(1) A tribunal of this state that has issued a child support order consistent with the law
of this state has and shall exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its
child support order if the order is the controlling order and:
(a) At the time of the filing of a request for modification this state is the residence
of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the
support order is issued; or
(b) Even if this state is not the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or
the child for whose benefit the support order is issued, the parties consent in a
record or in open court that the tribunal of this state may continue to exercise
jurisdiction to modify its order.
(2) A tribunal of this state that has issued a child support order consistent with the law
of this state may not exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the order
if:
(a) All of the parties who are individuals file consent in a record with the tribunal
of this state that a tribunal of another state that has jurisdiction over at least
one (1) of the parties who is an individual or that is located in the state of
residence of the child may modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction; or
(b) Its order is not the controlling order.
(3) If a tribunal of another state has issued a child support order pursuant to the
provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act as provided in KRS
407.5101 to 407.5902 or a law substantially similar to KRS 407.5101 to 407.5902
which modifies a child support order of a tribunal of this state, tribunals of this state
shall recognize the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal of the other
state.
(4) A tribunal of this state that lacks continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify a child
support order may serve as an initiating tribunal to request a tribunal of another
state to modify a support order issued in that state.
(5) A temporary support order issued ex parte or pending resolution of a jurisdictional
conflict does not create continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the issuing tribunal.
Effective: July 15, 2016
History: Amended 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 77, sec. 6, effective July 15, 2016. -- Repealed
and reenacted 2015 Ky. Acts ch. 18, sec. 8, effective June 24, 2015. -- Amended
1998 Ky. Acts ch. 101, sec. 2, effective March 23, 1998.-- Contingent effective date
repealed 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 101, sec. 20, effective March 23, 1998. -- Created 1996
Ky. Acts ch. 365, sec. 20, effective upon contingency.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
6
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 2006–2022 · leading case:
Gibson v. Gibson, 211 S.W.3d 601 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
Gibson v. Gibson, 211 S.W.3d 601 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 5× “KRS 407.5205 et seq., which is the controlling statute on this issue, states as follows: (1) A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order: (a) As long as this state…”
Adams-Smyrichinsky v. Smyrichinsky, 467 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. 2015).
· cites it 5× “KRS 407.5205. 6 Thus, while the home state of the child is a primary factor under the UCCJEA, under UIFSA continuing jurisdiction turns primarily on the residence in the issuing state of any of the parties.”
Alexander v. Morgan, 353 F. Supp. 3d 622 (W.D. Ky. 2018).
· cites it 2× “5205(1) ("A tribunal of this state that has issued a child support order consistent with the law of this state has and shall exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child support order ...."). As a result, it remains a pending forum for Alexander to bring his…”
Gaines v. Hagerty (W.D. Ky. 2022).
· cites it 2× “Ky. Rev. Stat. § 407.5205(1) (“A tribunal of this state that has issued a child support order consistent with the law of this state has and shall exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child support order .”
Jeffery Dale Donovan v. Stephanie Renee Donovan (Ky. Ct. App. 2022).
“]” KRS 407.5205(1). In a case where the circumstances have changed since entry of the original child support order, as argued by Jeffrey in this case, the proper way for a party to proceed is by -7- filing a motion to modify child support pursuant to KRS 403.”
Koerner v. Koerner, 270 S.W.3d 413 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).
“” KRS 407.5205(4). Like Kentucky, Georgia enacted its version of the UIFSA which is similar to that adopted by Kentucky.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 407.5205(1) — 4 cases
Alexander v. Morgan, 353 F. Supp. 3d 622 (W.D. Ky. 2018).
“5205(1) ("A tribunal of this state that has issued a child support order consistent with the law of this state has and shall exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child support order ...."). As a result, it remains a pending forum for Alexander to bring his…”
Gibson v. Gibson, 211 S.W.3d 601 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
“KRS 407.5205 et seq., which is the controlling statute on this issue, states as follows: (1) A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order: (a) As long as this state…”
Gaines v. Hagerty (W.D. Ky. 2022).
“Ky. Rev. Stat. § 407.5205(1) (“A tribunal of this state that has issued a child support order consistent with the law of this state has and shall exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child support order .”
Jeffery Dale Donovan v. Stephanie Renee Donovan (Ky. Ct. App. 2022).
“]” KRS 407.5205(1). In a case where the circumstances have changed since entry of the original child support order, as argued by Jeffrey in this case, the proper way for a party to proceed is by -7- filing a motion to modify child support pursuant to KRS 403.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 407.5205(4) — 1 case
Koerner v. Koerner, 270 S.W.3d 413 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).
“” KRS 407.5205(4). Like Kentucky, Georgia enacted its version of the UIFSA which is similar to that adopted by Kentucky.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 407.5205(l)(a) — 2 cases
Gibson v. Gibson, 211 S.W.3d 601 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
“KRS 407.5205 et seq., which is the controlling statute on this issue, states as follows: (1) A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order: (a) As long as this state…”
Adams-Smyrichinsky v. Smyrichinsky, 467 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. 2015).
“KRS 407.5205. 6 Thus, while the home state of the child is a primary factor under the UCCJEA, under UIFSA continuing jurisdiction turns primarily on the residence in the issuing state of any of the parties.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 407.5205(l)(b) — 2 cases
Gibson v. Gibson, 211 S.W.3d 601 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
“KRS 407.5205 et seq., which is the controlling statute on this issue, states as follows: (1) A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order: (a) As long as this state…”
Adams-Smyrichinsky v. Smyrichinsky, 467 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. 2015).
“KRS 407.5205. 6 Thus, while the home state of the child is a primary factor under the UCCJEA, under UIFSA continuing jurisdiction turns primarily on the residence in the issuing state of any of the parties.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.