rights which may be affected by it. Zorn v. Walker, 206 Ga. 181, 56 S.E.2d 511 (1949); State v. Sanks, 225 Ga. 88, 166 S.E.2d 19 (1969), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 144, 91 S. Ct. 593, 27 L. Ed. 2d 741 (1971).

The constitutional provision set forth in this paragraph is plainly subject to the inherent power of the court to prescribe the manner in which the business of the court shall be conducted and to preserve the order and decorum of the trial to the furtherance of justice; this discretion of the trial court in assuming the general superintendence and control of the litigation before it is a point of extreme delicacy with which the Court of Appeals is reluctant to interfere, and interference will not be had unless there appears in the case something to demand imperatively the corrective interposition of the Court of Appeals. Davis v. Barnes, 158 Ga. App. 89, 279 S.E.2d 330 (1981).

No requirement that prosecutor make evidence available before trial.

- There is no statute or rule of procedure of force in this state which requires a solicitor general (now district attorney) or other prosecuting officer to make evidence, documentary or otherwise, available to the accused or the accused's counsel before trial. Blevins v. State, 220 Ga. 720, 141 S.E.2d 426 (1965).

Argument of counsel to jury is a stage of trial. Pierce v. State, 47 Ga. App. 830, 171 S.E. 731 (1933).

Absence of counsel without consent of court will not prevent reception of verdict. Nowell v. State, 18 Ga. App. 143, 88 S.E. 909 (1916).

Argument of counsel may be limited.

- Ruling of court limiting argument by counsel was not contrary to the constitutional rights of the defendant. Lindsay v. State, 138 Ga. 818, 76 S.E. 369 (1912).

Inquiry into counsel's failure to challenge jury arrays required.

- When a defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to pursue the defendant's requests to challenge the arrays of the grand and traverse juries and to secure the presence of certain defense witnesses, the trial court's summary overruling of the defendant's motions for change of counsel without a hearing or any further inquiry was error. Heard v. State, 173 Ga. App. 543, 327 S.E.2d 767 (1985).

No abuse of discretion by court in refusing extension of time for further argument after counsel consumed the hour allowed. Port Wentworth Term. Corp. v. Leavitt, 28 Ga. App. 82, 110 S.E. 686 (1922).

Preclusion of right of nonresident contractor to bring action for payment on contract not unconstitutional.

- O.C.G.A. T. 48, C. 13, Art. 2 does not abridge a litigant's right to prosecute a cause of action in this state, as the same attack might lie logically against innumerable provisions of law which define the rights of litigants. Gorrell v. Fowler, 248 Ga. 801, 286 S.E.2d 13 (1982).

Right to be present at civil trial.

- In a medical malpractice case in which the trial judge received and answered a note from the jury without advising the parties or counsel, the plaintiffs were entitled to a new trial because the plaintiffs substantial rights to be present under due process and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII, had been infringed. Plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate harm because the note was destroyed and the trial judge and jurors disagreed on the note's contents, preventing supplementing the record under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-41. Phillips v. Harmon, 297 Ga. 386, 774 S.E.2d 596 (2015).

Right to be present not violated.

- Defendant's right to be present was not violated because the short portion of the trial in which the defendant was not present was not a critical phase of the proceedings as the only issue discussed was a procedural question about a witness that the court never had to rule on because it was resolved by the parties once the defendant was present. Pitt v. State, 337 Ga. App. 436, 787 S.E.2d 782 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1778, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 118 (Ga. 2017).

Right to testify not violated.

- Defendant's constitutional right to testify in the defendant's own behalf had not been violated. The trial court established that the defendant knew that the defendant had the right to testify if the defendant wanted to but elected not to after consulting with defense counsel. Branford v. State, 299 Ga. App. 890, 685 S.E.2d 731 (2009).

Recovery of attorney's fees.

- Trial court erred in finding that the Tort Reform Act of 2005, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68, violated Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII, since it permitted the recovery of attorney's fees absent the prerequisite showings of either O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 or O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, because there was no constitutional requirement that attorney's fees be awarded only pursuant to § 9-15-14 or § 13-6-11; in Georgia, attorney's fees are recoverable when authorized by some statutory provision or by contract, and § 9-11-68, is such a statutory provision authorizing the recovery of attorney's fees under specific circumstances. Smith v. Baptiste, 287 Ga. 23, 694 S.E.2d 83 (2010).

Presentation of legitimate defense precludes awarding attorney's fees.

- Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII right to defend one's own cause in court is a privilege granted to the defendant as well as the plaintiff; after a motorist being sued in a personal injury case testified that the rear-end collision at issue was caused when the injured person's car swerved suddenly into the motorist's lane, the injured person's witness, the driver of the other car, was a long-time friend of the injured person and that witness's testimony could have been self-serving, the motorist's deposition was consistent with the trial testimony, and the only substantial variation in the motorist's versions of events was between the police report, of which the officer had no independent recollection, and the motorist's testimony, there was a bona fide dispute as to liability and a reasonable defense, which precluded the award of attorney fees and expenses under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. Anderson v. Cayes, 278 Ga. App. 592, 630 S.E.2d 441 (2006).

Right to counsel at restitution hearing.

- Trial court erred in refusing to allow defendant's counsel, who was present in the defendant's absence at the restitution hearing, to cross-examine the victim, produce evidence, or present any argument on the defendant's behalf because a criminal defendant is entitled to representation by counsel at all critical stages of the proceeding, including sentencing, which included any hearing on restitution. Gibson v. State, 319 Ga. App. 627, 737 S.E.2d 728 (2013).

New trial warranted due to ex parte communication with jury.

- In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiffs were entitled to a new trial because the communication between the court and the jury was not disclosed to the plaintiffs or plaintiffs' counsel until after the verdict, the note and response were not made a part of the record, recollections differed as to the nature and timing of the communication, and it was impossible for the appellate court to determine if a defense verdict would have been demanded regardless of the effect of the communication on the jury. Phillips v. Harmon, 328 Ga. App. 686, 760 S.E.2d 235 (2014), aff'd in part and rev'd on other grounds, 297 Ga. 386, 774 S.E.2d 596 (2015), vacated on other grounds, 335 Ga. App. 450, 780 S.E.2d 914 (2015).

