Indiana Code
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-2 (2026)
Probable cause; offer of test; alternative tests; requirement to submit
✓ current as of May 2026
Sec. 2. (a) A law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense under this chapter, IC 9-30-5, or IC 9-30-9, or a violation under IC 9-30-15 shall offer the person the opportunity to submit to a chemical test.
(b) A law enforcement officer:
(1) is not required to offer a chemical test to an unconscious person; and
(2) may offer a person more than one (1) chemical test under this chapter.
(c) A test administered under this chapter must be administered within three (3) hours after the law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe the person committed an offense under IC 9-30-5 or a violation under IC 9-30-15.
(d) A person must submit to each chemical test offered by a law enforcement officer in order to comply with the implied consent provisions of this chapter.
[Pre-1991 Recodification Citation: 9-11-4-2.]
As added by P.L.2-1991, SEC.18. Amended by P.L.53-1994, SEC.7.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 61
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: Abney v. State, 811 N.E.2d 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
Abney v. State, 811 N.E.2d 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “Code § 9-30-6, involves implied consent where the arresting officer has probable cause to believe that a person has operated a vehicle while intoxicated.”
Schmidt v. State, 816 N.E.2d 925 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “Under Indiana's Implied Consent Statute, a law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe that a person has committed one of the applicable driving offenses shall offer the person the opportunity to submit to a chemical test.”
Temperly v. State, 933 N.E.2d 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “Brown involved the question whether a test offered following a fatal traffic accident under Indiana Code section 9-80-7-3 which does not require a showing of probable cause also had to meet the requirements of section 9-30-6-2 which does require such a showing.”
Datzek v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “See I.C. § 9-30-6-2. Indeed, the implied consent law allows an officer the ability to offer more than one chemical test and that the person who is asked to submit to a chemical test must submit to each test offered by an officer.”
Morgan Mannix v. State of Indiana, 54 N.E.3d 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “5 According to Indiana Code section 9-30-6-2(c), “A test administered under this chapter must be administered within three (3) hours after the law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe the person committed an offense under IC 9-30-5 or a violation under IC 9-30-15.”
Disbro v. State, 791 N.E.2d 774 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “§ 9-30-6-15 and I.C. § 9-30-6-2. These statutes permit the jury to relate the driver’s blood alcohol content at the time of the chemical test back to the blood alcohol content at the time he was driving.”
Dalton v. State, 773 N.E.2d 332 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “Ind.Code § 9-30-6-2. The provisions of the Implied Consent law only apply where the officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense such as operating a vehicle while intoxicated.”
Dannie Carl Pattison v. State of Indiana, 54 N.E.3d 361 (Ind. 2016). “12 Ind.Code § 9-30-6-2. Because the presumption is rebuttable, a defendant is free to present evidence in his *369 defense.”
Kristy Burnell v. State of Indiana, 56 N.E.3d 1146 (Ind. 2016). “I.C. § 9-30-6-2(a). “If a person refuses to submit to a chemical test, the arresting officer shall inform the person that refusal will result in the suspension of the person’s driving privileges.”
Cochran v. State, 771 N.E.2d 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “" The statute challenged by Cochran as unconstitutional, Indiana Code section 9-30-6-2, provides as follows: (a) A law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense under this chapter, IC 9-80-5, or IC 9-80- *107 9 shall offer the…”
Johnson v. State, 879 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “On October 13, 2006, Johnson filed a motion in limine and memorandum wherein she challenged the constitutionality of the statutory presumption created by Indiana Code section 9-30-6-2. Indiana Code section 9-30-6-15 creates a rebutta-ble presumption that the result of a…”
Ham v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “See Ind.Code § 9-30-6-2(a); see also Dalton v.”
— Ind. Code § 9-30-6-2(a) — 14 cases
Schmidt v. State, 816 N.E.2d 925 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “Under Indiana's Implied Consent Statute, a law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe that a person has committed one of the applicable driving offenses shall offer the person the opportunity to submit to a chemical test.”
Kristy Burnell v. State of Indiana, 56 N.E.3d 1146 (Ind. 2016). “I.C. § 9-30-6-2(a). “If a person refuses to submit to a chemical test, the arresting officer shall inform the person that refusal will result in the suspension of the person’s driving privileges.”
Datzek v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “See I.C. § 9-30-6-2. Indeed, the implied consent law allows an officer the ability to offer more than one chemical test and that the person who is asked to submit to a chemical test must submit to each test offered by an officer.”
Dalton v. State, 773 N.E.2d 332 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “Ind.Code § 9-30-6-2. The provisions of the Implied Consent law only apply where the officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense such as operating a vehicle while intoxicated.”
Barber v. State, 911 N.E.2d 641 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
— Ind. Code § 9-30-6-2(a)(d) — 1 case
Ham v. State, 826 N.E.2d 640 (Ind. 2005).
— Ind. Code § 9-30-6-2(b)(l) — 1 case
Copas v. State, 891 N.E.2d 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
— Ind. Code § 9-30-6-2(c) — 13 cases
Morgan Mannix v. State of Indiana, 54 N.E.3d 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “5 According to Indiana Code section 9-30-6-2(c), “A test administered under this chapter must be administered within three (3) hours after the law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe the person committed an offense under IC 9-30-5 or a violation under IC 9-30-15.”
Disbro v. State, 791 N.E.2d 774 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “§ 9-30-6-15 and I.C. § 9-30-6-2. These statutes permit the jury to relate the driver’s blood alcohol content at the time of the chemical test back to the blood alcohol content at the time he was driving.”
Johnson v. State, 879 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “On October 13, 2006, Johnson filed a motion in limine and memorandum wherein she challenged the constitutionality of the statutory presumption created by Indiana Code section 9-30-6-2. Indiana Code section 9-30-6-15 creates a rebutta-ble presumption that the result of a…”
Elberta N. Jackson v. State of Indiana, 67 N.E.3d 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
Duncan v. State, 799 N.E.2d 538 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
— Ind. Code § 9-30-6-2(d) — 2 cases
Ham v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “See Ind.Code § 9-30-6-2(a); see also Dalton v.”
Mullins v. State, 646 N.E.2d 40 (Ind. 1995).
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