Notes of Decisions
Cited in
13
cases, 1977–2007 · leading case:
State v. Stevens, 2007 ME 5 (Me. 2007).
State v. Stevens, 2007 ME 5 (Me. 2007).
“” Another statute, 17-A M.R.S. § 6 (2005), makes section 9-A applicable to crimes defined outside of the Criminal Code, such as the OUI statute, “unless the context of the statute defining the crime clearly requires otherwise.”
State v. Smith, 379 A.2d 722 (Me. 1977).
“By the clear mandate of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 6, the definitions are therefore applicable cumulatively, and the State must prove both concealability and operability of the weapon in order to establish a violation of 15 M.”
State v. Black, 2000 ME 211 (Me. 2000).
“See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 6 (1997). "A person acts culpably when he acts with the intention, knowledge, recklessness or criminal negligence as is required.”
State v. Moores, 396 A.2d 1010 (Me. 1979).
· cites it 2× “§ 1312(10) by the terms of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 6. 7 In the language of the statute last cited, we do not find that the context of the statute defining the crime clearly requires otherwise.”
State v. Davis, 398 A.2d 1218 (Me. 1979).
“§§ 6 and 11(5) 2 establish in combination that some “culpable mental state”, of those defined in Section 10 of the code, is required as an essential of any crime, whether defined in the code itself or in a criminal statute outside the code, unless a contrary legislative intent…”
State v. Flaherty, 400 A.2d 363 (Me. 1979).
· cites it 2× “” Applicable to this crime through 17-A M.R.S.A. § 6 (Supp.1978) 2 is 17-A M.”
State v. Stratton, 591 A.2d 246 (Me. 1991).
“§ 57 (1983), is unlimited so far as the crimes to which it applies. 2 The accomplice liability of section 57 is made applicable to crimes like OUI that are defined outside the Criminal Code “unless the context of the statute defining the crime clearly requires otherwise.”
State v. Dana, 517 A.2d 719 (Me. 1986).
“Title 17-A M.R.S.A. § 6 (1983) provides that the requirement of section 34 applies to crimes outside the Criminal Code “unless the context of the statute defining the crime clearly requires otherwise.”
State v. Lane, 495 A.2d 773 (Me. 1985).
“” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 6 (1983). Even if section 5331 still required a willful mens rea as it did when enacted, the element “willfully” is satisfied if “the person acted intentionally or knowingly” by virtue of 17-A M.”
Dist. Attorney v. City of Brewer, 543 A.2d 837 (Me. 1988).
“” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 6(1) (1983). Because section 410 does not clearly require otherwise, *839 the definition of “willful” as defined in the criminal code at 17-A M.”
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 6(1): 4 cases
State v. Stratton, 591 A.2d 246 (Me. 1991).
“§ 57 (1983), is unlimited so far as the crimes to which it applies. 2 The accomplice liability of section 57 is made applicable to crimes like OUI that are defined outside the Criminal Code “unless the context of the statute defining the crime clearly requires otherwise.”
State v. Moores, 396 A.2d 1010 (Me. 1979).
“§ 1312(10) by the terms of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 6. 7 In the language of the statute last cited, we do not find that the context of the statute defining the crime clearly requires otherwise.”
Dist. Attorney v. City of Brewer, 543 A.2d 837 (Me. 1988).
“” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 6(1) (1983). Because section 410 does not clearly require otherwise, *839 the definition of “willful” as defined in the criminal code at 17-A M.”
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