General Assembly cannot declare a person's domicile and residence in contradiction to general law.

- The General Assembly has no right to provide that a natural person, an individual, who lives and has a domicile and residence in one county, and the individual's domicile and residence is fixed there under the law as it stands, should be deemed also to be a resident, for certain purposes, of another county. A general law may fix the general place of residence; but when an individual has a residence and domicile fixed and established in accordance with the law, the legislature cannot declare that the individual may also be a resident of another county at the same time. Youmans v. Hickman, 179 Ga. 684, 177 S.E. 238 (1934).

This paragraph is inapplicable to a defendant who is a nonresident of this state. Moody v. Mendenhall, 238 Ga. 689, 234 S.E.2d 905 (1977) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III).

Construction of other Acts.

- The courts in construing an Act of the General Assembly will, if possible, ascribe to it a meaning so as to make it square with this paragraph. Newman Motors, Inc. v. Arrington, 194 Ga. 569, 22 S.E.2d 163 (1942) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III).

Removal of trustee not case contemplated by paragraph.

- An application to remove a trustee, addressed to the judge at chambers, was not "a case" within the meaning of this paragraph. This paragraph relates only to equitable petitions filed in the superior court and upon which a trial by jury may or must be had. Heath v. Miller, 117 Ga. 854, 44 S.E. 13 (1903), overruled on other grounds, 224 Ga. 440, 162 S.E.2d 294 (1968) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III).

An action to enjoin a foreclosure under a power of sale must be brought in the county where the defendant resides. Nylen v. Barbaris, 232 Ga. 79, 205 S.E.2d 303 (1974).

Cited in DeLacy v. Hurst, Purnell & Co., 83 Ga. 223, 9 S.E. 1052 (1889); Bishop v. Brown, 138 Ga. 771, 76 S.E. 89 (1912); Clark v. Hilliard, 19 Ga. App. 514, 91 S.E. 926 (1917); Amsler & Ferguson v. Lamar & Rankin Drug Co., 146 Ga. 635, 92 S.E. 55 (1917); Babson v. McEachin, 147 Ga. 143, 93 S.E. 292 (1917); Bank of East Point v. Dupre, 152 Ga. 547, 110 S.E. 240 (1922); Mansfield v. Gray, 153 Ga. 414, 112 S.E. 646 (1922); Holmes v. Holmes, 153 Ga. 790, 113 S.E. 81 (1922); Burkhalter v. Minter-Smith Hdwe. Co., 160 Ga. 307, 127 S.E. 852 (1925); Georgia Creosoting Co. v. Moody, 41 Ga. App. 701, 154 S.E. 294 (1930); Sanders v. Hinton, 171 Ga. 702, 156 S.E. 812 (1931); South Ga. Trust Co. v. Barlow, 172 Ga. 166, 157 S.E. 326 (1931); Mallory v. Clay County, 173 Ga. 59, 159 S.E. 578 (1931); Palmer v. Carson Naval Stores Co., 177 Ga. 734, 171 S.E. 262 (1933); Tribble v. Knight, 178 Ga. 804, 174 S.E. 626 (1934); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Baskin, 179 Ga. 86, 175 S.E. 251 (1934); Cone v. Davis, 179 Ga. 749, 177 S.E. 558 (1934); Sweat v. Arline, 186 Ga. 460, 197 S.E. 893 (1938); Kinney v. Crow, 186 Ga. 851, 199 S.E. 198 (1938); Marshall v. Marthin, 192 Ga. 613, 15 S.E.2d 861 (1941); Behr v. City of Macon, 194 Ga. 334, 21 S.E.2d 169 (1942); Hanleiter v. Spearman, 200 Ga. 289, 36 S.E.2d 780 (1946); Brown v. Mathis, 201 Ga. 740, 41 S.E.2d 137 (1947); Continental Carriers, Inc. v. Reese, 203 Ga. 433, 46 S.E.2d 927 (1948); Rylee v. Abernathy, 210 Ga. 673, 82 S.E.2d 220 (1954); Seckinger v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 213 Ga. 586, 100 S.E.2d 587 (1957); State Hwy. Dep't v. Southern Ry., 215 Ga. 71, 108 S.E.2d 699 (1959); Gunby v. Harper, 216 Ga. 94, 114 S.E.2d 856 (1960); North Am. Acceptance Corp. v. Ramey, 217 Ga. 476, 123 S.E.2d 253 (1961); Youmans v. Steele, 217 Ga. 747, 125 S.E.2d 215 (1962); Oxford v. Sanders, 217 Ga. 820, 125 S.E.2d 483 (1962); Dependable Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 218 Ga. 305, 127 S.E.2d 454 (1962); Pearson v. Walker, 218 Ga. 469, 128 S.E.2d 328 (1962); Modern Homes Constr. Co. v. Mack, 218 Ga. 795, 130 S.E.2d 725 (1963); Rossville Crushed Stone, Inc. v. Massey, 219 Ga. 467, 133 S.E.2d 874 (1963); Modern Homes Constr. Co. v. Burke, 219 Ga. 710, 135 S.E.2d 383 (1964); Kimsey v. Caudell, 109 Ga. App. 271, 135 S.E.2d 903 (1964); Gibson v. Hodges, 222 Ga. 434, 150 S.E.2d 651 (1966); Niedernhofer v. DeLoach, 222 Ga. 535, 150 S.E.2d 662 (1966); Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 225 Ga. 379, 169 S.E.2d 150 (1969); Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 121 Ga. App. 427, 174 S.E.2d 211 (1970); J.D. Jewell, Inc. v. Hancock, 226 Ga. 480, 175 S.E.2d 847 (1970); Register v. Stone's Indep. Oil Distribs., 122 Ga. App. 335, 177 S.E.2d 92 (1970); Chamblee Constr. Co. v. Pickett, 227 Ga. 421, 181 S.E.2d 32 (1971); Stanfield v. Brewton, 228 Ga. 92, 184 S.E.2d 352 (1971); Hallmark Properties, Inc. v. Slater, 229 Ga. 432, 192 S.E.2d 157 (1972); Pope v. Cokinos, 231 Ga. 79, 200 S.E.2d 275 (1973); Graham v. Tallent, 235 Ga. 47, 218 S.E.2d 799 (1975); Schuehler v. Pait, 239 Ga. 520, 238 S.E.2d 65 (1977); Scott v. Atlanta Dairies Coop., 239 Ga. 721, 238 S.E.2d 340 (1977); Peacock v. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 241 Ga. 280, 244 S.E.2d 816 (1978); Shaheen v. Dunaway Drug Stores, Inc., 246 Ga. 790, 273 S.E.2d 158 (1980); Dennard v. Freeport Minerals Co., 250 Ga. 330, 297 S.E.2d 222 (1982); Georgia Power Co. v. Harrison, 253 Ga. 212, 318 S.E.2d 306 (1984); Miller v. Bryant, 266 Ga. 584, 468 S.E.2d 762 (1996); Abrams v. Massell, 262 Ga. App. 761, 586 S.E.2d 435 (2003).

