Indiana Code
Ind. Code § 35-42-3-1 (2026)
Definition
✓ current as of May 2026
Sec. 1. As used in this chapter, "confine" means to substantially interfere with the liberty of a person.
As added by Acts 1976, P.L.148, SEC.2. Amended by Acts 1977, P.L.340, SEC.33.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 55
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1979–2026 · leading case: Koch v. State, 952 N.E.2d 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Koch v. State, 952 N.E.2d 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “" Ind.Code § 35-42-3-1. The term "hijacking" means "the exercising of unlawful or unauthorized control of a vehicle by force or threat of force upon the vehicle's inhabitants.”
Dewald v. State, 898 N.E.2d 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “” Ind. Code § 35-42-3-1 . Here, evidence was presented that Nichols passed the minivan driven by Trovatore and braked suddenly, forcing the minivan, which had been traveling thirty-five to forty miles per hour, to quickly brake and stop.”
Hardley v. State, 893 N.E.2d 1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “Ind.Code § 35-42-3-1 (2005). Our standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction is well-settled: In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the Court neither reweighs the evidence nor assesses the credibility of the…”
Davis v. State, 446 N.E.2d 1317 (Ind. 1983). “Subsequently, our Indiana General Assembly in its substantial revision of our Criminal Code, redefined the crime of kidnapping, added the crime of criminal confinement, and revised the range of sentences for these crimes with the result that the penalties now are substantially…”
Inman v. State, 393 N.E.2d 767 (Ind. 1979). “Criminal confinement requires proof of a nonconsensual interference with a person’s liberty, while resisting law enforcement requires proof of resisting, obstructing or interfering with a police officer lawfully executing his duties.”
Lewis v. State, 440 N.E.2d 1125 (Ind. 1982). “” I.C. § 35-42-3-1 [Burns 1979 Repl.] defines “confine” as “to substantially interfere with the liberty of another person.”
Mayo v. State, 681 N.E.2d 689 (Ind. 1997). “CODE § 35-42-3-1 (1993). Here the evidence supports the fact that a confinement took place separate from the rape.”
Richeson v. State, 704 N.E.2d 1008 (Ind. 1998). “§ 35-41-5-1 (West 1998) (attempt); Ind.Code Ann. § 35-42-3-1 (West 1998) (kidnaping); Ind.”
McDonald v. Indiana, 511 N.E.2d 1066 (Ind. 1987). “In other words, Appellant claims his intent was to escape, not to confine.”
Pine v. State, 408 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. 1980). ““Confine” is defined in Ind.Code § 35-42-3-1 (Burns 1979) as “to substantially interfere with the liberty of a person.”
Ransom v. State, 850 N.E.2d 491 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). “" I.C. § 35-42-3-1. Ransom first argues that the evidence of confinement is insufficient because Cahill "was not confined," in that she neither asked nor tried to leave the dining room, "was never told she could not leave the house or the room," and "was never ordered to go…”
Warfield v. State, 417 N.E.2d 304 (Ind. 1981). “” Confine is defined by Ind.Code, § 35-42-3-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.) as follows: “As used in this chapter, ‘confine’ means to substantially interfere with the liberty of a person.”
Ind. Code § 35-42-3-1(a): 1 case
Anthony Lee Leturgez v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
Ind. Code § 35-42-3-1(a)(2)(B): 1 case
Billy Bulu Gercilus v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
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