Cited in Boone v. Lord, 38 Ga. App. 397, 144 S.E. 123 (1928); Felker v. Still, 176 Ga. 735, 169 S.E. 15 (1933); Turner v. State, 176 Ga. 823, 169 S.E. 21 (1933); Adair v. Metropolitan Cas. Co., 48 Ga. App. 88, 171 S.E. 853 (1933); Simmons v. Newton, 178 Ga. 806, 174 S.E. 703 (1934); Johnson v. Walls, 185 Ga. 177, 194 S.E. 380 (1937); Mayor of Savannah v. Fawcett, 186 Ga. 132, 197 S.E. 253 (1938); Moyers v. State, 186 Ga. 446, 197 S.E. 846 (1938); West v. Haas, 191 Ga. 569, 13 S.E.2d 376 (1941); Morton v. Henderson, 123 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1941); White v. State, 196 Ga. 847, 27 S.E.2d 695 (1943); Steward v. Peerless Furn. Co., 70 Ga. App. 236, 28 S.E.2d 396 (1943); Thomas v. Dumas, 207 Ga. 161, 60 S.E.2d 356 (1950); Hilliard v. State, 209 Ga. 497, 74 S.E.2d 65 (1953); Hilliard v. State, 87 Ga. App. 769, 75 S.E.2d 173 (1953); Porch v. Foster, 209 Ga. 697, 75 S.E.2d 420 (1953); Garland v. Tanksley, 99 Ga. App. 201, 107 S.E.2d 866 (1959); Cadle v. State, 101 Ga. App. 175, 113 S.E.2d 180 (1960); Ferguson v. State, 219 Ga. 33, 131 S.E.2d 538 (1963); Bryan v. State, 224 Ga. 389, 162 S.E.2d 349 (1968); Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969); J. Bain, Inc. v. Poulos, 121 Ga. App. 647, 175 S.E.2d 86 (1970); Bush v. Morris, 123 Ga. App. 497, 181 S.E.2d 503 (1971); Ward v. Smith, 228 Ga. 137, 184 S.E.2d 592 (1971); Blocker v. Blackburn, 228 Ga. 285, 185 S.E.2d 56 (1971); Butts v. Davis, 126 Ga. App. 311, 190 S.E.2d 595 (1972); Doran v. Home Mart Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 233 Ga. 705, 213 S.E.2d 825 (1975); Revels v. Tift County, 235 Ga. 333, 219 S.E.2d 445 (1975); Tucker Door & Trim Corp. v. Fifteenth St. Co., 235 Ga. 727, 221 S.E.2d 433 (1975); Bradley v. Tenneco Oil Co., 146 Ga. App. 161, 245 S.E.2d 862 (1978); Spencer v. Hopper, 243 Ga. 532, 255 S.E.2d 1 (1979); Weeks v. State, 152 Ga. App. 629, 263 S.E.2d 513 (1979); Brown v. Department of Human Resources, 157 Ga. App. 106, 276 S.E.2d 155 (1981); Mullins v. Lavoie, 249 Ga. 411, 290 S.E.2d 472 (1982); Banks v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 168 Ga. App. 46, 308 S.E.2d 54 (1983); Dickerson v. State, 180 Ga. App. 852, 350 S.E.2d 835 (1986); Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 505 S.E.2d 731 (1998); Colwell v. State, 273 Ga. 634, 544 S.E.2d 120 (2001); Crane v. State Farm Ins. Co., 278 Ga. App. 655, 629 S.E.2d 424 (2006); Wheatley v. Moe's Southwest Grill, LLC, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2008); DeLong v. State, 310 Ga. App. 518, 714 S.E.2d 98 (2011); Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013).

Corporation does not have constitutional right to self-representation.

- A corporation is not a person for purposes of exercising a constitutional right to legal self-representation and is not permitted to have as its legal representative an individual who is not licensed to practice law in the courts of this state. Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Group, Inc., 267 Ga. 801, 485 S.E.2d 22 (1997), overruling Universal Scientific, Inc. v. Wolf, 165 Ga. App. 752, 302 S.E.2d 616 (1983); Knickerbocker Tax Systems, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 130 Ga. App. 383, 203 S.E.2d 290 (1973); Dixon v. Reliable Loans, Inc., 112 Ga. App. 618, 145 S.E.2d 77 (1965).

Request in mid-trial.

- Denial of defendant's request to represent oneself, a request made after the testimony of the state's third witness, could not serve as the basis for reversal since a defendant cannot frivolously change the defendant's mind in midstream by asserting the defendant's right to self-representation in the middle of the defendant's trial. Thaxton v. State, 260 Ga. 141, 390 S.E.2d 841 (1990).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's request for self-representation because the request was made in the middle of, not before, trial. Mason v. State, 325 Ga. App. 609, 754 S.E.2d 397 (2014).

Given the defendant's pre-trial equivocation, the defendant's outbursts during the trial, and the defendant's own statements indicating that the defendant never truly wished to finish the trial without the assistance of trial counsel, the defendant's decision to change the defendant's mind about counsel midstream and request to proceed pro se was, at best, a frivolous response to the introduction of evidence which disturbed the defendant; thus, the trial court did not violate the defendant's right to proceed pro se. Owens v. State, 298 Ga. 813, 783 S.E.2d 611 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 143, 196 L. Ed. 2d 110 (U.S. 2016).

Right of defendant to act as co-counsel abolished.

- Georgia Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. IX has been superseded by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII; thus, a person no longer has the right to represent oneself and also be represented by an attorney, i.e., the right to act as co-counsel. Jones v. State, 171 Ga. App. 184, 319 S.E.2d 18 (1984).

Defendant is not entitled to have counsel and also to represent oneself. The defendant is entitled to either, not both. Simmons v. State, 186 Ga. App. 886, 369 S.E.2d 36, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 919, 369 S.E.2d 36 (1988).

Defendant does not have a right to be represented by counsel and also to be self represented. Boyd v. State, 195 Ga. App. 758, 395 S.E.2d 7 (1990); Worley v. State, 201 Ga. App. 704, 411 S.E.2d 760 (1991).

No right to simultaneous representation by counsel and self-representation.

- Neither the state constitution nor the federal constitution provides a defendant with a right to simultaneous representation by counsel and self-representation. Loden v. State, 199 Ga. App. 683, 406 S.E.2d 103 (1991).

The trial court properly refused to accept plaintiff's pro se filings since the plaintiff was represented by counsel at the time of the filings. Jacobsen v. Haldi, 210 Ga. App. 817, 437 S.E.2d 819 (1993).

Representation by both counsel and self permitted.

- As the right to represent oneself does not evaporate when an attorney is hired, the court erred in barring a party from self representation because an appearance had been made for the attorney by other attorneys. However, the court is not required to accept random appearance and filings by both the client and the client's attorneys. If a party and the attorneys are unable to coordinate their efforts so that they speak with one voice, the court is empowered to appoint a leading counsel who shall be the spokesperson. Cherry v. Coast House, Ltd., 257 Ga. 403, 359 S.E.2d 904 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1060, 108 S. Ct. 1015, 98 L. Ed. 2d 981 (1988).

