Property subject to tax levy.

- The taxes provided for by this paragraph can only be levied upon "all taxable property of the county outside of independent local (school) systems" for the support of county schools under the control of county boards of education. Almand v. Board of Educ., 161 Ga. 911, 131 S.E. 897 (1926) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I).

Exclusive financing method.

- Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I establishes an exclusive financing method such that a school system is prohibited from receiving funds from any local tax source other than ad valorem taxes levied in accordance therewith. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys v. Lane, 266 Ga. 657, 469 S.E.2d 22 (1996).

An agreement between a city and school system whereby the system received an amount equal to 30% of the city's local option sales tax receipts was not valid since it was in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys v. Lane, 266 Ga. 657, 469 S.E.2d 22 (1996).

Authority over finances and taxing.

- The board of county commissioners, and not the board of tax assessors, has jurisdiction over county finances and levying and collection of taxes for county purposes. Green v. Calhoun, 204 Ga. 550, 50 S.E.2d 209 (1948).

The board of commissioners has no discretion in levying taxes; its action is ministerial. The amount of the levy is discretionary with the board of education, within limits fixed by the Constitution or statute, and when duly determined it is mandatory. Rosser v. Meriwether County, 125 Ga. App. 239, 186 S.E.2d 788 (1971).

Mandatory on county board of commissioners to follow county boards of education recommendation on levying taxes.

- Under this provision of the Constitution, it is mandatory upon county boards of commissioners, or other fiscal authorities levying taxes for the county, to follow the recommendation of county boards of education as to the tax levy to be made for the support of education where such recommendation is within the limitation defined by the Constitution. County Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues, 201 Ga. 815, 41 S.E.2d 398 (1947).

The limitation of this paragraph is not imposed upon independent school systems. Ingram v. Payton, 222 Ga. 503, 150 S.E.2d 825 (1966) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I).

School system within the grandfather clause of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I was authorized to levy school taxes in excess of 20 mills. Lane v. City of Atlanta, 267 Ga. 843, 483 S.E.2d 575 (1997).

Georgia Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VII, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I) applies only to elections for bonds, and not to elections authorizing levy of an additional educational tax in local school districts. Crye v. Pearce, 175 Ga. 85, 165 S.E. 121 (1932).

Illegality of providing additional revenue for education purposes by unlawful scheme.

- The evidence was sufficient to authorize the court to find that the increase of 25 percent on the valuations of realty on the returns of the petitioners and other taxpayers was not a process of equalizing such valuations, but was an unlawful and arbitrary attempt to provide additional revenue for educational purposes, and to grant an interlocutory injunction against the defendants from making up, compiling, or listing any report or digest incorporating or including therein any increased assessment or changes or alterations in the returns of the taxpayers of the county, and enjoining the tax receiver of the county, from transmitting to the State Department of Revenue or the Comptroller General or the tax collector of the county or any tax authorities of the county or state any report, list, or other compilation or digest including or incorporating therein any increase or change or alteration in the return filed with the tax receiver by any taxpayer thereof. Green v. Calhoun, 204 Ga. 550, 50 S.E.2d 209 (1948).

The provisions of this paragraph are not intended to suffice for all phases of educational expenditures, but are separate from the power to levy a tax for the payment of bonded indebtedness for the erection of school buildings. Nelms v. Stephens County Sch. Dist., 201 Ga. 274, 39 S.E.2d 651 (1946) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I).

Delegation of power without authorization prohibited.

- Without specific legislative authorization, a school board has no authority, by contract or otherwise, to delegate to others the duties placed on the board by the Constitution and laws of Georgia. Chatham Ass'n of Educators v. Board of Pub. Educ., 231 Ga. 806, 204 S.E.2d 138 (1974).

Necessary qualities for additional revenue amendment to comply with due process and equal protection.

- A proposed amendment allowing a school district to receive additional revenues from municipalities for school purposes had to be drafted to include all areas within the county school districts and ratified by the voters of each school district therein on a consolidated basis in order to comply with the due process and equal protection of law under the state and federal Constitution. City of Lithonia v. DeKalb County Bd. of Educ., 231 Ga. 150, 200 S.E.2d 698 (1973).

"Assessed value" defined.

- The words "assessed value" in this constitutional provision means the correctly assessed value, i.e., the assessed value approved by the revenue commissioner, not an incorrectly assessed value. Board of Comm'rs v. Allgood, 234 Ga. 9, 214 S.E.2d 522 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I).

"Assessed value" is the correctly assessed fair market value. Benson-Corwin, Inc. v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 239 Ga. 199, 236 S.E.2d 361 (1977).

To freeze the assessed value of property at an amount below its fair market value would obfuscate application of this paragraph. Benson-Corwin, Inc. v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 239 Ga. 199, 236 S.E.2d 361 (1977) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I).

Return of funds based on excessive tax assessment.

- Where city received more tax revenue from taxpayers than they lawfully owed, which error resulted in the city remitting more tax funds to the school board than it was entitled to receive, the school board was required to refund its pro-rata share of the taxes, penalties, and interest due the taxpayers because of the improper assessment. The city was effectively acting as an agent for the school board. Atlanta Bd. of Educ. v. City of Atlanta, 262 Ga. 15, 413 S.E.2d 716 (1992).

