Idaho Code
Idaho Code § 18-7906 (2026)
Stalking in the second degree.
✓ current as of May 2026
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Stalking in the second degree.
(1) A person commits the crime of stalking in the second degree if the person knowingly and maliciously:
(a) Engages in a course of conduct that seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the victim and is such as would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress; or
(b) Engages in a course of conduct such as would cause a reasonable person to be in fear of death or physical injury, or in fear of the death or physical injury of a family or household member.
(2) As used in this section:
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeated acts of nonconsensual contact involving the victim or a family or household member of the victim, provided however, that constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of this definition.
(b) "Family or household member" means:
(i) A spouse or former spouse of the victim, a person who has a child in common with the victim regardless of whether they have been married, a person with whom the victim is cohabiting whether or not they have married or have held themselves out to be husband or wife, and persons related to the victim by blood, adoption or marriage; or
(ii) A person with whom the victim is or has been in a dating relationship, as defined in section 39-6303, Idaho Code; or
(iii) A person living in the same residence as the victim.
(c) "Nonconsensual contact" means any contact with the victim that is initiated or continued without the victim’s consent, that is beyond the scope of the consent provided by the victim, or that is in disregard of the victim’s expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued. "Nonconsensual contact" includes, but is not limited to:
(i) Following the victim or maintaining surveillance, including by electronic means, on the victim;
(ii) Contacting the victim in a public place or on private property;
(iii) Appearing at the workplace or residence of the victim;
(iv) Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased or occupied by the victim;
(v) Contacting the victim by telephone or causing the victim’s telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously regardless of whether a conversation ensues;
(vi) Sending mail or electronic communications to the victim; or
(vii) Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased or occupied by the victim.
(d) "Victim" means a person who is the target of a course of conduct.
(3) Stalking in the second degree is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 21
cases (8 in the last 5 years), 2009–2026 · leading case: State v. Stewart, 234 P.3d 707 (Idaho 2010).
State v. Stewart, 234 P.3d 707 (Idaho 2010). “The misdemeanor stalking statute, Idaho Code § 18-7906 , requires for conviction a “course of conduct” that the statute defines as wrongful.”
State v. Desiree B. Eliasen, 348 P.3d 157 (Idaho 2015). “FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On October 7, 2008, Eliasen was charged with one count of second degree stalking under Idaho Code section 18-7906. The victim was a Pocatello police officer’s wife.”
State v. Smith, 569 P.3d 137 (Idaho 2025). “The State, however, contends that Smith’s repeated actions—including following the dispatcher, repeatedly appearing near her residence, and taking photographs in her neighborhood—constituted a “course of conduct” under the statute.”
State v. Hoak, 216 P.3d 1291 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009). “Idaho Code § 18-7906 defines stalking, in part, as follows: (1) A person commits the crime of stalking in the second degree if the person knowingly and maliciously: (a) Engages in a course of conduct that seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the victim and is such as would cause…”
State v. Christopher T. Dean (Idaho Ct. App. 2017). “1 both knowingly and maliciously, as required by Idaho Code Section 18-7906; (3) there was no evidence to support the district court’s finding that Dean had the requisite intent under the statute; (4) the term “nonconsensual contact” in I.C. § 18-7906 makes the statute ambiguous…”
State of Idaho v. Montrez Lushon Mayberry (Idaho Ct. App. 2026). “The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of the term “contact” supports both parties’ interpretations because “contact” within I.C. § 18-7906(2)(c) could mean to communicate, physically touch another person, or both.”
State v. Smith (Idaho 2025). “The State, however, contends that Smith’s repeated actions—including following the dispatcher, repeatedly appearing near her residence, and taking photographs in her neighborhood—constituted a “course of conduct” under the statute.”
State v. Smith (Idaho 2025). “The State, however, contends that Smith’s repeated actions—including following the dispatcher, repeatedly appearing near her residence, and taking photographs in her neighborhood—constituted a “course of conduct” under the statute.”
State v. Stephen William Lundquist (Idaho Ct. App. 2017). “See I.C. §§ 18-7906, 18-7905. As Lundquist provided no authority or argument as to why there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find he acted knowingly, we address only whether there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find Lundquist acted maliciously.”
State v. Frederick Anthony Tank (Idaho Ct. App. 2016). “The jury instruction mirrored the elements set forth in Idaho Code § 18-7906 , which prohibits stalking in the second degree.”