Venue of equity actions.

- Venue of equitable petition to enjoin levy of an execution and advertisement of land levied upon, and to set aside the judgment on which it issued, and where no complaint of misconduct on the part of the levying officer is alleged, is the county of the residence of the judgment plaintiff, if a resident of this state. Harrington v. Bryan, 169 Ga. 382, 150 S.E. 555 (1929); Whiteley v. Downs, 174 Ga. 839, 164 S.E. 318 (1932).

This also applies to a prayer for cancellation of a transfer of execution by the levying officer, the marshal and the clerk of the superior court being mere nominal parties. Interstate Bond Co. v. Lee, 182 Ga. 238, 184 S.E. 866 (1936).

Venue of petition for injunction, cancellation of deeds, and other equitable relief, in which it is sought to have a conveyance of land delivered up and cancelled, may be brought in the county of the residence of the grantee or in that of the grantor. Planters Cotton Oil Co. v. McCurley, 199 Ga. 104, 33 S.E.2d 270 (1945).

Assuming that O.C.G.A. § 53-7-54(b) created a cause of action against third-parties, as the trust created by the statute was a creature of equity jurisdiction, under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III, venue for such actions was in the county where a defendant resided. Thus, where a contempt petition was filed pursuant to the statute, the motion to transfer venue filed by two lawyers and their law firm should have been granted as neither lawyer resided in the forum county and their law firm was not located in that county. Rader v. Levenson, 290 Ga. App. 227, 659 S.E.2d 655 (2008).

Venue of action against public nuisance.

- In an injunctive action solely against the owner of the property on which an alleged public nuisance is being operated, the action must be brought in the county of the residence of the defendant, as required by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III. This is true even though O.C.G.A. § 3-10-8 states that the action is to be filed in the county where the nuisance exists, since the constitutional mandate must control. Chancey v. Hancock, 225 Ga. 715, 171 S.E.2d 302 (1969); Hopkins v. Baker, 258 Ga. App. 14, 572 S.E.2d 716 (2002).

Place of filing petition for interpleader when claimants reside in different counties.

- A petition for interpleader is an equitable proceeding. Substantial relief is prayed, so far as the stakeholders are concerned, against each of the persons claiming the fund; and, therefore, where the claimants reside in different counties, the petition may be properly filed in the county of the residence of either. The same principle is applicable where the original action is brought in a jurisdiction where the stakeholder is subject to suit, and the stakeholder's response is in the nature of interpleader, and one of the claimants to the stakeholder's funds is subject to the court's jurisdiction though other claimants reside in different counties. Williams v. Overstreet, 230 Ga. 112, 195 S.E.2d 906 (1973).

Venue proper in county of any one of two or more defendants of different counties.

- If substantial relief prayed is against two or more defendants residing in different counties, the suit may be brought in the county of the residence of either. O'Hara v. Jacobs, 191 Ga. 5, 11 S.E.2d 199 (1940).

Where plaintiff administratrix alleged that defendants entered into a conspiracy to fraudulently procure transfer to them by decedent of all of the decedent's real and personal estate, that the confederates had made a division of the fruits of their conspiracy and accordingly prayed for appropriate substantial equitable relief against each for benefit of the estate, the defendants were properly joined in the equitable suit and venue of that suit was laid in a county where any one of the defendants resided against whom substantial equitable relief was prayed. Hayes v. Hayes, 214 Ga. 624, 106 S.E.2d 790 (1959).

Injunctions.

- Fact of praying for an injunction against a defendant does not in all events confer right to file the equitable petition in county of defendant's residence, or to draw to that county residents of other counties. Carter v. Grogan, 230 Ga. 249, 196 S.E.2d 434 (1973).

Injunction to restrain continuing trespass.

- Where a petition for injunction, brought in the county where one defendant resides, seeks relief against joint trespasses by all of the defendants, the court is not without jurisdiction, even though all except one defendant are residents of other counties of the state, and even though the resident defendant, as an employee or agent of other defendants, may have been acting only under their command or authority in the commission of the trespasses. Hoch v. Candler, 190 Ga. 390, 9 S.E.2d 622 (1940).

This is true, even though the resident defendant may have been acting only as agent of or under the command, direction, or authority of the other defendants in the commission of the trespasses. Baggett v. Linder, 208 Ga. 590, 68 S.E.2d 469 (1952).

Where a petition for injunction brought in county where one defendant resides, seeks to restrain a continuing trespass which all defendants are committing, the court is not without jurisdiction to grant relief, even though all except the one defendant are residents of other counties in the state. Bennett v. Bagwell & Stewart, Inc., 214 Ga. 115, 103 S.E.2d 561 (1958), commented on in 21 Ga. B.J. 564 (1959).

