Sec. 9. (a) If it appears from a petition for an order for
protection or from a petition to modify an order for protection that
domestic or family violence has occurred or that a modification of an
order for protection is required, a court may:
(1) without notice or hearing, immediately issue an order for
protection ex parte or modify an order for protection ex parte; or
(2) upon notice and after a hearing, whether or not a respondent
appears, issue or modify an order for protection.
(b) If it appears from a petition for an order for protection or from
a petition to modify an order for protection that harassment has
occurred, a court:
(1) may not, without notice and a hearing, issue an order for
protection ex parte or modify an order for protection ex parte; but
(2) may, upon notice and after a hearing, whether or not a
respondent appears, issue or modify an order for protection.
A court must hold a hearing under this subsection not later than thirty
(30) days after the petition for an order for protection or the petition to
modify an order for protection is filed.
(c) A court may grant the following relief without notice and
hearing in an ex parte order for protection or in an ex parte order for
protection modification under subsection (a):
(1) Enjoin a respondent from threatening to commit or
committing acts of domestic or family violence against a
petitioner and each designated family or household member.
(2) Prohibit a respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with a
petitioner.
(3) Prohibit a respondent from using a tracking device (as defined
by IC 35-31.5-2-337.6) to determine the location of:
(A) the petitioner or property owned or used by the petitioner;
and
(B) any other family or household member or property owned
or used by the family or household member.
(4) Remove and exclude a respondent from the residence of a
petitioner, regardless of ownership of the residence.
(5) Order a respondent to stay away from the residence, school, or
place of employment of a petitioner or a specified place
frequented by a petitioner and each designated family or
household member.
(6) Order that a petitioner has the exclusive possession, care,
custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed, kept, or cared
for by the petitioner, respondent, minor child of either the
petitioner or respondent, or any other family or household
member.
(7) Prohibit a respondent from removing, transferring, injuring,
concealing, harming, attacking, mistreating, threatening to harm,
or otherwise disposing of an animal described in subdivision (6).
(8) Order possession and use of the residence, an automobile, and
other essential personal effects, regardless of the ownership of the
residence, automobile, and essential personal effects. If
possession is ordered under this subdivision or subdivision (6),
the court may direct a law enforcement officer to accompany a
petitioner to the residence of the parties to:
(A) ensure that a petitioner is safely restored to possession of
the residence, automobile, animal, and other essential personal
effects; or
(B) supervise a petitioner's or respondent's removal of personal
belongings and animal.
(9) Order other relief necessary to provide for the safety and
welfare of a petitioner and each designated family or household
member.
(d) A court may grant the following relief after notice and a hearing,
whether or not a respondent appears, in an order for protection or in a
modification of an order for protection:
(1) Grant the relief under subsection (c).
(2) Specify arrangements for parenting time of a minor child by
a respondent and:
(A) require supervision by a third party; or
(B) deny parenting time;
if necessary to protect the safety of a petitioner or child.
(3) Order a respondent to:
(A) pay attorney's fees;
(B) pay rent or make payment on a mortgage on a petitioner's
residence;
(C) if the respondent is found to have a duty of support, pay for
the support of a petitioner and each minor child;
(D) reimburse a petitioner or other person for expenses related
to the domestic or family violence or harassment, including:
(i) medical expenses;
(ii) counseling;
(iii) shelter; and
(iv) repair or replacement of damaged property;
(E) pay the costs and expenses incurred in connection with the
use of a GPS tracking device under subsection (k); or
(F) pay the costs and fees incurred by a petitioner in bringing
the action.
(4) Prohibit a respondent from using or possessing a firearm,
ammunition, or a deadly weapon specified by the court, and direct
the respondent to surrender to a specified law enforcement agency
the firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon for the duration of the
order for protection unless another date is ordered by the court.
(5) Permit the respondent and petitioner to occupy the same
location for any purpose that the court determines is legitimate or
necessary. The court may impose terms and conditions upon a
respondent when granting permission under this subdivision.
An order issued under subdivision (4) does not apply to a person who
is exempt under 18 U.S.C. 925.
(e) The court shall:
(1) cause the order for protection to be delivered to the county
sheriff for service;
(2) make reasonable efforts to ensure that the order for protection
is understood by a petitioner and a respondent if present;
(3) electronically notify each law enforcement agency:
(A) required to receive notification under IC 5-2-9-6; or
(B) designated by the petitioner;
(4) transmit a copy of the order to the clerk for processing under
IC 5-2-9;
(5) indicate in the order if the order and the parties meet the
criteria under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8); and
(6) require the clerk of court to enter or provide a copy of the
order to the Indiana protective order registry established by IC 5-2-9-5.5.
