Indiana Code

Ind. Code § 34-11-2-6 (2026)

Sheriffs or public officers; actions growing out of liability incurred during official acts or omissions of duty

✓ current as of May 2026
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     Sec. 6. An action against:

(1) a sheriff;

(2) another public officer; or

(3) the officer and the officer's sureties on a public bond;

growing out of a liability incurred by doing an act in an official capacity, or by the omission of an official duty, must be commenced within five (5) years after the cause of action accrues. However, an action may be commenced against the officer or the officer's legal representatives, for money collected in an official capacity and not paid over, at any time within six (6) years after the cause of action accrues.

[Pre-1998 Recodification Citation: 34-1-2-2(2).]

As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.6. Amended by P.L.9-2022, SEC.76.

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 20 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2000–2021 · leading case: Barrow v. City of Jeffersonville, 973 N.E.2d 1199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
Barrow v. City of Jeffersonville, 973 N.E.2d 1199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 36× “Ind.Code § 34-11-2-6. I. Whether Hicks and Segraves Were Public Officers The Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it found Hicks and Segraves were public officers protected by the statute of limitations contained in Indiana Code section 84-11-2-6.”
Jason T. Myers v. Thomas D. Maxson Amy L. Hutchison Bruce W. Graham & Trueblood & Graham (In their Off. & Individual Capacities) (mem. dec.), 51 N.E.3d 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 4× “See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-6 (providing that actions against public officers “growing out of a liability incurred by doing an act in an official capacity, or by the omission of an official duty, must be commenced within five (5) years after the cause of action accrues”).”
Lewis v. Rex Metal Craft, Inc., 831 N.E.2d 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 4× “Code § 34-11-2-5 (real property recovery actions "must be commenced within" five years); Ind.Code § 34-11-2-6 (actions against public officers "must be commenced within" five years); Ind.”
Howlett v. Hack, 794 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2015). “See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-6 (“An .action against: (A) a sheriff; (B), another public officer; or (C) the officer and the officer’s sureties on a public bond; .”
Est. of Wilson v. Steward, 937 N.E.2d 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “Code § 34-11-2-5 (real property recovery actions "must be commenced within" five years); Ind.Code § 34-11-2-6 (ac *830 tions against public officers "must be commenced within" five years); Ind.”
Dobbie v. Bremen Police Dep't, 341 F. Supp. 3d 896 (N.D. Ind. 2018). · cites it 2× “" Ind. Code § 34-11-2-6 . 3 For that reason, the plaintiffs cite Blake v.”
Bebout v. Thomas, 409 F. App'x 27 (7th Cir. 2011). “Applying Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury suits, see Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4, the court *29 concluded that Bebout’s complaint came at least 22 months too late.”
Patricia J. Barrow & Charlie Hanka v. City of Jeffersonville, Jeffersonville Plan. & Zoning Dept., Jeffersonville Bd. of Zoning Appeal, Jeffersonville Bldg. Comm. (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 32× “Ind. Code § 34-11-2-6 . 5 I. Whether Hicks and Segraves Were Public Officers The Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it found Hicks and Segraves were public officers protected by the statute of limitations contained in Indiana Code section 34- 11-2-6.”
Miles v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Jail, 335 F. App'x 633 (7th Cir. 2009). · cites it 2× “On appeal Miles argues that the district court applied the wrong statute of limitá *635 tion when it dismissed her complaint.”
Bedree v. Bedree, 396 F. App'x 312 (7th Cir. 2010). “See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-6 . This argument comes too late as he did not make this argument in the court below.”
Tipton Cnty. ex rel. Tipton Cnty. Council v. State ex rel. Nash, 731 N.E.2d 12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 2× “…per Ind.Code § 33-13-12-7(a) and $5,000 maximum annual voluntary county supplement per Ind.Code § 36-2-5-14. . Now Ind.Code § 34-11-2-6.”
Cathy Jo Robertson v. State of Indiana ex rel. Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney Gen. of Indiana Ronald Bloemer, Auto-Owners Ins. Co., & OneBeacon Ins. Co., 121 N.E.3d 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “5 In its response to Robertson's motion to dismiss, the OAG asserted that its complaint against Robertson was subject to a five or six-year statute of limitations pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-11-2-6(c). However, on appeal, the OAG does not make any argument under that…”
Ind. Code § 34-11-2-6(c): 1 case
Cathy Jo Robertson v. State of Indiana ex rel. Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney Gen. of Indiana Ronald Bloemer, Auto-Owners Ins. Co., & OneBeacon Ins. Co., 121 N.E.3d 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “5 In its response to Robertson's motion to dismiss, the OAG asserted that its complaint against Robertson was subject to a five or six-year statute of limitations pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-11-2-6(c). However, on appeal, the OAG does not make any argument under that…”
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