Me. Rev. Stat. » Title 33
Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, § 772 (2026)

Words of inheritance; habendum

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section ME-LEGlegislature.maine.gov JustiaTitle on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
1.  Words of inheritance; habendum.  In a conveyance or reservation of real estate, the terms "heirs," "successors," "assigns," "forever" or other technical words of inheritance, or an habendum clause, are not necessary to convey or reserve an estate in fee. A conveyance or reservation of real estate, whether made before or after the effective date of this section, must be construed to convey or reserve an estate in fee simple, unless a different intention is clearly expressed in the instrument by a statement that the interest conveyed or reserved is an interest other than an estate in fee, by a limiting of the duration of the interest to a period less than perpetual duration or by an explicit restriction of the interest to the use and benefit only of the person or persons to whom it is conveyed or reserved. The omission of technical words of inheritance may not be construed to evidence an intention to convey or reserve an interest other than an estate in fee simple, even if such words are used elsewhere in the same instrument.  
[PL 2013, c. 90, §1 (AMD).]
2.  Preservation of rights.  A person claiming an interest in real estate by reason of the omission of technical words of inheritance or the lack of an habendum clause in a deed that conveyed or reserved a property interest before October 7, 1967 may preserve that claim by commencing a civil action for the recovery of that property in the Superior Court or the District Court in the county or division in which the property is located on or before December 31, 2002.  
[PL 1999, c. 69, §1 (NEW).]
3.  Limitation.  After December 31, 2002, a person may not commence a civil action for the recovery of property or enter that property under a claim of right based on the absence of an habendum clause or technical words of inheritance in any deed.  
[PL 1999, c. 69, §1 (NEW).]
4.  Construction of laws.  This section may not be construed to extend the period for bringing of an action or for the doing of any other required act under any statute of limitations.  
[PL 1999, c. 69, §1 (NEW).]
5.  Liberal construction.  This section must be liberally construed to effect the legislative purpose of clarifying title to land currently encumbered by ancient deeds that lacked technical words of inheritance or an habendum clause.  
[PL 1999, c. 69, §1 (NEW).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1967, c. 377 (NEW). PL 1969, c. 344, §1 (AMD). PL 1999, c. 69, §1 (RPR). PL 2013, c. 90, §1 (AMD).
The Revisor's Office cannot provide legal advice or interpretation of Maine law to the public.
If you need legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases, 1987–2015 · leading case: Tarason v. Wesson Realty, LLC., 2012 ME 47 (Me. 2012).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Tarason v. Wesson Realty, LLC., 2012 ME 47 (Me. 2012). · cites it 23× “[6] 33 M.R.S.A. § 772 (Supp.1967 & 1999); see Wentworth v.”
Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69 (Me. 2001). · cites it 5× “; see also 33 M.R.S.A. § 772 at infra note 12. [¶ 36] In O’Donovan , we reiterated the O’Neill concept that, “to give effect to the intent of the parties and promote alienability, we have abolished the technical requirement that the word ‘heirs’ be used to preserve an interest…”
Wentworth v. Sebra, 2003 ME 97 (Me. 2003). · cites it 6× “33 M.R.S.A. § 772 (1999). Effective September 18, 1999, section 772 applied retroactively.”
Dale Henderson Logging, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 48 A.3d 233 (Me. 2012). · cites it 4× “33 M.R.S. § 772(1). In Tarason , we discussed and applied the SFDA, noting that section 772(1) requires that any conveyance of property not exempted by the Act’s “savings clause” be construed to grant a fee simple interest “unless a different intention clearly appears in the…”
Sebra v. Wentworth, 2010 ME 21 (Me. 2010). “Sebra filed a counterclaim to recover the easement pursuant to 33 M.R.S. § 772(2) (Supp.2002). Id. ¶ 6, 829 A.”
Richard P. French v. Est. of Martha Gutzan, 2015 ME 152 (Me. 2015). · cites it 2× “routinely construed a provision in a deed purporting to reserve an easement for the benefit of land retained by the grantor as the creation of an easement appurtenant.” O’Neill v. Williams, 527 A.”
Bernier v. Data Gen. Corp., 2002 ME 2 (Me. 2002). “§ 302, we concluded that the statute was applicable to pending proceedings. Id.”
