Scope of section.

- Because of subsection (b) of this section, the Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137) is much broader in scope and more comprehensive in its jurisdiction of justiciable controversies than is the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, which was approved in 1922 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and which has since been enacted into law, as thus approved, in more than 20 of the states. Therefore, by giving full effect to the provisions of the Act, it follows, as a matter of course, that the respective superior courts of this state, under subsection (b) of this section, have power to determine and settle by declaration any justiciable controversy of a civil nature when it appears to the court that the ends of justice require that such should be made for the guidance and protection of the petitioner, and when such a declaration will relieve the petitioner from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to the petitioner's rights, status, and legal relations. Calvary Independent Baptist Church v. City of Rome, 208 Ga. 312, 66 S.E.2d 726 (1951) (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2).

Court of Appeals of Georgia construe the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., liberally and merely requires the presence in a declaratory action of a party with an interest in the controversy adverse to that of the petitioner. A declaratory judgment is authorized when there are circumstances showing a necessity for a determination of the dispute to guide and protect the plaintiff from uncertainty and insecurity with regard to the propriety of some future act or conduct, which is properly incident to the plaintiff's alleged rights and which if taken without direction might reasonably jeopardize the plaintiff's interest. RTS Landfill, Inc. v. Appalachian Waste Sys., LLC, 267 Ga. App. 56, 598 S.E.2d 798 (2004).

Because an actual and ongoing controversy existed regarding the rights of competing parties to a condominium unit, specifically the unit's owners and its buyer and disputes concerning ownership of or right of access to land were classic candidates for resolution via declaratory judgment, the trial court correctly denied the owners' motion for summary judgment on the buyer's counterclaim for declaratory judgment. Quality Foods, Inc. v. Smithberg, 288 Ga. App. 47, 653 S.E.2d 486 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0437, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 316 (Ga. 2008).

In a declaratory judgment action between a water utility and residents of a subdivision, given that the residents had standing to sue on a contract for the provision of water services as incidental beneficiaries, the trial court erred in finding that the utility was charging the appropriate rates thereunder; but, the utility was allowed to increase the utility's minimum annual fee and, given the clear and unambiguous language of the contract, enforce a restrictive covenant. Alday v. Decatur Consol. Water Servs., 289 Ga. App. 902, 658 S.E.2d 476 (2008).

Standing to challenge statute.

- In a declaratory judgment action facially challenging Georgia's good behavior bond statute, O.C.G.A. § 17-6-90, the trial court judgment granting summary judgment to appellees was vacated because § 17-6-90(a) did not regulate the appellants' conduct and, in the absence of current peace bonding proceedings or even an allegation that a judicial officer in the county would exercise such discretion, the appellants failed to show nothing more than a hypothetical concern regarding § 17-6-90(a) and, therefore, lacked standing to challenge it. Parker v. Leeuwenburg, 300 Ga. 789, 797 S.E.2d 908 (2017).

Effect of subsection (c).

- Subsection (c) of this section does not change the requirement that in order to be entitled to a declaratory judgment the plaintiff must show facts or circumstances whereby it is in a position of uncertainty or insecurity because of a dispute and of having to take some future action which is properly incident to its alleged right, and which future action without direction from the court might reasonably jeopardize its interest. Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 101 Ga. App. 530, 114 S.E.2d 389 (1960).

Subsection (c) of this section does not mean that a declaratory judgment will lie to have just any justiciable controversy decided. Petitioners must show a necessity for a declaration of their rights or liabilities on account of uncertainty or insecurity regarding prior actions. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Brooks Lumber Co., 101 Ga. App. 620, 115 S.E.2d 271 (1960); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Boyle, 124 Ga. App. 739, 186 S.E.2d 140 (1971).

Under subsection (c) of this section, one is not precluded from obtaining relief by declaratory judgment merely because the complaining party has other adequate legal or equitable remedy or remedies. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Moody, 116 Ga. App. 2, 156 S.E.2d 117 (1967).

Although subsection (c) of this section provides that relief by declaratory judgment is available notwithstanding other adequate legal or equitable remedies, the necessity therefor must appear, and a petition will not lie when all rights of the parties have already accrued and when no facts or circumstances are alleged showing a necessity for adjudication in order to relieve the plaintiff from the risk of taking future undirected action, which, without such action, would jeopardize the plaintiff's interest. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Bishop, 121 Ga. App. 75, 172 S.E.2d 855 (1970).

To obtain relief by declaratory judgment, the plaintiff must show facts or circumstances whereby it is in a position of uncertainty because of a dispute and of having to take some future action which is properly incident to its alleged right, and which future action without direction from the court might reasonably jeopardize its interest. Farm & Home Life Ins. Co. v. Skelton, 235 Ga. App. 507, 510 S.E.2d 76 (1998).

Other adequate remedies at law.

- While under subsection (c) of this section, one is not precluded from obtaining relief by declaratory judgment merely because the complaining party has other adequate legal or equitable remedy or remedies, yet, when the petition shows that the rights of the parties have already accrued and no facts or circumstances are alleged which show the necessity for a determination of any dispute to guide and protect the petitioners from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to the propriety of some future act or conduct which is properly incident to their alleged right, which future action without direction would jeopardize their interest, the petition fails to state a cause of action for a declaratory judgment. Holcomb v. Bivens, 103 Ga. App. 86, 118 S.E.2d 840 (1961).

Declaratory judgment proceeding is action at law and, in the absence of specific statutory authority, new parties defendant cannot be made by a defendant in an action at law. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Moody, 116 Ga. App. 2, 156 S.E.2d 117 (1967).

Declaratory judgment action, absent appropriate prayers for specific equitable relief, is itself but an action at law. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Moody, 116 Ga. App. 2, 156 S.E.2d 117 (1967).

Petition for declaratory judgment is an action at law, and it is not converted into an equitable action simply because a temporary restraining order is granted in order to maintain the status quo pending adjudication. Hobgood v. Black, 144 Ga. App. 448, 241 S.E.2d 60 (1978).

Action brought under this section is not equitable proceeding per se. Felton v. Chandler, 201 Ga. 347, 39 S.E.2d 654 (1946); Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co. v. Davis, 204 Ga. 67, 48 S.E.2d 876 (1948); City of Summerville v. Georgia Power Co., 204 Ga. 276, 49 S.E.2d 661 (1948); Adler v. Adler, 209 Ga. 363, 72 S.E.2d 714 (1952); Boggs v. Broome, 209 Ga. 836, 76 S.E.2d 497 (1953); United States Cas. Co. v. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry., 212 Ga. 569, 94 S.E.2d 422 (1956); Whitehead v. Henson, 222 Ga. 429, 150 S.E.2d 628 (1966).

Relief provided for under the provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137) is not equitable per se. In suits instituted under the Act, when there is an absence of appropriate pleadings and prayers for specific equitable relief, in addition to those for the statutory relief provided for thereby, the case does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as being one in equity. Bond v. Ray, 207 Ga. 559, 63 S.E.2d 399 (1951).

Action brought under this section is not a proceeding involving extraordinary remedy within meaning of the Constitution. Felton v. Chandler, 201 Ga. 347, 39 S.E.2d 654 (1946); Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co. v. Davis, 204 Ga. 67, 48 S.E.2d 876 (1948); City of Summerville v. Georgia Power Co., 204 Ga. 276, 49 S.E.2d 661 (1948); Adler v. Adler, 209 Ga. 363, 72 S.E.2d 714 (1952); Whitehead v. Henson, 222 Ga. 429, 150 S.E.2d 628 (1966).

Declaratory judgment defined.

- Declaratory judgment or decree is one which simply declares the rights of the parties or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law, without ordering anything to be done; its distinctive characteristic being that the declaration stands by itself, and no executory process follows as of course; and the action is therefore distinguished from other actions in that it does not seek execution or performance from the defendant or opposing party. Burgess v. Burgess, 210 Ga. 380, 80 S.E.2d 280 (1954); Lee v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 159 Ga. App. 205, 282 S.E.2d 770 (1981).

Superior courts retain exclusive jurisdiction as to declaratory judgment actions. EVI Equip., Inc. v. Northern Ins. Co., 178 Ga. App. 197, 342 S.E.2d 380 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Mitchell v. Southern Gen. Ins. Co., 185 Ga. App. 870, 366 S.E.2d 179, cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 910, 366 S.E.2d 179 (1988).

Administrative proceeding pending.

- Subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2 did not give the plaintiff a right to sue for declaratory judgment notwithstanding pendency of the administrative proceeding. George v. Department of Natural Resources, 250 Ga. 491, 299 S.E.2d 556 (1983).

Availability of administrative remedy will not preclude declaratory judgment if the seeking of the remedy would expose the seeker, if unsuccessful, to loss of livelihood or otherwise seriously jeopardize the seeker's interests. Moss v. Central State Hosp., 255 Ga. 403, 339 S.E.2d 226 (1986).

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

- When an applicant's request for a solid waste handling permit was denied and the applicant then failed to exhaust administrative remedies, there was no longer an actual controversy, and the applicant's petition for declaratory judgment was not appropriate. Chambers of Ga., Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 232 Ga. App. 632, 502 S.E.2d 553 (1998).

Because the superior court should not have exercised the court's equitable jurisdiction when the property owners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 through the county board of equalization, the superior court's judgment for declaratory relief in favor of the property owners at summary judgment was reversed; instead, the superior court should have dismissed the property owners' suit for failing to state a claim. Chatham County Bd. of Assessors v. Jepson, 261 Ga. App. 771, 584 S.E.2d 22 (2003).

Trial court did not err by failing to dismiss a medical center's declaratory action based on the center's failure to exhaust administrative remedies because the center had standing to pursue, and was in fact pursuing, a direct facial constitutional challenge to a statute and was not required to exhaust the center's administrative remedies before filing its declaratory action. Women's Surgical Ctr., LLC v. Berry, 302 Ga. 349, 806 S.E.2d 606 (2017).

Words "actual controversy" in this section mean justiciable controversy, when interested parties are asserting adverse claims upon a state of facts wherein a legal judgment is sought that would control or direct future action. The danger, dilemma, or injury about which the plaintiff complains must not be speculative or contingent upon the happening of future events, but rather there must be a present, concrete issue between the parties wherein there is a definite assertion on the part of the plaintiff of legal rights and a positive legal duty on the part of the adverse party which is denied by such party. Darnell v. Tate, 206 Ga. 576, 58 S.E.2d 160 (1950).

Term "actual controversy" as used in this section and the terms "rights, status and other legal relations," all relate to a justiciable controversy, and a controversy is justiciable when there are interested parties asserting adverse claims upon an accrued state of facts. Adler v. Adler, 87 Ga. App. 842, 75 S.E.2d 578 (1953).

