Indiana Code

Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1 (2026)

Grounds for disqualification; modifications

✓ current as of May 2026
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     Sec. 1. (a) Regarding an individual's most recent separation from employment before filing an initial or additional claim for benefits, an individual who voluntarily left the employment without good cause in connection with the work or was discharged from the employment for just cause is ineligible for waiting period or benefit rights for the week in which the disqualifying separation occurred and until:

(1) the individual has earned remuneration in employment in at least eight (8) weeks; and

(2) the remuneration earned equals or exceeds the product of the weekly benefit amount multiplied by eight (8).

If the qualification amount has not been earned at the expiration of an individual's benefit period, the unearned amount shall be carried forward to an extended benefit period or to the benefit period of a subsequent claim.

     (b) When it has been determined that an individual has been separated from employment under disqualifying conditions as outlined in this section, the maximum benefit amount of the individual's current claim, as initially determined, shall be reduced by an amount determined as follows:

(1) For the first separation from employment under disqualifying conditions, the maximum benefit amount of the individual's current claim is equal to the result of:

(A) the maximum benefit amount of the individual's current claim, as initially determined; multiplied by

(B) seventy-five percent (75%);

rounded (if not already a multiple of one dollar ($1)) to the next higher dollar.

(2) For the second separation from employment under disqualifying conditions, the maximum benefit amount of the individual's current claim is equal to the result of:

(A) the maximum benefit amount of the individual's current claim determined under subdivision (1); multiplied by

(B) eighty-five percent (85%);

rounded (if not already a multiple of one dollar ($1)) to the next higher dollar.

(3) For the third and any subsequent separation from employment under disqualifying conditions, the maximum benefit amount of the individual's current claim is equal to the result of:

(A) the maximum benefit amount of the individual's current claim determined under subdivision (2); multiplied by

(B) ninety percent (90%);

rounded (if not already a multiple of one dollar ($1)) to the next higher dollar.

     (c) The disqualifications provided in this section shall be subject to the following modifications:

(1) An individual shall not be subject to disqualification because of separation from the individual's employment if:

(A) the individual left to accept with another employer previously secured permanent full-time work which offered reasonable expectation of continued covered employment and betterment of wages or working conditions and thereafter was employed on said job;

(B) having been simultaneously employed by two (2) employers, the individual leaves one (1) such employer voluntarily without good cause in connection with the work but remains in employment with the second employer with a reasonable expectation of continued employment; or

(C) the individual left to accept recall made by a base period employer.

(2) An individual whose unemployment is the result of medically substantiated physical disability and who is involuntarily unemployed after having made reasonable efforts to maintain the employment relationship shall not be subject to disqualification under this section for such separation.

(3) An individual who left work to enter the armed forces of the United States shall not be subject to disqualification under this section for such leaving of work.

(4) An individual whose employment is terminated under the compulsory retirement provision of a collective bargaining agreement to which the employer is a party, or under any other plan, system, or program, public or private, providing for compulsory retirement and who is otherwise eligible shall not be deemed to have left the individual's work voluntarily without good cause in connection with the work. However, if such individual subsequently becomes reemployed and thereafter voluntarily leaves work without good cause in connection with the work, the individual shall be deemed ineligible as outlined in this section.

(5) An otherwise eligible individual shall not be denied benefits for any week because the individual is in training approved under Section 236(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, nor shall the individual be denied benefits by reason of leaving work to enter such training, provided the work left is not suitable employment, or because of the application to any week in training of provisions in this law (or any applicable federal unemployment compensation law), relating to availability for work, active search for work, or refusal to accept work. For purposes of this subdivision, the term "suitable employment" means with respect to an individual, work of a substantially equal or higher skill level than the individual's past adversely affected employment (as defined for purposes of the Trade Act of 1974), and wages for such work at not less than eighty percent (80%) of the individual's average weekly wage as determined for the purposes of the Trade Act of 1974.