Refusal to permit co-counsel status constitutional.

- Defendant was not deprived of the defendant's constitutional right of self-representation through the trial court's refusal to permit the defendant to serve as co-counsel in defendant's own defense. Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616, 340 S.E.2d 891 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101, 107 S. Ct. 1328, 94 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1987); overruled on other grounds, Manzano v. State, 282 Ga. 557, 651 S.E.2d 661 (2007).

Trial court's requiring lead counsel to conduct examination of witnesses does not evince denial of the defendant's right of self-representation. Powers v. State, 168 Ga. App. 642, 310 S.E.2d 260 (1983).

No error in requiring defendant to designate lead counsel.

- It was not error to require the defendant in a criminal case to designate either the defendant or the defendant's attorney as lead counsel since the defendant was not denied the right to participate as co-counsel or required to elect whether the defendant wanted self representation or wanted to permit appointed counsel to defend the defendant. Garvey v. State, 176 Ga. App. 268, 335 S.E.2d 640 (1985).

Appointment of counsel when defendant refuses to cooperate not denial of right.

- When the trial judge had originally given the defendant the right to self-representation but retracted that right and reappointed a public defender after the defendant refused to participate in the trial, the defendant was not denied the right to self representation. Spencer v. State, 176 Ga. App. 313, 335 S.E.2d 661 (1985).

Lawyer, but not lay person, may act as co-counsel.

- A lay person does not have the right to self representation and also to be represented by an attorney, but a lawyer does have such a right, subject to the authority of the trial court to limit the exercise of that right in order to insure the orderly disposition of matters before it. Seagraves v. State, 259 Ga. 36, 376 S.E.2d 670 (1989); Miller v. State, 219 Ga. App. 213, 464 S.E.2d 621 (1995); Vick v. State, 237 Ga. App. 762, 516 S.E.2d 815 (1999).

Right of attorney to represent self.

- Attorney could not be disqualified from self representation in a pro se action even though the attorney had previously represented the defendant in defending similar allegations in another case. Johnston v. Aderhold, 216 Ga. App. 487, 455 S.E.2d 84 (1995).

Although rules of professional conduct preclude attorneys from engaging in certain behavior considered unethical when they are exercising their privilege of representing others, such prohibitions do not necessarily apply when attorneys exercise their right, either statutory or constitutional, to represent themselves as parties to litigation. Johnston v. Aderhold, 216 Ga. App. 487, 455 S.E.2d 84 (1995).

Voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of right to counsel.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's pro se motion for new trial by failing to warn the defendant of the dangers of self-representation because the trial court's colloquy with the defendant supported a finding that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived the right to counsel; the defendant, who was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that the defendant was a less safe driver, was a long-standing member of the Georgia Bar with experience in trying driving under the influence cases, and was assisted by a licensed member of the Bar sitting at counsel table. Davis v. State, 301 Ga. App. 484, 687 S.E.2d 854 (2009), cert. dismissed, No. S10C0633, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 339 (Ga. 2010).

Parent's right to represent themselves in appeal of child's delinquency adjudication.

- Child's parents had the right to appeal the juvenile court's delinquency adjudication of their child, to participate in the appellate process, and to represent themselves. In the Interest of J.L.B., 280 Ga. App. 556, 634 S.E.2d 514 (2006).

No abuse of discretion to refuse to allow defendant to cross-examine witness.

- Since leading counsel was conducting the cross-examination of a witness, the court did not abuse the court's discretion in refusing to allow the defendant (an attorney-at-law) also to conduct the cross-examination. Moyers v. State, 61 Ga. App. 324, 6 S.E.2d 438 (1939).

No right to address jury when pleading set up no defense.

- When a person is sued, and the answer which the person makes sets up no defense, and under the person's own evidence the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict against the person, the person has no cause and no right to appear and address the jury to whom the case has been submitted. Gunn v. Head, 116 Ga. 325, 42 S.E. 343 (1902).

Judge has discretion to permit accused to conduct part or all of cause.

- If a party is represented by counsel, it is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge upon timely request as to whether such party may or may not conduct part or all of the cause. Such limitation does not violate the constitutional right of an individual to defend oneself. Hiatt v. State, 144 Ga. App. 298, 240 S.E.2d 894 (1977).

Prohibition against deprivation of right to defend cause includes statutory rights of appeal.

- Under the Constitution, no person may be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend a cause in any of the courts of the state. Although the right of appeal is wholly statutory, it is available to any party who comes within the statute granting the right, and cannot be denied or abridged by the courts except as authorized by the statute. Hearing v. Johnson, 105 Ga. App. 408, 124 S.E.2d 655 (1962).

Waiver of right to appellate counsel.

- While a defendant has a right to pursue an appeal pro se under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, it must be preceded by an appropriate waiver of the right to appellate counsel. Costello v. State, 240 Ga. App. 87, 522 S.E.2d 572 (1999).

Right to self-representation on appeal.

- Trial court erred in refusing to allow a defendant to represent oneself at the hearing for defendant's motion for new trial or on appeal because, while the federal constitution did not recognize a defendant's right to self-representation on appeal, Georgia case law and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII recognized a right to self-representation on appeal. Cook v. State, 296 Ga. App. 496, 675 S.E.2d 245 (2009).

Provision for self-representation incidentally recognizes right of court access.

- This paragraph is intended to guarantee the right of self-representation in the courts of this state or by an attorney and as only incidentally recognizing the inherent right of access to the courts. Bloomfield v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 230 Ga. 484, 198 S.E.2d 144 (1973).

Plaintiff has right to sign plaintiff's own petition. Lanier v. Lanier, 79 Ga. App. 131, 53 S.E.2d 131 (1949).

No violation of right if defendant admits inability to represent oneself.

- When the defendant requested self-representation at trial but, upon hearing the trial court's warnings about self-representation admitted to being incapable of self-representation, the trial court did not err by proceeding with the trial with the existing appointed counsel representing the defendant. Lovelace v. State, 262 Ga. App. 690, 586 S.E.2d 386 (2003).

Failure to make unequivocal request for self-representation.

- Defendant's conviction of theft by taking, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, was supported by sufficient circumstantial evidence pursuant to O.C.G.A § 24-4-6 and the trial court also did not violate the defendant's right to self-representation under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII, as the defendant made no unequivocal request for self representation. Crutchfield v. State, 269 Ga. App. 69, 603 S.E.2d 462 (2004).

Ineffective assistance of counsel.