(f) Except as provided in subsection (g), an order for protection
issued ex parte or upon notice and a hearing, or a modification of an
order for protection issued ex parte or upon notice and a hearing, is
effective for two (2) years after the date of issuance unless another date
is ordered by the court. The sheriff of each county shall provide
expedited service for an order for protection.
(g) This subsection applies to an order for protection issued ex parte
or upon notice and a hearing, or to a modification of an order for
protection issued ex parte or upon notice and a hearing, if:
(1) the respondent named in the order is a sex or violent offender
(as defined in IC 11-8-8-5) and is required to register as a lifetime
sex or violent offender under IC 11-8-8-19; and
(2) the petitioner was the victim of the crime that resulted in the
requirement that the respondent register as a lifetime sex or
violent offender under IC 11-8-8-19.
An order for protection to which this subsection applies is effective
indefinitely after the date of issuance unless another date is ordered by
the court. The sheriff of each county shall provide expedited service for
an order for protection.
(h) A finding that domestic or family violence or harassment has
occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order under this section
means that a respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of a
petitioner or a member of a petitioner's household. Upon a showing of
domestic or family violence or harassment by a preponderance of the
evidence, the court shall grant relief necessary to bring about a
cessation of the violence or the threat of violence. The relief may
include an order directing a respondent to surrender to a law
enforcement officer or agency all firearms, ammunition, and deadly
weapons:
(1) in the control, ownership, or possession of a respondent; or
(2) in the control or possession of another person on behalf of a
respondent;
for the duration of the order for protection unless another date is
ordered by the court.
(i) An order for custody, parenting time, or possession or control of
property issued under this chapter is superseded by an order issued
from a court exercising dissolution, legal separation, paternity, or
guardianship jurisdiction over the parties.
(j) The fact that an order for protection is issued under this chapter
does not raise an inference or presumption in a subsequent case or
hearings between the parties.
(k) Upon a finding of a violation of an order for protection, the court
may:
(1) require a respondent to wear a GPS tracking device; and
(2) prohibit the respondent from approaching or entering certain
locations where the petitioner may be found.
If the court requires a respondent to wear a GPS tracking device under
subdivision (1), the court shall, if available, require the respondent to
wear a GPS tracking device with victim notification capabilities.
(l) The court may permit a victim, a petitioner, another person, an
organization, or an agency to pay the costs and expenses incurred in
connection with the use of a GPS tracking device under subsection (k).
As added by P.L.133-2002, SEC.56. Amended by P.L.68-2005,
SEC.59; P.L.116-2009, SEC.13; P.L.130-2009, SEC.24; P.L.1-2010,
SEC.135; P.L.112-2017, SEC.1; P.L.266-2019, SEC.9; P.L.159-2022,
SEC.2; P.L.172-2023, SEC.1; P.L.9-2024, SEC.527.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
110
cases (
9 in the last 5 years), 2003–2026 · leading case:
Tons v. Bley, 815 N.E.2d 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
Tons v. Bley, 815 N.E.2d 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 22× “Ind.Code § 34-26-5-9(F). The statute provides that "[a] finding that domestic or family violence has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order under this section means that a respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of the petitioner or a member of the…”
John A. Fox v. Tracy Bonam & Doug Bonam, 45 N.E.3d 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 11× “Trial Rule 52(A) and IndCode § 34-26-5-9(a), -(f)). We apply a two-tiered standard of review: we &st determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and then we determine whether the findings support the order.”
VanHorn v. State, 889 N.E.2d 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 12× “Ind.Code § 34-26-5-9. A person who knowingly or intentionally violates a protective order issued under the CPOA commits invasion of privacy, a class A misdemeanor.”
Essany v. Bower, 790 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 8× “I.C. § 34-26-5-9(a)(2), (c). 5 . An order for protection issued ex parte or upon notice and a hearing is effective for two years after the date of issuance unless another date is ordered.”
J.K. v. T.C., 25 N.E.3d 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 10× “Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-9 applies to both original issuances and modifications of protective orders, and subsection (f) of the statute squarely places the burden of proof on a petitioner.”
N.E. v. L.W., 130 N.E.3d 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 19× “See Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9 . Under Indiana Code section 34-26-5-9(a)(2), a trial court may " upon notice and after a hearing, whether or not a respondent appears, issue or modify an order for protection.”
