Indiana Code

Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5 (2026)

Breath test operators, equipment, and chemicals; certification; rules; certificates as prima facie evidence

✓ current as of May 2026
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     Sec. 5. (a) The director of the state department of toxicology shall adopt rules under IC 4-22-2 concerning the following:

(1) Standards and regulations for the:

(A) selection;

(B) training; and

(C) certification;

of breath test operators.

(2) Standards and regulations for the:

(A) selection; and

(B) certification;

of breath test equipment and chemicals.

(3) The certification of the proper technique for administering a breath test.

     (b) A certification in accordance with rules adopted under subsection (a) shall be:

(1) sent in writing to the clerk of the circuit court in each county where the breath test operator, equipment, or chemicals are used to administer breath tests; or

(2) published on the website of the state department of toxicology.

However, failure to send or publish a certification as required by this subsection does not invalidate any test.

     (c) A certification in accordance with rules adopted under subsection (a) that is sent in writing under subsection (b)(1) or published on the website of the state department of toxicology under subsection (b)(2) and obtained from the state department of toxicology as an electronic record bearing an electronic signature:

(1) is admissible in a proceeding under this chapter, IC 9-30-5, IC 9-30-9, or IC 9-30-15;

(2) constitutes prima facie evidence that the equipment or chemical:

(A) was inspected and approved by the state department of toxicology on the date specified on the writing or electronic record; and

(B) was in proper working condition on the date the breath test was administered if the date of approval is not more than one hundred eighty (180) days before the date of the breath test;

(3) constitutes prima facie evidence of the approved technique for administering a breath test; and

(4) constitutes prima facie evidence that the breath test operator was certified by the state department of toxicology on the date specified on the writing or electronic record.

     (d) Results of chemical tests that involve an analysis of a person's breath are not admissible in a proceeding under this chapter, IC 9-30-5, IC 9-30-9, or IC 9-30-15 if:

(1) the test operator;

(2) the test equipment;

(3) the chemicals used in the test, if any; or

(4) the techniques used in the test;

have not been approved in accordance with the rules adopted under subsection (a).

[Pre-1991 Recodification Citation: 9-11-4-5.]

As added by P.L.2-1991, SEC.18. Amended by P.L.53-1994, SEC.9; P.L.158-2011, SEC.2; P.L.38-2017, SEC.1; P.L.1-2025, SEC.141.