(6) An individual is not subject to disqualification because of separation from the individual's employment if:

(A) the employment was outside the individual's labor market;

(B) the individual left to accept previously secured full-time work with an employer in the individual's labor market; and

(C) the individual actually became employed with the employer in the individual's labor market.

(7) An individual who, but for the voluntary separation to move to another labor market to join a spouse who had moved to that labor market, shall not be disqualified for that voluntary separation, if the individual is otherwise eligible for benefits. Benefits paid to the spouse whose eligibility is established under this subdivision shall not be charged against the employer from whom the spouse voluntarily separated.

(8) An individual shall not be subject to disqualification if the individual voluntarily left employment or was discharged due to circumstances directly caused by domestic or family violence (as defined in IC 31-9-2-42). An individual who may be entitled to benefits based on this modification may apply to the office of the attorney general under IC 5-26.5 to have an address designated by the office of the attorney general to serve as the individual's address for purposes of this article.

(9) An individual shall not be subject to disqualification if the individual:

(A) has requested an exemption from an employer's COVID-19 immunization requirement;

(B) has complied with the requirements set forth in IC 22-5-4.6; and

(C) was discharged from employment for failing or refusing to receive an immunization against COVID-19.

As used in this subsection, "labor market" means the area surrounding an individual's permanent residence, outside which the individual cannot reasonably commute on a daily basis. In determining whether an individual can reasonably commute under this subdivision, the department shall consider the nature of the individual's job.

     (d) "Discharge for just cause" as used in this section is defined to include but not be limited to:

(1) separation initiated by an employer for falsification of an employment application to obtain employment through subterfuge;

(2) knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer, including a rule regarding attendance;

(3) if an employer does not have a rule regarding attendance, an individual's unsatisfactory attendance, if good cause for absences or tardiness is not established;

(4) damaging the employer's property through willful and wanton misconduct;

(5) refusing to obey instructions;

(6) conduct endangering safety of self or coworkers;

(7) incarceration in jail following conviction of a misdemeanor or felony by a court of competent jurisdiction; or

(8) any breach of duty in connection with work which is reasonably owed an employer by an employee.

     (e) To verify that domestic or family violence has occurred, an individual who applies for benefits under subsection (c)(8) shall provide one (1) of the following:

(1) A report of a law enforcement agency (as defined in IC 10-13-3-10).

(2) A protection order issued under IC 34-26-5.

(3) A foreign protection order (as defined in IC 34-6-2.1-76).

(4) An affidavit from a domestic violence service provider verifying services provided to the individual by the domestic violence service provider.

Formerly: Acts 1947, c.208, s.1501; Acts 1957, c.261, s.1; Acts 1965, c.190, s.9; Acts 1967, c.310, s.19; Acts 1971, P.L.355, SEC.35; Acts 1972, P.L.174, SEC.1; Acts 1974, P.L.110, SEC.4. As amended by Acts 1977, P.L.262, SEC.25; Acts 1980, P.L.158, SEC.5; Acts 1982, P.L.95, SEC.4; P.L.20-1986, SEC.9; P.L.80-1990, SEC.13; P.L.21-1995, SEC.83; P.L.166-1996, SEC.3; P.L.290-2001, SEC.7; P.L.189-2003, SEC.3; P.L.97-2004, SEC.82; P.L.175-2009, SEC.23; P.L.121-2014, SEC.12; P.L.183-2015, SEC.7; P.L.224-2017, SEC.10; P.L.1-2022, SEC.8; P.L.117-2023, SEC.8; P.L.186-2025, SEC.121; P.L.200-2025, SEC.18.