- When a criminal defendant elects self representation, either solely or in conjunction with representation or assistance by an attorney, the defendant will not thereafter be heard to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to any stage of the proceedings wherein the defendant was counsel. Mullins v. Lavoie, 249 Ga. 411, 290 S.E.2d 472 (1982); Bole v. State, 178 Ga. App. 508, 343 S.E.2d 729 (1986).

Assertion of right to be represented by counsel does not constitute waiver of right of self-representation. Burney v. State, 244 Ga. 33, 257 S.E.2d 543, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 970, 100 S. Ct. 463, 62 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1979).

No waiver of right to self-representation.

- Because there was no affirmative evidence that the defendant wavered or equivocated in the desire to proceed pro se, the defendant's mere silence at the start of trial was insufficient to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of the defendant's already invoked right to self-representation. Wiggins v. State, 298 Ga. 366, 782 S.E.2d 31 (2016).

Denial of right to self representation not found.

- Denial of a defendant's motion to participate at trial as co-counsel deprived the defendant of the defendant's state constitutional right of self-representation. However, when the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, in addition to the fact that the defendant was represented by two able counsel who conducted the defendant's defense in an extremely competent manner, denial of the motion constituted harmless error. Burney v. State, 244 Ga. 33, 257 S.E.2d 543, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 970, 100 S. Ct. 463, 62 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1979).

Defendant was not wrongfully denied the constitutional right to self-representation because inasmuch as the defendant's handwritten note sought to dismiss trial counsel and replace them with retained counsel, a public defender, or the defendant, the communication was not an unequivocal assertion of the defendant's right to self-representation. Danenberg v. State, 291 Ga. 439, 729 S.E.2d 315 (2012), cert. denied, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 941, 184 L. Ed. 2d 726 (2013).

Trial court did not err by failing to allow the defendant to fire counsel mid-trial and proceed pro se as the trial court indicated that the court did so to protect the defendant's best interests and the defendant's decision to change the defendant's mind about counsel midstream was, at best, a frivolous response to the introduction of evidence which disturbed the defendant. Owens v. State, 298 Ga. 813, 783 S.E.2d 611 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 143, 196 L. Ed. 2d 110 (U.S. 2016).

No general "right of access."

- The sole purpose underlying the revision and adoption of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII was to define and protect the right of an individual to self representation in the courts of this state, and not to afford a general "right of access." Nelms v. Georgian Manor Condominium Ass'n, 253 Ga. 410, 321 S.E.2d 330 (1984).

In a suit challenging a court's electronic filing fee system, the trial court did not err when the court granted the motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII and O.C.G.A. § 1-2-6(a)(6) because Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII was never intended to provide a right of access to the courts and the Georgia Supreme Court has established that there is no express constitutional right of access to the courts under the Georgia Constitution. Best Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Reed Elsevier Inc., 334 Ga. App. 826, 780 S.E.2d 689 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0502, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 286 (Ga. 2016).

Payment of damages into state treasury.

- Paragraph (e)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1, requiring that 75 percent of punitive damages awarded in a product liability action be paid into the state treasury, does not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII. State v. Moseley, 263 Ga. 680, 436 S.E.2d 632 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1107, 114 S. Ct. 2101, 128 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1994).

High-Voltage Safety Act, O.C.G.A. § 46-3-30 et seq., does not deprive injured persons of due process by abolishing a common law claim, since the legislature has the authority to abolish such claims prior to their accrual. Santana v. Georgia Power Co., 269 Ga. 127, 498 S.E.2d 521 (1998).

Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII is a right of choice between self-representation and representation by counsel provision, and not an access to the courts provision; thus, there is no express constitutional right of access to the courts under the Georgia Constitution. Couch v. Parker, 280 Ga. 580, 630 S.E.2d 364 (2006).

Trial court's dismissal of a driver's negligence lawsuit filed against an insured's insurer did not deprive the driver of any Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial or right of access to the courts under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII, given that the Seventh Amendment did not apply to suits in state courts and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII dealt with a litigant's choice of either self-representation or representation by counsel, not access to the courts. Crane v. Lazaro, 281 Ga. App. 127, 635 S.E.2d 319 (2006), cert. denied, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 907 (Ga. 2006); cert. dismissed, mot. denied, 549 U.S. 1200, 127 S. Ct. 1278, 167 L. Ed. 2d 69 (2007).

In an action which represented the tenth time a litigant had made the same argument that summary disposition of a prior state court case deprived the litigant of a federal Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, a motion for a new trial was properly dismissed, given that: (1) the claims therein had been previously addressed and rejected; (2) Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII was a right of choice provision, not a right of access provision; and (3) the motion was both untimely under O.C.G.A. § 5-5-40(a), and filed in the wrong county court, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(b). Crane v. Poteat, 282 Ga. App. 182, 638 S.E.2d 335 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 54 (Ga. 2007); cert. dismissed, 551 U.S. 1101, 127 S. Ct. 2912, 168 L. Ed. 2d 241 (2007).

Constitutional right to be heard in courts is granted defendants as well as plaintiffs. Traders Ins. Co. v. Mann, 118 Ga. 381, 45 S.E. 426 (1903).

Overbroad restrictions unconstitutional.

- After the court required any future suits filed by the defendant to be certified as a prima facie case by an attorney, this condition compelled the defendant to incur an expense, albeit relatively minor, of hiring an attorney despite the constitutional right to self representation, and contravened constitutional bounds by its overbreadth. In re Carter, 235 Ga. App. 551, 510 S.E.2d 91 (1998).

Defendant should not be deprived of liberty without opportunity to be heard.

- To deprive a defendant of liberty upon the theory that the defendant has violated any of the rules and regulations prescribed in a suspended or probated sentence without giving the defendant a notice and opportunity to be heard upon the question of whether or not the defendant has violated such rules and regulations would be to violate one of the fundamentals of our system of jurisprudence that a person shall not be deprived of liberty without due process of law, which includes notice and an opportunity to be heard. Lester v. Foster, 207 Ga. 596, 63 S.E.2d 402 (1951).

When defendant has right to present case though not on time.

- Although defendant might have been in contempt of court for failing to appear at the time set forth in the subpoena, to deny the defendant the right to present the defendant's case when the defendant arrives prior to the close of the plaintiff's evidence or before the defendant's counsel has waived the right to present evidence would constitute a violation of the defendant's due process rights under the Constitution. Sawyer v. Dogwood Stables, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 534, 278 S.E.2d 115 (1981).

Law and Constitution require appointment of counsel for indigent and opportunity to consult client and prepare defense.

