Kentucky Revised Statutes

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.39-230 (2026)

Limitations of actions

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) If no basic or added reparation benefits have been paid for loss arising otherwise than from death, an action therefor may be commenced not later than two (2) years after the injured person suffers the loss and either knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, that the loss was caused by the accident, or not later than four (4) years after the accident, whichever is earlier. If basic or added reparation benefits have been paid for loss arising otherwise than from death, an action for further benefits, other than survivor's benefits, by either the same or another claimant, may be commenced not later than two (2) years after the last payment of benefits.

(2) If no basic or added reparation benefits have been paid to the decedent or his or her survivors, an action for survivor's benefits may be commenced not later than one (1) year after the death or four (4) years after the accident from which death results, whichever is earlier. If survivor's benefits have been paid to any survivor, an action for further survivor's benefits by either the same or another claimant may be commenced not later than two (2) years after the last payment of benefits. If basic or added reparation benefits have been paid for loss suffered by an injured person before his or her death resulting from the injury, an action for survivor's benefits may be commenced not later than one (1) year after the death or four (4) years after the last payment of benefits, whichever is earlier.

(3) If timely action for basic reparation benefits is commenced against a reparation obligor and benefits are denied because of a determination that the reparation obligor's coverage is not applicable to the claimant under the provisions on priority of applicability of basic reparation security, an action against the applicable reparation obligor or the assigned claims bureau may be commenced not later than sixty (60) days after the determination becomes final or the last date on which the action could otherwise have been commenced, whichever is later.

(4) Except as subsections (1), (2), or (3) of this section prescribe a longer period, an action by a claimant on an assigned claim which has been timely presented may be commenced not later than sixty (60) days after the claimant received written notice of rejection of the claim by the reparation obligor to which it was assigned.

(5) If a person entitled to basic or added reparation benefits is under legal disability when the right to bring an action for the benefits first accrues, the period of his or her disability is a part of the time limited for commencement of the action.

