Indiana Code

Ind. Code § 22-3-3-31 (2026)

Joint service of two or more employers; apportionment of award

✓ current as of May 2026
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     Sec. 31. Whenever any employee for whose injury or death compensation is payable under IC 22-3-2 through IC 22-3-6 shall at the time of the injury be in the joint service of two (2) or more employers subject to IC 22-3-2 through IC 22-3-6, such employers shall contribute to the payment of such compensation in proportion to their wage liability to such employees; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall prevent any reasonable arrangements between such employers for a different distribution as between themselves of the ultimate burden of compensation.

Formerly: Acts 1929, c.172, s.49. As amended by P.L.144-1986, SEC.40.

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases, 1977–2019 · leading case: Degussa Corp. v. Mullens.
Degussa Corp. v. Mullens (Ind. 2001). · cites it 4× “In addition, it is possible for an employee to be "in the joint service of two (2) or more employers," Ind.Code § 22-3-3-31, and an employee's remedies remain exclusive under the Worker's Compensation Act even in such dual employer situations.”
Steel Transp., Inc. v. Hyatt (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 12× “The Board further concluded that Hyatt was in the joint employ of both DES and Steel and the award was to be apportioned equally between them under Ind.Code § 22-3-3-31. Finally, the Board concluded that Hyatt was entitled to an award under Ind.”
Kenwal Steel Corp. v. Seyring (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 3× “Indiana Code Section 22-3-3-31 requires joint employers to contribute to the payment of compensation for injuries or death in proportion to their wage liability.”
Taylor v. Ford Motor Co. (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 4× “The court also noted that this statute further provides that joint employers may make ‘“reasonable arrangements between such employers for a different distribution as between themselves of the ultimate burden of compensation.”
Lora Brenner & Shawn Brenner v. All Steel Carports, Inc., All Steel Carports & Bldgs., LLC, Chavez Real Est. an (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “Because the Complaint did not establish an employer-employee relationship, the burden to do so remained on Chavez Real Estate. [20] Inasmuch as Chavez Real Estate argues that Lora was employed by both it and All Steel, under the WCA, it is possible for an employee to…”
Eshanya Walls v. Markley Enter., Inc. (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 4× “Indiana Code § 22-3-3-31 requires joint employers to contribute to the payment of compensation for injuries or death in proportion to their wage liability.”
Jennings v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr. (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 2× “Vincent and StarMed and thus barred from bringing a claim against St.”
Fox v. Contract Beverage Packers, Inc. (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). “Ind. Code 22-3-3-31; see also Motor Dispatch, Inc.”
Walters v. Modern Aluminum (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 2× “DISCUSSION For purposes of the Worker’s Compensation Act, it is possible for an employee to be “in the joint service of two (2) or more employers_” Ind.Code § 22-3-3-31. We have held that “[w]here two employers ‘so associate themselves together that both are in direct control of…”
Louise Frontz, Guardian of the Person & Est. of Brian O'Neal Frontz, & Brian Frontz v. Middletown Enter., Inc (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 4× “” Ind.Code § 22-3-3-31. Both employers are responsible for contributing to the worker’s “compensation in proportion to their wage liability,” unless the employers have made other reasonable arrangements between themselves.”
Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ. v. Frye (Va. Ct. App. 1988). “, Ind. Code § 22-3-3-31 . In contrast, our Workers’ Compensation Act does not provide for shared liability and our case law clearly places responsibility on the special employer.”
Rice Ex Rel. Lopez v. Harper (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “2d at 402 ; Ind.Code § 22-3-3-31. To determine whether an employer-employee relationship exists, we weigh seven factors: (1) right to discharge; (2) mode of payment; (3) supplying tools or equipment; (4) belief of the parties in the existence of an employer-employee…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.