Sec. 2. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this
section, a prosecution for an offense is barred unless it is commenced:
(1) within five (5) years after the commission of the offense, in
the case of a Class B, Class C, or Class D felony (for a crime
committed before July 1, 2014) or a Level 3, Level 4, Level 5, or
Level 6 felony (for a crime committed after June 30, 2014); or
(2) within two (2) years after the commission of the offense, in the
case of a misdemeanor.
(b) A prosecution for a Class B or Class C felony (for a crime
committed before July 1, 2014) or a Level 3, Level 4, or Level 5 felony
(for a crime committed after June 30, 2014) that would otherwise be
barred under this section may be commenced within one (1) year after
the earlier of the date on which the state:
(1) first discovers evidence sufficient to charge the offender with
the offense through DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) analysis; or
(2) could have discovered evidence sufficient to charge the
offender with the offense through DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid)
analysis by the exercise of due diligence.
However, if the offense is a sex offense against a child described in
subsection (m), a prosecution otherwise barred under this section may
be prosecuted in accordance with subsection (p).
(c) Except as provided in subsection (e), a prosecution for a Class
A felony (for a crime committed before July 1, 2014) or a Level 1
felony or Level 2 felony (for a crime committed after June 30, 2014)
may be commenced at any time.
(d) A prosecution for murder may be commenced:
(1) at any time; and
(2) regardless of the amount of time that passes between:
(A) the date a person allegedly commits the elements of
murder; and
(B) the date the alleged victim of the murder dies.
(e) Except as provided in subsection (p), a prosecution for the
following offenses is barred unless commenced before the date that the
alleged victim of the offense reaches thirty-one (31) years of age:
(1) IC 35-42-4-3 (Child molesting).
(2) IC 35-42-4-5 (Vicarious sexual gratification).
(3) IC 35-42-4-6 (Child solicitation).
(4) IC 35-42-4-7 (Child seduction).
(5) IC 35-42-4-9 (Sexual misconduct with a minor).
(6) IC 35-46-1-3 (Incest).
(f) A prosecution for forgery of an instrument for payment of
money, or for the uttering of a forged instrument, under IC 35-43-5-2,
is barred unless it is commenced within five (5) years after the maturity
of the instrument.
(g) If a complaint, indictment, or information is dismissed because
of an error, defect, insufficiency, or irregularity, a new prosecution may
be commenced within ninety (90) days after the dismissal even if the
period of limitation has expired at the time of dismissal, or will expire
within ninety (90) days after the dismissal.
(h) The period within which a prosecution must be commenced does
not include any period in which:
(1) the accused person is not usually and publicly resident in
Indiana or so conceals himself or herself that process cannot be
served;
(2) the accused person conceals evidence of the offense, and
evidence sufficient to charge the person with that offense is
unknown to the prosecuting authority and could not have been
discovered by that authority by exercise of due diligence; or
(3) the accused person is a person elected or appointed to office
under statute or constitution, if the offense charged is theft or
conversion of public funds or bribery while in public office.
(i) For purposes of tolling the period of limitation only, a
prosecution is considered commenced on the earliest of these dates:
(1) The date of filing of an indictment, information, or complaint
before a court having jurisdiction.
(2) The date of issuance of a valid arrest warrant.
(3) The date of arrest of the accused person by a law enforcement
officer without a warrant, if the officer has authority to make the
arrest.
(j) A prosecution is considered timely commenced for any offense
to which the defendant enters a plea of guilty, notwithstanding that the
period of limitation has expired.
(k) The following apply to the specified offenses:
(1) A prosecution for an offense under IC 30-2-9-7(b) (misuse of
funeral trust funds) is barred unless commenced within five (5)
years after the date of death of the settlor (as described in IC 30-2-9).
(2) A prosecution for an offense under IC 30-2-10-9(b) (misuse
of funeral trust funds) is barred unless commenced within five (5)
years after the date of death of the settlor (as described in IC 30-2-10).
(3) A prosecution for an offense under IC 30-2-13-38(f) (misuse
of funeral trust or escrow account funds) is barred unless
commenced within five (5) years after the date of death of the
purchaser (as defined in IC 30-2-13-9).
(l) A prosecution for an offense under IC 23-2-6, IC 23-2.5, IC 23-14-48-9, or IC 23-19 is barred unless commenced within five (5)
years after the earlier of the date on which the state:
(1) first discovers evidence sufficient to charge the offender with
the offense; or
(2) could have discovered evidence sufficient to charge the
offender with the offense by the exercise of due diligence.
