Section 7. The judgment in an action under this chapter shall not be a bar to any action thereafter brought by either party to recover the land or tenements in question, or to recover damages for any trespass thereon; but the amount recovered for rent under section five shall be deducted in any assessment of damages in such subsequent action by the original plaintiff.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
4
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 1980–2024 · leading case:
Slater v. Krinsky, 416 N.E.2d 983 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
Slater v. Krinsky, 416 N.E.2d 983 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
“The summary process actions were predicated on two different theories of possession as provided for in the first and third sentences of G. L. c. 186, § 12. Moreover, any threat of material prejudice to Krinsky was removed by the order in the Superior Court permitting the first…”
Bigelow v. Reem Prop., LLC (Mass. App. Ct. 2023).
· cites it 2× “Here, the issue of the foreclosure's invalidity was actually and necessarily litigated in the summary process action 3 Because issue preclusion applies, we need not address Bigelow's argument that G. L. c. 239, § 7, barred the judge from relying on claim preclusion.”
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