When there was an actual controversy between the parties which was ripe for adjudication, but the petition for declaratory judgment showed on its face that all possible rights between the parties had accrued and all possible obligations had attached, there was no actual or justiciable controversy present, and the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter a judgment. Farm & Home Life Ins. Co. v. Skelton, 235 Ga. App. 507, 510 S.E.2d 76 (1998).

Trial court erred by failing to dismiss a city's suits seeking a declaratory judgment as to the annexation of school property because there was no actual annexation of any of the properties in question; thus, the controversy was founded upon proposed legislation and the trial court could not render an advisory opinion. City of Atlanta v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 300 Ga. 213, 794 S.E.2d 162 (2016).

If an action for a declaration raises issues which are fictitious, colorable, hypothetical, abstract, academic, or dead, and hence moot, the Georgia declaratory judgments statute is not applicable, and the action must be dismissed as decisively as would be any other action presenting the same nonjusticiable issues. Felton v. Chandler, 75 Ga. App. 354, 43 S.E.2d 742 (1947).

Issues which are based on fictitious, colorable, hypothetical, or academic questions, or questions that have become moot, do not involve legal rights, legal status, and other legal relations within the meaning of "actual" justiciable controversy as used in this section. Brown v. Lawrence, 204 Ga. 788, 51 S.E.2d 651 (1949); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Cravey, 90 Ga. App. 113, 82 S.E.2d 150 (1954).

Word "actual," preceding word "controversy" in this section is word of emphasis, and not of definition. The word "controversy" within itself contemplates a justiciable controversy. A controversy is justiciable when there are "interested parties" asserting "adverse" claims upon a state of facts which must have accrued, wherein a legal decision is sought or demanded. Brown v. Lawrence, 204 Ga. 788, 51 S.E.2d 651 (1949).

No "actual controversy" shown.

- There was no "actual controversy" when the plaintiff acknowledged that the plaintiff had not been charged with a violation of the statute nor had there been any showing of intent by authorities to take any action pursuant to the statute. Patterson v. State, 242 Ga. App. 131, 528 S.E.2d 884 (2000).

Trial court did not err by affirming the dismissal of the property owner's two latest lawsuits in a case in which the owners were challenging zoning decisions related to a proposed private school near or contiguous to their property; none of the claims in the fourth lawsuit challenged the zoning status of the county government representatives and private developers' property and the fifth lawsuit did not present a justiciable issue of fact, or, in other words, an "actual controversy." Harrell v. Fulton County, 272 Ga. App. 760, 612 S.E.2d 838 (2005).

Given the absence of a justiciable controversy, the trial court erred in granting a county industrial development authority's petition for declaratory judgment finding that the authority was immune from a county's zoning regulations as it amounted to an advisory opinion and had to be vacated and remanded for an order dismissing the petition without prejudice. Effingham County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Effingham County Indus. Dev. Auth., 286 Ga. App. 748, 650 S.E.2d 274 (2007).

As a city had the right under a lease and an airport authority's enabling legislation to relocate the airport against the authority's wishes, the authority did not face "uncertainty and insecurity" as to such an action. As the authority did not establish the existence of a justiciable controversy under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2(a), the authority's declaratory judgment suit was properly dismissed. Airport Auth. v. City of St. Marys, 297 Ga. App. 645, 678 S.E.2d 103 (2009).

Trial court's holding that a bank was not required to confirm a second nonjudicial foreclosure sale under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 before pursuing an action for a deficiency judgment against a guarantor was an erroneous advisory opinion because the bank did file a confirmation petition and, thus, the parties failed to show under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2(a) that there was any justiciable controversy on the issue of whether the bank was required to do so. Building Block Enterprises, LLC v. State Bank & Trust Company, 314 Ga. App. 147, 723 S.E.2d 467 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1053, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 553 (Ga. 2012).

Trial court erred in dismissing a coastal environmental center's claim for injunctive relief because the center alleged ultra vires conduct on the part of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources by the Department's issuance of letters of permission for activities that required a permit under the Shore Protection Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-5-237; thus, the center was authorized to bring suit under O.C.G.A. § 12-5-245 seeking injunctive relief, but the center's claim for declaratory relief was properly dismissed because no actual controversy existed since the center was complaining about prior letters issued, not any pending. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, Inc. v. Ga. Dep't of Natural Res., 319 Ga. App. 205, 734 S.E.2d 206 (2012).

Although there might be some actual or justiciable controversy between the offender and the sheriff, there was no present controversy whatsoever between the offender and the Sexual Offender Registration Review Board as the relief requested by the offender, if granted, would have no practical effect on the controversy between the offender and the Board and, thus, the trial court erred in denying the Board's motion to dismiss the offender's declaratory judgment action. Sexual Offender Registration Review Bd. v. Berzett, 301 Ga. 391, 801 S.E.2d 821 (2017).

"Interested" parties as used in this section must, of course, mean parties having legal, protectible interest. If the petitioner can show that the petitioner's rights are in direct issue or jeopardy, and at the same time show that the facts are complete, and that the petitioner's interest is not merely academic, hypothetical, or colorable, but actual, a "legal interest" as related to a justiciable controversy may be shown. Brown v. Lawrence, 204 Ga. 788, 51 S.E.2d 651 (1949).

Under the Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137), the respective superior courts of the state have power on petition therefor to declare the rights and other legal relations of an interested party, (a) in cases of actual controversy, and (b) in any civil case in which it appears to the court that the ends of justice require that such a declaration should be made for the guidance and protection of the petitioner. Cook v. Sikes, 210 Ga. 722, 82 S.E.2d 641 (1954).

Party is "interested" within the meaning of this section whenever a party has a protectible interest and asserts an adverse claim on an accrued statement of facts. Hobgood v. Black, 144 Ga. App. 448, 241 S.E.2d 60 (1978).

Adverse claim asserted under real estate contract.

- Since the president of the corporate buyer on a real estate contract asserted an adverse claim based upon the transaction in a separate suit in federal court, the president was an interested party within the meaning of the declaratory judgment statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2(a), and was subject to the declaratory relief relating to the contract sought by the sellers. Smyrna Dev. Co. v. Whitener Ltd. P'ship, 280 Ga. App. 788, 635 S.E.2d 173 (2006).

Under this section, court may declare rights, and other legal relations of any interested party petitioning. Central Ry. v. Southern Clays, Inc., 94 Ga. App. 377, 94 S.E.2d 625 (1956).

Default judgment was properly entered, after the defendant did not file an answer within the time permitted by law. Town of Thunderbolt v. River Crossing Apts., Ltd., 189 Ga. App. 607, 377 S.E.2d 12, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 913, 377 S.E.2d 12 (1988).

When a seller failed to pay the closing costs under a buy-back provision in its contract with the buyers, the buyers were properly granted a declaratory judgment which held that the seller was responsible to pay the closing costs, and an offer to do so was insufficient to satisfy this duty, and did not satisfy O.C.G.A. § 13-4-24. Tullis Devs., Inc. v. 3M Constr., Inc., 282 Ga. App. 335, 638 S.E.2d 787 (2006).

Trial court did not err in granting declaratory relief to an attorney via a default judgment because a petition for declaratory judgment was an action at law pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2 and a petition for declaratory judgment was governed by the practice rules contained in the Civil Practice Act, specifically O.C.G.A. § 9-11-81, including the rules pertaining to default judgment; the attorney was entitled to a judgment that a doctor was not entitled to attorney fees from the doctor's former spouse under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) based on the admissions that the former spouse had successfully obtained a family violence protective order against the doctor and that this order was only vacated after the former spouse agreed to voluntarily dismiss the case. Vaughters v. Outlaw, 293 Ga. App. 620, 668 S.E.2d 13 (2008).

Principle of declaratory judgment is that it declares existing law on existing state of facts. The danger or dilemma of the plaintiff must be present, not contingent on the happening of hypothetical future events and the prejudice to the plaintiff's position must be actual and genuine and not merely possible or remote. City of Nashville v. Snow, 204 Ga. 371, 49 S.E.2d 808 (1948); Brown v. Lawrence, 204 Ga. 788, 51 S.E.2d 651 (1949); Hudgens v. Retail, Whsle. & Dep't Store Local 315, 133 Ga. App. 329, 210 S.E.2d 821 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 957, 96 S. Ct. 1435, 47 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1976).

Declaratory judgment is available in case of "actual controversy" to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations. Mayor of Savannah v. Bay Realty Co., 90 Ga. App. 261, 82 S.E.2d 710 (1954).

Under the Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137), the courts of this state are authorized to grant declaratory relief only when there exists between the parties an actual controversy which is ripe for judicial determination; the courts are unauthorized to grant such relief respecting future rights. Sanders v. Harlem Baptist Church, 207 Ga. 7, 59 S.E.2d 720 (1950).

Justiciable controversy is essential to the right to obtain an action for declaratory judgment. Hatcher v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 711, 146 S.E.2d 535 (1965).

Case is appropriate for declaratory judgment where a justiciable controversy between adverse parties is evident from the pleadings and record in the case. Hassell v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 240 Ga. 285, 240 S.E.2d 35 (1977).

O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2 does not mean that a declaratory judgment action will lie to have just any justiciable controversy decided. Chattahoochee Bancorp, Inc. v. Roberts, 203 Ga. App. 405, 416 S.E.2d 875 (1992).

Determining when controversy justiciable.

- When a concrete issue is present, and there is a definite assertion of legal rights, and a positive legal duty with respect thereto, which are denied by the adverse party, there is a justiciable controversy calling for the invocation of a declaratory judgment action. However, the controversy must have proceeded sufficiently, or have ripened to the extent, that it has progressed beyond the stage of a mere apprehension, or fear that the defendant may make some assertion adverse to the plaintiff's rights. City of Nashville v. Snow, 204 Ga. 371, 49 S.E.2d 808 (1948).

Controversy is justiciable when there are interested parties asserting "adverse" claims upon a state of facts which must have accrued, wherein a legal decision is sought or demanded. Sanders v. Harlem Baptist Church, 207 Ga. 7, 59 S.E.2d 720 (1950); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Cravey, 90 Ga. App. 113, 82 S.E.2d 150 (1954).

Not just a question of meaning of statute.

- In order that a controversy may justify the making of a declaration, it must include a right claimed by one party and denied by the other, and not merely a question as to the abstract meaning or validity of a statute. Brown v. Lawrence, 204 Ga. 788, 51 S.E.2d 651 (1949); Cook v. Sikes, 210 Ga. 722, 82 S.E.2d 641 (1954); Pilgrim v. First Nat'l Bank, 235 Ga. 172, 219 S.E.2d 135 (1975).

