cites § 72-101 4×cited by 60 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “Thereafter, Collier Carbon moved that the judgment be amended by reducing the amount thereof in the sum of the workmen's compensation benefits received by Tucker. That motion was denied, as were other post-trial and post-judgment motions.”
- The case’s holding
- The adoption of a comparative negligence statute does not abolish the common law doctrine of joint and several liability for multiple tortfeasors.
- Later courts cite it for
- “as to one of multiple tortfeasors being immunized from liability, the restatement (second) of torts, 880 states: ' where one of two tortfeasors has immunity. - where two persons would otherwise be liable for a harm, one of them is not relieved from liability by the fact that the other has an absolute privilege to act or an immunity from liability to the person harmed.” · 1 citing court
cites § 72-101 4×cited by 54 cases
Overruled by Jones v. Emmett Manor on other grounds: 3 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “, and Workmen's Compensation Exchange to provide claimant respondent Kenneth Paulson with medical treatment for his mental condition and to pay Paulson income benefits for temporary total disability.”
- The case’s holding
- Medical testimony sufficiently establishes causation if it plainly and unequivocally conveys a conviction that events are causally related without requiring a specific verbal formula.
- Later courts cite it for
- “no special verbal formula is necessary when, as here, a doctor's testimony plainly and unequivocally conveys his conviction that events are causally related.” · 1 citing court
cites § 72-101 4×cited by 18 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “, and SHEPARD and BAKES, J.J., concur. BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting.”
cites § 72-101 4×cited by 14 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “§§ 72-701 and 72-706 are general limitations sections, applicable to both accidents and occupational diseases.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “decline claimants' invitation to toll the limitations, especially given the legislature's clear intent to the contrary.” · 1 citing court
cites § 72-101 4×cited by 3 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “When the relevant provisions under the Law are read in context as a whole, it plainly does not empower or authorize an employer or surety to unilaterally invoke and execute the enforcement mechanisms in Idaho Code section 72-434 without first obtaining an order from the…”
- Later courts cite it for
- “because our overruling of brewer applies only prospectively, we remand with instructions . . . .” · 2 citing courts
cites § 72-101 4×cited by 32 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “[6] See I.C. § 72-101; Idaho Sess. Laws 1917, ch.”
- The case’s holding
- Statutes in pari materia pertaining to the same subject matter are construed in harmony with one another as far as reasonably possible.
- Later courts cite it for
- “as a fundamental rule of statutory construction, 'statutes in pari materia pertaining to the same subject, although in apparent con flict, are so far as reasonably possible construed to be in harmony with each other.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 72-101 4×cited by 5 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “The language of that statute is even more specific, restricting its application to benefits “under this chapter.”
cites § 72-101 2×cited by 33 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “The Commission held a hearing on May 18, 1994, and denied Ogden’s claim for worker’s compensation benefits concluding that “[t]he evidence fails to establish that [Ogden] suffered an injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, nor does the…”
- The case’s holding
- Courts review industrial commission factual findings only to determine if substantial and competent evidence supports them and exercise free review over questions of law.
- Later courts cite it for
- “in any review of a decision by the industrial commission, the court will review questions of fact only to determine whether substantial and competent evidence supports the commission's findings and will exercise free review over questions of law.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 72-101 4×cited by 25 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “[5] Thus Goodson is not covered because he was an employee principally engaged in an agricultural pursuit, an exempt business, because at the time of the accident he was performing a task incidental to the exempt employment.”
- The case’s holding
- A separate marketing operation involving the handling of finished farm products constitutes a distinct enterprise rather than an agricultural pursuit for workers' compensation purposes.
cites § 72-101 2×cited by 10 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “There is no statutory basis in worker’s compensation law to credit the employer for permanent physical impairment benefits paid to the employee before the award of total and permanent disability benefits.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “although partial permanent disability benefits are calculated in relation to permanent physical impairment benefits, idaho code sections 72-427 to -429, partial permanent disability benefits and permanent physical impairment benefits are two separate forms of compensation.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 72-101 2×cited by 21 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “Excepted from the exemption rule are claims for the enforcement of a support order under Idaho Code Title 7, Chapter 12. Id. Title 7, Chapter 12 of the Idaho Code sets forth the remedies available to the Department for the enforcement of child support orders.”