- When the law of the state requires the appointment of counsel for indigent persons - and the law of Georgia does - certainly in a capital case when the defendant is unable to engage a lawyer and is incapacitated by ignorance, illiteracy, physical disability, or the like, to adequately make the defendant's own defense, due process of law requires that the court assign counsel for the defendant, competent to serve, and who shall give more than casual or perfunctory service to the prisoner. Lip service only will not do. Furthermore, the Constitution also requires that a fair opportunity shall be afforded such counsel to consult the client and to prepare a defense against the charge. Coates v. Lawrence, 46 F. Supp. 414 (S.D. Ga. 1942), aff'd, 131 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 759, 63 S. Ct. 532, 87 L. Ed. 1132 (1943).

Refusal of offer to appoint counsel in criminal case dispenses appointment. Stokes v. State, 73 Ga. 816 (1884).

Right of representation in court does not include layman inmate.

- The right of a person to prosecute one's own cause in any court of this state, in person or by attorney, as guaranteed under this paragraph refers to an attorney-at-law in the commonly accepted meaning of the term and as defined by the laws of this state. It does not include a layman inmate of the Georgia State Prison. Green v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 650, 193 S.E.2d 847 (1972).

Right to counsel does not guarantee representation by out-of-state counsel.

- A defendant, although guaranteed the right to counsel by both the federal and state Constitutions, has no guarantee that the defendant can be represented by out-of-state counsel. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 494, 277 S.E.2d 781 (1981).

Right to reasonably effective assistance of counsel, not errorless counsel.

- The constitutional right to assistance of counsel ensures not errorless counsel, and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance. Austin v. Carter, 248 Ga. 775, 285 S.E.2d 542 (1982).

Forum non conveniens could not be invoked because plaintiff chose to prosecute cause in Georgia courts.

- Under the provisions of the Georgia Constitution, which provides that "No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend his own cause in any of the courts of this state," the trial courts are required to exercise jurisdiction of an action brought by a resident of Georgia, as administrator of a decedent who was a resident of Georgia, against a nonresident corporation having an office, agent, and place of doing business in Georgia, upon a cause of action arising in another state, and the rule of forum non conveniens could not be invoked by the defendant to oust the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Wiggins, 77 Ga. App. 756, 49 S.E.2d 909 (1948).

Exercise of right of access subjects one to court's power to control proceedings.

- One having exercised one's inherent right of access and having pleaded one's case, in person, or by attorney, or both, subjects the person to the inherent power of the court to control its proceedings and to issue a stay in proceedings. Bloomfield v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 230 Ga. 484, 198 S.E.2d 144 (1973).

Broad discretion of trial court to regulate conduct must not result in deprivation of right.

- This paragraph is plainly subject to the inherent power of the court to prescribe the manner in which the business of the court shall be conducted and to preserve the order and decorum of the trial to the furtherance of justice. The discretion of the trial judge in regulating the conduct of counsel, parties, and witnesses, and in prescribing the manner in which the business shall be conducted, is broad and is ample to enable the judge in any case to effect the purposes for which is inherently the judge's; but the judge's discretion is not unlimited, for it must not be abused and it may not be exercised in such a way as to involve a deprivation of right. Loomis v. State, 78 Ga. App. 153, 51 S.E.2d 13 (1948); Jackson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 496, 254 S.E.2d 739 (1979), but see Vick v. State, 237 Ga. App. 762, 516 S.E.2d 815 (1999); Moody v. State, 153 Ga. App. 866, 267 S.E.2d 291 (1980); Jackson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 367, 268 S.E.2d 418 (1980).

Prisoner not denied right to prosecute cause in habeas corpus court.

- Ga. L. 1961, p. 835, § 3 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42) is not unconstitutional since it does not violate this paragraph because a prisoner is not denied the prisoner's right to prosecute the cause in the habeas corpus court. Reed v. Hopper, 235 Ga. 298, 219 S.E.2d 409 (1975).

No right to be present when trial court addressed summmoned prospective jurors.

- Defendant did not have a right to be present when the trial court addressed summoned prospective jurors before the trial started. Neale v. State, 344 Ga. App. 448, 810 S.E.2d 621 (2018).

Right to be present during hearings.

- Defendant had the right to be present at a hearing in the separate trial of the defendant's coindictee at which the court addressed issues concerning a possible conflict of interest caused by the fact that the defendant and the defendant's coindictee had retained the same attorney. Rice v. State, 226 Ga. App. 770, 487 S.E.2d 517 (1997).

Right to be present during sentencing hearing.

- Because both the defendant and defense counsel were present for the entire sentencing hearing when the information relied upon by the court for its sentencing decision was admitted, and the defendant had the opportunity to present evidence and to object, but did neither, the defendant's constitutional right to be present under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII was not violated. Small v. State, 285 Ga. App. 445, 646 S.E.2d 292 (2007), cert. dismissed, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 876 (Ga. 2008).

No right to be present at sidebar conference.

- Defendant's right to be present was not violated due to the defendant's absence from sidebar conferences. Smith v. State, 319 Ga. App. 590, 737 S.E.2d 700 (2013).

In-chambers hearing.

- Defendant's right to be present at trial under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII was violated when the trial court questioned a juror in chambers without defense counsel or the prosecutor present, dismissed the juror, and replaced the juror with an alternate; defendant did not acquiesce in the illegal proceedings and repudiated counsel's silent waiver of the rights at the first opportunity, the hearing on the motion for a new trial, when defendant was represented by new counsel. Sammons v. State, 279 Ga. 386, 612 S.E.2d 785 (2005).

No right to be present at discussion of whether character in issue.

- Discussion between the trial court and counsel over whether the defendant's character had been placed in issue by questions from the defense regarding the defendant's service in Vietnam and the defendant's work with children was not a critical stage of the proceeding at which the defendant had the right to be present. Defendant was present when defense counsel made a motion to strike the character evidence and when the judge ruled on the motion. Lyde v. State, 311 Ga. App. 512, 716 S.E.2d 572 (2011).

Right to be present inapplicable to voluntary absence of accused.

- Principle that a person accused of a crime has the right to be present at all stages of the trial is not applicable when the accused is voluntarily absent on bail. Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 73, 90 S.E.2d 557 (1955).

Voluntary absence from trial.

- When the defendant was out on bail and was voluntarily absent from the proceedings, the defendant waived the defendant's confrontation rights and the defendant's right to be present during the trial. Estep v. State, 238 Ga. App. 170, 518 S.E.2d 176 (1999).

Right of accused to be present at all stages of trial ranks among defendant's most substantial rights, and it ranks next in importance to, if not on a par with, the defendant's right to be presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. Pierce v. State, 47 Ga. App. 830, 171 S.E. 731 (1933).