For a controversy to justify the making of a declaration, it must include a right claimed by one party and denied by the other, and not merely a question as to the abstract meaning or validity of a statute. Pangle v. Gossett, 261 Ga. 307, 404 S.E.2d 561 (1991).

There can be no justiciable controversy unless there are interested parties asserting adverse claims upon a state of facts which have accrued. Cook v. Sikes, 210 Ga. 722, 82 S.E.2d 641 (1954); Pilgrim v. First Nat'l Bank, 235 Ga. 172, 219 S.E.2d 135 (1975).

Justiciable controversy must include a right claimed by one party and denied by the other, and there must be interested parties asserting adverse claims upon a state of facts which have accrued. Slaughter v. Faust, 155 Ga. App. 68, 270 S.E.2d 218 (1980).

Presence in the declaratory judgment action of a party with an interest in the controversy adverse to that of the petitioner is necessary under either subsection (a) or (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2. Pangle v. Gossett, 261 Ga. 307, 404 S.E.2d 561 (1991).

While administrators are entitled to judicial guidance under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-4(a), the requirement for a determination to guide and protect administrators from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to some future act or conduct applies in cases under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-4 as well as to cases arising under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2; consequently, a declaratory judgment was not authorized when the rights of the parties had accrued and there was no uncertainty alleged requiring direction from the court. Hammond v. Sanders, 210 Ga. App. 307, 436 S.E.2d 45 (1993).

Whe no justiciable controversy is alleged, action for declaratory judgment will not lie. Liner v. City of Rossville, 212 Ga. 664, 94 S.E.2d 862 (1956).

When a complaint for declaratory judgment shows upon its face there is no actual or justiciable controversy between adverse parties, a trial court does not have jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment. Kaylor v. Kaylor, 236 Ga. 777, 225 S.E.2d 320 (1976).

Declaratory judgment may not be granted in the absence of a justiciable controversy. Town of Thunderbolt v. River Crossing Apts., Ltd., 189 Ga. App. 607, 377 S.E.2d 12, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 913, 377 S.E.2d 12 (1988).

Action for declaratory judgment will not lie when declaration would be academic or useless. Kiker v. Hefner, 119 Ga. App. 629, 168 S.E.2d 637 (1969).

Action for declaratory judgment will not lie when rights of parties have already accrued. Kiker v. Hefner, 119 Ga. App. 629, 168 S.E.2d 637 (1969).

Declaratory judgment cannot be obtained when there is no room for reasonable question as to rights of parties. Hatcher v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 711, 146 S.E.2d 535 (1965).

Declaratory judgment action will not be rendered based upon possible or probable contingency, but must be based upon accrued facts, or facts already existing. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hillhouse, 131 Ga. App. 524, 206 S.E.2d 627 (1974).

Courts will not render declaratory judgment as to future rights, but just as in ordinary actions will wait until the event giving rise to the rights has happened, or, in other words, until the rights have become fixed under an existing state of facts. Sanders v. Harlem Baptist Church, 207 Ga. 7, 59 S.E.2d 720 (1950).

Statutes relative to declaratory judgments do not as a rule contemplate declarations upon remote contingencies or as to matters whenre the interest of the plaintiff is merely contingent upon the happening of some event in the future. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Cravey, 90 Ga. App. 113, 82 S.E.2d 150 (1954).

No declaratory judgment permitted to confirm action already taken.

- When the plaintiff is not faced with any dilemma with regard to the course it should pursue but seeks confirmation of what it has already done, declaratory judgment is not an available remedy. Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Jones, 124 Ga. App. 761, 186 S.E.2d 119 (1971).

Declaratory judgment is not available to a party merely to test the viability of its defenses. Chattahoochee Bancorp, Inc. v. Roberts, 203 Ga. App. 405, 416 S.E.2d 875 (1992).

Georgia Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137) makes no provision for declaratory judgment which is merely advisory. Liner v. City of Rossville, 212 Ga. 664, 94 S.E.2d 862 (1956); Henderson v. Alverson, 217 Ga. 541, 123 S.E.2d 721 (1962); Village of N. Atlanta v. Cook, 219 Ga. 316, 133 S.E.2d 585 (1963); Bryant v. Clark Glass & Mirror Co., 109 Ga. App. 606, 136 S.E.2d 915 (1964); Garrett v. Columbus Realty Co., 113 Ga. App. 835, 149 S.E.2d 757 (1966); Hawes v. Cordell Ford Co., 223 Ga. 260, 154 S.E.2d 599 (1967); Residential Devs., Inc. v. Merchants Indem. Co., 122 Ga. App. 503, 177 S.E.2d 715 (1970); King v. Peagler, 227 Ga. 29, 178 S.E.2d 897 (1970); Hudgens v. Retail, Whsle. & Dep't Store Local 315, 133 Ga. App. 329, 210 S.E.2d 821 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 957, 96 S. Ct. 1435, 47 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1976).

In order to authorize declaratory relief, the record must disclose antagonistic claims indicating imminent and inevitable litigation; and courts will not render an opinion which is merely advisory in character upon a state of facts which have not fully accrued. Wright v. Heffernan, 205 Ga. 75, 52 S.E.2d 289 (1949).

When the party seeking declaratory judgment does not show it is in a position of uncertainty as to an alleged right, dismissal of the declaratory judgment action is proper; otherwise, the trial court will be issuing an advisory opinion, and the Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137) makes no provision for a judgment that would be "advisory." Sieg v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, L.L.P., 246 Ga. App. 394, 539 S.E.2d 896 (2000).

Opinions are denominated "advisory" when there is insufficient interest in plaintiff or defendant to justify judicial determination, when the judgment sought would not constitute specific relief to a litigant or affect legal relations or when, by reason of inadequacy of parties defendant, the judgment could not be sufficiently conclusive. Cook v. Sikes, 210 Ga. 722, 82 S.E.2d 641 (1954); Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gardner, 107 Ga. App. 472, 130 S.E.2d 507 (1963).

No advisory opinions regarding issues pending in other court proceedings.

- Courts will ordinarily refuse to entertain an action for a declaratory judgment as to questions which are determinable in a pending action or proceeding between the same parties. Shippen v. Folsom, 200 Ga. 58, 35 S.E.2d 915 (1945); Carter v. State, 93 Ga. App. 12, 90 S.E.2d 672 (1955).

Declaratory judgment will not be rendered to give an advisory opinion in regard to questions arising in a proceeding, pending in a court of competent jurisdiction in which the same questions may be raised and determined. Ulmer v. State Hwy. Dep't, 90 Ga. App. 833, 84 S.E.2d 583 (1954); Kiker v. Hefner, 119 Ga. App. 629, 168 S.E.2d 637 (1969); Frost v. Gazaway, 122 Ga. App. 244, 176 S.E.2d 476 (1970); Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Jones, 124 Ga. App. 761, 186 S.E.2d 119 (1971).

When a declaration is sought as to matters or claims already pending between the parties in a court of competent jurisdiction, a declaratory judgment will be denied, since such declaration will be in nature and effect an advisory opinion to such other court. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hillhouse, 131 Ga. App. 524, 206 S.E.2d 627 (1974).

It is not grounds for denial of relief that declaratory judgment action anticipate another proceeding. Jahncke Serv., Inc. v. Department of Transp., 134 Ga. App. 106, 213 S.E.2d 150 (1975), later appeal, 137 Ga. App. 179, 223 S.E.2d 228 (1976).

Court may not decide abstract questions of law.

- Proceeding must not be merely one in which the court is called upon to decide an abstract or theoretical question of law or to give an advisory opinion. Questions which are merely incidental to a determination of no controversy between the parties are not the proper subject matter of a declaratory judgment proceeding. Darnell v. Tate, 206 Ga. 576, 58 S.E.2d 160 (1950).

No abstract ability to determine validity of statute or ordinance.

- General rule is that a court under a declaratory judgment proceeding does not have the right to determine whether a statute or ordinance is, abstractly, valid or invalid. City of Nashville v. Snow, 204 Ga. 371, 49 S.E.2d 808 (1948).

Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137) does not give the superior court authority to render a declaratory judgment as to the validity or invalidity of a municipal ordinance when there is a pending prosecution of the plaintiff by the defendant municipality for a violation of the ordinance. Staub v. Mayor of Baxley, 211 Ga. 1, 83 S.E.2d 606 (1954).

No action for declaratory judgment when no need to determine petitioner's rights in order to protect its interests.

- When the petition shows that the rights of the parties have already accrued and no facts or circumstances are alleged which show that an adjudication of the plaintiffs' rights is necessary in order to relieve the plaintiffs from the risk of taking any future undirected action incident to their rights, which action without direction would jeopardize their interests, the petition fails to state a cause of action for declaratory judgment. Pinkard v. Mendel, 216 Ga. 487, 117 S.E.2d 336 (1960), later appeal, 217 Ga. 562, 123 S.E.2d 770 (1962); State Hwy. Dep't v. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry., 216 Ga. 547, 117 S.E.2d 897 (1961); Dunn v. Campbell, 219 Ga. 412, 134 S.E.2d 20 (1963); Salomon v. Central of Ga. Ry., 220 Ga. 671, 141 S.E.2d 424 (1965); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Moody, 116 Ga. App. 2, 156 S.E.2d 117 (1967).

Petition does not state a cause of action for a declaratory judgment when the rights of the parties have already accrued and there is no necessity to protect and guide the petitioner from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to the propriety of some future act or conduct. Gant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 109 Ga. App. 41, 134 S.E.2d 886 (1964); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hillhouse, 131 Ga. App. 524, 206 S.E.2d 627 (1974).

Petition fails to state a cause of action for declaratory judgment when the petition shows that any rights the plaintiff has have already accrued, and does not show that the plaintiff is in danger of taking some future undirected action which if taken without judicial direction might reasonably jeopardize the plaintiff's rights. Bryant v. Clark Glass & Mirror Co., 109 Ga. App. 606, 136 S.E.2d 915 (1964).

Petition for declaratory judgment will not lie when all rights of the parties have already accrued unless it is necessary in order to relieve the parties from the risk of taking any future undirected action incident to their rights, which action without direction would jeopardize their interests. Fletcher v. Russell, 151 Ga. App. 229, 259 S.E.2d 212, rev'd on other grounds, 244 Ga. 854, 262 S.E.2d 138 (1979).

Subject matter jurisdiction.

- Subject matter of which the court must have jurisdiction in order to enter a valid declaratory judgment is defined by the courts of this state as: "the power to deal with the general abstract question, to hear the particular facts in any case relating to this question, and to determine whether or not they are sufficient to invoke the exercise of that power." Williams v. Kaylor, 218 Ga. 576, 129 S.E.2d 791 (1963).

