§3-110. Identification of person to whom instrument is payable
(a) The person to whom an instrument is initially payable is determined by the intent of the person, whether or not authorized, signing as, or in the name or behalf of, the issuer of the instrument. The instrument is payable to the person intended by the signer even if that person is identified in the instrument by a name or other identification that is not that of the intended person. If more than one person signs in the name or behalf of the issuer of an instrument and all the signers do not intend the same person as payee, the instrument is payable to any person intended by one or more of the signers.
(b) If the signature of the issuer of an instrument is made by automated means, such as a check-writing machine, the payee of the instrument is determined by the intent of the person who supplied the name or identification of the payee, whether or not authorized to do so.
(c) A person to whom an instrument is payable may be identified in any way, including by name, identifying number, office, or account number. For the purpose of determining the holder of an instrument, the following rules apply:
(1) If an instrument is payable to an account and the account is identified only by number, the instrument is payable to the person to whom the account is payable. If an instrument is payable to an account identified by number and by the name of a person, the instrument is payable to the named person, whether or not that person is the owner of the account identified by number.
(2) If an instrument is payable to:
(i) a trust, an estate, or a person described as trustee or representative of a trust or estate, the instrument is payable to the trustee, the representative, or a successor of either, whether or not the beneficiary or estate is also named;
(ii) a person described as agent or similar representative of a named or identified person, the instrument is payable to the represented person, the representative, or a successor of the representative;
(iii) a fund or organization that is not a legal entity, the instrument is payable to a representative of the members of the fund or organization; or
(iv) an office or to a person described as holding an office, the instrument is payable to the named person, the incumbent of the office, or a successor to the incumbent.
(d) If an instrument is payable to two or more persons alternatively, it is payable to any of them and may be negotiated, discharged, or enforced by any or all of them in possession of the instrument. If an instrument is payable to two or more persons not alternatively, it is payable to all of them and may be negotiated, discharged, or enforced only by all of them. If an instrument payable to two or more persons is ambiguous as to whether it is payable to the persons alternatively, the instrument is payable to the persons alternatively.
Acts 1992, No. 1133, §3, eff. July 1, 1993; Acts 1993, No. 948, §10, eff. Jan. 1, 1994.
Notes of Decisions
Specialized Loan Servicing, L.L.C. v. January, 119 So. 3d 582 (La. 2013).
· cites it 2× “R.S. 10:3-110 in pertinent part explains: If an instrument is payable to X and Y, neither X nor Y acting alone is the person to whom the instrument is payable.”
Credit Recoveries, Inc. v. Crow, 862 So. 2d 1146 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 2× “The principles stated in R.S. 10:3-110 apply to special indorsements.”
Block v. Bernard, Cassisa, Elliott & Davis, 927 So. 2d 339 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
“R.S. 10:3-110(d). [8] To acquire possession, one must intend to possess as owner and must take corporeal possession of the thing.”
First Nat. Bank v. Carr, 572 So. 2d 1106 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
“" However, LSA-R.S. 10:3-110(3) states that "[a]n instrument made payable both to order and to bearer is payable to order unless the bearer words are handwritten or typewritten.”
Poirier v. Poirier, 664 So. 2d 532 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
“R.S. 10:3-110 and La.R.S. 10:3-111. The certificates simply provide the account holders' names.”
Martin v. David, 685 So. 2d 158 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
“R.S. 10:3-110. Because Scottsdale's settlement check was payable to the order of plaintiff and attorney Calahan only and to the exclusion of Shea.”
Fields v. Roark, 630 So. 2d 1359 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
“It is now located at LSA-R.S. 10:3-110(d). The old and new statutes are substantively the same.”
La Indus. for Disabled, Inc. v. Premier Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 807 So. 2d 1190 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
“R.S. 10:3-110. Louisiana Revised Statute 10:3-110(a), provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he person to whom an instrument is initially payable is determined by the intent of the person .”
Adair v. Stutsman Constr., LLC (M.D. La. 2024).
“”69 Comment 4 indicates that the “ambiguous” rule applies to cases where it is unclear whether “an instrument is payable to multiple payees alternatively. In the case of ambiguity[,] persons dealing with the instrument should be able to rely on the indorsement of a single payee.”
Jackson Hosp., LLC v. Zayed, 24 So. 3d 1033 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
“R.S. 10:3-110(d). Although Jekishan Chauhan and Jackson Hospitality are payees under the terms of the promissory note, Jekishan Chauhan is not a party to this action.”
La. Rev. Stat. § 10:3-110(3): 2 cases
First Nat. Bank v. Carr, 572 So. 2d 1106 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
“" However, LSA-R.S. 10:3-110(3) states that "[a]n instrument made payable both to order and to bearer is payable to order unless the bearer words are handwritten or typewritten.”
La. Rev. Stat. § 10:3-110(c)(2)(i): 1 case
La. Rev. Stat. § 10:3-110(d): 5 cases
Specialized Loan Servicing, L.L.C. v. January, 119 So. 3d 582 (La. 2013).
“R.S. 10:3-110 in pertinent part explains: If an instrument is payable to X and Y, neither X nor Y acting alone is the person to whom the instrument is payable.”
Block v. Bernard, Cassisa, Elliott & Davis, 927 So. 2d 339 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
“R.S. 10:3-110(d). [8] To acquire possession, one must intend to possess as owner and must take corporeal possession of the thing.”
Fields v. Roark, 630 So. 2d 1359 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
“It is now located at LSA-R.S. 10:3-110(d). The old and new statutes are substantively the same.”
Adair v. Stutsman Constr., LLC (M.D. La. 2024).
“”69 Comment 4 indicates that the “ambiguous” rule applies to cases where it is unclear whether “an instrument is payable to multiple payees alternatively. In the case of ambiguity[,] persons dealing with the instrument should be able to rely on the indorsement of a single payee.”
Jackson Hosp., LLC v. Zayed, 24 So. 3d 1033 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
“R.S. 10:3-110(d). Although Jekishan Chauhan and Jackson Hospitality are payees under the terms of the promissory note, Jekishan Chauhan is not a party to this action.”
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