Trial court erred in removing defendants from the courtroom during the testimony, out of the presence of the jury, or rebuttal witnesses for the state. Perry v. State, 216 Ga. App. 749, 456 S.E.2d 89 (1995).

Right to be present cannot be waived by attorney except by express authority of defendant. Palmer v. State, 155 Ga. App. 368, 271 S.E.2d 24 (1980).

Presence of defendant during voir dire of jury.

- Defendant's absence during the voir dire of prospective jurors violated defendant's right to be present at trial and required reversal. Goodroe v. State, 224 Ga. App. 378, 480 S.E.2d 378 (1997), overruling Smith v. State, 182 Ga. App. 623, 356 S.E.2d 702 (1987).

Defendant was entitled to a hearing to determine whether the defendant knowingly acquiesced in the waiver by defense counsel of defendant's presence during the voir dire of certain jurors conducted in the judge's chambers. Russell v. State, 230 Ga. App. 546, 497 S.E.2d 36 (1998).

Objection to absence during voir dire waived.

- Defendant waived error by the trial judge in questioning and dismissing a potential juror out of defendant's presence since the defendant was advised after the judge returned to the courtroom that the juror had been excused, yet made no objection until further voir dire was completed and the jury was selected and sworn. Harmon v. State, 224 Ga. App. 890, 482 S.E.2d 730 (1997).

Right to testify as witness is personal right and is an adjunct or portion of the fundamental concept of freedom and liberty protected by Ga. Const. 1945, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. III (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I) and Ga. Const. 1945, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. IX (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII). Carter v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 392 F. Supp. 494 (S.D. Ga. 1974).

Presence of counsel is no substitute for that of man on trial; both should be present. Pierce v. State, 47 Ga. App. 830, 171 S.E. 731 (1933).

Right to be present during juror questioning on illness.

- Defendant was entitled to a new trial because the defendant's right to be present was violated when the trial court discussed with counsel about excusing a juror who was in pain following surgery and eventually released the juror from returning to court as the trial court conducted a portion of the jury selection outside the defendant's presence. Burch v. State, 343 Ga. App. 474, 806 S.E.2d 863 (2017).

Defendant in this state may personally waive the right to be present or defense counsel may waive this right for the defendant when the waiver is made in the defendant's presence. Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 73, 90 S.E.2d 557 (1955).

Waiver of right.

- Defendant waived the right to be present at trial by choosing not to attend the first day of the sentencing phase after a medical expert examined the defendant, treated the defendant, and pronounced the defendant fit to proceed. Dawson v. State, 283 Ga. 315, 658 S.E.2d 755 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 169, 172 L. Ed. 2d 122 (2008).

Defendant waived the right to be present during the bench conferences discussing the dismissal of a juror and the ultimate removal of the juror by failing to voice any objection regarding the defendant's absence from that portion of the trial until the proceedings before the Supreme Court of Georgia. Zamora v. State, 291 Ga. 512, 731 S.E.2d 658 (2012).

Requirements for effective waiver of right.

- The right in a criminal trial to be present at all stages of the trial is an important right of the defendant, guaranteed by our Constitution, and in order for the waiver of counsel to be binding on the defendant, it must be made in the defendant's presence or by the defendant's express authority, or be subsequently acquiesced in by the defendant. Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 73, 90 S.E.2d 557 (1955).

Deprivation of right to be present entitles defendant to new trial.

- When the defendant was deprived of the right to be present at every stage and proceeding of the defendant's trial, the defendant is entitled to a new trial. Palmer v. State, 155 Ga. App. 368, 271 S.E.2d 24 (1980).

Because no evidence supported a finding that the defendants were aware of their right to be present in chambers during voir dire and jury selection, their convictions would be reversed and they would be granted a new trial. Russell v. State, 236 Ga. App. 645, 512 S.E.2d 913 (1999).

Because the defendant had a right to be present in the courtroom during voir dire of the jury, regarding some suspicious telephone calls that some had been receiving, in order to assist trial counsel in effectively examining the jurors regarding their abilities to be fair and impartial, and the defendant did not waive said right, the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. Vaughn v. State, 281 Ga. App. 475, 636 S.E.2d 163 (2006).

Defendant was entitled to a reversal of the defendant's convictions for improper lane change, serious injury by vehicle while driving under the influence, and misdemeanor obstruction of an officer as the trial judge violated the defendant's right to be present at all stages of the proceedings by responding to a jury inquiry in writing that the jury should continue to deliberate and try to reach an unanimous verdict without contacting defense counsel and defendant. Given the necessary considerations and significant ramifications, instructions to the deliberating jury concerning its reported deadlocked status on several counts constituted a substantive communication at a critical stage in the defendant's criminal prosecution. Wells v. State, 297 Ga. App. 153, 676 S.E.2d 821 (2009).

Motion for new trial should have been granted based upon defendant's absence from courtroom.

- When a statement by counsel that counsel would waive the right of the defendant to be present during the argument of the solicitor general (now district attorney), up to that time, was not in the presence of the defendant, was not authorized by the defendant, and was made during the defendant's involuntary absence from the courtroom, and this alleged waiver of the defendant's presence by defense counsel was repudiated by the defendant at the first opportunity, upon information received by the defendant subsequently to the verdict, it was error to overrule the ground of the motion for new trial based upon the defendant's involuntary absence from the courtroom during the part of the argument of the solicitor general (now district attorney). Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 73, 90 S.E.2d 557 (1955).

Conflict with ruling that counsel waived irregularity of receiving verdict in involuntary absence of defendant.

- Statement in Morris v. State, 177 Ga. 365, 369, 170 S.E. 217 (1933), indicating that it was the opinion of the court that the silence of the defendant's counsel would waive the irregularity of receiving a verdict in the involuntary absence of the defendant, is in direct conflict with rulings in older, full-bench decisions and the case was decided on other points. Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 73, 90 S.E.2d 557 (1955).

Reversible error for jury to view truck in absence of defendant.

- After the trial court granted a request that the jury be allowed to view a truck, and directed the bailiff to take the jury to see the truck, but permitted no lawyers, no witnesses, and no parties to go with the jury, despite the request of defense counsel to go with the jury, this was reversible error. Palmer v. State, 155 Ga. App. 368, 271 S.E.2d 24 (1980).

Harmless error for judge's contact with jury.

- Even if the defendant's right to be present at all stages of a trial under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII was violated, any error was harmless in a situation in which the trial judge, with the approval of defense counsel, entered the jury room alone to respond to the jury's note, was told by the jury that it had reached a verdict but was unsure if it was proper, told the jury to return the verdict in the courtroom, and left the jury room. Grimes v. State, 280 Ga. App. 65, 633 S.E.2d 401 (2006).