Parties seeking to maintain action must have capacity to sue, and must have a right which is justiciable and subject to a declaration of rights, and it must be brought against an adverse party with an antagonistic interest. Cook v. Sikes, 210 Ga. 722, 82 S.E.2d 641 (1954); Pilgrim v. First Nat'l Bank, 235 Ga. 172, 219 S.E.2d 135 (1975).

Declaration will be refused when no party to proceeding has interest in controversy adverse to that of the petitioner. Cook v. Sikes, 210 Ga. 722, 82 S.E.2d 641 (1954); Pilgrim v. First Nat'l Bank, 235 Ga. 172, 219 S.E.2d 135 (1975).

Party is not entitled to declaratory judgment if the party has no present right to protect or right to a directive decree to guide the party with respect to some future act or conduct which is properly incidental to any of the party's alleged rights, and which future action without such direction might jeopardize the party's interest. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Cravey, 90 Ga. App. 113, 82 S.E.2d 150 (1954).

Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137) is governed by the practice rules contained in the Civil Practice Act. Town of Thunderbolt v. River Crossing Apts., Ltd., 189 Ga. App. 607, 377 S.E.2d 12 (1988), cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 913, 377 S.E.2d 12 (1988); Smith v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 200 Ga. App. 534, 408 S.E.2d 833 (1991).

General civil practice rules applicable to pleadings for declaratory judgment.

- Since the Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137) contains no special provisions for pleading, the test of what is needed to withstand a motion to dismiss a petition for declaratory judgment is determined under other provisions of this title. Southeastern Fid. Fire Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 118 Ga. App. 861, 165 S.E.2d 887 (1968).

Petition must plead existence of justiciable controversy.

- It is incumbent upon the party seeking declaratory judgment to allege facts sufficient to show the existence of a controversy within the meaning of this section, and a petition which does not set forth an actual controversy between the parties may be subject to demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gardner, 107 Ga. App. 472, 130 S.E.2d 507 (1963).

Mere conclusions of pleader insufficient to state cause of action.

- When the petition contains only conclusions of the pleader that there does exist a substantial controversy for determination, and no facts are alleged upon which the controversy can be predicated, the petition fails to state a justiciable dispute or controversy which would authorize the court to grant any relief under this section. Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gardner, 107 Ga. App. 472, 130 S.E.2d 507 (1963).

Failure to name adverse party or parties with antagonistic interest is fatal to justiciability in an action for declaratory relief. Cook v. Sikes, 210 Ga. 722, 82 S.E.2d 641 (1954); Pilgrim v. First Nat'l Bank, 235 Ga. 172, 219 S.E.2d 135 (1975).

Adequacy of pleadings.

- When the allegations of the petition show an actual controversy between the petitioner and the defendants, the petition presents a case for a declaratory judgment as to the rights of the parties, and, accordingly, the court does not err in overruling the general demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Mensinger v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 202 Ga. 258, 42 S.E.2d 628 (1947).

To withstand a general demurrer (now motion to dismiss), it is only necessary that the plaintiff show an existing justiciable controversy as provided by the Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137). It is not necessary that the petition go farther and show that the plaintiff's contention is correct. Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Turner, 86 Ga. App. 418, 71 S.E.2d 773 (1952); Parks v. Jones, 88 Ga. App. 188, 76 S.E.2d 449 (1953).

When a petition fails to allege a situation of uncertainty and insecurity with respect to the propriety of some future act or conduct, which action without such direction might reasonably jeopardize the petitioner's interest, it fails to allege a cause of action for a declaration of rights. Brown v. Cobb County, 212 Ga. 172, 91 S.E.2d 516 (1956).

Petition seeking a declaratory judgment, which shows that the petitioner was not uncertain or insecure as to the petitioner's asserted rights as executor as against the claim of a legatee, was properly dismissed on demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Venable v. Dallas, 212 Ga. 595, 94 S.E.2d 416 (1956).

When no facts or circumstances are alleged to show any necessity for a determination of any dispute to guide and protect the plaintiff from uncertainty and insecurity with regard to the propriety of some future act or conduct which is properly incident to the plaintiff's alleged rights and which future action, without such directions, might reasonably jeopardize the plaintiff's interest, there are no grounds for a declaration of rights. Henderson v. Alverson, 217 Ga. 541, 123 S.E.2d 721 (1962).

Petition that had no parties against whom any declaration of rights could be made under the Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137) did not state a cause of action for declaratory relief. Village of N. Atlanta v. Cook, 219 Ga. 316, 133 S.E.2d 585 (1963).

Plaintiffs' allegations are not sufficient for a declaratory judgment if the petition fails to allege any necessity for a determination to guide and protect the plaintiffs from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to the propriety of some future act or conduct which is properly incident to their alleged right, and which future action without such direction might reasonably jeopardize their interest. Gay v. Hunt, 221 Ga. 841, 148 S.E.2d 310 (1966).

When the petition shows that the rights of the parties have already accrued and no facts or circumstances are alleged which show that an adjudication of the plaintiffs' rights is necessary in order to relieve the plaintiffs from the risk of taking any future undirected action incident to their rights, which action without direction would jeopardize their interests, the petition fails to state a cause of action for declaratory judgment. Poole v. City of Atlanta, 117 Ga. App. 432, 160 S.E.2d 874 (1968).

Allegations of a petition clearly bring the petition within the ambit of the Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137) when the petitioner is faced with an immediacy of choice before rights must become fixed or affected by the rendition of judgments. Southeastern Fid. Fire Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 118 Ga. App. 861, 165 S.E.2d 887 (1968).

Trial court erred by dismissing the appellants' declaratory judgment action on the basis that it improperly called for the interpretation and application of a criminal statute because they were not seeking an advisory opinion but sought a determination of whether licensed individuals may carry a weapon on the grounds of the garden at issue in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(c), which was a proper subject for declaratory relief. Georgiacarry.Org, Inc. v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc., 299 Ga. 26, 785 S.E.2d 874 (2016).

Party opposing motion under

§ 9-11-12 or § 9-11-56 entitled to respond. - When a party seeking a declaratory judgment contends that the party is entitled to judgment based on the facts or allegations currently of record, the party may move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c) or for summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(a). Under either procedure, the opposing party would be entitled to an opportunity to respond. Smith v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 200 Ga. App. 534, 408 S.E.2d 833 (1991).

Notice and opportunity to be heard required.

- There is no procedure pursuant to which the trial court may simply grant a complaint for declaratory judgment sua sponte, without affording the opposing party notice or an opportunity to be heard. Smith v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 200 Ga. App. 534, 408 S.E.2d 833 (1991).

Plaintiff's burden of pleading and proof.

- In order to be entitled to a declaratory judgment, the plaintiff must show facts or circumstances whereby it is in a position of uncertainty or insecurity because of a dispute and because of having to take some future action which is properly incident to its alleged right, and which further action without direction from the court might reasonably jeopardize its interest. Residential Devs., Inc. v. Merchants Indem. Co., 122 Ga. App. 503, 177 S.E.2d 715 (1970), overruled on other grounds, Atlantic Wood Indus., Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 190 Ga. App. 814, 380 S.E.2d 504 (1989).

No executory action follows declaratory judgment.

- Distinctive characteristic of a declaratory judgment is that it stands by itself, and no executory process follows as of course; and the action is therefore distinguished from other actions in that it does not seek execution or performance from the defendant or opposing party. Kiker v. Hefner, 119 Ga. App. 629, 168 S.E.2d 637 (1969).

Appeal from declaratory judgment.

- Declaratory judgments have the force and effect of final judgments and are reviewable as such. Sunstates Refrigerated Servs., Inc. v. Griffin, 215 Ga. App. 61, 449 S.E.2d 858 (1994).

In a shareholder dispute between siblings, a trial court's declaratory judgment on one issue was directly appealable because it had the force and effect of a final judgment, notwithstanding that other issues and claims in the case remained pending before the trial court; accordingly, the appellate court had jurisdiction. Ward v. Ward, 322 Ga. App. 888, 747 S.E.2d 95 (2013).

Cited in Brown v. Mathis, 201 Ga. 740, 41 S.E.2d 137 (1947); Edwards v. Dowdy, 85 Ga. App. 876, 70 S.E.2d 608 (1952); McCallum v. Quarles, 214 Ga. 192, 104 S.E.2d 105 (1958); United States Epperson Underwriting Co. v. Jessup, 22 F.R.D. 336 (M.D. Ga. 1958); Massey v. Curry, 216 Ga. 22, 114 S.E.2d 416 (1960); Johnson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 101 Ga. App. 734, 115 S.E.2d 221 (1960); Insurance Ctr., Inc. v. Hamilton, 218 Ga. 597, 129 S.E.2d 801 (1963); Dixie Fireworks Co. v. McArthur, 218 Ga. 735, 130 S.E.2d 731 (1963); Lott Inv. Corp. v. City of Waycross, 218 Ga. 805, 130 S.E.2d 741 (1963); Stolaman v. Stolaman, 220 Ga. 799, 142 S.E.2d 70 (1965); Yarborough v. Horis A. Ward, Inc., 112 Ga. App. 263, 145 S.E.2d 262 (1965); Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188, 87 S. Ct. 357, 17 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1966); City of Atlanta v. East Point Amusement Co., 222 Ga. 774, 152 S.E.2d 374 (1966); Stevenson v. City of Atlanta, 225 Ga. 190, 167 S.E.2d 151 (1969); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Fulton County, 123 Ga. App. 323, 180 S.E.2d 905 (1971); Continental Oil Co. Agrico Chem. Co. Div. v. Sutton, 126 Ga. App. 78, 189 S.E.2d 925 (1972); Carroll v. Cates, 134 Ga. App. 10, 213 S.E.2d 120 (1975); Fourth Nat'l Bank v. Grant, 140 Ga. App. 78, 230 S.E.2d 60 (1976); Bache v. Bache, 240 Ga. 3, 239 S.E.2d 677 (1977); Septum, Inc. v. Keller, 614 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1980); High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 621 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1980); Peoples Bank v. Austin, 159 Ga. App. 223, 283 S.E.2d 81 (1981); Edwards v. Davis, 160 Ga. App. 122, 286 S.E.2d 301 (1981); Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Evans, 165 Ga. App. 880, 303 S.E.2d 74 (1983); Fritts v. Mid-Coast Trading Corp., 166 Ga. App. 31, 303 S.E.2d 148 (1983); Taylor v. Mosley, 252 Ga. 325, 314 S.E.2d 184 (1984); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Georgia Auto. Dealers' Group Self-Insurers' Fund, 182 Ga. App. 595, 356 S.E.2d 686 (1987); Braddy v. Morgan Oil Co., 183 Ga. App. 157, 358 S.E.2d 305 (1987); Solid Rock Baptist Church, Inc. v. Freight Terms., Inc., 184 Ga. App. 111, 361 S.E.2d 200 (1987); Oxford Fin. Cos. v. Dennis, 185 Ga. App. 177, 363 S.E.2d 614 (1987); Fortson v. Kiser, 188 Ga. App. 660, 373 S.E.2d 842 (1988); Chastain v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 190 Ga. App. 215, 378 S.E.2d 397 (1989); Ridgeview Inst., Inc. v. Brunson, 191 Ga. App. 608, 382 S.E.2d 409 (1989); Nash v. Johnson, 192 Ga. App. 412, 385 S.E.2d 294 (1989); Watts v. Promina Gwinnett Health Sys., Inc., 242 Ga. App. 377, 530 S.E.2d 14 (2000); Department of Human Resources v. Citibank F.S.B., 243 Ga. App. 433, 534 S.E.2d 422 (2000); Hulcher Servs. v. R.J. Corman R.R. Co. L.L.C., 247 Ga. App. 486, 543 S.E.2d 461 (2000); Giles v. Vastakis, 262 Ga. App. 483, 585 S.E.2d 905 (2003); Cox v. Athens Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 279 Ga. App. 586, 631 S.E.2d 792 (2006); Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 294 Ga. 657, 755 S.E.2d 683 (2014); SJN Props., LLC v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 770 S.E.2d 832 (2015).