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 188 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1976–2025 · leading case: Beckingham v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 903 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
Beckingham v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 903 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 94× “Based upon the foregoing discussion and authorities, we conclude that Beckingham was discharged for just cause under Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1 (d)(2) and that, based upon the language of the statute, the attendance issue in this case was not required to be reviewed under Ind.”
Stanrail Corp. v. Review Bd. of the Dep't of Workforce Dev., 735 N.E.2d 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 28× “(d) "Discharge for just cause" as used in this section is defined to include but not be limited to: (2) knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer; Ind.”
McHugh v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 842 N.E.2d 436 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 18× “2d at 1202 ; Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1 (2005). Under the statute, "Discharge for just cause" as used in this section is defined to include but not be limited to: [[Image here]] (8) .”
Chrysler Grp., LLC v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 960 N.E.2d 118 (Ind. 2012). · cites it 10× “(citing Ind.Code § 22-4-15-1 (2007 & Supp.2011)).”
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). · cites it 4× “[1] Indiana Code § 22-4-15-1 (Supp. 1978) provides: "With respect to benefit periods including extended benefit periods established subsequent to July 6, 1974, and before July 3, 1977, an individual who has voluntarily left his employment without good cause in connection with…”
Recker v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 958 N.E.2d 1136 (Ind. 2011). · cites it 6× “laimant should have known that there was a duty to maintain training levels in order to remain employed,” that “[b]y failing to meet the training levels, the claimant no longer had the proper qualifications to meet the job requirements,” and thus “that the claimant breached a…”
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127 (Ind. 1979). · cites it 16× “The question presented for our review is whether the statute which made the claimant ineligible for unemployment benefits if he voluntarily left his employment without good cause in connection with the work, Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1 (Burns 1974), as it applies to Thomas, violates…”
Indiana State Univ. v. LaFief, 888 N.E.2d 184 (Ind. 2008). · cites it 6× “See Ind.Code Ann. § 22-4-15-1; Quillen v. Review Bd.”
Russell v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Emp. & Training Servs., 586 N.E.2d 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 8× “CODE § 22-4-15-1. Under I.C. § 22-4-15-1(d), "just cause" includes: "(1) separation initiated by an employer for falsification of an employment application to obtain employment through subterfuge; (2) knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer;…”
Stanrail Corp. v. Unemployment Ins. Review Bd., 734 N.E.2d 1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 12× “Ind.Code Ann. § 22-4-15-1 (d)(2) (West . Supp.”
S.S. LLC v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 953 N.E.2d 597 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 8× “Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1 (d)(2). An employer's asserted work rule must be reduced to writing and introduced into evidence to enable this Court to fairly and reasonably review the determination that an employee was discharged for just cause for the knowing violation of a rule.”
Ramsey v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 789 N.E.2d 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 3× “§ 22-4-15-1, the statute which defines "discharge for just cause" and under which he was denied benefits.”
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(2) — 1 case
Huber v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 422 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(a) — 27 cases
Indianapolis Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Jones, 669 N.E.2d 431 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
Beckingham v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 903 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “Based upon the foregoing discussion and authorities, we conclude that Beckingham was discharged for just cause under Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1 (d)(2) and that, based upon the language of the statute, the attendance issue in this case was not required to be reviewed under Ind.”
Brown v. Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 919 N.E.2d 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
S.A. v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 936 N.E.2d 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(c) — 3 cases
Y.G. v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 936 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(c)(1) — 4 cases
Bailey v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 668 N.E.2d 1293 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
Wade v. Review Bd. of Ind., 599 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(c)(1)(B) — 1 case
Co. v. C.R. (mem. dec.) (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(c)(2) — 11 cases
Whiteside v. Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 873 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Y.G. v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 936 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
K.S. v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 33 N.E.3d 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
Giovanoni v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 900 N.E.2d 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
M.M. v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 921 N.E.2d 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(c)(5) — 1 case
Whiteside v. Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 873 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(c)(8) — 1 case
K.S. v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 33 N.E.3d 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(d) — 32 cases
Beckingham v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 903 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “Based upon the foregoing discussion and authorities, we conclude that Beckingham was discharged for just cause under Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1 (d)(2) and that, based upon the language of the statute, the attendance issue in this case was not required to be reviewed under Ind.”
