Section 34A. Whenever a judgment for alimony shall be made in a proceeding for divorce directing that a deed, conveyance or release of any real estate or interest therein shall be made such judgment shall create an equitable right to its enforcement, subject to the provisions for recording of notice in section fifteen of chapter one hundred and eighty-four, in the party entitled thereto by the judgment, and if the judgment has not been complied with at the time the judgment of divorce becomes absolute, and is thereafter recorded in the manner provided by section forty-four of chapter one hundred and eighty-three, then the judgment itself shall operate to vest title to the real estate or interest therein in the party entitled thereto by the judgment as fully and completely as if such deed, conveyance or release had been duly executed by the party directed to make it.
No assignment, transfer or conveyance, from one spouse to the other, under this section or under a separation agreement, of real estate which is encumbered by a mortgage shall be deemed a transfer or divestment of said mortgage under the provisions of mortgage covenants, which provide that the debt secured by said mortgage becomes due and payable on demand upon transfer or divestment to anyone other than the mortgagor.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
8
cases, 1973–2005 · leading case:
Dee v. Dee, 296 N.E.2d 521 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973).
Dee v. Dee, 296 N.E.2d 521 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973).
· cites it 4× “[7] The legislative history of the latter section [8] suggests no more than an intention to implement alimony decrees which might provide for the conveyance of an interest in real estate in substantially the same manner in which decrees for conveyance of real estate which are…”
Maze v. Mihalovich, 387 N.E.2d 196 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
“1 Along the same lines, the defendant argues that if the Legislature had intended the creation of broad new powers, G. L. c. 208, § 34A, would have been amended to reflect the change.”
Well-Built Homes, Inc. v. Shuster, 834 N.E.2d 1213 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
“”); G. L. c. 208, § 34A (same, with respect to judgment of divorce directing a party to make a deed, conveyance or release of real estate in lieu of alimony).”
True v. Wisniowski, 434 N.E.2d 686 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982).
· cites it 2× “The plaintiff now owns the property by virtue of G. L. c. 208, § 34A, as amended through St.”
Wyman v. Wyman, 330 N.E.2d 500 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975).
· cites it 2× “34 & 34A, 1 ____” The second petition, similar in form to the first, makes no mention of child support in the prayer but prays for modification of the earlier decree in accordance with G. L. c. 208, § 34A. The December 6, 1973, decree, captioned a “Decree of Modification,” 2…”
Heller v. Turner Bros. Constr., Inc., 663 N.E.2d 1243 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
“We stated that the wife’s equitable rights, under G. L. c. 208, § 34A, were subject to her recordation of a lis pendens notice.”
Ricciardelli v. Ricciardelli, 343 N.E.2d 433 (Mass. App. Ct. 1976).
“That rule provides in part that no conveyance of real estate pursuant to G. L. c. 208, § 34A, shall be entered in any order or judgment in a divorce case unless a specific prayer has been made for such in the divorce libel.”
Feldman v. Feldman, 480 N.E.2d 45 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985).
“We perceive nothing in the first paragraph of G. L. c. 208, § 34A, as appearing in St. 1975, c.”
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