Prisoner should be present for hearing for resentencing.

- In a hearing for resentencing when the prisoner would have substantial rights, the prisoner should be allowed to be present in the trial court for resentencing. Williams v. Ricketts, 234 Ga. 716, 217 S.E.2d 292 (1975).

Involuntary absence of defendant does not affect date set for execution of sentence.

- The order of a trial judge fixing a new date for the execution of the sentence after the original date has passed is not void because the defendant is involuntarily absent and has not waived or authorized anyone else to waive the defendant's right to be present at the time and place of resentencing, and the passage of such order is not violative of the plaintiff's rights under the several provisions of the state and federal Constitutions. McBurnett v. Balkcom, 207 Ga. 452, 62 S.E.2d 180 (1950).

Proceeding in absence of accused does not always require new trial.

- In some instances, because of the particular facts of the case, some proceedings in the trial of an accused in the accused's absence will not require the grant of a new trial. Wanzer v. State, 232 Ga. 523, 207 S.E.2d 466 (1974).

Although all persons accused of a crime in Georgia are guaranteed the right to be present at all stages of trial by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII, and thus, the defendants on trial must be present when the court takes any action materially affecting their case, responding to a jury's request to see a transcript of testimony was held not to be prejudicial to the defendant, even though it was made outside the presence of the defendant, because the trial court simply denied the request in writing and told the jury to rely on their recollection of the evidence. Buckner v. State, 253 Ga. App. 294, 558 S.E.2d 823 (2002).

Because the defendant's right to be present at trial did not extend to any and all communications between the trial courts and potential jurors, the defendant had no right to be present for an out of court conversation between the trial judge and one of the jurors from the venire panel held while the judge was fulfilling the administrative duties as the presiding judge for the circuit. Thus, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial as a result. Payne v. State, 290 Ga. App. 589, 660 S.E.2d 405 (2008).

Trial court did not err by proceeding with the third day of trial in the defendant's absence because there was evidence that supported a finding that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily chose to be absent from the courtroom as jail personnel asked the defendant if the defendant wanted to go to court and the defendant responded in the negative. LaGon v. State, 334 Ga. App. 14, 778 S.E.2d 32 (2015).

Trial court committed no error by beginning the defendant's trial in the defendant's absence, given that the defendant was in custody and was informed of the right to be present and that the trial would proceed without the defendant, but the defendant made clear that the defendant would not enter the courtroom without a fight. LaGon v. State, 334 Ga. App. 14, 778 S.E.2d 32 (2015).

Provision for appearance by brief meets constitutional requirement of this paragraph. Finley v. Thompson, 100 Ga. App. 508, 112 S.E.2d 166 (1959).

Court's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial in the absence of defendant and defense counsel did not deprive the defendant of the defendant's right to be present when all events upon which the court would rule had occurred in the defendant's presence and only legal consideration, not further proceeding, was called for. Bishop v. State, 176 Ga. App. 357, 335 S.E.2d 742 (1985).

Communication with jury outside presence of defendant.

- Trial court erred in communicating with the jury outside the presence of the appellant and appellant's counsel when the court denied the jury's request to see the transcript of an eyewitness' statements to police in writing without notifying or consulting either side. Burtts v. State, 269 Ga. 402, 499 S.E.2d 326 (1998).

Trial court committed reversible error by having a colloquy with a juror in the judge's chambers in defendant's absence and, since an attempted waiver by counsel was made without the knowledge or consent of defendant, it was not a valid waiver of defendant's right to be present at all stages of the trial proceedings. Pennie v. State, 271 Ga. 419, 520 S.E.2d 448 (1999).

Defendant failed to rebut the trial court's findings that no communication between the trial court and the jury regarding the return of a verdict by the jury occurred outside of the presence of defendant and the counsel and that the trial court did not in the case, or in any other case, call for the return of a verdict until the parties and their counsel were present in the courtroom; it could be inferred from the notation in the transcript cited by defendant only that the court reporter was not present, not the whereabouts of defendant and the counsel. Hall v. State, 273 Ga. App. 203, 614 S.E.2d 844 (2005).

Defendants' rights to be present under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII were violated because a trial court excused a juror during ex parte proceedings in the defendants' absence and without the defendants' knowledge or consent, and the defendants' absence was neither consented to nor waived; although neither counsel objected to the trial court's action, such inaction on the part of counsel did not constitute a waiver for the clients, and since the defendants were not informed of the ex parte excusal of the juror, the defendants' could not knowingly acquiesce to the waiver on the part of defense counsel. Ward v. State, 288 Ga. 641, 706 S.E.2d 430 (2011).

Bench conference.

- Bench conference which took place when a bailiff informed the trial court that a juror thought that the juror might know the victim's parents, was not a critical stage of the proceedings at which the defendant had a right to be present since the juror was not actually present during this brief colloquy, since the judge asked the attorneys if they wanted to question this juror further and since, when defense counsel indicated that the counsel wanted to ask the juror some more questions, the conference ended. Bennett v. State, 279 Ga. App. 371, 631 S.E.2d 402 (2006).

Because, at the bench conference, the trial court resolved a purely legal question of whether a first-offender felon was qualified to serve on a jury, the defendant had no constitutional right to be present. Pack v. State, 335 Ga. App. 783, 783 S.E.2d 146 (2016).

Harmless error.

- After a lunch break during the guilt phase of the trial, the trial court made a few remarks to the jury while awaiting the return of the defendant, and the trial judge later restated the judge's comments, as well as the judge could remember them, into the record, relating that the judge had told the jury that the trial would be slightly delayed because the defendant had eaten late and had congratulated one of the jurors for having been elected to the board of education, there was no violation of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-41 or O.C.G.A. § 17-8-5, and any possible constitutional error relating to the defendant's right to be present during all stages of the defendant's trial was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Westbrook v. State, 256 Ga. 776, 353 S.E.2d 504 (1987).

When, in a criminal trial, the trial court responded to a jury question during deliberations outside of the presence of defendant or defendant's counsel, this was an error, but the error did not require the reversal of defendant's conviction because it was not shown that anything about the communication was prejudicial or that the nature of the communication hastened the verdict finding defendant guilty or caused a juror to yield, as each juror affirmed that the juror arrived at the verdict freely and voluntarily, that the verdict remained the juror's own, and the trial court instructed the jurors to consult with each other during deliberations, but not to surrender an honest opinion to reach a verdict, so there was no reasonable probability that the trial court's erroneous communication contributed to the jury's verdict. Barnett v. State, 276 Ga. App. 238, 623 S.E.2d 136 (2005).