McHugh v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 842 N.E.2d 436 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). “2d at 1202 ; Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1 (2005). Under the statute, "Discharge for just cause" as used in this section is defined to include but not be limited to: [[Image here]] (8) .”
Stanrail Corp. v. Unemployment Ins. Review Bd., 734 N.E.2d 1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “Ind.Code Ann. § 22-4-15-1 (d)(2) (West . Supp.”
Russell v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Emp. & Training Servs., 586 N.E.2d 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). “CODE § 22-4-15-1. Under I.C. § 22-4-15-1(d), "just cause" includes: "(1) separation initiated by an employer for falsification of an employment application to obtain employment through subterfuge; (2) knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer;…”
S.S. LLC v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 953 N.E.2d 597 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1 (d)(2). An employer's asserted work rule must be reduced to writing and introduced into evidence to enable this Court to fairly and reasonably review the determination that an employee was discharged for just cause for the knowing violation of a rule.”
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(1) — 4 cases
Stanrail Corp. v. Review Bd. of the Dep't of Workforce Dev., 735 N.E.2d 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “(d) "Discharge for just cause" as used in this section is defined to include but not be limited to: (2) knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer; Ind.”
Russell v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Emp. & Training Servs., 586 N.E.2d 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). “CODE § 22-4-15-1. Under I.C. § 22-4-15-1(d), "just cause" includes: "(1) separation initiated by an employer for falsification of an employment application to obtain employment through subterfuge; (2) knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer;…”
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(2) — 30 cases
Beckingham v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 903 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “Based upon the foregoing discussion and authorities, we conclude that Beckingham was discharged for just cause under Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1 (d)(2) and that, based upon the language of the statute, the attendance issue in this case was not required to be reviewed under Ind.”
Stanrail Corp. v. Review Bd. of the Dep't of Workforce Dev., 735 N.E.2d 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “(d) "Discharge for just cause" as used in this section is defined to include but not be limited to: (2) knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer; Ind.”
McHugh v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 842 N.E.2d 436 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). “2d at 1202 ; Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1 (2005). Under the statute, "Discharge for just cause" as used in this section is defined to include but not be limited to: [[Image here]] (8) .”
Ramsey v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 789 N.E.2d 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “§ 22-4-15-1, the statute which defines "discharge for just cause" and under which he was denied benefits.”
Recker v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 958 N.E.2d 1136 (Ind. 2011). “laimant should have known that there was a duty to maintain training levels in order to remain employed,” that “[b]y failing to meet the training levels, the claimant no longer had the proper qualifications to meet the job requirements,” and thus “that the claimant breached a…”
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(3) — 7 cases
Beckingham v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 903 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “Based upon the foregoing discussion and authorities, we conclude that Beckingham was discharged for just cause under Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1 (d)(2) and that, based upon the language of the statute, the attendance issue in this case was not required to be reviewed under Ind.”
Stanrail Corp. v. Review Bd. of the Dep't of Workforce Dev., 735 N.E.2d 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “(d) "Discharge for just cause" as used in this section is defined to include but not be limited to: (2) knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer; Ind.”
Giovanoni v. Review Bd. in Dept. Workforce, 900 N.E.2d 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(4) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(5) — 5 cases
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(6) — 2 cases
Owen Cty Bd. Com'rs v. Ind Dept. Workforce, 861 N.E.2d 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(7) — 1 case
Gibson v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 671 N.E.2d 933 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(8) — 11 cases
McHugh v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 842 N.E.2d 436 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). “2d at 1202 ; Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1 (2005). Under the statute, "Discharge for just cause" as used in this section is defined to include but not be limited to: [[Image here]] (8) .”
Beckingham v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 903 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “Based upon the foregoing discussion and authorities, we conclude that Beckingham was discharged for just cause under Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1 (d)(2) and that, based upon the language of the statute, the attendance issue in this case was not required to be reviewed under Ind.”
Giovanoni v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 900 N.E.2d 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(9) — 12 cases
Spieker v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 925 N.E.2d 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(e) — 2 cases
Byrd v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 469 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
Moore v. Review Bd., 444 N.E.2d 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
— Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(e)(2) — 1 case
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