(m) Except as provided in subsection (p), a prosecution for a sex
offense listed in IC 11-8-8-4.5 that is committed against a child and
that is not:
(1) a Class A felony (for a crime committed before July 1, 2014)
or a Level 1 felony or Level 2 felony (for a crime committed after
June 30, 2014); or
(2) listed in subsection (e);
is barred unless commenced within ten (10) years after the commission
of the offense, or within four (4) years after the person ceases to be a
dependent of the person alleged to have committed the offense,
whichever occurs later.
(n) A prosecution for rape (IC 35-42-4-1) as a Class B felony (for a
crime committed before July 1, 2014) or as a Level 3 felony (for a
crime committed after June 30, 2014) that would otherwise be barred
under this section may be commenced not later than ten (10) years after
the earlier of the date on which:
(1) the state first discovers evidence sufficient to charge the
offender with the offense through DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid)
analysis;
(2) the state first becomes aware of the existence of a recording
(as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-273) that provides evidence sufficient
to charge the offender with the offense; or
(3) a person confesses to the offense.
(o) A prosecution for criminal deviate conduct (IC 35-42-4-2)
(repealed) as a Class B felony for a crime committed before July 1,
2014, that would otherwise be barred under this section may be
commenced not later than five (5) years after the earliest of the date on
which:
(1) the state first discovers evidence sufficient to charge the
offender with the offense through DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid)
analysis;
(2) the state first becomes aware of the existence of a recording
(as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-273) that provides evidence sufficient
to charge the offender with the offense; or
(3) a person confesses to the offense.
(p) A prosecution for an offense described in subsection (e) or
subsection (m) that would otherwise be barred under this section may
be commenced not later than five (5) years after the earliest of the date
on which:
(1) the state first discovers evidence sufficient to charge the
offender with the offense through DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid)
analysis;
(2) the state first becomes aware of the existence of a recording
(as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-273) that provides evidence sufficient
to charge the offender with the offense; or
(3) a person confesses to the offense.
As added by Acts 1976, P.L.148, SEC.1. Amended by Acts
1977, P.L.340, SEC.17; P.L.309-1985, SEC.2; P.L.232-1993, SEC.3;
P.L.9-2000, SEC.1; P.L.48-2001, SEC.1; P.L.1-2002, SEC.149;
P.L.97-2004, SEC.124; P.L.6-2006, SEC.7; P.L.140-2006, SEC.30;
P.L.173-2006, SEC.30; P.L.143-2009, SEC.47; P.L.44-2013, SEC.2;
P.L.158-2013, SEC.407; P.L.168-2014, SEC.63; P.L.72-2015, SEC.1;
P.L.70-2016, SEC.4; P.L.158-2017, SEC.15; P.L.40-2019, SEC.7;
P.L.175-2019, SEC.9; P.L.211-2019, SEC.45; P.L.31-2020, SEC.2;
P.L.3-2023, SEC.1; P.L.112-2025, SEC.1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
94
cases (
8 in the last 5 years), 1982–2026 · leading case:
Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917 (Ind. 2011).
Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917 (Ind. 2011).
· cites it 72× “[5] With some exceptions, prosecution for Class B, Class C, and Class D felonies must be commenced within five years after the commission of the offense; prosecution for misdemeanors must be commenced within two years after the commission of the offense; and prosecution for…”
Edward Gilliland v. State of Indiana, 979 N.E.2d 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 24× “Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2 (a). “The period within which a prosecution must be commenced does not include any period in which …the accused person conceals evidence of the offense, and evidence sufficient to charge the person with that offense is unknown to the prosecuting authority…”
Wallace v. State, 753 N.E.2d 568 (Ind. 2001).
· cites it 29× “I.C. § 35-41-4-2 (1998) (emphasis added).”
Marshall v. State, 832 N.E.2d 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 16× “- Ind.Code § 35-41-4-2 (20083) (emphasis added).”