Moore v. Moore, 904 N.E.2d 353 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 10× “See Ind.Code § 34-26-5-9. However, a finding by the trial court that domestic or family violence has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order for protection means that the respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of the petitioner.”
Danny L. Young v. Lu Ann S. Young, 81 N.E.3d 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 16× “2012) *256 (quoting I.C. § 34-26-5-9(a)) (emphasis added). “Domestic or family violence” means, except for an act of self-defense, the occurrence of at least one of the following acts committed by a family or household member: (1) Attempting to cause, threatening to cause, or…”
In the Matter of the Petition for Temp. Prot. Order: A.N. v. K.G., 10 N.E.3d 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 6× “See I.C. § 34-26-5-9. Thus, a finding by the trial court that domestic or family violence has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order for protection means that the respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of the petitioner.”
Laux v. State, 821 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. 2005).
· cites it 4× “, and particularly Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9 (b)(2), a court is authorized to order the relief that the trial court ordered here.”
Richard Troy Dunno v. Ronalee Rasmussen, 980 N.E.2d 846 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 6× “Dunno argues that the trial court improperly assessed attorney fees against him because Ind.Code § 34-26-5-9 allows for a trial court to order only a respondent to pay attorney fees.”
Jarrett v. State, 804 N.E.2d 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 11× “I.C. § 34-26-5-9. When the testimony was introduced by Denise, Jarrett did not dispute that he had sent letters to her home.”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(1): 1 case
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(4): 2 cases
As v. Th, 920 N.E.2d 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(F): 3 cases
Tons v. Bley, 815 N.E.2d 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
“Ind.Code § 34-26-5-9(F). The statute provides that "[a] finding that domestic or family violence has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order under this section means that a respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of the petitioner or a member of the…”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(a): 20 cases
VanHorn v. State, 889 N.E.2d 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
“Ind.Code § 34-26-5-9. A person who knowingly or intentionally violates a protective order issued under the CPOA commits invasion of privacy, a class A misdemeanor.”
John A. Fox v. Tracy Bonam & Doug Bonam, 45 N.E.3d 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
“Trial Rule 52(A) and IndCode § 34-26-5-9(a), -(f)). We apply a two-tiered standard of review: we &st determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and then we determine whether the findings support the order.”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(a)(2): 3 cases
Essany v. Bower, 790 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
“I.C. § 34-26-5-9(a)(2), (c). 5 . An order for protection issued ex parte or upon notice and a hearing is effective for two years after the date of issuance unless another date is ordered.”
N.E. v. L.W., 130 N.E.3d 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
“See Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9 . Under Indiana Code section 34-26-5-9(a)(2), a trial court may " upon notice and after a hearing, whether or not a respondent appears, issue or modify an order for protection.”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(a)(l): 2 cases
Essany v. Bower, 790 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
“I.C. § 34-26-5-9(a)(2), (c). 5 . An order for protection issued ex parte or upon notice and a hearing is effective for two years after the date of issuance unless another date is ordered.”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(b): 15 cases
Essany v. Bower, 790 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
“I.C. § 34-26-5-9(a)(2), (c). 5 . An order for protection issued ex parte or upon notice and a hearing is effective for two years after the date of issuance unless another date is ordered.”
Jarrett v. State, 804 N.E.2d 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
“I.C. § 34-26-5-9. When the testimony was introduced by Denise, Jarrett did not dispute that he had sent letters to her home.”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(b)(1): 1 case
Tons v. Bley, 815 N.E.2d 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
“Ind.Code § 34-26-5-9(F). The statute provides that "[a] finding that domestic or family violence has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order under this section means that a respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of the petitioner or a member of the…”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(b)(2): 5 cases
Laux v. State, 821 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. 2005).
“, and particularly Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9 (b)(2), a court is authorized to order the relief that the trial court ordered here.”
As v. Th, 920 N.E.2d 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(b)(3): 2 cases
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(b)(6): 1 case
John A. Fox v. Tracy Bonam & Doug Bonam, 45 N.E.3d 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
“Trial Rule 52(A) and IndCode § 34-26-5-9(a), -(f)). We apply a two-tiered standard of review: we &st determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and then we determine whether the findings support the order.”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(c): 6 cases
John A. Fox v. Tracy Bonam & Doug Bonam, 45 N.E.3d 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
“Trial Rule 52(A) and IndCode § 34-26-5-9(a), -(f)). We apply a two-tiered standard of review: we &st determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and then we determine whether the findings support the order.”