Bankruptcy trustee of insolvent corporation seeking to recover unpaid stock subscriptions.

- A trustee in bankruptcy of an insolvent corporation may recover unpaid stock subscriptions from any number of persons in one equitable action, and may bring the action in the county of the residence of any of the defendants. Sanders v. Culpepper, 226 Ga. 598, 176 S.E.2d 83 (1970).

Venue proper as to all parties.

- Where a nonresident admits jurisdiction and the defendant against whom substantial relief is prayed is a resident and a second defendant is a joint obligor of the first, venue is proper as to all parties. Cheek v. Savannah Valley Prod. Credit Ass'n, 244 Ga. 768, 262 S.E.2d 90 (1979).

Venue in county in which cause of action originated.

- A motor common carrier may be a nonresident corporation, yet since it is engaged in doing business in this state, and has agents in the state for that purpose, it is a resident of this state and a resident of the county in which the cause of action originated, so far as the right to bring a suit against it for a cause of action originating in that county is concerned, and, being a resident of that county for purpose of suit, a joint tort-feasor, notwithstanding that the joint tort-feasor may reside in another county of this state, may be sued jointly with the motor common carrier in the county in which the cause of action originated. A.G. Boone Co. v. Owens, 51 Ga. App. 739, 181 S.E. 519 (1935).

An action against a motor common carrier, except where the Constitution of this state otherwise provides, may be brought and maintained in any county or militia district where the action could be brought if the defendant were a railroad company being sued upon a like cause of action, and if the defendant or defendants or any of them cannot be found for service in the county or militia district where the action is brought the second original or originals may issue and service may be made in any other county where the service can be made upon the defendant or defendants or defendant's, its, or their agents; a motor common carrier, doing business as such within this state by being engaged in the business of trucking, hauling, and transporting with automobile trucks over various public highways, is subject to be sued, as is a railroad company, in any county in this state in which the cause of action originated, for damages for an injury to person or property by the operation of the vehicles of such motor common carrier, although it may not have an agent in that county upon whom service of the suit may be perfected. A.G. Boone Co. v. Owens, 51 Ga. App. 739, 181 S.E. 519 (1935).

Proceeding exempt from filing in county instituted in.

- When an alleged landlord sued out a statutory proceeding to eject an alleged tenant for nonpayment of rent, the latter could file a suit in equity against the alleged landlord to enjoin the dispossessory proceeding where the tenant denied that the relation of landlord and tenant existed between the tenant and the plaintiff in such proceeding, but alleged that the tenant held under plaintiff under a contract of sale, and in the same suit, in a proper case, could seek specific performance by the plaintiff in such proceeding, of the contract of sale without being required to file a counter-affidavit to such proceeding and to give the bond required by the statute to arrest such proceeding, and without being required to file the tenant's suit for equitable relief in the county where such proceeding was instituted. Harvey v. Atlanta & Lowry Nat'l Bank, 164 Ga. 625, 139 S.E. 147 (1927).

Jurisdiction of probate court and superior court hinges on type of action.

- If a will expressly creates a trust, and imposes special fiduciary duties on the person named executor, not as executor but as trustee, and the executor has expressly or impliedly assented to the gift and taken over the property as trustee, it is plain that the person is not amenable to a proceeding in the court of ordinary (now probate court), brought by a legatee for an accounting and settlement with respect to the trust; but relief must be sought by equitable suit in the superior court where the defendant resides. McDowell v. McDowell, 68 Ga. App. 363, 22 S.E.2d 851 (1942).

Boundary-line dispute.

- Where equitable relief is sought in conjunction with a boundary-line dispute (i.e., removal of a fence and ejectment from a disputed strip of land), the county of the defendant's residence is the proper venue forum. Beauchamp v. Knight, 261 Ga. 608, 409 S.E.2d 208 (1991).

A bill in equity to enjoin a trespass upon realty by felling timber is not a suit respecting title to land as must be brought in the county where the land lies. The proper venue of such a case is the county of the residence of a defendant against whom substantial relief is prayed. Powell v. Cheshire, 70 Ga. 357, 48 Am. R. 572 (1883); Chase v. Endsley, 165 Ga. 292, 140 S.E. 876 (1927), commented on in 1 Ga. L. Rev. 49 (1927).

Venue in county where at least one of the defendants against whom substantial relief is prayed resides.

- An equitable action against three defendants, two resident and one nonresident, seeking to have equity decree title in the plaintiffs to land lying in the county of the suit, not being one respecting title to land, must be brought in the county where one of the defendants against whom substantial relief is prayed resides. Empire Land Co. v. Stokes, 212 Ga. 707, 95 S.E.2d 283 (1956).

If the proceeding to foreclose the lien in the case was one in equity, the suit ought to be brought in the county of the residence of a defendant against whom substantial relief is prayed. Middleton v. Westmoreland, 164 Ga. 324, 138 S.E. 852 (1927).

Venue in foreclosure proceedings.

- While a statutory mortgage on real property must be foreclosed in the county where the property lies, the rule is different where a deed is executed by a borrower to secure a note given to the lender, and the deed is foreclosed as an equitable mortgage on land lying in a different county from that where the vendor lives. In the former case, of a statutory mortgage, generally no title to the land passes from the mortgagor to the mortgagee, but in the latter case it does, and may be foreclosed as an equitable mortgage in the county of the residence of the vendor. Kitchens v. Molton, 172 Ga. 690, 158 S.E. 570 (1931).

Venue of suit to foreclose lien for materials, see Atkinson v. Wingate Plumbing Co., 20 Ga. App. 480, 93 S.E. 122 (1917).

