Section 1. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, where two or more persons become jointly liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, there shall be a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.
(b) The right of contribution shall exist only in favor of a joint tortfeasor, hereinafter called tortfeasor, who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery shall be limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tortfeasor shall be compelled to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the entire liability.
(c) A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant shall not be entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable.
(d) A liability insurer, who by payment has discharged in full or in part the liability of a tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full its obligation as insurer, shall be subrogated to the tortfeasor's right of contribution to the extent of the amount it has paid in excess of the tortfeasor's pro rata share of the common liability. This provision shall not limit or impair any right of subrogation arising from any other relationship.
(e) This chapter shall not impair any right of indemnity under existing law. Where one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of the indemnity obligee shall be for indemnity and not contribution, and the indemnity obligor shall not be entitled to contribution from the obligee for any portion of his indemnity obligation.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 75
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1970–2024 · leading case: Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 1008 (Mass. 1982).
Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 1008 (Mass. 1982). · cites it 4דAt the center of the dispute is whether Donahue and Ford were “jointly liable in tort” within the meaning of those words in G. L. c. 231B, § 1 (a). 3 We conclude that they were.”
Ankiewicz v. Kinder, 563 N.E.2d 684 (Mass. 1990). · cites it 7דHe reasoned that "it would be straining to construe a claim under [the lead poisoning prevention act] as sounding in tort, because it is founded on an act of the legislature and not on the common law decisions that constitute the basis of tort law," and that allowing…”
LeBlanc v. Logan Hilton Jt. Venture, 463 Mass. 316 (Mass. 2012). · cites it 3דtogether with the summary judgment order, and the absence of any appeal from that judgment by the estate, preclude the status of the architectural parties as joint tortfeasors and therefore their susceptibility to contribution under G. L. c. 231B, § 1 (a).” Id. at 711-712 & n.”
Berube v. City of Northampton, 602 N.E.2d 560 (Mass. 1992). · cites it 3דHe maintains on appeal that, as assignee *636 of contribution rights under G. L. c. 231B, § 1 (1990 ed.), 2 he has essentially become a third-party plaintiff and, as such, is exempt from compliance with the two-year presentment requirement of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act…”
Hernandez v. City of Boston, 277 F. Supp. 3d 176 (D. Mass. 2017). · cites it 2דMassachusetts law provides that “where two or more persons become jointly liable in tort ,.”
Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033 (Mass. 1983). “231, § 85, and the contribution statute, G. L. c. 231B, § 1. These statutes did not create the liability of the third party, which is of common law origin, and there is no indication that they were intended to destroy it.”
Lehman v. Revolution Portfolio LLC, 166 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 1999). “See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231B, § 1(a) (1986) (providing a right of contribution among persons who are jointly liable in tort for the same injury); see also Wolfe v.”
Robertson v. McCarte, 433 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). · cites it 2דSee G. L. c. 231B, § 1(d); Mass.R.Civ.P. 17(a), 365 Mass.”
Mongeau v. Boutelle, 407 N.E.2d 352 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980). “93A, they would not be “jointly liable” with the broker within the meaning of G. L. c. 231B, § 1(c), 8 even under an expansive reading of that section.”
Maddocks v. Ricker, 403 Mass. 592 (Mass. 1988). “Further, in considering another issue collateral to the underlying dispute, we see no valid basis for argument that, as a matter of law on the face of the pleadings, the alleged negligence of the defendants and of Casson did not result in joint liability for the same injury (G.…”
A.L. v. Commonwealth, 521 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1988). “See G.L.c. 231B, § 1 ( a ). That statute provides that, "where two or more persons become jointly liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, there shall be a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.”
Lehman v. Revolution Portfolio LLC, 166 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 1999). “See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231B, § 1(a) (1986) (providing a right of contribution among persons who are jointly liable in tort for the same injury); see also Wolfe v.”
Hernandez v. City of Boston, 277 F. Supp. 3d 176 (D. Mass. 2017). “Massachusetts law provides that “where two or more persons become jointly liable in tort ,.”
Hernandez v. City of Boston, 277 F. Supp. 3d 176 (D. Mass. 2017). “Massachusetts law provides that “where two or more persons become jointly liable in tort ,.”
Mongeau v. Boutelle, 407 N.E.2d 352 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980). “93A, they would not be “jointly liable” with the broker within the meaning of G. L. c. 231B, § 1(c), 8 even under an expansive reading of that section.”
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231B, § 1(d) — 1 case
Robertson v. McCarte, 433 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). “See G. L. c. 231B, § 1(d); Mass.R.Civ.P. 17(a), 365 Mass.”
Robertson v. McCarte, 433 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). “See G. L. c. 231B, § 1(d); Mass.R.Civ.P. 17(a), 365 Mass.”
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