Section applicable to automobile insurance policies.

- When there exists a controversy within the meaning of this section, parties to a policy of automobile liability insurance may invoke this remedy for determination of controversies arising from the construction and operation of the policy. Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gardner, 107 Ga. App. 472, 130 S.E.2d 507 (1963).

Retroactive application of judicial decision regarding optional no-fault coverage.

- Declaratory judgment action was appropriate vehicle for determination of whether case requiring insurer to obtain insured's signature indicating acceptance or rejection of optional no-fault coverages should be applied retroactively. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shuman, 163 Ga. App. 313, 293 S.E.2d 868 (1982).

Declaratory judgment inappropriate when no dispute as to meaning of policy.

- When it was nowhere alleged that there was any dispute between the parties as to the meaning of the contract of insurance in any particular, or that there was any uncertainty in the meaning of any portion of the contract of insurance and there was no allegation that the facts were in dispute on which the operation of the contract depended, and there was no prayer for a determination of disputed facts, the petitioner was not entitled to a declaratory judgment. Hatcher v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 711, 146 S.E.2d 535 (1965).

Insurer not entitled to declaratory judgment.

- Insurer had not shown that the insurer was entitled to a declaratory judgment that a second insurer had to defend an estate against a personal injury lawsuit; the first insurer had conceded that it was obligated to defend the estate itself, and it had not demonstrated sufficient uncertainty concerning its duty to negotiate a settlement demand that exceeded its policy limits to authorize a declaratory judgment. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 284 Ga. App. 430, 643 S.E.2d 895 (2007).

On appeal from an order denying an insurer's motion to enforce a settlement agreement with an estate, and the insurer's petition for a declaratory judgment, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that: (1) absent an executed writing, a settlement agreement between the parties was never finalized; and (2) admissions that the negotiation between the estate's attorney and the insurer was restricted by the probate court's order, and evidence that the estate subsequently offered to assign the bad faith claim after the alleged settlement clearly showed that the estate never reached a final agreement with the insurer. In re Estate of Huff, 287 Ga. App. 614, 652 S.E.2d 203 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0217, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 223 (Ga. 2008).

Right of intervention.

- When there is no allegation in the petition claiming that the plaintiff insurer is uncertain as to its right to intervene, or as to the extent of its rights after intervening, nor any other allegation indicating that it is uncertain as to any further action on its part or that a declaration of its rights will furnish it guidance and protection, it fails to meet the requirements of the Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137). American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aderholt, 114 Ga. App. 508, 151 S.E.2d 833 (1966).

Insurer filing action prior to lawsuit.

- When a claim for insurance has been made, and a legitimate question exists as to the propriety of denying coverage, the insurance company may file a declaratory judgment action before denying the claim. It is not necessary for the insurance company to wait for the insured to file a lawsuit against it. Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Fountain, 262 Ga. 16, 413 S.E.2d 450 (1992).

Question of whether insurance company is required to defend insured in damage suit may be proper subject for declaratory judgment when the facts alleged present an actual or justiciable controversy for determination of the courts, or when the ends of justice demand that such relief be given. Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gardner, 107 Ga. App. 472, 130 S.E.2d 507 (1963).

When an insurer denies coverage under a particular policy and seeks to relieve itself of its obligation to defend a pending suit against an insured because of circumstances pleaded which cast doubt on the coverage of the policy as applied to those circumstances, there is such an immediacy of choice imposed upon it as to justify an adjudication by declaratory judgment. Ditmyer v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 117 Ga. App. 512, 160 S.E.2d 844 (1968); LaSalle Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Popham, 125 Ga. App. 724, 188 S.E.2d 870 (1972).

Insurance company may by a declaratory judgment action, and after procuring a reservation of rights agreement from one claiming to be insured under its policy, seek a judicial determination of its obligations under the policy and its duty, if any, to defend certain pending actions. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Ga. App. 332, 208 S.E.2d 170 (1974).

Insurance company's petition for declaratory judgment was properly granted when the declaratory judgment sought provided specific relief to the insurance company and the directly affected legal relations between the insurance company and defendants, indirectly affecting the company's legal relations with the injured party. Famble v. State Farm Ins. Co., 204 Ga. App. 332, 419 S.E.2d 143 (1992).

Declaratory judgment on duty to defend will determine insurer's duty to pay judgment.

- When the insurance company presents a justiciable controversy with its insured, wherein it seeks determination of the question of whether, under the facts alleged and the terms of its policy, it is required to defend the insured in damage suit actions, an adjudication in a declaratory judgment action, of that question will determine the company's liability to pay any judgment obtained by the plaintiffs; but, if the accident victims are not parties to the declaratory judgment action these victims will not be bound thereby. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 216 Ga. 437, 117 S.E.2d 459 (1960).

Interest adverse to insured.

- When an insurance company entered a reservation of rights with its insured, the insurer and the insured's interest were adverse regarding whether the insurer did or did not have a right to decline to defend a pending suit brought against the insured. Famble v. State Farm Ins. Co., 204 Ga. App. 332, 419 S.E.2d 143 (1992); Harkins v. Progressive Gulf Ins. Co., 262 Ga. App. 559, 586 S.E.2d 1 (2003).

Failing and refusing to defend or defending without reservation of rights will bar declaratory judgment action by an insurer to determine its obligation to defend in pending actions. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Ga. App. 332, 208 S.E.2d 170 (1974).

Insurer may not refuse to pay and then use declaratory judgment procedure to avoid bad faith penalties. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Ga. App. 332, 208 S.E.2d 170 (1974).

Accident victims proper parties to action declaring insurer's liability.

- Accident victims in a damage suit had such interest in the policy of insurance on the insured's car as made them proper parties to the declaratory judgment action of the insurance company to determine its liability to pay any judgment that might be secured by the victims against the insured. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 216 Ga. 437, 117 S.E.2d 459 (1960).

When there has been no disclaimer by the accident victims of intention to seek payment of their judgments against the insured by the insurance company, the victims are proper parties to a declaratory judgment suit by the insurance company against them. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 216 Ga. 437, 117 S.E.2d 459 (1960).

Petition must allege necessity of judgment to prevent harm to insurer's interests.

- When a petition for declaratory judgment brought by the insurer against the insured and a known uninsured motorist seeks to have the court declare its rights under an exclusion clause of the policy, but does not allege that the adjudication of the plaintiff insurer's rights is necessary in order to relieve the plaintiff from the risk of taking any future undirected action incident to its rights, which action without direction would jeopardize its interest, the petition fails to state a cause of action for declaratory judgment. American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aderholt, 114 Ga. App. 508, 151 S.E.2d 833 (1966).

Required to pay diminution in value despite repair.

- Trial court appropriately entered a declaratory judgment finding that an insurance company was required to pay any diminution in value caused by the fact of physical damage to covered vehicles even if repairs returned the vehicles to pre-loss condition in terms of appearance and function. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 274 Ga. 498, 556 S.E.2d 114 (2001).

Declaratory judgment to determine defense obligations.

- Trial court erred in denying motions for summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 by an insurer in a declaratory judgment action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2 to determine whether the insurer had a duty to defend, and by the owners of an automobile on claims of negligent entrustment by the plaintiffs, a driver and passengers; the owners' son, who was driving the vehicle when the accident occurred, did not have permission to drive the vehicle, and therefore the son was not an insured under the owners' insurance policy. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. McCall, 261 Ga. App. 92, 581 S.E.2d 651 (2003).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to an insured in its insurer's declaratory judgment action, requiring the insurer to defend and indemnify the insured in the underlying suit filed by a resident of the insured's personal care home arising from an attack by a fellow resident, as the incident occurred without the insured's foresight, expectation, or design, and was thus properly characterized as accidental under the terms of the insured's policy. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Magnolia Estates, Inc., 286 Ga. App. 183, 648 S.E.2d 498 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1660, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 88 (Ga. 2008).

Resolution of issues raised by Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool.

- Because: (1) resolution of the issues raised in a petition filed by the Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool was dependent upon a determination by the State Board of Workers' Compensation of the amount, if any, an injured employee was entitled to recover in the pending, unresolved claim for workers' compensation; and (2) after a notice to controvert was filed, the Board never held a hearing or issued any findings with regard to liability for the claim, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine the applicability of earlier provisions of O.C.G.A. § 33-36-14(a) to the Pool's claim against an insurer, after another carrier became insolvent, and hence, grant the Pool summary judgment in its declaratory judgment action. Royal Indem. Co. v. Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool, 284 Ga. App. 787, 644 S.E.2d 279 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 639 (Ga. 2007).

Claims seeking declaratory judgment found moot.

- Taxpayer's claims seeking declaratory judgment regarding a county commissioner's transaction by which property was sold to the county were properly found moot because the transaction had already concluded. Richardson v. Phillips, 302 Ga. App. 305, 690 S.E.2d 918 (2010).

Trial court properly dismissed residents' declaratory judgment action which asked the trial court to declare an election of the board of directors of a homeowners' association valid on the ground that the residents' claim was moot because the residents failed to demonstrate that the residents were in need of guidance from the trial court to protect the residents from uncertainty regarding some future conduct; the residents sought to have the trial court validate a past event and, thus, the residents were not entitled to declaratory judgment, which would be nothing more than an advisory opinion from the trial court as to which party would succeed on the merits of any claim pertaining to the outcome of that election. Crittenton v. Southland Owners Ass'n, 312 Ga. App. 521, 718 S.E.2d 839 (2011).

