§343-7 Limitation of actions.
(a) Any judicial proceeding, the subject of which is the lack of assessment
required under section 343-5, shall be initiated within one hundred twenty days
of the agency's decision to carry out or approve the action, or, if a proposed
action is undertaken without a formal determination by the agency that a
statement is or is not required, a judicial proceeding shall be instituted
within one hundred twenty days after the proposed action is started. The
office, any agency responsible for approval of the action, or the applicant
shall be adjudged an aggrieved party for the purposes of bringing judicial
action under this subsection. Others, by environmental court action, may be
adjudged aggrieved.
(b) Any judicial proceeding, the subject of
which is the determination that a statement is required for a proposed action,
shall be initiated within sixty days after the public has been informed of such
determination pursuant to section 343-3. Any judicial proceeding, the subject
of which is the determination that a statement is not required for a proposed
action, shall be initiated within thirty days after the public has been
informed of such determination pursuant to section 343-3. The applicant shall
be adjudged an aggrieved party for the purposes of bringing judicial action
under this subsection. Others, by environmental court action, may be adjudged
aggrieved.
(c) Any judicial proceeding, the subject of
which is the acceptance or nonacceptance of an environmental impact statement
required under section 343-5, shall be initiated within sixty days after the
public has been informed pursuant to section 343-3 of the acceptance or
nonacceptance of such statement. Affected agencies and persons who provided
written comment to an accepted statement during the designated review period
shall be adjudged aggrieved parties for the purpose of bringing judicial action
under this subsection; provided that for aggrieved parties, the contestable
issues shall be limited to issues identified and discussed in the written
comment, and for applicants bringing judicial action under this section on the
nonacceptance of a statement, the contestable issues shall be limited to those
issues identified by the accepting authority as the basis for nonacceptance of
the statement. [L 1974, c 246, pt of §1; am and ren L 1979, c 197, §1(8); am L
1983, c 140, §10; am L 1992, c 241, §3; am L 2014, c 218, §8; am L 2021, c 152,
§15]
Law Journals and Reviews
The Moon Court's Environmental Review Jurisprudence:
Throwing Open the Courthouse Doors to Beneficial Public Participation. 33 UH
L. Rev. 581 (2011).
Case Notes
Plaintiff's claims that Hawai`i environmental policy act was
violated were barred; plaintiff did not submit comment and filed suit more than
sixty days after office of environmental quality control informed the public
that the state final environmental impact statement had been accepted. 307 F.
Supp. 2d 1149 (2004).
Court has no jurisdiction over actions initiated after time
limit. 64 H. 126, 637 P.2d 776 (1981).
Date of commission's decision to grant SMA permit triggered
time period for appeal, not date when commission made express determination
that no environmental assessment was required for project; plaintiff's
challenge to lack of environmental assessment thus timely. 86 H. 66, 947 P.2d
378 (1997).
Where the federal construct of a procedural right was not
germane to case because this section, the statute at issue, establishes who and
under what circumstances the lack of an environmental assessment, may be
challenged, and federal cases recognizing this standard were inapposite because
they rested on non-analogous statutes, petitioner could not be afforded
so-called "procedural standing" under subsection (a). 100 H. 242, 59
P.3d 877 (2002).
Where Hawaiian homes commission did not accept the proposal
for an environmental impact statement, the subject of the judicial proceeding
before the trial court was not the "acceptance" of such statement;
intervenors were not required to provide written comments pursuant to
subsection (c) as subsection (c) did not apply; intervenor's objections,
therefore, were subject to judicial review under subsection (b). 106 H. 270,
103 P.3d 939 (2005).
Appellants established standing where they showed threatened
injuries under the traditional injury-in-fact test and procedural injuries
based on a procedural right test; the threatened injury in fact was due to
defendant's decision to go forward with harbor improvements and allow the
superferry project to operate at Kahului harbor without conducting an
environmental assessment; the procedural injury was based on various interests
appellants identified that were threatened due to the violation of their procedural
rights under this chapter. 115 H. 299, 167 P.3d 292 (2007).
Where this section waived the State's sovereign immunity
against actions brought to challenge: (1) the lack of an environmental
assessment; (2) the determination that an environmental impact statement is or
is not required; and (3) the acceptance of an environmental impact statement,
sovereign immunity did not prevent the application of the private attorney
general doctrine against the State and the circuit court did not err in relying
on the doctrine as a basis for its award of attorney's fees against the State
and superferry jointly. 120 H. 181, 202 P.3d 1226 (2009).
Although the subdivision application was part of the larger
action (i.e., the project), the specific "action" for statute of
limitations purposes was the date the subdivision application was approved, as
opposed to when the project itself was originally approved; thus, where
plaintiffs' initial complaint was filed within 120 days of the department of
planning and permitting's approval of the subdivision application, plaintiffs'
claims were not barred by this section. 123 H. 150, 231 P.3d 423 (2010).