Sally C. Pew v. Robert N. Sayler, 2015 ME 120 (Me. 2015). · cites it 2× “As amended, the statute provides: In a conveyance or reservation of real estate, the terms “heirs,” “successors,” “assigns,” “forever” or other technical words of inheritance, or an habendum clause, are not necessary to convey or reserve an estate in fee.”
Lloyd v. Est. of Robbins, 2010 ME 59 (Me. 2010). “See 33 M.R.S. § 772(1); see also 1 Richard R.”
O'NEILL v. Williams, 527 A.2d 322 (Me. 1987). “See 33 M.R.S.A. § 772 (1978). It was an unyielding rule of the common law that, to create an interest of perpetual duration in land by deed to an individual, it was necessary to use the technical word “heirs.”
Gilder v. Mitchell, 668 A.2d 879 (Me. 1995). “; see 33 M.R.S.A. § 772 (1988). At common law, it was an “unyielding rule” that in order to create an interest of perpetual duration in land by deed, it was necessary to use the technical words “heirs.”
Belanger v. Belanger (Me. Super. Ct 2005). “2d at 595 . The Law Court noted in 1990, “that a grantor cannot destroy his own grant, however much he may modify it or load it with conditions .”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, § 772(1) — 8 cases
Tarason v. Wesson Realty, LLC., 2012 ME 47 (Me. 2012). “[6] 33 M.R.S.A. § 772 (Supp.1967 & 1999); see Wentworth v.”
Wentworth v. Sebra, 2003 ME 97 (Me. 2003). “33 M.R.S.A. § 772 (1999). Effective September 18, 1999, section 772 applied retroactively.”
Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69 (Me. 2001). “; see also 33 M.R.S.A. § 772 at infra note 12. [¶ 36] In O’Donovan , we reiterated the O’Neill concept that, “to give effect to the intent of the parties and promote alienability, we have abolished the technical requirement that the word ‘heirs’ be used to preserve an interest…”
Dale Henderson Logging, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 48 A.3d 233 (Me. 2012). “33 M.R.S. § 772(1). In Tarason , we discussed and applied the SFDA, noting that section 772(1) requires that any conveyance of property not exempted by the Act’s “savings clause” be construed to grant a fee simple interest “unless a different intention clearly appears in the…”
Bernier v. Data Gen. Corp., 2002 ME 2 (Me. 2002). “§ 302, we concluded that the statute was applicable to pending proceedings. Id.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, § 772(2) — 3 cases
Wentworth v. Sebra, 2003 ME 97 (Me. 2003). “33 M.R.S.A. § 772 (1999). Effective September 18, 1999, section 772 applied retroactively.”
Sebra v. Wentworth, 2010 ME 21 (Me. 2010). “Sebra filed a counterclaim to recover the easement pursuant to 33 M.R.S. § 772(2) (Supp.2002). Id. ¶ 6, 829 A.”
Tarason v. Wesson Realty, LLC., 2012 ME 47 (Me. 2012). “[6] 33 M.R.S.A. § 772 (Supp.1967 & 1999); see Wentworth v.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, § 772(3) — 1 case
Tarason v. Wesson Realty, LLC., 2012 ME 47 (Me. 2012). “[6] 33 M.R.S.A. § 772 (Supp.1967 & 1999); see Wentworth v.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, § 772(5) — 3 cases
Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69 (Me. 2001). “; see also 33 M.R.S.A. § 772 at infra note 12. [¶ 36] In O’Donovan , we reiterated the O’Neill concept that, “to give effect to the intent of the parties and promote alienability, we have abolished the technical requirement that the word ‘heirs’ be used to preserve an interest…”
Tarason v. Wesson Realty, LLC., 2012 ME 47 (Me. 2012). “[6] 33 M.R.S.A. § 772 (Supp.1967 & 1999); see Wentworth v.”
Dale Henderson Logging, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 48 A.3d 233 (Me. 2012). “33 M.R.S. § 772(1). In Tarason , we discussed and applied the SFDA, noting that section 772(1) requires that any conveyance of property not exempted by the Act’s “savings clause” be construed to grant a fee simple interest “unless a different intention clearly appears in the…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.