Declaratory judgment upon moot issue not authorized.

- Superior court's judgment declaring that an agreement between a condominium association and a telecommunications company was subject to termination by the association pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-3-101 was vacated because the 12-month period of O.C.G.A. § 44-3-101(c) expired without the association having terminated any telecommunications contract, rendering the issue in its declaratory judgment action moot, and the declaratory judgment upon a moot issue was not authorized under the Declaratory Judgment Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-4-1 et seq.; by the time the superior court issued the declaratory judgment, the statutory period of O.C.G.A. § 44-3-101(c) had expired, and any right the association had to cancel and terminate contracts under that statute expired. Capitol Infrastructure, LLC v. Plaza Midtown Residential Condo. Ass'n, 306 Ga. App. 794, 702 S.E.2d 910 (2010).

Constitutionality of statutes.

- In an action for injunctive and declaratory relief, after the trial court resolved a controversy between a county and city on the annexation and re-zoning of property, in the absence of an actual controversy or circumstances showing a necessity for a determination to guide and protect a party from uncertainty and insecurity with regard to the propriety of some future act or conduct, the court erred when the court ruled on the portion of the county's petition seeking a declaratory judgment that certain statutes were unconstitutional. Baker v. City of Marietta, 271 Ga. 210, 518 S.E.2d 879 (1999).

After proceedings to revoke the license of a mortgage lending company for allegedly having an impermissible relationship with an individual in violation of O.C.G.A. § 7-1-1004(e), it was appropriate for the individual, a convicted felon, to bring a declaratory judgment action questioning the constitutionality of the subsection. Agan v. State, 272 Ga. 540, 533 S.E.2d 60 (2000).

Regulatory investigation.

- Trial court properly dismissed a declaratory judgment action brought by a bank and a cash advance lender, which was operating as an agent for the bank, to stop the Georgia Industrial Loan Commissioner from conducting an investigation of their lending activities because the Commissioner was authorized to conduct an investigation of the two entities' loan activities, notwithstanding the lender's claim that the bank and the lender were operating under the authority of federal banking law. BankWest, Inc. v. Oxendine, 266 Ga. App. 771, 598 S.E.2d 343 (2004).

Judgment creditor's property rights.

- That disputed factual issues remained as to the actualization of a judgment creditor's claimed interest in properties that allegedly were fraudulently transferred by the judgment debtor did not foreclose on the judgment creditor's standing to seek a declaratory judgment as to the priority of that interest. RES-GA YPL, LLC v. Rowland, 340 Ga. App. 713, 798 S.E.2d 315 (2017).

Standing to challenge commissioner's rules and regulations.

- Trial court did not err in concluding that the plaintiff had standing to bring the declaratory judgment action as the plaintiff made a sufficient showing that the facts were complete and that its interest was not merely academic, hypothetical, or colorable, but actual because, as a Vidalia onion grower, the plaintiff was an interested party claiming a right to ship onions pursuant to the shipping statute - a right the plaintiff claimed was impeded by a newly enacted regulation; and because, if the plaintiff failed to comply with the new regulation, the Georgia Commissioner of Agriculture had that statutory authority to impose civil and criminal penalties. Black v. Bland Farms, LLC, 332 Ga. App. 653, 774 S.E.2d 722 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1669, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 713 (Ga. 2015).

District attorney request for declaratory judgment on admissibility of hearsay evidence.

- District attorney's declaratory judgment claim, which sought an order requiring magistrate judges to admit and consider hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings to determine whether to bind over a defendant for grand jury indictment, was proper as involving a justiciable controversy under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2 because the magistrate court established a standard practice requiring the production of direct evidence in addition to hearsay evidence to support a bindover determination at a preliminary hearing; the result was uncertainty and insecurity in the district attorney as to the district attorney's office's burden of proof and production at future preliminary hearings. Bethel v. Fleming, 310 Ga. App. 717, 713 S.E.2d 900 (2011).

Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the judgment of the lower courts granting a district attorney a declaratory judgment because the district attorney did not have the right to bring a declaratory judgment action to obtain review of the probable cause decisions of magistrate judges at preliminary hearings or to challenge the admissibility of hearsay evidence at such hearings. Leitch v. Fleming, 291 Ga. 669, 732 S.E.2d 401 (2012).

Action in ejectment.

- Action in ejectment and a suit for specific performance contained in a one count petition for declaratory relief is not such procedure authorized under the Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137). Clein v. Kaplan, 201 Ga. 396, 40 S.E.2d 133 (1946).

No standing to seek declaration regarding physician participation in execution.

- Physicians and a sociologist lacked standing to seek a declaration under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2 that Georgia law prohibited physician participation in executions; the physicians in question had not participated or planned to participate in executions, only three of them practiced medicine in Georgia, and a medical board decision indicated that no physician who participated in an execution would be subject to disciplinary proceedings. Zitrin v. Ga. Composite State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 288 Ga. App. 295, 653 S.E.2d 758 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0500, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 285 (Ga. 2008).

Non-party could not challenge validity of agreement, but could seek a declaration of rights.

- In a dispute between a back-up buyer and the buyer and sellers of real property, the back-up buyer had standing under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2 to seek a declaration of its rights, if any, to the disputed property, although the back-up buyer was not a party to the contracts between the buyer and the sellers; however, the back-up buyer did not have standing to challenge the signatures on those contracts pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-2-20. Del Lago Ventures, Inc. v. QuikTrip Corp., 330 Ga. App. 138, 764 S.E.2d 595 (2014).

Disputes concerning ownership of or right of access to land.

- Because a club's possession of certain real property did not eliminate the need for direction to resolve an on-going conflict over a buyer's re-entry rights to the property, declaratory judgment was an available remedy for the club. Smith v. Jones, 278 Ga. 661, 604 S.E.2d 187 (2004).

Lease dispute.

- Owner of leased facilities was not prohibited from seeking a declaratory judgment against a corporation regarding the rights of the parties to written leases for the facilities on the basis that the owner had already executed a lease with a new tenant and filed dispossessory actions against the corporation; the dispossessory actions against the corporation were stayed pending the outcome of the declaratory judgment action, and the corporation remained in possession of the facilities. Mariner Healthcare, Inc. v. Foster, 280 Ga. App. 406, 634 S.E.2d 162 (2006).

Challenge to the validity of administrative rule.

- Challenge to a rule of the Composite State Board of Medical Examiners arising from the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the complainant could not be the subject of declaratory relief because the issues raised were purely hypothetical and there was no justiciable controversy. Burton v. Composite State Bd. of Med. Examin'rs, 245 Ga. App. 587, 538 S.E.2d 501 (2000).

Petition by administrative agency.

- Petition of the State Highway Board (now Board of Transportation) for a declaratory judgment which shows a pressing need in an important matter pertaining to the board's right in the construction of a highway, and that there is an actual controversy and justiciable issue in reference to such matter set forth a cause for the relief prayed. Woodside v. State Hwy. Dep't, 216 Ga. 254, 115 S.E.2d 560 (1960).

Declaratory judgment improper after administrative appeal.

- Appellants, once having invoked their right of appeal to the city personnel board, could not thereafter properly seek a declaratory judgment. Wooten v. City of Atlanta, 149 Ga. App. 568, 254 S.E.2d 889 (1979).

Payment of legal fees incurred by county solicitor.

- In county solicitor's declaratory judgment action against a county to declare the solicitor's entitlement to reimbursement from the county for legal fees the solicitor had already expended, there was no actual controversy under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2(a) and no justiciable controversy existed under § 9-4-2(b) since the fees were already incurred and, when the trial court addressed the issue, the court had already found the solicitor had no right to compel the county to pay the fees. Gwinnett County v. Blaney, 275 Ga. 696, 572 S.E.2d 553 (2002).

Condemnation proceedings.

- Petition for a declaratory judgment should be denied when the petition is filed after a condemnation case has proceeded to an award by the master, payment into court by the condemnor of the amount awarded by the master, a judgment decreeing title to the lands described in the petition to be in the condemnor, and appeals by both parties to a jury therein. Johnson v. Fulton County, 216 Ga. 498, 117 S.E.2d 155 (1960).

When every relief sought by a petition for declaratory judgment pertained to matters involved in a condemnation case, and the court in the condemnation case had jurisdiction to adjudicate every question raised, the court erred in denying a motion to dismiss the petition, which motion was based on the ground that every question raised should have been presented in the condemnation case. Johnson v. Fulton County, 216 Ga. 498, 117 S.E.2d 155 (1960).

Power company was properly granted declaratory relief and an injunction against the property owners who would not permit the power company access to their land to conduct surveys for a planned electrical transmission line because the power company, as the condemning body, had the right to survey and the property owners' express refusal to allow access presented an actual risk of a breach of the peace that was alleviated by the entry of the declaratory judgment. Bearden v. Ga. Power Co., 262 Ga. App. 550, 586 S.E.2d 10 (2003).

Land disturbance permits.

- In a declaratory judgment action brought by a developer against a county seeking to invalidate an ordinance which required denial of the developer's land disturbance permit based on two soil-related ordinance violations existing, the judgment in favor of the developer was upheld on appeal with regard to the developer's claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for alleged violations of the developer's equal protection rights in the county's enforcement of the ordinance. The trial court properly determined that the developer was not required to prove a valid property right with regard to the developer's equal protection challenge; the trial court properly awarded attorney fees to the developer under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 as the jury was authorized to award the attorney fees as an element of the damages the jury awarded on the developer's federal equal protection claim, regardless of whether the developer could prevail on any state law claim for damages; but the trial court erred by failing to address the merits of the developer's petition for a declaratory judgment since the overall enforceability of the ordinance, which was still the law, was not rendered moot by the withdrawal notice. Fulton County v. Legacy Inv. Group, LLC, 296 Ga. App. 822, 676 S.E.2d 388 (2009).

Validity of proposed annexation.

- City's declaratory judgment action seeking to determine the validity of a proposed annexation, to which the county objected based on a local constitutional amendment creating the industrial district sought to be annexed which prohibited annexation, presented no justiciable controversy because the annexation was merely proposed. Fulton County v. City of Atlanta, 299 Ga. 676, 791 S.E.2d 821 (2016).

Construction of contracts.

- When a contract is so plain and unambiguous as not to be susceptible to any logical construction except its unmistakable mandate, there is no need of a declaratory judgment. Vandiver v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 222 F. Supp. 731 (M.D. Ga. 1963).