Payment for garbage disposal associated with school lunch program proper.

- Garbage disposal resulting from the school lunch program is incidental to that program which is assigned to the school district by the Constitution and "the county boards of education shall have the power to . . . make all arrangements necessary to the efficient operation of the schools"; accordingly, the school districts have the authority and obligation to contract and pay for the service provided by the county in disposing of garbage resulting from the operation of the school lunch program. Fletcher v. Russell, 151 Ga. App. 229, 259 S.E.2d 212, rev'd on other grounds, 244 Ga. 854, 262 S.E.2d 138 (1979).

School district being an independent political entity may provide and compensate school crossing guards. Russell v. Fletcher, 244 Ga. 854, 262 S.E.2d 138 (1979).

Payment for county road improvements not authorized.

- Improvements to a county public road leading to a school were the responsibility of the county because such improvements were not "necessary and incidental" to public education. Any representation by the school district supervisor of construction to the contrary did not bind the district to pay for the improvements. DeKalb County Sch. Dist. v. DeKalb County, 263 Ga. 879, 440 S.E.2d 185 (1994).

The use of school taxes to finance a redevelopment plan along 22 miles of historical rail segments violated Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I(b) because it was not "necessary or incidental" to public schools or public education. The plan benefitted all citizens and had little if any nexus to the actual operation of public schools. Woodham v. City of Atlanta, 283 Ga. 95, 657 S.E.2d 528 (2008).

Use of local school taxes for redevelopment.

- School system, development authority, and others were properly granted summary judgment in a suit challenging the allocation of school taxes because the 2008 amendments to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VII(b) and O.C.G.A. § 36-44-9(g), governing tax allocation districts, changed the law and retroactively allowed use of local school taxes for general redevelopment purposes. Sherman v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 293 Ga. 268, 744 S.E.2d 26 (2013).

Instance of county children paying fee to attend city school not applicable.

- Where a city school used funds raised from a county-wide tax and from federal and state funds based in part on students not in the city, children from the county could attend city schools without paying a charge or matriculation fee. Peak v. Board of Educ., 177 Ga. 476, 170 S.E. 488 (1933).

Homestead exemption did not violate this paragraph.

- Court rejected a taxpayer's contention that a school tax homestead exemption violated Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I, which required that school taxes be imposed on correctly assessed values, because the school taxes would be imposed on correctly assessed values, but the values of certain properties would then be reduced by the homestead exemption. Blevins v. Dade County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 288 Ga. 113, 702 S.E.2d 145 (2010).

Rule governing jurisdiction of Court of Appeals and Supreme Court.

- The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide questions of law that involve application, in a general sense, of unquestioned and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution to a given state of facts, and that do not involve construction of some constitutional provision directly in question and doubtful either under its own terms or under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the state or of the United States, and that do not involve the constitutionality of any law of the state or of the United States or of any treaty. Under this rule, the Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction where surety seeks to be held free of liability on grounds of constitutional provisions which made obligation unenforceable against school system as principal. Franklin v. Mobley, 202 Ga. 212, 42 S.E.2d 755 (1947).

Cited in Dougherty County v. Jones, 43 Ga. App. 188, 158 S.E. 432 (1931); Southern Ry. v. Paulding County, 44 Ga. App. 806, 162 S.E. 919 (1932); Richards v. Zentner, 176 Ga. 222, 167 S.E. 516 (1933); Keever v. Board of Educ., 188 Ga. 299, 3 S.E.2d 886 (1939); Davis v. Haddock, 191 Ga. 639, 13 S.E.2d 657 (1941); Board of Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues v. Bond, 203 Ga. 558, 47 S.E.2d 511 (1948); Towns v. Suttles, 208 Ga. 838, 69 S.E.2d 742 (1952); Commissioners of Chatham County v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 215 Ga. 636, 112 S.E.2d 655 (1960); McLennan v. Aldredge, 223 Ga. 879, 159 S.E.2d 682 (1968); Grimes v. Clark, 226 Ga. 195, 173 S.E.2d 686 (1970); Watkins v. Jackson, 227 Ga. 213, 179 S.E.2d 747 (1971); Board of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage v. Zimmerman, 231 Ga. 562, 203 S.E.2d 178 (1974); Young v. State, 132 Ga. App. 790, 209 S.E.2d 96 (1974); Coleman v. Kiley, 236 Ga. 751, 225 S.E.2d 273 (1976); Smith v. Crim, 240 Ga. 390, 240 S.E.2d 884 (1977); DeKalb County v. Hinson, 243 Ga. 623, 255 S.E.2d 722 (1979); Concerned Sch. Patrons & Taxpayers v. Ware County Bd. of Educ., 245 Ga. 202, 263 S.E.2d 925 (1980); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981); Lomax v. McBrayer, 248 Ga. 753, 286 S.E.2d 35 (1982); Board of Comm'rs v. Clayton County Sch. Dist., 250 Ga. 244, 297 S.E.2d 724 (1982); Salem v. Tattnall County, 250 Ga. 881, 302 S.E.2d 99 (1983).