Venue of an equitable action to restrain the exercise of a power of sale contained in a security deed by a resident agent of the grantee, who is a resident of another county, is in the county of the residence of the grantee, and a suit for injunction against the resident agent and the grantee in the county of the agent's residence cannot be sustained. Grace v. Interstate Bond Co., 193 Ga. 810, 20 S.E.2d 131 (1942).

Venue of a suit by a creditor of an intestate person against the administrator is the county of the defendant's residence, and not the county of the administrator's appointment where the administrator resides in a different county. Hopkins v. Kidd, 192 Ga. 791, 16 S.E.2d 570 (1941).

Corporation subject to equity suit in county of principal office.

- A corporation of this state is not subject to a suit for equitable relief by injunction in a county other than that fixed by its charter as the county of its principal office, and this is true although the suit embraces also a claim for past damages. Caldwell v. Swift & Co., 174 Ga. 313, 162 S.E. 814 (1932); Grimaud v. Knox-Georgia Homes, Inc., 210 Ga. 514, 81 S.E.2d 476 (1954).

In a representative capacity, an executrix must be sued in equity, if sued alone, in the county of the executrix's residence. Hopkins v. Kidd, 192 Ga. 791, 16 S.E.2d 570 (1941).

Real estate agents.

- The joining as defendant of a real estate agent as to whom there is no charge of the commission of any unlawful act against the plaintiff irreparable in damages, and against whom only incidental relief is sought, in an equitable action against the nonresident principal, who is the only defendant against whom substantial equitable relief is sought, will not afford jurisdiction in the county of the residence of the agent. Payne v. Hightower, 198 Ga. 421, 31 S.E.2d 816 (1944).

Wills.

- If all the parties interested in a will are nonresidents of the state, the executor may file the bill in the county where the administration is pending, as the Code gives equity concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of ordinary (now probate court) in the administration of estates and permits the executor to apply to equity for direction. As jurisdiction of the administration of the estate is vested in the court of ordinary (now probate court) of the county of the domicile of the deceased, the court of equity for that county can take jurisdiction for the purpose of construing the will or for directing the administration, and service on such nonresidents can be made by publication. Barker v. Wilkinson, 222 Ga. 329, 149 S.E.2d 698 (1966).

Multiple claims arising from same transaction.

- Where a plaintiff brings suit in the same county on two claims arising from the same transaction and the Georgia Constitution designates that county as the venue for one of those claims, the trial court has the discretion to entertain both claims. Natpar Corp. v. E.T. Kassinger, Inc., 258 Ga. 102, 365 S.E.2d 442 (1988).

Where a joint obligor claim and an equitable claim arose from the same transaction, and involved the same parties and witnesses and substantially the same proof, venue with regard to both claims was proper in the county where only one of the joint obligors lived, despite the fact that the other joint obligor was the only defendant against whom equitable relief was prayed. Natpar Corp. v. E.T. Kassinger, Inc., 258 Ga. 102, 365 S.E.2d 442 (1988).

Statutory adverse possession.

- A landowner's suit is clearly not in equity where the landowner seeks to establish legal title by adverse possession as a matter of law in reliance on a statute. Venue is constitutionally in the county in which the land lies, as provided in O.C.G.A. § 44-5-168(b)(1). Hayes v. Howell, 251 Ga. 580, 308 S.E.2d 170 (1983).

Suit subject to dismissal where substantial relief is sought only against nonresident defendant.

- Mere fact of praying for injunction against defendant does not in all events confer right to file equitable petition in county of defendant's residence, or to draw to that county residents of other counties; thus, where substantial relief is sought only against nonresident defendant, suit is subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Newport Timber Corp. v. Floyd, 247 Ga. 535, 277 S.E.2d 646 (1981).

Substantial relief rule.

- Generally, suits for equitable relief must be brought in the county of the residence of a defendant against whom substantial relief is prayed. Waters v. Waters, 167 Ga. 389, 145 S.E. 460 (1928); Bradley v. Burns, 188 Ga. 434, 4 S.E.2d 147 (1939); Harper v. Gunby, 215 Ga. 466, 111 S.E.2d 85 (1959).

Substantial relief sought against multiple defendants.

- An equitable petition asking substantial relief against both defendants may be brought in the county of either. Georgia Power Co. v. City of Rome, 172 Ga. 14, 157 S.E. 283 (1931).

Venue was proper in Echols County, even though the complaint sought additional relief against the DeKalb County Tax Commissioner, who resided in DeKalb County, as the complaint sought substantial relief against the Echols County Tax Commissioner and the commissioner resided in Echols County; the complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to prevent the duplicate collection of ad valorem taxes by the two tax commissioners. Scott v. Prime Sales & Leasing, Inc., 276 Ga. App. 283, 623 S.E.2d 167 (2005).

A person who would have equity must do equity, hence equity, having the parties before the court rightfully, will proceed to give full relief to all parties in reference to the subject matter, provided the court has jurisdiction thereof. Pearson v. George, 211 Ga. 18, 83 S.E.2d 593 (1954).

Construction of substantial relief.

- Properly construed, "substantial relief" mentioned in this paragraph and in former Civil Code 1910, § 5527 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-10-30) referred to substantial equitable relief. Wright v. Trammell, 176 Ga. 84, 166 S.E. 866 (1932); Huckabee Auto Co. v. Norris, 190 Ga. 515, 9 S.E.2d 840 (1940) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III).

Common substantial equitable relief between resident and nonresident required.

- This paragraph has been uniformly construed to mean that in order to join a nonresident in a suit, substantial equitable relief must be common to the nonresident and the resident defendant. This means that regardless of substantial relief sought against the resident defendant and other substantial equitable relief sought against the nonresident, the nonresident cannot be joined. I. Perlis & Sons v. National Sur. Corp., 218 Ga. 667, 129 S.E.2d 915 (1963) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III).

Collateral or incidental relief not sufficient to give jurisdiction.