In a declaratory judgment action between a settlor's offspring regarding an agreement signed by the settlor to reform a trust, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to one sibling over the other, upholding the agreement as validly reforming the trust in order to fully effectuate the settlor's intent that the offspring divide the remainder of a trust's proceeds equally between them, per stirpes; moreover, the trial court correctly ruled that the prevailing sibling could not rely on the defenses of laches and unclean hands as such were equitable doctrines not applicable in a declaratory judgment action. Briden v. Clement, 283 Ga. App. 626, 642 S.E.2d 318 (2007).

Drainage disputes.

- Homeowners established entitlement to declaratory judgment since there was evidence that drainage pipes running through the property were not maintained properly and resulted in flooding of the homeowner's property but there was a dispute as to who was responsible for maintaining the pipes. Macko v. City of Lawrenceville, 231 Ga. App. 671, 499 S.E.2d 707 (1998), overruled on other grounds, Kleber v. City of Atlanta, 291 Ga. App. 146, 661 S.E.2d 195 (2008).

Employment agreements.

- Action seeking a declaratory judgment that restrictive covenants in an employment agreement were unenforceable presented a justiciable case or controversy. Enron Capital & Trade Resources Corp. v. Pokalsky, 227 Ga. App. 727, 490 S.E.2d 136 (1997).

Trial court erroneously declared that a non-solicitation covenant between a group of employees and their former employer was unenforceable as overbroad, and the Court of Appeals wrongfully upheld that decision, addressing only the lack of any restriction placed on the period of time during which the employees served the former employer's customers, because the covenant was narrowly limited to those customers served by the employees during their terms of employment; hence, it was not overbroad merely because it provided no time restriction on the provision of services to the former employer's customers. Palmer & Cay of Ga., Inc. v. Lockton Cos., 280 Ga. 479, 629 S.E.2d 800 (2006).

In a removed action seeking a declaration as to the enforceability of a non-compete provision, a corporation was not fraudulently joined as a plaintiff in order to avoid complete diversity, warranting a remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447, because under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2(b) state courts were authorized to entertain declaratory actions brought by any interested party whether or not further relief was or could have been prayed when the ends of justice required that the declaration should be made, and the court could not say with certainty that the corporation was not a real party in interest. Campbell v. Quixtar, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. June 13, 2008).

Requirements for application of the declaratory judgment statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2, were met in a case involving a new employer bringing suit against the former employer seeking a declaration as to the legal effect of the non-compete covenants between the former employer and the former employees, thus, the new employer had standing to seek a declaration as to the legal effect of the non-compete covenants in the employment agreements. Lapolla Indus. v. Hess, 325 Ga. App. 256, 750 S.E.2d 467 (2013).

In a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration as to the enforceability of non-compete clauses in an employment contract, the trial court properly granted the competitor judgment on the pleadings because the court correctly found that the pleadings showed that the lack of any limit on the scope of the restricted work or the solicitation of former customers were void and unenforceable under the non-severability rule as a matter of law. Lapolla Indus. v. Hess, 325 Ga. App. 256, 750 S.E.2d 467 (2013).

Suit for declaratory judgment cannot be maintained by person accused of crime when the alleged criminal conduct has already taken place. Ross v. State, 238 Ga. 445, 233 S.E.2d 381 (1977).

Actions for declaratory judgment are not maintainable by persons already convicted of crimes who wish to examine or reexamine aspects of the conviction or sentence for the reasons that the controversy has been adjudicated, and the rights and relations have become fixed. Ross v. State, 238 Ga. 445, 233 S.E.2d 381 (1977).

Authority of state court judge to appoint county officers.

- Justiciable controversy existed between a county and a state court judge concerning the judge's authority to appoint county officers and order funds withheld from the county treasury. Cramer v. Spalding County, 261 Ga. 570, 409 S.E.2d 30 (1991).

Applicability to divorce decree.

- Declaratory judgment is an appropriate means of ascertaining one's rights and duties under a contract and decree of divorce. Royal v. Royal, 246 Ga. 229, 271 S.E.2d 144 (1980).

Construing language of divorce decree.

- Language in 1960 divorce decree "setting aside" property "to" wife "for the purpose of making a home for herself and the children" was ambiguous and unclear as to whether the language was intended to confer fee simple title to the property or some limited estate, and consequently, a construction of the effect of this language would be a proper subject of a declaratory judgment action. Royal v. Royal, 246 Ga. 229, 271 S.E.2d 144 (1980).

Wife did not file a declaratory judgment action since the wife sought guidance with respect to provisions in a settlement agreement in order to compel a husband to provide the wife with additional funds as the trial court's decision was interlocutory and the wife did not secure a certificate of immediate review, the discretionary appeal to resolve whether the trial court's declaratory ruling was appealable as a final judgment was dismissed. Gelfand v. Gelfand, 281 Ga. 40, 635 S.E.2d 770 (2006).

Declaratory judgment improper when relief sought is cancellation of divorce decree.

- When the petitioner sought in the superior court to obtain a judgment declaring void a divorce decree rendered against her in an action between her former husband, now deceased, and herself, and declaring that she is the widow and lawful heir of the deceased, and entitled to be the administratrix of his estate; and the petition shows the rendition of judgments by courts having jurisdiction of the subject matter and parties and under which the rights in question were conclusively and finally adjudicated against the plaintiff; and the judgment of the superior court denying, after a hearing, the petitioner's application to intervene in the proceeding and be appointed administratrix of the estate, the petitioner was not entitled to a declaratory judgment in the premises. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 87 Ga. App. 150, 73 S.E.2d 231 (1952).

When the real relief and only substantial relief sought is the cancellation of the divorce decree, the facts alleged in the petition do not present a question that can be properly decided under the provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137). Burgess v. Burgess, 210 Ga. 380, 80 S.E.2d 280 (1954).

Marital status.

- Petition alleging that the defendant falsely claimed to have entered into a ceremonial marriage with the plaintiff and that he was the father of her child, and that she caused to be issued a warrant accusing him of abandonment of the child, failed to state a cause of action for a declaratory judgment to establish that the plaintiff and the defendant were not husband and wife. Gibbs v. Forrester, 204 Ga. 545, 50 S.E.2d 318 (1948).

Support obligations.

- As a former spouse planned to continue denying the second former spouse's claim of back child support based on the first spouse's understanding of an unclear divorce decree's formula for calculating increases in the first spouse's support obligation, but doing so subjected the first spouse to contempt charges, the first spouse properly filed a declaratory judgment action under Georgia's Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-4-1 et seq. Acevedo v. Kim, 284 Ga. 629, 669 S.E.2d 127 (2008).

Railroad corporation.

- Superior court had jurisdiction to provide declaratory relief to a railroad corporation in an appeal from a decision of the Public Service Commission denying the corporation's application to modify its staff at a service facility. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. CSX Transp., Inc., 225 Ga. App. 787, 484 S.E.2d 799 (1997).

Effect on prior existing landlord remedies.

- Law does not nullify the rights, remedies and penalties in favor of landlords already accruing under dispossessory warrants law when the tenant is already in default. Shippen v. Folsom, 200 Ga. 58, 35 S.E.2d 915 (1945).

Possession of building.

- When there is a controversy as to who is entitled to possession of a building on a specified date, there is a case for a declaratory judgment. Greene v. Golucke, 202 Ga. 494, 43 S.E.2d 497 (1947).

Determination of the rights of the parties to a lease agreement is a proper subject for relief under O.C.G.A. Ch. 4, T. 9. Cook Farms, Inc. v. Bostwick, 165 Ga. App. 692, 302 S.E.2d 574 (1983).

Taxation.

- State could not hold out what plainly appeared to be a "clear and certain" postdeprivation remedy and then declare, only after the disputed taxes had been paid, that no such remedy existed. Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 115 S. Ct. 547, 130 L. Ed. 2d 454 (1994).

Trial court erred by dismissing a city's declaratory judgment action against several online travel companies for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the appellate court erred by affirming the dismissal,as the issue of whether the city's ordinance allowing the city to collect a hotel occupancy tax from the online travel companies was a contested issue in the matter that neither lower court had determined. The legal question of whether the ordinance even applied to the online travel companies had to be determined before the city was required to submit to the administrative process set forth within the ordinance and the Enabling Statutes, O.C.G.A. § 48-13-50 et seq. City of Atlanta v. Hotels.com, L.P., 285 Ga. 231, 674 S.E.2d 898 (2009).

Trial court granted an impermissible advisory opinion when the court granted a second city's request for a declaratory judgment that the second city was authorized to impose and collect taxes on the sale, storage, and distribution of alcoholic beverages at an airport within that city's limits because the second city failed to show that there was any justiciable controversy; the first city conceded that, under Georgia's Alcoholic Beverages Code, O.C.G.A. § 3-8-1(e), only the second city was authorized to impose and collect taxes on the sale, storage, and distribution of alcoholic beverages at the airport within the city's limits and that the first city had to refund any alcoholic beverage taxes that the city received in error for the sale, storage, and distribution of alcohol in portions of the airport located within the corporate boundaries of the second city. City of Atlanta v. City of College Park, 311 Ga. App. 62, 715 S.E.2d 158 (2011).

Existence of agreement to sell property.

- When the vendor of property denied the existence of any agreement to sell the property and asserted control over the property which was inconsistent with the buyer's claimed contractual rights, this case presented a proper matter for a declaration as to the existence and effect of such an agreement. Stephens v. Trotter, 213 Ga. App. 596, 445 S.E.2d 359 (1994).

Violation of Open Meetings Act.

- In an action against an airport authority for violations of the Open Meetings Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1 et seq., the taxpayers did not seek to contest any decisions made at any of the challenged meetings or assert that the taxpayers were in a position of uncertainty as to an alleged right, but sought to prohibit future violations and punish the authority for the authority's violations; dismissal of the taxpayers' claim for declaratory relief was proper. Avery v. Paulding County Airport Auth., 343 Ga. App. 832, 808 S.E.2d 15 (2017).

Constitutionality of county ordinance.

- Trial court correctly found that declaratory relief was appropriate to relieve an electrical transmission corporation of uncertainty and insecurity with regard to its rights after a county board of commission enacted an ordinance that imposed a moratorium on the construction of new power lines, since the ordinance expressly targeted the very power line proposed by the corporation and plainly prohibited the construction of that line or similar ones. If the corporation could not have obtained declaratory relief, it would have been in danger of losing a valuable property right as a result of the enforcement of the ordinance which was declared to be unconstitutional. Cobb County v. Ga. Transmission Corp., 276 Ga. 367, 578 S.E.2d 852 (2003).

Lack of actual controversy when city sued over sidewalks.

- Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment stating that a city was prohibited from installing sidewalks. As the city never began construction of the sidewalks and asserted that the city had no plans to do so, there was no actual controversy within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2(a); therefore, the plaintiffs did not have standing to raise a claim under the Georgia Declaratory Judgment Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 4, T. 9. Bailey v. City of Atlanta, 296 Ga. App. 679, 675 S.E.2d 564 (2009).