- The case’s holding
- Different portions of a workers' compensation award may qualify as medical benefits or as wages, and each portion's exempt or garnishable status is determined under the Idaho statutory exemptions.
cites § 72-101 2×cited by 9 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “By that time, the Idaho Industrial Commission had made an award to Plaintiff under Idaho’s Worker Compensation Law, Idaho Code § 72-101 et seq. While the Worker Compensation Law is generally intended to provide the exclusive remedy for an injured worker, see Idaho Code §§ 72-211…”
cites § 72-101 4×cited by 12 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “Musgrave, State Insurance Manager, State of Idaho, are subrogees under the Workmen's Compensation Law, I.C. § 72-101 et seq., claiming re-imbursement for *336 funds paid under such law to appellant, William Byron Hoffman.”
cites § 72-101 2×cited by 44 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “Claimant presented a claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, I.C. § 72-101 et seq. A hearing was had before the Industrial Accident Board, which awarded him compensation.”
- The case’s holding
- An injury does not arise out of employment if it results from personal acts undertaken for the employee's own benefit that are not incidental to the employment.
- Later courts cite it for
- “where going to work or returning from work in some transportation facility furnished by the employer,” · 3 citing courts
cites § 72-101 2×cited by 14 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “§ 72-707, the words “this law” refer to I.C. §§ 72-101 to 72-805, essentially the entire body of the Worker’s Compensation Act.”
- The case’s holding
- Where a workers' compensation statute expressly vests district courts with jurisdiction over penalty actions, the Industrial Commission's general exclusive-jurisdiction provision does not bar such suits.
- Later courts cite it for
- “an interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which the court exercises free review.” · 1 citing court
cites § 72-101 1×cited by 50 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “124, compiled in the Idaho Code as §§ 72-101 through 72-805. The 1971 Idaho Session Laws also added the following definitions of permanent impairment and permanent disability: “PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT.”
- The case’s holding
- The special indemnity fund is liable when a subsequent injury aggravates a preexisting permanent physical impairment even if the impairment did not cause a prior permanent disability.
- Later courts cite it for
- “since these three statutory definitions (i.c. 72-332(2), -422, -423) were passed simultaneously by the legislature, we can only conclude that the legislature intended that they define three different, but related, classifications. 1971 idaho session laws, ch. 124.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 72-101 4×cited by 4 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “It was my thought then, and continues to be, that the Court has allowed itself to become mired down in attempting to make perfect sense of what now is accepted as an extremely complex set of statutory provisions in the Worker's Compensation Law, I.C. § 72-101 et seq. Of course,…”
- Later courts cite it for
- “if compensation is discontinued more than five (5) years from the date of the accident causing the injury.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 72-101 2×cited by 26 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “The dependents of decedent filed an appropriate claim for compensation benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, I.C. § 72-101 et seq. Upon hearing before the Industrial Accident Board the claim was denied on the ground that the relationship between the Dairy and the…”
- The case’s holding
- Where the hirer retains control over the details of work and whether it continues, the worker is an employee, and recurring, anticipated work is not casual employment.
- Later courts cite it for
- “a determination ... must be made upon the particular undisputed facts liberally construed to include employment as covered rather than exclude it” · 1 citing court
cites § 72-101 2×cited by 7 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “2d 260, 263 (1986); I.C. §§ 72-101 to -929. Specifically, under I.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “the law in idaho clearly states that an employee who suffers from a pre- existing condition must establish that his or her disease was aggravated by an accident before they are entitled to recover.” · 1 citing court
cites § 72-101 2×cited by 16 cases
- Where it cites § 72-101
- “On November 17, 1949, Gerald McGee, Claimant, appellant here, while working in an industry covered by Workmen’s Compensation Law, I.C. § 72-101 et seq., sustained an injury rendering him totally and permanently disabled.”
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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.