State v. Christopher Briggs (Idaho Ct. App. 2012). “FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Briggs was convicted by jury verdict of second degree stalking, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-7906 . After dismissing the jury, the magistrate notified the parties that the jury may have been misinstructed, because the definition provided for…”
State v. Hartzell, 305 P.3d 551 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013). “§ 18-7905, to second degree stalking, I.C. § 18-7906. The state appeals. II. ANALYSIS A charge of stalking may be elevated to stalking in the first degree based on one of the aggravating factors listed in Idaho Code section 18-7905.”
— Idaho Code § 18-7906(1)(a) — 9 cases
State v. Smith, 569 P.3d 137 (Idaho 2025). “The State, however, contends that Smith’s repeated actions—including following the dispatcher, repeatedly appearing near her residence, and taking photographs in her neighborhood—constituted a “course of conduct” under the statute.”
State v. Desiree B. Eliasen, 348 P.3d 157 (Idaho 2015). “FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On October 7, 2008, Eliasen was charged with one count of second degree stalking under Idaho Code section 18-7906. The victim was a Pocatello police officer’s wife.”
State v. Stephen William Lundquist (Idaho Ct. App. 2017). “See I.C. §§ 18-7906, 18-7905. As Lundquist provided no authority or argument as to why there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find he acted knowingly, we address only whether there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find Lundquist acted maliciously.”
State v. Smith (Idaho 2025). “The State, however, contends that Smith’s repeated actions—including following the dispatcher, repeatedly appearing near her residence, and taking photographs in her neighborhood—constituted a “course of conduct” under the statute.”
State v. Smith (Idaho 2025). “The State, however, contends that Smith’s repeated actions—including following the dispatcher, repeatedly appearing near her residence, and taking photographs in her neighborhood—constituted a “course of conduct” under the statute.”
— Idaho Code § 18-7906(2) — 1 case
State of Idaho v. Montrez Lushon Mayberry (Idaho Ct. App. 2026). “The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of the term “contact” supports both parties’ interpretations because “contact” within I.C. § 18-7906(2)(c) could mean to communicate, physically touch another person, or both.”
— Idaho Code § 18-7906(2)(a) — 9 cases
State v. Desiree B. Eliasen, 348 P.3d 157 (Idaho 2015). “FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On October 7, 2008, Eliasen was charged with one count of second degree stalking under Idaho Code section 18-7906. The victim was a Pocatello police officer’s wife.”
State v. Smith, 569 P.3d 137 (Idaho 2025). “The State, however, contends that Smith’s repeated actions—including following the dispatcher, repeatedly appearing near her residence, and taking photographs in her neighborhood—constituted a “course of conduct” under the statute.”
State of Idaho v. Montrez Lushon Mayberry (Idaho Ct. App. 2026). “The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of the term “contact” supports both parties’ interpretations because “contact” within I.C. § 18-7906(2)(c) could mean to communicate, physically touch another person, or both.”
State v. Christopher T. Dean (Idaho Ct. App. 2017). “1 both knowingly and maliciously, as required by Idaho Code Section 18-7906; (3) there was no evidence to support the district court’s finding that Dean had the requisite intent under the statute; (4) the term “nonconsensual contact” in I.C. § 18-7906 makes the statute ambiguous…”
State v. Stephen William Lundquist (Idaho Ct. App. 2017). “See I.C. §§ 18-7906, 18-7905. As Lundquist provided no authority or argument as to why there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find he acted knowingly, we address only whether there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find Lundquist acted maliciously.”
— Idaho Code § 18-7906(2)(c) — 7 cases
State v. Smith, 569 P.3d 137 (Idaho 2025). “The State, however, contends that Smith’s repeated actions—including following the dispatcher, repeatedly appearing near her residence, and taking photographs in her neighborhood—constituted a “course of conduct” under the statute.”
State of Idaho v. Montrez Lushon Mayberry (Idaho Ct. App. 2026). “The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of the term “contact” supports both parties’ interpretations because “contact” within I.C. § 18-7906(2)(c) could mean to communicate, physically touch another person, or both.”
