Sec. 17. (a) A putative father whose consent to an
adoption is implied under section 15 of this chapter is not entitled to
establish paternity of the child, by affidavit or otherwise, in Indiana or
any other jurisdiction.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a putative father who is barred
from establishing paternity of the child under subsection (a) may
establish paternity of the child in a court proceeding under IC 31-14 or
in any other jurisdiction if:
(1) the putative father submits, together with the petition to
establish paternity, an affidavit prepared by the:
(A) licensed child placing agency; or
(B) attorney;
that served notice or caused notice to be served upon the putative
father under IC 31-19-3-1 stating that neither a petition for
adoption nor a placement of the child in a proposed adoptive
home is pending; and
(2) the court finds on the record, based on all the information
available to the court, including an affidavit described under
subdivision (1), that neither a:
(A) petition for adoption; nor
(B) placement of the child in a prospective adoptive home;
is pending.
The requirements of this subsection are jurisdictional and must be
strictly adhered to by the putative father and the court.
(c) An individual who is otherwise barred from establishing
paternity under this article may establish paternity in relation to a child
if an adoption for the child is not pending or contemplated. A petition
for adoption that is not filed or a petition for adoption that is dismissed
is not a basis for enabling an individual to establish paternity under this
section unless the requirements of subsection (b) are satisfied.
[Pre-1997 Recodification Citation: 31-3-1-6.4(h).]
As added by P.L.1-1997, SEC.11. Amended by P.L.200-1999,
SEC.22; P.L.61-2003, SEC.12; P.L.113-2017, SEC.8.
Notes of Decisions
In Re Paternity of MGS, 756 N.E.2d 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 14× “This distinction is important, insists Wachowski, because if the adoption was subsequently cancelled and he sought to reassert paternity pursuant to I.C. § 31-19-9-17, attorney Kirsch would have no knowledge about the status of the adoption.”
In Re Adoption of EL, 913 N.E.2d 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 6× “2002), for example, we interpreted Indiana Code section 31-19-9-17(b) as removing the implied-consent bar to petitioning for paternity if an adoption is dismissed or otherwise "falls through.”
Wachowski v. Beke, 756 N.E.2d 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 9× “This distinction is important, insists Wachowski, because if the adoption was subsequently cancelled and he sought to reassert paternity pursuant to I.C. § 31-19-9-17, attorney Kirsch would have no knowledge about the status of the adoption.”
R.J. v. V.N., 913 N.E.2d 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 6× “2002), for example, we interpreted Indiana Code section 31-19-9-17(b) as removing the implied-consent bar to petitioning for paternity if an adoption is dismissed or otherwise "falls through.”
Ind. Code § 31-19-9-17(a): 2 cases
In Re Paternity of MGS, 756 N.E.2d 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
“This distinction is important, insists Wachowski, because if the adoption was subsequently cancelled and he sought to reassert paternity pursuant to I.C. § 31-19-9-17, attorney Kirsch would have no knowledge about the status of the adoption.”
Wachowski v. Beke, 756 N.E.2d 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
“This distinction is important, insists Wachowski, because if the adoption was subsequently cancelled and he sought to reassert paternity pursuant to I.C. § 31-19-9-17, attorney Kirsch would have no knowledge about the status of the adoption.”
Ind. Code § 31-19-9-17(b): 4 cases
In Re Paternity of MGS, 756 N.E.2d 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
“This distinction is important, insists Wachowski, because if the adoption was subsequently cancelled and he sought to reassert paternity pursuant to I.C. § 31-19-9-17, attorney Kirsch would have no knowledge about the status of the adoption.”
In Re Adoption of EL, 913 N.E.2d 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
“2002), for example, we interpreted Indiana Code section 31-19-9-17(b) as removing the implied-consent bar to petitioning for paternity if an adoption is dismissed or otherwise "falls through.”
Wachowski v. Beke, 756 N.E.2d 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
“This distinction is important, insists Wachowski, because if the adoption was subsequently cancelled and he sought to reassert paternity pursuant to I.C. § 31-19-9-17, attorney Kirsch would have no knowledge about the status of the adoption.”
R.J. v. V.N., 913 N.E.2d 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
“2002), for example, we interpreted Indiana Code section 31-19-9-17(b) as removing the implied-consent bar to petitioning for paternity if an adoption is dismissed or otherwise "falls through.”
Ind. Code § 31-19-9-17(c): 2 cases
In Re Adoption of EL, 913 N.E.2d 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
“2002), for example, we interpreted Indiana Code section 31-19-9-17(b) as removing the implied-consent bar to petitioning for paternity if an adoption is dismissed or otherwise "falls through.”
R.J. v. V.N., 913 N.E.2d 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
“2002), for example, we interpreted Indiana Code section 31-19-9-17(b) as removing the implied-consent bar to petitioning for paternity if an adoption is dismissed or otherwise "falls through.”
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