Where there was no evidence that the city department of
planning and permitting filed a notice with the office of environmental quality
control pursuant to HAR §11-200-11.1 of its determination that a supplemental
environmental impact statement was not required, there was no date from which
to measure the thirty day limitation prescribed by subsection (b) and
subsection (b) was thus inapplicable; in addition, given the plain and
unambiguous language of this section and §343-3, coupled with the related administrative
rules, actual knowledge cannot be substituted for the public notice
requirement. 123 H. 150, 231 P.3d 423 (2010).
In a declaratory action brought to challenge an agency's
determination that an environmental impact statement is not required, judicial
review is not restricted to the administrative record. 138 H. 364, 382 P.3d
176 (2016).
Cited: 134 H. 86 (App.), 332 P.3d 688 (2014).
Notes of Decisions
Sierra Club v. Hawaii Tourism Auth., 59 P.3d 877 (Haw. 2002).
· cites it 96× “It is evident that the federal construct of a procedural right is not germane in this case because (1) HRS § 343-7, the Hawaii statute at issue, establishes who and under what circumstances the lack of an EA, may be challenged, and (2) federal cases recognizing this standard are…”
Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp. of the State, 202 P.3d 1226 (Haw. 2009).
· cites it 41× “At the time Sierra Club filed its complaint, HRS section 343-7 provided: (a) Any judicial proceeding, the subject of which is the lack of assessment required under section 343-5, shall be initiated within one hundred twenty days of the *1272 agency's decision to carry out or…”
Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp., 167 P.3d 292 (Haw. 2007).
· cites it 42× “The first amended complaint, styled as a complaint “for declaratory, injunctive and other relief,” was based on the relevant HEPA section, HRS § 343-7; the declaratory judgment statute, HRS § 632-1; 15 and article XI, section 9 of the Hawai'i State Constitution.”
Kepo'o v. Kane, 103 P.3d 939 (Haw. 2005).
· cites it 52× “Growney and Mauna Kea further maintain that HRS § 343-7 is a statute of limitations relating to “actions,” not parties, and because Kepo'o, Tanimoto, and Dela Cruz brought judicial proceedings within the thirty-day statute of limitations pursuant to HRS § 343-7(b), the…”
Tax Found. of Hawaiʻi v. State., 439 P.3d 127 (Haw. 2019).
· cites it 15× “In Superferry I , for example, this court held that HRS § 343-7, regarding proceedings to enforce violations of HEPA, "concern[ed] 'standing requisites.”
Unite Here! Local 5 v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 231 P.3d 423 (Haw. 2010).
· cites it 28× “]" In their first motion for summary judgment, the defendants argued that the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitation set forth in HRS § 343-7 (1993), quoted infra. In the second motion, Kuilima argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on the entirety of the…”
Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 307 P.3d 142 (Haw. 2013).
· cites it 14× “7 In Sierra Club , this court concluded that HRS § 661-1 waived sovereign immunity on all claims founded upon any statute, the statute in that case being HRS § 343-7 (1993), which authorized judicial review of a state agency’s decisions concerning environmental assessments and…”
Kilakila 'O Haleakala v. Univ. of Hawaii., 382 P.3d 176 (Haw. 2016).
· cites it 12× “3d at 301 ; see HRS § 343-7. 11 . The parties debated whether an environmental assessment was required for the Management Plan or whether it was exempt from HEPA as a planning document under HRS § 343-5(b).”
Kaleikini v. Yoshioka., 304 P.3d 252 (Haw. 2013).
· cites it 8× “There, this court concluded that the State waived its sovereign immunity pursu *468 ant to HRS § 343-7, because that statute authorizes judicial review of specified agency decisions.”
Cnty. of Hawai'i v. Ala Loop Homeowners, 235 P.3d 1103 (Haw. 2010).
· cites it 4× “Put another way, although the provision preserves the ability of the legislature to impose reasonable limitations on the exercise of the right, the right exists and can be exercised even in the absence of such limitations. It is noteworthy that some limitations already existed…”
Bremner v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 28 P.3d 350 (Haw. App. 2001).
· cites it 4× “Bremner filed his complaint on March 5, 1998, over a'year after the zoning ordinance took effect and far in excess of the time limit prescribed by even a most lenient reading of HRS § 343-7. 3 B. The Development Plan Ordinance.”
Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n v. Cnty. of Maui, 947 P.2d 378 (Haw. 1997).
· cites it 5× “HRS 343-7(a) (1993) provides that “[a]ny judicial proceeding, the subject of which is the lack of assessment required under section 343-5, shall be initiated within one hundred twenty days of the agency’s decision to carry out or approve the action.”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 343-7(a) — 13 cases
Sierra Club v. Hawaii Tourism Auth., 59 P.3d 877 (Haw. 2002).