State v. Christopher T. Dean (Idaho Ct. App. 2017). “1 both knowingly and maliciously, as required by Idaho Code Section 18-7906; (3) there was no evidence to support the district court’s finding that Dean had the requisite intent under the statute; (4) the term “nonconsensual contact” in I.C. § 18-7906 makes the statute ambiguous…”
State v. Smith (Idaho 2025). “The State, however, contends that Smith’s repeated actions—including following the dispatcher, repeatedly appearing near her residence, and taking photographs in her neighborhood—constituted a “course of conduct” under the statute.”
State v. Smith (Idaho 2025). “The State, however, contends that Smith’s repeated actions—including following the dispatcher, repeatedly appearing near her residence, and taking photographs in her neighborhood—constituted a “course of conduct” under the statute.”
— Idaho Code § 18-7906(2)(c)(4) — 1 case
State v. Christopher T. Dean (Idaho Ct. App. 2017). “1 both knowingly and maliciously, as required by Idaho Code Section 18-7906; (3) there was no evidence to support the district court’s finding that Dean had the requisite intent under the statute; (4) the term “nonconsensual contact” in I.C. § 18-7906 makes the statute ambiguous…”
— Idaho Code § 18-7906(2)(c)(i) — 4 cases
State v. Smith, 569 P.3d 137 (Idaho 2025). “The State, however, contends that Smith’s repeated actions—including following the dispatcher, repeatedly appearing near her residence, and taking photographs in her neighborhood—constituted a “course of conduct” under the statute.”
State of Idaho v. Montrez Lushon Mayberry (Idaho Ct. App. 2026). “The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of the term “contact” supports both parties’ interpretations because “contact” within I.C. § 18-7906(2)(c) could mean to communicate, physically touch another person, or both.”
State v. Smith (Idaho 2025). “The State, however, contends that Smith’s repeated actions—including following the dispatcher, repeatedly appearing near her residence, and taking photographs in her neighborhood—constituted a “course of conduct” under the statute.”
State v. Smith (Idaho 2025). “The State, however, contends that Smith’s repeated actions—including following the dispatcher, repeatedly appearing near her residence, and taking photographs in her neighborhood—constituted a “course of conduct” under the statute.”
— Idaho Code § 18-7906(2)(c)(ii) — 1 case
State of Idaho v. Montrez Lushon Mayberry (Idaho Ct. App. 2026). “The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of the term “contact” supports both parties’ interpretations because “contact” within I.C. § 18-7906(2)(c) could mean to communicate, physically touch another person, or both.”
— Idaho Code § 18-7906(2)(c)(iii) — 4 cases
State v. Smith, 569 P.3d 137 (Idaho 2025). “The State, however, contends that Smith’s repeated actions—including following the dispatcher, repeatedly appearing near her residence, and taking photographs in her neighborhood—constituted a “course of conduct” under the statute.”
State v. Smith (Idaho 2025). “The State, however, contends that Smith’s repeated actions—including following the dispatcher, repeatedly appearing near her residence, and taking photographs in her neighborhood—constituted a “course of conduct” under the statute.”
State v. Smith (Idaho 2025). “The State, however, contends that Smith’s repeated actions—including following the dispatcher, repeatedly appearing near her residence, and taking photographs in her neighborhood—constituted a “course of conduct” under the statute.”
State of Idaho v. Montrez Lushon Mayberry (Idaho Ct. App. 2026). “The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of the term “contact” supports both parties’ interpretations because “contact” within I.C. § 18-7906(2)(c) could mean to communicate, physically touch another person, or both.”
— Idaho Code § 18-7906(a) — 1 case
State v. Stephen William Lundquist (Idaho Ct. App. 2017). “See I.C. §§ 18-7906, 18-7905. As Lundquist provided no authority or argument as to why there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find he acted knowingly, we address only whether there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find Lundquist acted maliciously.”
— Idaho Code § 18-7906(c) — 1 case
State v. Desiree B. Eliasen, 348 P.3d 157 (Idaho 2015). “FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On October 7, 2008, Eliasen was charged with one count of second degree stalking under Idaho Code section 18-7906. The victim was a Pocatello police officer’s wife.”
— Idaho Code § 18-7906(l)(a) — 1 case
State v. Desiree B. Eliasen, 348 P.3d 157 (Idaho 2015). “FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On October 7, 2008, Eliasen was charged with one count of second degree stalking under Idaho Code section 18-7906. The victim was a Pocatello police officer’s wife.”
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