Reeves v. State, 938 N.E.2d 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 16× “DECISION Reeves argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss because the prosecution of the class C felony charges against him is barred by the five-year period of limitation set forth in Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2. This Court reviews a…”
Kyle Pavan v. State of Indiana, 64 N.E.3d 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 16× “[9] Pavan’s appellate argument is based on a flawed interpretation of I.C. § 35-41-4-2 (2007), which, at the time Pa-van was charged, 2 read in relevant part as follows: (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a prosecution for an offense is barred unless it is…”
Kifer v. State, 740 N.E.2d 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 16× “He presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether his conviction is barred by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in Indiana Code Section 35-41-4-2(a)(1). We reverse. FACTS On the morning of October 2, 1987, David Kifer was driving a green Chevrolet on Christ…”
Roberts v. State, 712 N.E.2d 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 12× “CODE § 35-41-4-2; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding a videotaped interview of the victim during which she denied having sexual intercourse with Roberts; and (4) whether Roberts was denied effective assistance of trial counsel.”
Bleeke v. Lemmon, 6 N.E.3d 907 (Ind. 2014).
· cites it 4× “See Ind.Code § 35-41-4-2 (no statute of limitations on class A felony prosecutions or murder prosecutions; prosecutions for sex crimes against children not barred until victim reaches age of thirty-one).”
State v. Sagalovsky, 836 N.E.2d 260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 10× “With respect to *265 misdemeanor offenses, the relevant statute of limitation is as follows: (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a prosecution for an offense is barred unless it is commenced: (2) within two (2) years after the commission of the offense, in the case…”
State of Indiana v. John K. Sturman, 56 N.E.3d 1187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 9× “” I.C. § 35-41-4-2(a)(l). The Information alleges- that Sturman committed Count 1, reckless homicide, “[b]etween May 10, 2010 and August 6, 2010.”
State v. Lindsay, 862 N.E.2d 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 6× “The statute of limitation at issue in the present case is Indiana Code § 35-41-4-2(a)(1) (Burns Code Ed.”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(a) — 9 cases
Edward Gilliland v. State of Indiana, 979 N.E.2d 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
“Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2 (a). “The period within which a prosecution must be commenced does not include any period in which …the accused person conceals evidence of the offense, and evidence sufficient to charge the person with that offense is unknown to the prosecuting authority…”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(a)(1) — 13 cases
Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917 (Ind. 2011).
“[5] With some exceptions, prosecution for Class B, Class C, and Class D felonies must be commenced within five years after the commission of the offense; prosecution for misdemeanors must be commenced within two years after the commission of the offense; and prosecution for…”
Wallace v. State, 753 N.E.2d 568 (Ind. 2001).
“I.C. § 35-41-4-2 (1998) (emphasis added).”
Kifer v. State, 740 N.E.2d 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
“He presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether his conviction is barred by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in Indiana Code Section 35-41-4-2(a)(1). We reverse. FACTS On the morning of October 2, 1987, David Kifer was driving a green Chevrolet on Christ…”
State v. Lindsay, 862 N.E.2d 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
“The statute of limitation at issue in the present case is Indiana Code § 35-41-4-2(a)(1) (Burns Code Ed.”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(a)(2) — 5 cases
Edward Gilliland v. State of Indiana, 979 N.E.2d 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
“Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2 (a). “The period within which a prosecution must be commenced does not include any period in which …the accused person conceals evidence of the offense, and evidence sufficient to charge the person with that offense is unknown to the prosecuting authority…”
State v. Sagalovsky, 836 N.E.2d 260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
“With respect to *265 misdemeanor offenses, the relevant statute of limitation is as follows: (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a prosecution for an offense is barred unless it is commenced: (2) within two (2) years after the commission of the offense, in the case…”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(a)(Z) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(a)(l) — 8 cases
Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917 (Ind. 2011).
“[5] With some exceptions, prosecution for Class B, Class C, and Class D felonies must be commenced within five years after the commission of the offense; prosecution for misdemeanors must be commenced within two years after the commission of the offense; and prosecution for…”
Bleeke v. Lemmon, 6 N.E.3d 907 (Ind. 2014).
“See Ind.Code § 35-41-4-2 (no statute of limitations on class A felony prosecutions or murder prosecutions; prosecutions for sex crimes against children not barred until victim reaches age of thirty-one).”
State of Indiana v. John K. Sturman, 56 N.E.3d 1187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
“” I.C. § 35-41-4-2(a)(l). The Information alleges- that Sturman committed Count 1, reckless homicide, “[b]etween May 10, 2010 and August 6, 2010.”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(b) — 2 cases
Marshall v. State, 832 N.E.2d 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
“- Ind.Code § 35-41-4-2 (20083) (emphasis added).”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(b)(2) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(c) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(c)(1) — 1 case
Wallace v. State, 753 N.E.2d 568 (Ind. 2001).