County's action against an airport authority.

- County's action against an airport authority seeking a declaration that the authority lacked the authority to submit an application to the Federal Aviation Administration for an Airport Operating Certificate without the county's consent stated an actual controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-4-1 et seq., and should not have been dismissed. Avery v. Paulding County Airport Auth., 343 Ga. App. 832, 808 S.E.2d 15 (2017).

Probationer's claim for declaratory judgment on bond issue.

- Trial court correctly dismissed a former probationer's claim for declaratory judgment, in which the probationer sought a declaration that an insurance policy satisfied the statutory bond requirements for officers under O.C.G.A. § 42-8-26(d), because a resolution as to whether the officer was properly bonded for damages caused by the officer's misfeasance was of no consequence until a judgment was obtained against the officer for such conduct and the probationer was entitled to collect damages. Walker v. Owens, 298 Ga. 516, 783 S.E.2d 114 (2016).

Actions by pension fund administrators.

- In a case in which the pension fund participants, the board members, and the advocates sought a declaration allowing the pension funds to hire a third party administrator and an outside counsel, an actual controversy existed pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2(a), (b) with regard to the two funds that had already hired third party administrators and outside counsel; the City of Atlanta had refused to recognize, honor, cooperate with, or implement the decisions of the pension funds to hire third party administrators and outside counsel. City of Atlanta v. S. States Police Benevolent Ass'n, 276 Ga. App. 446, 623 S.E.2d 557 (2005).

Counterclaim.

- In an interpleader action by a bank against a depositor and the depositor's assignee with respect to funds in bank accounts, the assignee's counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that the bank's setoff against one of the accounts was improper presented a justiciable controversy and the trial court could consider the counterclaim. Bank of Spalding County v. Pound, 213 Ga. App. 324, 444 S.E.2d 375 (1994).

Challenging failure to designate a location as a voter registration site.

- Complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the acts and policies of the local board of registrars in not designating the plaintiff-church as a voter registration site were illegal was properly dismissed as (1) mandamus, used to compel official action when a public official has discretion to act, but arbitrarily and capriciously refuses to do so, was the appropriate remedy; and (2) nothing in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-218(f) (voter registration places) required that churches be designated as voter registration sites. Fourth St. Baptist Church v. Board of Registrars, 253 Ga. 368, 320 S.E.2d 543 (1984).

County lacked standing to challenge the state's rules restricting emissions of volatile compounds; while the county presented evidence that the rules might deter some investment in the county, there was no evidence that the rules had actually done so, and whether any economic harm to its own emission sources would be caused by the rules was speculative. Bd. of Natural Res. of Ga. v. Monroe County, 252 Ga. App. 555, 556 S.E.2d 834 (2001).

Authority of chairperson of county board of commissioners.

- Based on the authority granted under Ga. L. 1984, p. 3815, § VIII, the chairperson of a county board of commissioners was authorized to hire and fire county employees without the approval of the board as the power to do so was reasonably necessary for the chairperson to carry out the expressed authority to administer, supervise, operate, and control the county departments, agencies, and offices; thus, the trial court erred in denying the chairperson declaratory relief regarding the personnel. Duggan v. Leslie, 281 Ga. App. 894, 637 S.E.2d 428 (2006).

General contractor's obligations under bond.

- In the general contractor's declaratory judgment action against the materials provider in which the general contractor sought a declaration as to its rights with regard to a payment bond claim filed by the provider, the action was justiciable under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2(a); the general contractor faced uncertainty as to the legal effect of the payment bond and as to the specific amount the provider had sent forth in its notice to the contractor, and the general contractor needed direction on these issues to determine whether it had to take additional steps to secure a different type of payment bond in order to properly discharge the provider's lien and so that it could clarify its potential indemnification obligations and/or liability to the retailer for whom the construction was being performed. Sierra Craft, Inc. v. T. D. Farrell Constr., Inc., 282 Ga. App. 377, 638 S.E.2d 815 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0460, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 145 (Ga. 2007).

Beneficiary's challenge to will provision.

- Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2(c), a beneficiary of a will who wished to remove the executor, and who contended that a will provision restricting the beneficiary's right to alienate a fee simple estate was invalid, could seek a declaratory judgment even if the beneficiary had other adequate legal or equitable remedies. Bandy v. Henderson, 284 Ga. 692, 670 S.E.2d 792 (2008).

Suit to compel release of medical records.

- Surviving spouse sued a nursing home for wrongful death and sought a temporary restraining order and a permanent injunction requiring the home to release the decedent's medical records, as well as a judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2 declaring her legal entitlement to such records. As the spouse sought injunctive relief in a case involving an actual controversy, the suit was an appropriate case for a declaratory judgment. Alvista Healthcare Ctr., Inc. v. Miller, 296 Ga. App. 133, 673 S.E.2d 637 (2009).

Suit for access to court records.

- Law firm that sought copies of a court reporter's recordings of hearings in two criminal cases was not entitled to a declaratory judgment regarding a trial court's order denying the request for copies because the Declaratory Judgment Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-4-1 et seq., was not intended to be used to set aside or modify judicial decrees. Merch. Law Firm, P.C. v. Emerson, 301 Ga. 609, 800 S.E.2d 557 (2017).

Declaratory judgment not available in action to enforce attorney's lien.

- Under the right-for-any-reason rule, the trial court did not err by dismissing a law firm's case against an insurer under the Declaratory Judgment Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-4-1, and O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(b) to enforce the firm's attorney's lien in a case the firm filed on behalf of an owner against the insurer because declaratory judgment was not available; the issues the firm raised were the same as those raised in an owner's case against the insurer for failure to provide a defense, and the rights of the parties in the owner's case had already accrued. McRae, Stegall, Peek, Harman, Smith & Manning, LLP v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 316 Ga. App. 526, 729 S.E.2d 649 (2012).

Declaratory judgment improperly denied when agreement not properly terminated.

- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the appellee on the appellee's counterclaim for breach of the subordination agreement (SA) as the SA did not bar the appellant from bringing the current lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the management services agreement (MSA) as the MSA remained in effect with respect to the appellant, and management fees continued to accrue to the appellant, as the MSA was not properly terminated as to the appellant because it was not terminated by mutual consent of the parties; thus, the trial court erred in denying the appellant's claim for declaratory judgment. GAPIII, Inc. v. Seal Indus., 338 Ga. App. 101, 789 S.E.2d 321 (2016).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 22A Am. Jur. 2d, Declaratory Judgments, §§ 9, 11, 17, 21, 50.

8A Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Declaratory Judgments, § 2.

C.J.S.

- 26 C.J.S., Declaratory Judgments, §§ 5 et seq., 16 et seq., 49 et seq., 54 et seq., 147 et seq., 163 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (U.L.A.) § 1.

ALR.

- Declaration of rights or declaratory judgments, 12 A.L.R. 52; 19 A.L.R. 1124; 50 A.L.R. 42; 68 A.L.R. 110; 87 A.L.R. 1205; 114 A.L.R. 1361; 142 A.L.R. 8.

Decree or order which merely declares rights of parties without an express command or prohibition as basis of contempt proceeding, 29 A.L.R. 134.

Remedy or procedure to make effective rights established by declaratory judgment, 101 A.L.R. 689.

Questions or controversy between public officers as within contemplation of Declaratory Judgment Act, 103 A.L.R. 1094.

Right to quiet title or remove cloud on title to personal property by suit in equity or under Declaratory Judgment Act, 105 A.L.R. 291.

Determination of constitutionality of statute or ordinance, or proposed statute or ordinance, as proper subject of judicial decision under Declaratory Judgment Act, 114 A.L.R. 1361.

Jurisdictional amount in its relation to suit for declaratory judgment, 115 A.L.R. 1489.

Action under Declaratory Judgment Act to test validity or effect of a decree of divorce, 124 A.L.R. 1336.

Original availability to wrongdoer of remedy under Declaratory Judgment Act as affecting defense of laches, mitigation of damages, or other equitable defenses in subsequent suit against him, 131 A.L.R. 791.

Tax questions as proper subject of action for declaratory judgment, 132 A.L.R. 1108; 11 A.L.R.2d 359.

Jurisdiction of declaratory action as affected by pendency of another action or proceeding, 135 A.L.R. 934.

Doctrine of in pari delicto as applicable to suits for declaratory relief, 141 A.L.R. 1427.

Application of Declaratory Judgment Act to questions in respect of insurance policies, 142 A.L.R. 8.

Statute of limitations or doctrine of laches in relation to declaratory actions, 151 A.L.R. 1076.

Validity and effect of former judgment or decree as proper subject for consideration in declaratory action, 154 A.L.R. 740.

May declaratory and coercive or executory relief be combined in action under Declaratory Judgment Act, 155 A.L.R. 501.

Application of Declaratory Judgment Act to questions in respect of contracts or alleged contracts, 162 A.L.R. 756.

Release as proper subject of action for declaratory judgment, 167 A.L.R. 433.

Labor dispute as proper subject of declaratory action, 170 A.L.R. 421.

Custody of child as proper subject of declaratory action, 170 A.L.R. 521.

Right to declaratory relief as affected by existence of other remedy, 172 A.L.R. 847.

Determination of seniority rights of employee as proper subject of declaratory suit, 172 A.L.R. 1247.

"Actual controversy" under declaratory judgment statute in zoning and building restriction cases, 174 A.L.R. 853.

Declaratory or advisory relief respecting future interest, 174 A.L.R. 880.

Relief against covenant restricting right to engage in business or profession, as subject of declaratory judgment, 10 A.L.R.2d 743.

Declaratory relief with respect to unemployment compensation, 14 A.L.R.2d 826.

Burden of proof in actions under general declaratory judgment acts, 23 A.L.R.2d 1243.

Issue as to negligence as a proper subject of declaratory judgment action, 28 A.L.R.2d 957.

Partnership or joint-venture matters as subject of declaratory judgment, 32 A.L.R.2d 970.

Availability of declaratory judgment to determine validity of lease of real property, 60 A.L.R.2d 400.

Declaratory judgment, during lifetime of spouses, as to construction of antenuptial agreement dealing with property rights of survivor, 80 A.L.R.2d 941.

Validity, construction and application of criminal statutes or ordinances as proper subject for declaratory judgment, 10 A.L.R.3d 727.

Availability and scope of declaratory judgment actions in determining rights of parties, or powers and exercise thereof by arbitrators, under arbitration agreements, 12 A.L.R.3d 854.

Propriety of state court's grant or denial of application for pre-action production or inspection of documents, persons, or other evidence, 12 A.L.R.5th 577.