- If relief is sought against a resident defendant, which is merely collateral or incidental, this will not suffice to give the court jurisdiction. The relief prayed for against a defendant must be substantial. Beacham v. Cullens, 194 Ga. 739, 22 S.E.2d 508 (1942).

Substantial equitable relief must be prayed.

- The essential fact necessary to confer equitable jurisdiction in a county is not that the defendant residing therein shall have an interest, or a substantial interest, but that substantial relief shall be prayed against such defendant. If substantial relief is prayed against a defendant residing in the county in which an equity case is brought, the equity case "shall be tried" there. Bennett v. Blackshear Mfg. Co., 183 Ga. 240, 187 S.E. 865 (1936); Planters Cotton Oil Co. v. McCurley, 199 Ga. 104, 33 S.E.2d 270 (1945).

An indispensable prerequisite to joining a nonresident in an equity suit is a prayer for substantial equitable relief which is common to the resident and nonresident defendants. Martin v. Bennett, 221 Ga. 482, 145 S.E.2d 517 (1965); Madray v. Ogden, 225 Ga. 806, 171 S.E.2d 560 (1969).

The question is not whether the defendant was a proper or necessary party to the suit, but rather did the petition seek substantial equitable relief against it. That it may properly be made a party does not determine the other inquiry; it is a question of proper venue, not proper parties. Carlson v. Hall County Planning Comm'n, 233 Ga. 286, 210 S.E.2d 815 (1974).

In a suit in equity, all persons whose rights and interests are sought to be affected are necessary party defendants and where they are joined as such they are parties against whom substantial equitable relief is prayed within the meaning of the rule as to venue in equity cases. Huey v. National Bank, 177 Ga. 64, 169 S.E. 491 (1933); Summit Ins. Co. v. Mulherin, 233 Ga. 606, 212 S.E.2d 788 (1975).

Absence of jurisdiction appears on the face of the pleading when there is no prayer for substantial equitable relief that is common to both defendants. Martin v. Bennett, 221 Ga. 482, 145 S.E.2d 517 (1965).

Where rights of the resident defendant are only incidentally involved by the grant of the relief sought by the plaintiff, the resident defendant is not a party against whom substantial relief is prayed. Summit Ins. Co. v. Mulherin, 233 Ga. 606, 212 S.E.2d 788 (1975).

Court properly granted motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

- Where the sole equitable relief sought in petition is a recovery ex delicto against nonresident defendants, to be set-off against amounts constituting the basis of several suits in the city court, and the alleged acts of the several nonresidents for which a recovery is sought are matters not included in the subject matter of city court suits, the court did not err in sustaining a demurrer (now motion to dismiss) thereto. Askew v. Bassett Furn. Co., 172 Ga. 700, 158 S.E. 577 (1931).

Showing of substantial relief.

- While, under this section, an equity case must be brought in the county where a defendant resides against whom substantial relief is prayed, and the mere fact that a defendant residing in the county has a substantial pecuniary interest in the litigation, and is a proper or necessary party thereto, will not confer jurisdiction upon the courts of that county where it is not alleged that the resident defendant is doing or threatening to do an illegal act; however, where the petition, brought by minority stockholders of a corporation, alleges that the deceased owner of the controlling stock had pledged stock to the corporation as security for an indebtedness and that the defendants, the heirs at law, one of whom resides in the county where the suit is filed, have entered into a fraudulent scheme and conspiracy with the administrators of the deceased and directors of the corporation, to sell the stock so as to defeat the lien of the corporation thereon, and such petition seeks discovery of the terms of the proposed sale, and to enjoin such threatened fraudulent sale of stock, and to enjoin the bank, a resident corporation of the county in which the suit was filed, from surrendering possession of stock certificate, the petition sought such substantial relief against the defendants residing in the county where it was filed as to confer jurisdiction upon the superior court of that county. Screven Oil Mill v. Hudmon, 214 Ga. 414, 105 S.E.2d 328 (1958) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III).

Prayer for substantial relief required for injunctive relief.

- Where a defendant corporation is a domestic corporation and a resident of a county different from the plaintiff's, the superior court of the plaintiff's county would have no jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief against it, if no substantial relief is prayed against the resident defendant. Screven County v. Reddy, 208 Ga. 730, 69 S.E.2d 186 (1952).

Suit in county of residence of attorney who allegedly had contingent interest in estate.

- Where a suit instituted by an administrator against heirs at law and their attorney alleged a contingent interest of the attorney in the subject matter of suit; and, though contingent upon recovery for clients, it was a substantial interest in the property alleged to be in the hands of the administrator for distribution among the heirs, and afforded grounds for equitable relief against the attorney as suit was in equity, venue was properly laid in the county of the residence of the attorney at law. Reynolds v. Ingraham, 179 Ga. 398, 175 S.E. 918 (1934).

Cancellation of a security deed was "substantial relief " against a resident defendant where plaintiff alleged that the deed was a sham for tax purposes, that there was never any agreement to repay the money used to buy the property, and that defendants, one a county resident and the other a nonresident, were involved in a collusive effort to foreclose on the property and sell it. Stephenson v. Edwards, 259 Ga. 173, 377 S.E.2d 840 (1989).

Attachment of jurisdiction in quasi-in rem suit.

- Where the plaintiff who obtained an alleged fraudulent judgment was a nonresident of the state and had caused the writ based on the judgment to be levied upon the property of the defendant located in Floyd County, plaintiff was subjected to the jurisdiction of the court in Floyd County for the purpose of a suit quasi-in rem to set aside the judgment and cancel the entry of the writ on the execution docket, as a cloud upon the plaintiff's title. Turner v. Koske, 173 Ga. 390, 160 S.E. 398 (1931).

Jurisdiction over nonresidents on account of joinder of resident defendant.