Richard Troy Dunno v. Ronalee Rasmussen, 980 N.E.2d 846 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
“Dunno argues that the trial court improperly assessed attorney fees against him because Ind.Code § 34-26-5-9 allows for a trial court to order only a respondent to pay attorney fees.”
N.E. v. L.W., 130 N.E.3d 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
“See Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9 . Under Indiana Code section 34-26-5-9(a)(2), a trial court may " upon notice and after a hearing, whether or not a respondent appears, issue or modify an order for protection.”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(c)(2): 1 case
Jarrett v. State, 804 N.E.2d 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
“I.C. § 34-26-5-9. When the testimony was introduced by Denise, Jarrett did not dispute that he had sent letters to her home.”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(c)(3): 2 cases
N.E. v. L.W., 130 N.E.3d 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
“See Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9 . Under Indiana Code section 34-26-5-9(a)(2), a trial court may " upon notice and after a hearing, whether or not a respondent appears, issue or modify an order for protection.”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(c)(3)(A): 1 case
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(c)(4): 2 cases
Tons v. Bley, 815 N.E.2d 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
“Ind.Code § 34-26-5-9(F). The statute provides that "[a] finding that domestic or family violence has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order under this section means that a respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of the petitioner or a member of the…”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(d): 1 case
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(d)(5): 1 case
John A. Fox v. Tracy Bonam & Doug Bonam, 45 N.E.3d 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
“Trial Rule 52(A) and IndCode § 34-26-5-9(a), -(f)). We apply a two-tiered standard of review: we &st determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and then we determine whether the findings support the order.”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(e): 10 cases
Essany v. Bower, 790 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
“I.C. § 34-26-5-9(a)(2), (c). 5 . An order for protection issued ex parte or upon notice and a hearing is effective for two years after the date of issuance unless another date is ordered.”
J.K. v. T.C., 25 N.E.3d 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
“Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-9 applies to both original issuances and modifications of protective orders, and subsection (f) of the statute squarely places the burden of proof on a petitioner.”
John A. Fox v. Tracy Bonam & Doug Bonam, 45 N.E.3d 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
“Trial Rule 52(A) and IndCode § 34-26-5-9(a), -(f)). We apply a two-tiered standard of review: we &st determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and then we determine whether the findings support the order.”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(f): 29 cases
Tons v. Bley, 815 N.E.2d 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
“Ind.Code § 34-26-5-9(F). The statute provides that "[a] finding that domestic or family violence has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order under this section means that a respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of the petitioner or a member of the…”
In the Matter of the Petition for Temp. Prot. Order: A.N. v. K.G., 10 N.E.3d 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
“See I.C. § 34-26-5-9. Thus, a finding by the trial court that domestic or family violence has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order for protection means that the respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of the petitioner.”
VanHorn v. State, 889 N.E.2d 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
“Ind.Code § 34-26-5-9. A person who knowingly or intentionally violates a protective order issued under the CPOA commits invasion of privacy, a class A misdemeanor.”
John A. Fox v. Tracy Bonam & Doug Bonam, 45 N.E.3d 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
“Trial Rule 52(A) and IndCode § 34-26-5-9(a), -(f)). We apply a two-tiered standard of review: we &st determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and then we determine whether the findings support the order.”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(g): 2 cases
Moore v. Moore, 904 N.E.2d 353 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
“See Ind.Code § 34-26-5-9. However, a finding by the trial court that domestic or family violence has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order for protection means that the respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of the petitioner.”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(h): 9 cases
J.K. v. T.C., 25 N.E.3d 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
“Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-9 applies to both original issuances and modifications of protective orders, and subsection (f) of the statute squarely places the burden of proof on a petitioner.”
Moore v. Moore, 904 N.E.2d 353 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
“See Ind.Code § 34-26-5-9. However, a finding by the trial court that domestic or family violence has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order for protection means that the respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of the petitioner.”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(i): 2 cases
Danny L. Young v. Lu Ann S. Young, 81 N.E.3d 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
“2012) *256 (quoting I.C. § 34-26-5-9(a)) (emphasis added). “Domestic or family violence” means, except for an act of self-defense, the occurrence of at least one of the following acts committed by a family or household member: (1) Attempting to cause, threatening to cause, or…”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(i)(2): 1 case
Danny L. Young v. Lu Ann S. Young, 81 N.E.3d 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
“2012) *256 (quoting I.C. § 34-26-5-9(a)) (emphasis added). “Domestic or family violence” means, except for an act of self-defense, the occurrence of at least one of the following acts committed by a family or household member: (1) Attempting to cause, threatening to cause, or…”
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(j): 1 case
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