“I.C. § 35-41-4-2 (1998) (emphasis added).”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(d) — 2 cases
State of Indiana v. John K. Sturman, 56 N.E.3d 1187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
“” I.C. § 35-41-4-2(a)(l). The Information alleges- that Sturman committed Count 1, reckless homicide, “[b]etween May 10, 2010 and August 6, 2010.”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(d)(1) — 1 case
Roberts v. State, 712 N.E.2d 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
“CODE § 35-41-4-2; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding a videotaped interview of the victim during which she denied having sexual intercourse with Roberts; and (4) whether Roberts was denied effective assistance of trial counsel.”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(d)(l) — 1 case
Roberts v. State, 712 N.E.2d 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
“CODE § 35-41-4-2; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding a videotaped interview of the victim during which she denied having sexual intercourse with Roberts; and (4) whether Roberts was denied effective assistance of trial counsel.”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(e) — 7 cases
Kyle Pavan v. State of Indiana, 64 N.E.3d 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
“[9] Pavan’s appellate argument is based on a flawed interpretation of I.C. § 35-41-4-2 (2007), which, at the time Pa-van was charged, 2 read in relevant part as follows: (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a prosecution for an offense is barred unless it is…”
Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917 (Ind. 2011).
“[5] With some exceptions, prosecution for Class B, Class C, and Class D felonies must be commenced within five years after the commission of the offense; prosecution for misdemeanors must be commenced within two years after the commission of the offense; and prosecution for…”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(e)(1) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(e)(2) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(e)(3) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(e)(l) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(g) — 2 cases
Roberts v. State, 712 N.E.2d 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
“CODE § 35-41-4-2; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding a videotaped interview of the victim during which she denied having sexual intercourse with Roberts; and (4) whether Roberts was denied effective assistance of trial counsel.”
Kifer v. State, 740 N.E.2d 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
“He presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether his conviction is barred by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in Indiana Code Section 35-41-4-2(a)(1). We reverse. FACTS On the morning of October 2, 1987, David Kifer was driving a green Chevrolet on Christ…”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(g)(1) — 1 case
Kifer v. State, 740 N.E.2d 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
“He presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether his conviction is barred by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in Indiana Code Section 35-41-4-2(a)(1). We reverse. FACTS On the morning of October 2, 1987, David Kifer was driving a green Chevrolet on Christ…”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(g)(2) — 1 case
Kifer v. State, 740 N.E.2d 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
“He presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether his conviction is barred by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in Indiana Code Section 35-41-4-2(a)(1). We reverse. FACTS On the morning of October 2, 1987, David Kifer was driving a green Chevrolet on Christ…”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(h) — 6 cases
Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917 (Ind. 2011).
“[5] With some exceptions, prosecution for Class B, Class C, and Class D felonies must be commenced within five years after the commission of the offense; prosecution for misdemeanors must be commenced within two years after the commission of the offense; and prosecution for…”
Marshall v. State, 832 N.E.2d 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
“- Ind.Code § 35-41-4-2 (20083) (emphasis added).”
Edward Gilliland v. State of Indiana, 979 N.E.2d 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
“Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2 (a). “The period within which a prosecution must be commenced does not include any period in which …the accused person conceals evidence of the offense, and evidence sufficient to charge the person with that offense is unknown to the prosecuting authority…”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(h)(1) — 1 case
State v. Lindsay, 862 N.E.2d 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
“The statute of limitation at issue in the present case is Indiana Code § 35-41-4-2(a)(1) (Burns Code Ed.”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(h)(2) — 10 cases
Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917 (Ind. 2011).
“[5] With some exceptions, prosecution for Class B, Class C, and Class D felonies must be commenced within five years after the commission of the offense; prosecution for misdemeanors must be commenced within two years after the commission of the offense; and prosecution for…”
Reeves v. State, 938 N.E.2d 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
“DECISION Reeves argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss because the prosecution of the class C felony charges against him is barred by the five-year period of limitation set forth in Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2. This Court reviews a…”
Edward Gilliland v. State of Indiana, 979 N.E.2d 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
“Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2 (a). “The period within which a prosecution must be commenced does not include any period in which …the accused person conceals evidence of the offense, and evidence sufficient to charge the person with that offense is unknown to the prosecuting authority…”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(k) — 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.