Constitution manifests General Assembly's and people's intent to create two political subdivisions for handling schools.

- This paragraph, Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. VI (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I), and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I) indicate that it was the intention of the General Assembly proposing the new Constitution, and of the people in adopting the new constitution, that there should be two political subdivisions for handling school affairs; first, the county district composed of the territory lying outside of the independent system, which territory should be under the control and management of a county board of education, and secondly, independent systems operated by municipal corporations. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 115 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I).

County boards of education have authority to recommend to county boards of commissioners the tax to be levied for school purposes. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 96.

Board of education must recommend the new rate to the taxing authority of the county. Their recommendation must precede the setting of the new tax levy by the taxing authorities. No specific date may be stated or recommended as the latest for the election. The date to be decided upon depends upon local conditions, but the constitutional provision must be complied with as to the method of removal and the determination of the new rate. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 44.

County fiscal authorities must levy taxes for education as recommended by county board of education. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 184.

Board of commissioners of a county has no discretion to refuse to levy any portion of the school tax recommended by the county board of education, so long as the amount of the recommended levy falls within the limits prescribed by law. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U89-22.

It is mandatory upon the fiscal authorities of a county levying taxes to follow recommendation of the county board of education as to tax levy to be made for support of education where such recommendation is within the limits defined by the Constitution; in effect, the action of the county board of commissioners is purely ministerial and they have no choice other than to make the tax levy recommended by the county board of education. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 37.

Tax limitation could be removed effective same year election is held for removal. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 44.

County board of education may not levy a county-wide school tax on property located in an independent school district. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 148.

Exclusive use of tax for purpose specified.

- Interest earned on education taxes and in special county taxes becomes part of the tax proceeds in the account fund, which fund is required to be used exclusively for the purpose(s) specified in the resolution or ordinance calling for the imposition of the tax. 2001 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2001-3.

Establishment of a separate digest for school purposes would violate the spirit and intention of this paragraph. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 69 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I).

Tax assessors may not lawfully create a separate tax digest or arbitrarily increase county tax digest for the purpose of providing additional revenue for educational purposes. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 69.

Term of contractual employment limited.

- This paragraph, Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II), and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VII, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. V), impliedly limit the term of contractual employment of employees by county boards of education to one school year. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 79 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I).

A bonded indebtedness created by a subdistrict is not the debt of a county board of education but the debt of the political subdivision known as the school district. The county board of education would not have the right or power to levy special bond tax on all of the property of the county outside of independent school systems for the purpose of providing a sinking fund to pay the principal and interest of a debt created by one of the districts. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 170.

A county board of education may use surplus county school funds to retire matured bonds issued by a local school district prior to the 1945 Constitution for the erection of schoolhouses, title to which has vested in the county board of education. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 170.

County maintained roads.

- Board of education may not use its funds for laying out, altering, maintaining and improving a public, county maintained road even though school transportation would be facilitated thereby; it is the sole duty and responsibility of the local officials in charge of county matters to lay out, alter, maintain, and improve the subject road in the manner they deem best suited to the needs of the county. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 189.

Items of a personal nature such as military uniforms are probably not legal expenditures for a local board of education; if a court subsequently held otherwise, the local superintendent would be held personally liable on the superintendent's bond for any such illegal expenditures. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 114.

The general arrangement for financing of independent school systems by a municipality is intended to be carried out upon a year to year basis upon the annual recommendations of the board of education to the municipality as to the rate of tax levy to be made by the municipal corporation, and upon such taxes as levied and collected for support of such independent school systems as appropriated when collected by the governing authority of the municipality to the board of education. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 186.

School funds cannot be used by a local school system to purchase billboard space for the display of public relations advertisements. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84-85.

Charges for school meals sold to employees.

- From a viewpoint of state law, since there are no longer any apparent state constitutional restrictions (as opposed to statutory and regulatory authorizations and restraints) respecting charges for school meals, in determining the sum it will charge teachers and other school employees for school meals, a local school system may properly exclude those indirect costs which the school system would have to bear whether or not the meals were sold to teachers and employees as well as to students; it would be permissible for a local school system to calculate the sum to be charged to the teacher or other employee based upon direct costs only. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-23.

Local school funds may not be used to pay chamber of commerce membership dues of the county school superintendent. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U90-3.

Lease of vehicles for students' extracurricular use.

- A local board of education may not provide transportation to students for extracurricular activities by leasing vehicles for that use. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 95-2.

Sharing of services between boards of education unauthorized.

- Georgia boards of education are not empowered to share services by creating and utilizing a nonprofit corporation such as the Consortium for Adequate School Funding in Georgia, Inc., for the purpose of challenging state school funding by litigation or otherwise. 2009 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2009-3.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Schools, §§ 58 et seq., 110 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 78 C.J.S., Schools and School Districts, § 103 et seq.

ALR.

- Validity of legislative delegation of taxing power to school districts in absence of express constitutional provision authorizing such delegation, 113 A.L.R. 1416.

Validity of basing public school financing system on local property taxes, 41 A.L.R.3d 1220.

Procedural issues concerning public school funding cases, 115 A.L.R.5th 563.