(6) An action for tort liability not abolished by KRS 304.39-060 may be commenced not later than two (2) years after the injury, or the death, or the date of issuance of the last basic or added reparation payment made by any reparation obligor, whichever later occurs. For the purposes of determining the date of issuance of the last basic or added reparation payment made by a reparation obligor, a replacement payment does not extend the date beyond the date of the original payment. For the purposes of this section, "replacement payment" means a payment in the same amount as the original payment, but which is issued as a replacement for the original payment for reasons including but not limited to the original payment being lost, stolen, or not delivered. A reparation obligor shall provide to a claimant or the claimant's attorney upon written request information on whether any payment is a replacement payment. Effective:June 29, 2017 History: Amended 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 34, sec. 4, effective June 29, 2017. -- Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 385, sec. 23, effective July 1, 1975.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 79 cases (23 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case: Gordon v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 914 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1995).
Gordon v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 914 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1995). · cites it 28× “The Court of Appeals voided the contract provision, reasoning that: Although [KRS 304.39-230] does not specifically refer to suing one's insurance carrier for uninsured or underinsured benefits, it makes no sense to allow two years (or more) to file a suit against an uninsured…”
Troxell v. Trammell, 730 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1987). · cites it 13× “to the extent" it seeks to recover for: (a) items of damages covered by "basic reparation benefits" (KRS -060(2)(a)); or (b) "non-economic detriment" (further defined as "damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience") caused by an injury which fails to…”
Lawson v. Helton Sanitation, Inc., 34 S.W.3d 52 (Ky. 2001). · cites it 17× “" Regarding limitations, KRS 304.39-230 states in relevant part: (6) An action for tort liability not abolished by KRS 304.”
Floyd v. Gray, 657 S.W.2d 936 (Ky. 1983). · cites it 14× “" The "Limitations of Actions" section, KRS 304.39-230, has six different subsections.”
Crenshaw v. Weinberg, 805 S.W.2d 129 (Ky. 1991). · cites it 11× “This case involves applying KRS 304.39-230, the “Limitation of Actions” section of the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (“MVRA”), to movant Crenshaw’s tort liability claim.”
Bailey v. Reeves, 662 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1984). · cites it 5× “We have been invited to engage in a dialogue regarding the intention of the legislature in enacting the MVRA and to add limiting language to KRS 304.39-230(6) based on appellee’s interpretation of some rather vague commentary to the parent Act, the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident…”
Worldwide Equip., Inc. v. Mullins, 11 S.W.3d 50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 6× “Worldwide misconstrues the holding in Gray as “limiting” application of the statute (KRS 304.39-230) to only those entitled to survivor’s benefits.”
Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975). · cites it 6× “Limitations on actions for no-fault benefits vary from one to four years after the accident or after the last payment of benefits, but are not pertinent to this inquiry except for KRS 304.39-230(5), which provides as follows: "If a person entitled to basic or added reparation…”
Goodin v. Overnight Transp. Co., 701 S.W.2d 131 (Ky. 1985). · cites it 9× “KRS 304.39-230(6) provides: "An action for tort liability not abolished by KRS 304.”
Elkins v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 844 S.W.2d 423 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 6× “KRS 304.39-230. Although the latter statute does not specifically refer to suing one's insurance carrier for uninsured or underinsured benefits, it makes no sense to allow two years (or more) to file a suit against an uninsured or underinsured tort-feasor and yet permit the…”
Gailor v. Alsabi, 990 S.W.2d 597 (Ky. 1999). · cites it 4× “As a general rule, a cause of action for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident must be brought within two years after the date of injury or the last payment of basic reparation benefits.”
Milby v. Wright, 952 S.W.2d 202 (Ky. 1997). · cites it 5× “39-040(2), wherein it states that the obligation to pay BRB “exists without regard to immunity from liability or suit which might otherwise be applicable,” Appellant contends the limitations language of KRS 304.39-230 does not apply to the right to BRB set forth in KRS 304.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.39-230(1) — 20 cases
Crenshaw v. Weinberg, 805 S.W.2d 129 (Ky. 1991). “This case involves applying KRS 304.39-230, the “Limitation of Actions” section of the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (“MVRA”), to movant Crenshaw’s tort liability claim.”
Milby v. Wright, 952 S.W.2d 202 (Ky. 1997). “39-040(2), wherein it states that the obligation to pay BRB “exists without regard to immunity from liability or suit which might otherwise be applicable,” Appellant contends the limitations language of KRS 304.39-230 does not apply to the right to BRB set forth in KRS 304.”
Gordon v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 914 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1995). “The Court of Appeals voided the contract provision, reasoning that: Although [KRS 304.39-230] does not specifically refer to suing one's insurance carrier for uninsured or underinsured benefits, it makes no sense to allow two years (or more) to file a suit against an uninsured…”
Worldwide Equip., Inc. v. Mullins, 11 S.W.3d 50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999). “Worldwide misconstrues the holding in Gray as “limiting” application of the statute (KRS 304.39-230) to only those entitled to survivor’s benefits.”
Holbrook v. Lexmark Int'l Grp., Inc., 65 S.W.3d 908 (Ky. 2002).
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.39-230(2) — 1 case
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.39-230(4) — 1 case
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.39-230(5) — 3 cases
Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975). “Limitations on actions for no-fault benefits vary from one to four years after the accident or after the last payment of benefits, but are not pertinent to this inquiry except for KRS 304.39-230(5), which provides as follows: "If a person entitled to basic or added reparation…”
McClure v. K&K Ins. (E.D. Ky. 2023).
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.39-230(6) — 52 cases
Troxell v. Trammell, 730 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1987). “to the extent" it seeks to recover for: (a) items of damages covered by "basic reparation benefits" (KRS -060(2)(a)); or (b) "non-economic detriment" (further defined as "damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience") caused by an injury which fails to…”
Lawson v. Helton Sanitation, Inc., 34 S.W.3d 52 (Ky. 2001). “" Regarding limitations, KRS 304.39-230 states in relevant part: (6) An action for tort liability not abolished by KRS 304.”
Gordon v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 914 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1995). “The Court of Appeals voided the contract provision, reasoning that: Although [KRS 304.39-230] does not specifically refer to suing one's insurance carrier for uninsured or underinsured benefits, it makes no sense to allow two years (or more) to file a suit against an uninsured…”
Floyd v. Gray, 657 S.W.2d 936 (Ky. 1983). “" The "Limitations of Actions" section, KRS 304.39-230, has six different subsections.”
Bailey v. Reeves, 662 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1984). “We have been invited to engage in a dialogue regarding the intention of the legislature in enacting the MVRA and to add limiting language to KRS 304.39-230(6) based on appellee’s interpretation of some rather vague commentary to the parent Act, the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident…”
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