- It was not contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, in fixing the venue of equity suits, that nonresidents could be made to litigate in one county issues between them and the plaintiffs solely on account of the joinder of a resident defendant against whom there was a prayer for equitable relief. The mere fact of praying for an injunction against a defendant does not in all events confer the right to file the equitable petition in the county of that defendant's residence, or to draw to that county residents of other counties. Mandeville v. Mandeville, 207 Ga. 125, 60 S.E.2d 460 (1950) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III).

In order to confer on the court of a particular county jurisdiction to hear and determine an issue between the plaintiff and a nonresident defendant, it is essential that the plaintiff present a case showing grounds for the equitable relief sought against the resident defendant. Mandeville v. Mandeville, 207 Ga. 125, 60 S.E.2d 460 (1950).

Separate and distinct equitable causes of action do not give rise to jurisdiction.

- A separate and distinct equitable cause of action against a resident defendant will not give the superior court of the county of such residence jurisdiction of a nonresident defendant against whom the plaintiff has another, independent, separate, and distinct equitable cause of action. Jones v. Hudgins, 218 Ga. 43, 126 S.E.2d 414 (1962).

When paragraph inapplicable.

- Where a suit in equity is brought against a sole nonresident defendant of this state, seeking to cancel and set aside certain deeds as a cloud upon the title of the petitioner, and containing a prayer for general relief, a court of equity, under the prayer for general relief, may decree title to be in the petitioner; in such a case, this paragraph is inapplicable and the question is whether any court of equity in this state has jurisdiction. Hale v. Turner, 185 Ga. 516, 195 S.E. 423 (1937) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III).

Others cannot allow court to obtain jurisdiction of nonresident defendants.

- The court cannot gain jurisdiction of any defendants who are nonresidents of the state, by reason of including in the petition the superintendent of banks (now commissioner of banking and finance), the judge of a city court, and an attorney at law. Askew v. Bassett Furn. Co., 172 Ga. 700, 158 S.E. 577 (1931).

Distinction between suits to establish title and suits to recover land.

- There is a distinction between suits to establish title to land or to establish the evidence of title, and suits to recover the land upon legal title; the former being suits in equity, and the latter actions at law. Owenby v. Stancil, 190 Ga. 50, 8 S.E.2d 7 (1940).

The common test as to whether an action to recover land is an action respecting title to land within the venue provision of the Constitution is whether the plaintiff can recover on the plaintiff's title alone, or whether the plaintiff must seek the aid of a court of equity in order to recover. Payne v. Terhune, 212 Ga. 169, 91 S.E.2d 348 (1956).

Suits alleging fraud and coercion.

- An action to cancel a deed conveying land, alleging the deed to have been obtained by fraud and coercion, is not a suit respecting title to land within the meaning of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. II), but is an equitable action, and must be brought in the county of the residence of the defendants, as required by this paragraph. Hawkins v. Pierotti, 232 Ga. 631, 208 S.E.2d 452 (1974) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III).

Ascertainment and establishment of boundary line case in equity and not one respecting title to land.

- Petition predicated upon ownership by plaintiff of certain described lands upon which defendants allegedly committed acts of trespass, and which of necessity required ascertainment and establishment of the boundary line in controversy, was a case in equity seeking injunctive relief against trespass to land, and was not a case respecting title to land, within the venue provisions of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. II), and the case was properly brought in the county of the residence of a defendant against whom substantial equitable relief was prayed, as required by this paragraph. Dawson v. Altamaha Land Co., 215 Ga. 700, 113 S.E.2d 129 (1960) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III).

Suit to remove cloud on title arising from certain year's support proceeding.

- Suit to remove from record a certain year's support proceeding as a cloud upon title of described land in plaintiff's possession was one in equity and not one respecting title to land, and should have been brought in the county of a defendant against whom substantial relief was sought; since the suit was brought in a county where neither defendant resided, the court was without jurisdiction of the subject matter and such jurisdiction could not be conferred by consent or waived by the parties. Sweatman v. Roberts, 213 Ga. 112, 97 S.E.2d 320 (1957).

Other equitable proceedings.

- Suit by assignee of obligee of a bond for title for an accounting and setoff against the purchase price of rents, appointment of a receiver to collect rents, specific performance and other relief, should have been brought in the county wherein the obligor under the bond for title resided, and not in the county of the tenant's residence; nor did plaintiff's striking of the plaintiff's prayer of injunction, and praying for possession of the premises, make the suit one respecting title to land, to be tried in the county where the land lay, as only after relief in equity decreeing title in plaintiff would the plaintiff have an action at law for recovery of the land. Bradley v. Burns, 188 Ga. 434, 4 S.E.2d 147 (1939).

Contract set asides based on mental incapacity or insanity.

- A petition filed in the court where a judgment was rendered to set aside the judgment on the ground of mental incapacity to enter into contract and of insanity existing at the time the judgment was rendered is not "an equity case" as is contemplated by the Constitution of Georgia. Perry v. Fletcher, 174 Ga. 180, 162 S.E. 285 (1932).

Jurisdiction and venue distinguished.

- Jurisdiction means the power of a court to render a binding judgment in the case, and venue means the place of trial. Williams v. Fuller, 244 Ga. 846, 262 S.E.2d 135 (1979).

The domicile of transient persons as fixed by former Civil Code 1910, § 2182 (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-2-2) was a sufficient residence within the meaning of this paragraph. Crawford v. Wilson, 142 Ga. 734, 83 S.E. 667 (1914) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III).

Essential fact necessary to confer jurisdiction is not that a defendant residing in county has substantial interest in litigation, but whether or not substantial equitable relief is prayed against such defendant. Newport Timber Corp. v. Floyd, 247 Ga. 535, 277 S.E.2d 646 (1981).

Waiver permissible.

- This paragraph confers a personal privilege on the defendant which may be waived by the defendant. Thomason v. Thompson, 129 Ga. 440, 59 S.E. 236, 26 L.R.A. (n.s.) 536 (1907) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III).

Amendment.