“It is evident that the federal construct of a procedural right is not germane in this case because (1) HRS § 343-7, the Hawaii statute at issue, establishes who and under what circumstances the lack of an EA, may be challenged, and (2) federal cases recognizing this standard are…”
Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp., 167 P.3d 292 (Haw. 2007).
“The first amended complaint, styled as a complaint “for declaratory, injunctive and other relief,” was based on the relevant HEPA section, HRS § 343-7; the declaratory judgment statute, HRS § 632-1; 15 and article XI, section 9 of the Hawai'i State Constitution.”
Tax Found. of Hawaiʻi v. State., 439 P.3d 127 (Haw. 2019).
“In Superferry I , for example, this court held that HRS § 343-7, regarding proceedings to enforce violations of HEPA, "concern[ed] 'standing requisites.”
Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp. of the State, 202 P.3d 1226 (Haw. 2009).
“At the time Sierra Club filed its complaint, HRS section 343-7 provided: (a) Any judicial proceeding, the subject of which is the lack of assessment required under section 343-5, shall be initiated within one hundred twenty days of the *1272 agency's decision to carry out or…”
Cnty. of Hawai'i v. Ala Loop Homeowners, 235 P.3d 1103 (Haw. 2010).
“Put another way, although the provision preserves the ability of the legislature to impose reasonable limitations on the exercise of the right, the right exists and can be exercised even in the absence of such limitations. It is noteworthy that some limitations already existed…”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 343-7(b) — 15 cases
Kepo'o v. Kane, 103 P.3d 939 (Haw. 2005).
“Growney and Mauna Kea further maintain that HRS § 343-7 is a statute of limitations relating to “actions,” not parties, and because Kepo'o, Tanimoto, and Dela Cruz brought judicial proceedings within the thirty-day statute of limitations pursuant to HRS § 343-7(b), the…”
Kilakila 'O Haleakala v. Univ. of Hawaii., 382 P.3d 176 (Haw. 2016).
“3d at 301 ; see HRS § 343-7. 11 . The parties debated whether an environmental assessment was required for the Management Plan or whether it was exempt from HEPA as a planning document under HRS § 343-5(b).”
Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp. of the State, 202 P.3d 1226 (Haw. 2009).
“At the time Sierra Club filed its complaint, HRS section 343-7 provided: (a) Any judicial proceeding, the subject of which is the lack of assessment required under section 343-5, shall be initiated within one hundred twenty days of the *1272 agency's decision to carry out or…”
Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp., 167 P.3d 292 (Haw. 2007).
“The first amended complaint, styled as a complaint “for declaratory, injunctive and other relief,” was based on the relevant HEPA section, HRS § 343-7; the declaratory judgment statute, HRS § 632-1; 15 and article XI, section 9 of the Hawai'i State Constitution.”
Unite Here! Local 5 v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 231 P.3d 423 (Haw. 2010).
“]" In their first motion for summary judgment, the defendants argued that the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitation set forth in HRS § 343-7 (1993), quoted infra. In the second motion, Kuilima argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on the entirety of the…”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 343-7(c) — 9 cases
Kepo'o v. Kane, 103 P.3d 939 (Haw. 2005).
“Growney and Mauna Kea further maintain that HRS § 343-7 is a statute of limitations relating to “actions,” not parties, and because Kepo'o, Tanimoto, and Dela Cruz brought judicial proceedings within the thirty-day statute of limitations pursuant to HRS § 343-7(b), the…”
Tax Found. of Hawaiʻi v. State., 439 P.3d 127 (Haw. 2019).
“In Superferry I , for example, this court held that HRS § 343-7, regarding proceedings to enforce violations of HEPA, "concern[ed] 'standing requisites.”
Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp. of the State, 202 P.3d 1226 (Haw. 2009).
“At the time Sierra Club filed its complaint, HRS section 343-7 provided: (a) Any judicial proceeding, the subject of which is the lack of assessment required under section 343-5, shall be initiated within one hundred twenty days of the *1272 agency's decision to carry out or…”
Kilakila 'O Haleakala v. Univ. of Hawaii., 382 P.3d 176 (Haw. 2016).
“3d at 301 ; see HRS § 343-7. 11 . The parties debated whether an environmental assessment was required for the Management Plan or whether it was exempt from HEPA as a planning document under HRS § 343-5(b).”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 343-7(c)(2022) — 1 case
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 343-7(e) — 2 cases
Kepo'o v. Kane, 103 P.3d 939 (Haw. 2005).
“Growney and Mauna Kea further maintain that HRS § 343-7 is a statute of limitations relating to “actions,” not parties, and because Kepo'o, Tanimoto, and Dela Cruz brought judicial proceedings within the thirty-day statute of limitations pursuant to HRS § 343-7(b), the…”
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