Indiana Code

Ind. Code § 34-13-9-8 (2026)

Exercise of religion

✓ current as of May 2026
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     Sec. 8. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a governmental entity may not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.

     (b) A governmental entity may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if the governmental entity demonstrates that application of the burden to the person:

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

As added by P.L.3-2015, SEC.1.

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 2017–2026 · leading case: Rodney Tyms-Bey v. State of Indiana, 69 N.E.3d 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
Rodney Tyms-Bey v. State of Indiana, 69 N.E.3d 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 12× “[5] Indiana Code section 34-13-9-8, the heart of Indiana’s RFRA, provides as follows: (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a governmental entity may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”
John Doe 1 v. The Boone Cnty. Prosecutor, in his Off. capacity, 85 N.E.3d 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 4× “Ind. Code § 34-13-9-8 . 4 . The State does not argue any of these subsections apply.”
House of Prayer Ministries, Inc. d/b/a Harvest Christian Camp v. Rush Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals Milco Dairy Farm, LLC, 91 N.E.3d 1053 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 4× “" I.C. § 34-13-9-8(a). However, "[a] governmental entity may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion" when the burden "is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”
Indiana Fam. Inst. Inc. v. City of Carmel (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 4× “Ind. Code § 34-13-9-8 . [52] Additionally, as explained above, the Companies have alleged only a hypothetical intention to offer their programs and events in the Cities, along with a vague statement that certain individuals could be excluded from attending their events.”
Individual Members of the Med. Licensing Bd. of Indiana v. Anonymous 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 4× “” Ind. Code § 34-13-9-8 (b). Plaintiffs allege that their sincere religious beliefs (or, in the case of Hoosier Jews for Choice, its members’ sincere religious beliefs) direct them to seek pregnancy terminations criminalized by the Abortion Law.”
James Michael Cox v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “Cox’s RFRA Arguments Indiana Code Section 34-13-9-8, also referred to as RFRA, states: (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a governmental entity may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”
John Johnson v. Catherine Barnes (mem. dec.) (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “Consistent therewith, governmental intrusion in matters of religion is circumscribed by Indiana Code Section 34-13-9-8 (a governmental entity may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, and a…”
Grant Elam v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “” I.C. § 34-13-9-8. On this basis, Elam asserts that the No Contact Order burdened his “religious communications with [Dorian],” which could have been accomplished through less restrictive 2 The No Contact Order was implemented pursuant to this statute, which provides, in…”
Ruby v. Holcomb (N.D. Ind. 2021). · cites it 2× “See Ind. Code § 34-13-9-8 . of City of New York, 436 U.”
Burgin (N.D. Ind. 2026). · cites it 2× “” Ind. Code § 34-13-9-8 (b). The State of Indiana has a legitimate interest in having drivers have valid driver’s licenses.”
— Ind. Code § 34-13-9-8(a) — 1 case
House of Prayer Ministries, Inc. d/b/a Harvest Christian Camp v. Rush Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals Milco Dairy Farm, LLC, 91 N.E.3d 1053 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “" I.C. § 34-13-9-8(a). However, "[a] governmental entity may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion" when the burden "is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”
— Ind. Code § 34-13-9-8(b) — 2 cases
Rodney Tyms-Bey v. State of Indiana, 69 N.E.3d 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “[5] Indiana Code section 34-13-9-8, the heart of Indiana’s RFRA, provides as follows: (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a governmental entity may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”
House of Prayer Ministries, Inc. d/b/a Harvest Christian Camp v. Rush Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals Milco Dairy Farm, LLC, 91 N.E.3d 1053 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “" I.C. § 34-13-9-8(a). However, "[a] governmental entity may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion" when the burden "is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”
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