- An amendment to a bill will not be allowed if one of the effects of the amendment would be to compel defendants to come to trial in a different county from that of their residence. Jordan v. Jordan, 16 Ga. 446 (1854); Johnson v. Griffin, 80 Ga. 551, 7 S.E. 94 (1888).

The trial court properly sustained the ground of demurrer (now motion to dismiss) which set up its want of jurisdiction, because no substantial relief was prayed against the only resident defendant. White v. North Ga. Elec. Co., 139 Ga. 587, 77 S.E. 789 (1913); Middlebrooks v. Barron, 150 Ga. 701, 105 S.E. 298 (1920); Glenn v. Cauthen, 150 Ga. 784, 105 S.E. 365 (1920); Willie v. Willie, 154 Ga. 688, 115 S.E. 257 (1922).

A bill is not demurrable (now motion to dismiss) on the ground that land lying in another county was involved in the litigation. Fulgham v. Pate, 77 Ga. 454 (1886).

Collateral relief against real estate agent does not confer jurisdiction.

- Where the relief prayed against a resident real estate agent is collateral to and dependent upon the granting of the main relief sought against the executor, residing in another county, the superior court of that county has no jurisdiction of the case. Martin v. Gaissert, 134 Ga. 34, 67 S.E. 536 (1910).

Upon showing defendant and respondent as joint wrongdoers and substantial relief sought jurisdiction established.

- Where the allegations of the amended petition are sufficient to show that the original defendant and the respondent are joint wrongdoers and substantial equitable relief is sought against both, there is no merit in the contention that the superior court of the county does not have jurisdiction of the respondent. Hardin v. Homeyer, 213 Ga. 321, 99 S.E.2d 136 (1957).

Venue in licensing actions against state board.

- Venue of contractors' action seeking to restrain the Georgia State Licensing Board for Residential and General Contractors and a county from enforcing a licensing law, O.C.G.A. § 43-41-1 et seq., was proper in Muscogee County because there was substantial equitable relief sought that was common to the Board and to the resident county; the complaint alleged that enforcement of the licensing law by both the Board and the county would cause irreparable injury to the contractors, and it asked that preliminary and permanent injunctions be issued against both the county and the Board enjoining and restraining them from exercising any of the powers, rights, or duties respecting enforcement of the licensing law. Ga. State Licensing Bd. for Residential & Gen. Contrs. v. Allen, 286 Ga. 811, 692 S.E.2d 343 (2010).

Grounds for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

- A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is properly granted by the trial court where an equitable action is brought: (1) in which in personam relief is prayed against a nonresident of Georgia; and (2) in which no substantial relief is prayed against a resident of the county where the action is brought. Roberts v. Markin, 225 Ga. 352, 168 S.E.2d 576 (1969).

Joinder of a resident defendant did not give jurisdiction.

- A nonresident cannot be made to litigate in one county issues between the nonresident and a plaintiff solely on account of joinder of a resident defendant against whom there is a prayer for equitable relief. Beacham v. Cullens, 194 Ga. 739, 22 S.E.2d 508 (1942).

Suit subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction.

- Where the only substantial relief sought is against nonresident defendants, and the sole resident defendant individually has no connection with the alleged cause of action, and no act or claim by the defendant is involved except as agent of the other defendants, the suit is subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Carter v. Grogan, 230 Ga. 249, 196 S.E.2d 434 (1973).

Jury's finding not authorized by evidence.

- The evidence did not authorize a finding by a jury that defendant resided in the county in which suit for injunction and damages was brought when such suit was brought. Grimaud v. Knox-Georgia Homes, Inc., 210 Ga. 514, 81 S.E.2d 476 (1954).

Nonresident defendant lacked substantial interest.

- An equitable petition against two defendants residing in different counties in this state, brought in the county of the residence of one of them, where it is apparent that the only substantial relief sought is against the nonresident defendant, is subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Beacham v. Cullens, 194 Ga. 739, 22 S.E.2d 508 (1942).

Where the interests of the plaintiff and the resident defendant are identical and the allegations of the petition fail to show any justiciable controversy between the plaintiff and the resident defendant in which the nonresident defendant has any substantial interest, on motion of the nonresident defendant, setting out that it is a resident of a named county in this state and subject to suit only in the superior court of that county, the petition will be dismissed as to such nonresident defendant for want of jurisdiction. Maryland Cas. Co. v. City of Adel, 87 Ga. App. 138, 73 S.E.2d 237 (1952).

Where defendants filed a complaint in equity to set aside a default judgment rendered against them in a previous civil action, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction and venue was improper, since a complaint in equity to set aside a judgment must be brought in the county in which a defendant resides against whom substantial relief is prayed. Franks v. Horton, 244 Ga. 611, 261 S.E.2d 570 (1979).

Dismissal proper where suit brought in county other than defendant's residence.

- While a written motion to dismiss an equitable petition will not be granted unless every material fact on which the motion is founded is apparent in the petition, yet there is no deviation from this rule in dismissing a petition on written motion specifically raising the question of lack of jurisdiction where it appears that the only defendant against whom substantial relief is prayed is a resident of a county other than that in which the petition is brought. Payne v. Hightower, 198 Ga. 421, 31 S.E.2d 816 (1944).

Where the only defendant was a resident of one county, when the plaintiff instituted a suit against the defendant for equitable relief in the superior court of another county, and the petition prayed for relief as to matters not included in the defendant's pending application to probate a will in solemn form, the court did not err in sustaining the defendant's plea to the jurisdiction of the court and in dismissing the plaintiff's suit. Spiller v. Chapman, 216 Ga. 456, 117 S.E.2d 536 (1960).

Cross actions.