Because the trial transcript failed to support the defendant's claim that the trial court erroneously ordered the defendant be excluded from the courtroom during a critical stage of the proceeding, and in front of the jury, and given what transpired during the brief period that the defendant was absent from the courtroom, no due process violation occurred. Arnold v. State, 284 Ga. App. 598, 645 S.E.2d 68 (2007).

No ineffective assistance of counsel shown by waiver of arraignment.

- Waiver of arraignment provides a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel only if the defendant can show the defendant was unaware of the charges against the defendant. Biggs v. State, 281 Ga. 627, 642 S.E.2d 74 (2007).

In the absence of any claim or evidence that the defendant was not aware of the charges against the defendant, the defendant failed to show that defense counsel's performance was deficient; therefore, the defendant's claim that the waiver of arraignment violated the defendant's right to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings against the defendant was rejected on appeal. Biggs v. State, 281 Ga. 627, 642 S.E.2d 74 (2007).

Failure to consult before responding to deadlocked jury.

- A defendant's right to be present under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII was not violated by the trial court's failure to consult with the defendant and counsel prior to responding to the jury's communication that the jury was deadlocked. Lowery v. State, 282 Ga. 68, 646 S.E.2d 67, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 999, 128 S. Ct. 508, 169 L. Ed. 2d 355 (2007).

No right to be present at charge conference during jury deliberations.

- There was no violation of the defendant's right to be present at all proceedings under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII when the defendant was excluded from a charge conference that occurred during jury deliberations as that was not a stage of a criminal proceeding that invoked the right to be present. Milligan v. State, 307 Ga. App. 1, 703 S.E.2d 1 (2010).

Right to be present regardless of whether the party's physical or mental condition may evoke sympathy.

- Party may not be excluded from the party's own trial simply because the party's physical and mental condition may evoke sympathy. Instead, trial courts can and should address the risk of undue sympathy using jury instructions and other common and time-tested means of ensuring that both parties receive a fair trial, without infringing on the parties' right to be present. Kesterson v. Jarrett, 291 Ga. 380, 728 S.E.2d 557 (2012).

Right of self-representation before probate court.

- Since a court of ordinary (now probate court) is a court of this state, a person has a constitutional right to self representation therein. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U73-66.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 16B Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 667 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 16B C.J.S., Constitutional Law, §§ 1207, 1372 et seq. 16C C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 1840 et seq. 16D C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 1912 et seq.

ALR.

- Validity of contract by attorney to prosecute or assist in prosecution of criminal case on contingent fee, 11 A.L.R. 1192.

Removal or dismissal of public officers or employees for bringing or defending an action affecting personal rights or liabilities, 74 A.L.R. 500.

Punishment of civil contempt in other than divorce cases by striking pleading or entering default judgment or dismissal against contemner, 14 A.L.R.2d 580.

Constitutionality of arbitration statutes, 55 A.L.R.2d 432.

Power to try, in his absence, one charged with misdemeanor, 68 A.L.R.2d 638.

Counsel's right, in consulting with accused as client, to be accompanied by psychiatrist, psychologist, hypnotist, or similar practitioner, 72 A.L.R.2d 1120.

Right of accused to have his witnesses free from handcuffs, manacles, shackles, or the like, 75 A.L.R.2d 762.

Right to counsel in insanity or incompetency adjudication proceedings, 87 A.L.R.2d 950.

When criminal case becomes moot so as to preclude review of or attack on conviction or sentence, 9 A.L.R.3d 462.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" within role of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of his federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation, 31 A.L.R.3d 565.

Censorship of convicted prisoners' "legal" mail, 47 A.L.R.3d 1150.

Censorship of convicted prisoners' "nonlegal" mail, 47 A.L.R.3d 1192.

Right of accused to have press or other media representatives excluded from criminal trial, 49 A.L.R.3d 1007.

Right of indigent to proceed in marital action without payment of costs, 52 A.L.R.3d 844.

Right to counsel in contempt proceedings, 52 A.L.R.3d 1002.

Power of private citizen to institute criminal proceedings without authorization or approval by prosecuting attorney, 66 A.L.R.3d 732.

Appointment of counsel for indigent husband or wife in action for divorce or separation, 85 A.L.R.3d 983.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of gagging, shackling, or otherwise physically restraining accused during course of state criminal trial, 90 A.L.R.3d 17.

Religious belief, affiliation, or prejudice of prospective jurors as proper subject of inquiry or grounds for challenge on voir dire, 95 A.L.R.3d 172.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding argument, 6 A.L.R.4th 16.

Existence and extent of right of litigant in civil case, or of criminal defendant, to represent himself before state appellate courts, 24 A.L.R.4th 430.

Physical condition of plaintiff in personal injury action as affecting right to be present at trial, 27 A.L.R.4th 583.

Application of statute denying access to courts or invalidating contracts where corporation fails to comply with regulatory statute as affected by compliance after commencement of action, 23 A.L.R.5th 744.

Hospital as within constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures, 28 A.L.R.6th 245.

Application in state narcotics cases of collective knowledge doctrine or fellow officers' rule under Fourth Amendment - marijuana cases, 35 A.L.R.6th 497.

Validity of search of cruise ship cabin, 43 A.L.R.6th 355.

Validity of search and reasonable expectation of privacy as affected by no trespassing or similar signage, 45 A.L.R.6th 643.

Construction and application of "automatic companion rule" or person's "mere propinquity" to arrestee to determine propriety of search of person for weapons or firearms, 47 A.L.R.6th 423.

Construction and application of consent-once-removed doctrine, permitting warrantless entry into residence by law enforcement officers for purposes of effectuating arrest or search where confidential informant or undercover officer enters with consent and observes criminal activity or contraband in plain view, 50 A.L.R.6th 1.

Sufficiency of showing to support no-knock search warrant - cases decided after Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 l. Ed. 2d 615 (1997), 50 A.L.R.6th 455.

Construction and application of Supreme Court's holding in Arizona v. Gant , 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485, 47 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 657 (2009), that police may search vehicle incident to recent occupant's arrest only if arrestee is within reaching distance of passenger compartment at time of search or it is reasonable to believe vehicle contains evidence of offense - substantive traffic offenses, 55 A.L.R.6th 1.

Sufficiency of information provided by anonymous informant to provide probable cause for federal search warrant - cases decided after Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), 178 A.L.R. Fed. 487.

Due process afforded in drug court proceedings, 78 A.L.R.6th 1.

Construction and application of booking question exception to Miranda, 81 A.L.R.6th 505.