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 63 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1991–2023 · leading case: Edwin Jones v. State of Indiana, 982 N.E.2d 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
Edwin Jones v. State of Indiana, 982 N.E.2d 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 26× “are admissible in a proceeding under this chapter, IC 9-30-5 . . . .” Id. at 9-10 . Jones argues that “[p]roceedings under ‘IC 9-30-5’ are criminal prosecutions of individuals charged with OVWI, the very proceedings to which [he] was subjected,” and that thus “the analyst who…”
Ramirez v. State, 928 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 16× “" I.C. § 9-30-6-5(b). Meanwhile the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .”
Johnson v. State, 879 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 18× “I.C. § 9-30-6-5. In support of her contentions, Johnson cites Napier v.”
Mullins v. State, 646 N.E.2d 40 (Ind. 1995). · cites it 11× “5-6, the predecessor of the current § 9-30-6-5). Thus, onee the State had introduced prima facie evidence that the machine was in proper working condition, the burden of production shifted to Mullins to rebut the State's prima facie showing.”
State v. Rumple, 723 N.E.2d 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 28× “We must examine Ind.Code Ann. § 9-30-6-5 (West Supp.1999) in the context of the relevant administrative regulations in order to determine whether those materials require independent testing and certification of the simulator solutions pursuant to 260 IAC 1.”
Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 7× “demied; see also Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5 (d). The admission of chemical breath test results is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”
Platt v. State, 589 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. 1992). · cites it 6× “[6] Now found at Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5 (West Supp. 1991). For a more detailed discussion on the admissibility of documents certifying inspection of breath test machines, see Hatch v.”
Baran v. State, 639 N.E.2d 642 (Ind. 1994). · cites it 8× “Because Indiana Code § 9-30-6-5(a)(2) mandates the Director of the Department of Toxicology to adopt standards and regulations for the selection and certification of breath test equipment and chemicals, and because Indiana Administrative Code tit.”
Curley v. State, 777 N.E.2d 58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 5× “I.C. § 9-30-6-5 prohibits the admission of results of chemical tests that involve an analysis of a person’s breath unless the test equipment has been approved by the Department of Toxicology.”
Dannie Carl Pattison v. State of Indiana, 54 N.E.3d 361 (Ind. 2016). · cites it 2× “Ind.Code § 9-30-6-5 (2010); 260 Ind. Admin.”
State v. Lloyd, 800 N.E.2d 196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 4× “Ind.Code § 9-30-6-5(c)(1); Wray v. State, 751 N.”
Guy v. State, 805 N.E.2d 835 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 12× “1998) (citing Ind.Code § 9-30-6-5). As the party offering the results of a breath test, the State has the burden of establishing the foundation for admitting the test.”
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5(a): 9 cases
Curley v. State, 777 N.E.2d 58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “I.C. § 9-30-6-5 prohibits the admission of results of chemical tests that involve an analysis of a person’s breath unless the test equipment has been approved by the Department of Toxicology.”
State v. Rumple, 723 N.E.2d 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “We must examine Ind.Code Ann. § 9-30-6-5 (West Supp.1999) in the context of the relevant administrative regulations in order to determine whether those materials require independent testing and certification of the simulator solutions pursuant to 260 IAC 1.”
Edward Wolpert v. State of Indiana, 47 N.E.3d 1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
Reynolds v. State, 698 N.E.2d 390 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
Tanner Piotrowski v. State of Indiana, 3 N.E.3d 1051 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5(a)(2): 8 cases
Baran v. State, 639 N.E.2d 642 (Ind. 1994). “Because Indiana Code § 9-30-6-5(a)(2) mandates the Director of the Department of Toxicology to adopt standards and regulations for the selection and certification of breath test equipment and chemicals, and because Indiana Administrative Code tit.”
Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “demied; see also Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5 (d). The admission of chemical breath test results is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”
Baran v. State, 622 N.E.2d 1326 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
Sales v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
Fields v. State, 807 N.E.2d 106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5(a)(3): 1 case
Brittanie R. Corbin v. State of Indiana, 113 N.E.3d 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5(b): 4 cases
Johnson v. State, 879 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “I.C. § 9-30-6-5. In support of her contentions, Johnson cites Napier v.”
Edwin Jones v. State of Indiana, 982 N.E.2d 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “are admissible in a proceeding under this chapter, IC 9-30-5 . . . .” Id. at 9-10 . Jones argues that “[p]roceedings under ‘IC 9-30-5’ are criminal prosecutions of individuals charged with OVWI, the very proceedings to which [he] was subjected,” and that thus “the analyst who…”
Ramirez v. State, 928 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “" I.C. § 9-30-6-5(b). Meanwhile the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .”
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5(c): 8 cases
Ramirez v. State, 928 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “" I.C. § 9-30-6-5(b). Meanwhile the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .”
Edwin Jones v. State of Indiana, 982 N.E.2d 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “are admissible in a proceeding under this chapter, IC 9-30-5 . . . .” Id. at 9-10 . Jones argues that “[p]roceedings under ‘IC 9-30-5’ are criminal prosecutions of individuals charged with OVWI, the very proceedings to which [he] was subjected,” and that thus “the analyst who…”
Johnson v. State, 879 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “I.C. § 9-30-6-5. In support of her contentions, Johnson cites Napier v.”
Fields v. State, 807 N.E.2d 106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
English v. State, 603 N.E.2d 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5(c)(1): 2 cases
State v. Lloyd, 800 N.E.2d 196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “Ind.Code § 9-30-6-5(c)(1); Wray v. State, 751 N.”
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5(c)(2): 1 case
Michael Porter v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5(c)(2)(B): 1 case
Mullins v. State, 646 N.E.2d 40 (Ind. 1995). “5-6, the predecessor of the current § 9-30-6-5). Thus, onee the State had introduced prima facie evidence that the machine was in proper working condition, the burden of production shifted to Mullins to rebut the State's prima facie showing.”
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5(c)(8): 1 case
Mullins v. State, 646 N.E.2d 40 (Ind. 1995). “5-6, the predecessor of the current § 9-30-6-5). Thus, onee the State had introduced prima facie evidence that the machine was in proper working condition, the burden of production shifted to Mullins to rebut the State's prima facie showing.”
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5(c)(l): 1 case
Johnson v. State, 879 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “I.C. § 9-30-6-5. In support of her contentions, Johnson cites Napier v.”
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5(d): 26 cases
Ramirez v. State, 928 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “" I.C. § 9-30-6-5(b). Meanwhile the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .”
Mullins v. State, 646 N.E.2d 40 (Ind. 1995). “5-6, the predecessor of the current § 9-30-6-5). Thus, onee the State had introduced prima facie evidence that the machine was in proper working condition, the burden of production shifted to Mullins to rebut the State's prima facie showing.”
Baran v. State, 639 N.E.2d 642 (Ind. 1994). “Because Indiana Code § 9-30-6-5(a)(2) mandates the Director of the Department of Toxicology to adopt standards and regulations for the selection and certification of breath test equipment and chemicals, and because Indiana Administrative Code tit.”
Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “demied; see also Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5 (d). The admission of chemical breath test results is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”
Short v. State, 962 N.E.2d 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5(d)(3): 1 case
State v. Rumple, 723 N.E.2d 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “We must examine Ind.Code Ann. § 9-30-6-5 (West Supp.1999) in the context of the relevant administrative regulations in order to determine whether those materials require independent testing and certification of the simulator solutions pursuant to 260 IAC 1.”
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5(d)(4): 1 case
Brian Harold Connor v. State of Indiana, 114 N.E.3d 901 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
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