- When to a suit at law, by the transferee against the maker of a promissory note, an answer in the nature of a cross action was filed praying equitable relief against the original payee, who resided in a county other than the one wherein the suit was pending, it was error to sustain a motion making such transferor a party, over the transferor's objection that the court had no jurisdiction to do so, or to grant the relief sought. Huckabee Auto Co. v. Norris, 190 Ga. 515, 9 S.E.2d 840 (1940).

Where, to an action at law brought by a resident of Polk County against a defendant residing in Fulton County, an answer in the nature of a cross action was filed, in which substantial equitable relief was prayed against the plaintiff and a third party who was also a resident of Polk County, it was erroneous to make the latter a party over the latter's objection, and to refuse the third party's motion to dismiss the cross action as to the third party, the ground of such objection and motion being that the court had no jurisdiction to grant as to the third party the relief sought. Terhune v. Pettit, 195 Ga. 793, 25 S.E.2d 660 (1943).

An equitable petition against two defendants residing in this state, brought in the county where one of them resides, from which together with the prayers it is apparent that the only substantial relief sought is against the nonresident defendant, and that the sole resident defendant individually has no connection with the alleged cause of action, and no act or claim by the resident defendant is involved except as agent of the other defendant, is subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Payne v. Hightower, 198 Ga. 421, 31 S.E.2d 816 (1944).

Contracting company's residence did not give jurisdiction.

- Fact that plaintiff, as surety, guaranteed performance of contract by contracting company, as principal, would not give the superior court of the county of residence of the contracting company jurisdiction on petition of the surety to hear and determine controversy between the contracting company and the city for which the work was to be performed as to whether or not there had been a breach of contract on the part of the contracting company, nor would fact that plaintiff and contracting company had entered into a separate contract by application for the performance bond give plaintiff any right to compel the city to join in a suit with reference to this separate contract, since the city was not a party to the application and had no interest therein. Maryland Cas. Co. v. City of Adel, 87 Ga. App. 138, 73 S.E.2d 237 (1952).

The Superior Court of Murray County did not have jurisdiction to entertain a case for a declaratory judgment where all of the party defendants except one defendant, against whom no substantial equitable relief was prayed, were nonresidents of Murray County; the equitable feature of the case is removed, leaving the action solely one at law under Ga. L. 1945, p. 137, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2). The venue of such an action is in the county where the defendant resides, Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI). The nonresident defendants not being of the class of persons who may be sued in counties other than the counties of their residence as permitted in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Paras. IV and V (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Paras. IV and V), the court was without jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment as to their rights. Harper v. Gunby, 215 Ga. 466, 111 S.E.2d 85 (1959).

Error in finding venue under § 33-4-1. - Where an owner's suit did not arise out of a title insurance company's business as an insurer, pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III, the trial court erred in finding venue under O.C.G.A. § 33-4-1(2); in addition, the grant of an interlocutory injunction was error because there was no showing that the title company had any opportunity to challenge the applicability of an amendment to add a quiet title action under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-62 to the complaint. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Broadstreet, 260 Ga. App. 705, 580 S.E.2d 676 (2003).

Dismissal proper in dispute over insurance policy.

- Columbia County Superior Court did not have personal jurisdiction over an insurance policy beneficiary who resided in another county sufficient to impose equitable relief against the beneficiary, pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III. Joinder of the beneficiary was not proper even if jurisdiction was proper as to the insurer under O.C.G.A. § 33-4-1(4) because the complaint did not seek equitable relief common to both the non-resident beneficiary and the insurer. Skaliy v. Metts, 287 Ga. 777, 700 S.E.2d 357 (2010).

"Waiver" defined.

- The only way in which former Code 1933, § 3-202 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-10-30) can be reconciled with this paragraph is on the idea of waiver, in that a plaintiff by voluntarily instituting a suit gave to the court of the county where it was so instituted jurisdiction of the plaintiff's person, sufficient to answer all the ends of justice respecting the suit originally instituted. Terhune v. Pettit, 195 Ga. 793, 25 S.E.2d 660 (1943) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III).

Significance of waiver.

- Only through waiver or voluntary submission to the courts of another county may a trial take place in a county other than that of the defendant's residence. Hanson v. Williams, 170 Ga. 779, 154 S.E. 240 (1930); Terhune v. Pettit, 195 Ga. 793, 25 S.E.2d 660 (1943).

Connection and reconciling paragraph with other sections.

- Since former Code 1933, § 3-202 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-10-30) can be reconciled with this paragraph as to venue of equity cases only on the ground of waiver, then former Code 1933, § 24-112 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-1-2), and particularly the latter portion thereof, was directly on point in a case where third parties were involved. Terhune v. Pettit, 195 Ga. 793, 25 S.E.2d 660 (1943) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III).

Plaintiffs estopped by their action to deny jurisdiction of court.

- Where the plaintiffs themselves brought the petition, and invoked the aid of a court of equity to enjoin certain acts by the bank, and filed the suit in the county of residence of the bank against which substantial relief was prayed, and the petition alleged that title to the land in controversy was in the plaintiffs, and the court was asked to decree that the title was legally in them, and was not subject to the payment of the indebtedness of another to the bank, the plaintiffs, having invoked the jurisdiction in equity of the court in such county, were estopped from denying that the court had jurisdiction to entertain the case; and if the title to the land in another county is involved in the litigation, it is only incidentally so, and on account of the fact that the plaintiffs themselves brought the question into the case. Manry v. Farmers' Bank, 177 Ga. 370, 170 S.E. 30 (1933).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 77 Am. Jur. 2d, Venue, §§ 22, 23.

ALR.

- Guardianship of incompetent or infant as affecting venue of action, 111 A.L.R. 167.

Proper county for bringing replevin, or similar possessory action, 60 A.L.R.2d 487.

Venue of action for specific performance of contract pertaining to real property, 63 A.L.R.2d 456.

Independent venue requirements as to cross complaint or similar action by defendant seeking relief against a codefendant or third party, 100 A.L.R.2d 693.