SKI AREA SAFETY ACT OF 1962
Act 199 of 1962
408.322 Definitions.
Sec. 2.
As used in this act:
(a) "Board" means the ski area safety board.
(b) "Commissioner" means the director of commerce or an authorized representative of the director.
(c) "Department" means the state department of commerce.
(d) "Operator" means a person who owns or controls, or who has operational responsibility for, a ski area or ski lift. An operator includes this state or a political subdivision of this state.
(e) "Passenger" means a person, skier or nonskier, who boards, disembarks from, or is transported by a ski lift, regardless of whether the ski lift is being used during the skiing season or nonskiing season, and includes a person waiting for or moving away from the loading or unloading point of a ski lift.
(f) "Ski area" means an area used for skiing and served by 1 or more ski lifts.
(g) "Skier" means a person wearing skis or utilizing a device that attaches to at least 1 foot or the lower torso for the purpose of sliding on a slope. The device slides on the snow or other surface of a slope and is capable of being maneuvered and controlled by the person using the device. Skier includes a person not wearing skis or a skiing device while the person is in a ski area for the purpose of skiing.
(h) "Ski lift" means a device for transporting persons uphill on skis, or in cars on tracks, or suspended in the air by the use of cables, chains, belts, or ropes, and usually supported by trestles or towers with 1 or more spans. Ski lift includes a rope tow.
History: 1962, Act 199, Imd. Eff. June 7, 1962 ;-- Am. 1976, Act 364, Imd. Eff. Dec. 23, 1976 ;-- Am. 1981, Act 86, Imd. Eff. July 2, 1981 ;-- Am. 1995, Act 120, Imd. Eff. June 30, 1995
Compiler's Notes:
For transfer of powers and duties of certain occupational functions, boards, and commissions from the Department of Licensing and Regulation to the Department of Commerce, see E.R.O. No. 1991-9, compiled at MCL 338.3501 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
9
cases (
4 in the last 5 years), 1996–2025 · leading case:
Barr v. Mt. Brighton Inc., 546 N.W.2d 273 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
Barr v. Mt. Brighton Inc., 546 N.W.2d 273 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
“10 While the parties refer to the area in question as "out of bounds,” they do not appear to argue that this area was outside the "ski area,” MCL 408.322(f); MSA 18.483(2)(f). Instead, defendant argues that the assumption of risk clause covers the instant action while plaintiff…”
McGoldrick v. Holiday Amusements, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 98 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
“” MCL 408.322(h); MSA 18.483(2)(h). Plaintiff does not dispute that the metal *294 pole with which plaintiff’s decedent collided was part of a tensioning structure associated with a rope tow that was designed to take slack out of the rope tow.”
Barrett v. Mt. Brighton, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 154 (Mich. 2006).
“" MCL 408.322(g). It does not distinguish among alpine skiers, cross-country skiers, and snowboarders.”
Trevor Rhoda v. Peter E O'Dovero Inc (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 2× “” MCL 408.322(f). Read in its entirety, we find nothing in the broad language of the Act suggesting that the Legislature intended that a snowboarding feature such as a rail would remain unregulated by the SASB.”
Jordan v. Menjoulet (E.D. Mich. 2021).
“§408.322(g). large part on Anderson v. Pine Knob Ski Resort, Inc.”
Jordan v. Menjoulet (E.D. Mich. 2023).
“§408.322(g), the Court’s references to “skiing” include “snowboarding” throughout this opinion.”
Mark Goss v. Dep't of Nat. Resources (Mich. Ct. App. 2025).
“342(1)(b) and (2); MCL 408.322. Our Supreme Court has explained that snow-grooming equipment includes “grooming machines,” suggesting that equipment differs from vehicles.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 408.322(f) — 2 cases
Barr v. Mt. Brighton Inc., 546 N.W.2d 273 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
“10 While the parties refer to the area in question as "out of bounds,” they do not appear to argue that this area was outside the "ski area,” MCL 408.322(f); MSA 18.483(2)(f). Instead, defendant argues that the assumption of risk clause covers the instant action while plaintiff…”
Trevor Rhoda v. Peter E O'Dovero Inc (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
“” MCL 408.322(f). Read in its entirety, we find nothing in the broad language of the Act suggesting that the Legislature intended that a snowboarding feature such as a rail would remain unregulated by the SASB.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 408.322(g) — 5 cases
Barrett v. Mt. Brighton, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 154 (Mich. 2006).
“" MCL 408.322(g). It does not distinguish among alpine skiers, cross-country skiers, and snowboarders.”
Trevor Rhoda v. Peter E O'Dovero Inc (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
“” MCL 408.322(f). Read in its entirety, we find nothing in the broad language of the Act suggesting that the Legislature intended that a snowboarding feature such as a rail would remain unregulated by the SASB.”
Jordan v. Menjoulet (E.D. Mich. 2021).
“§408.322(g). large part on Anderson v. Pine Knob Ski Resort, Inc.”
Jordan v. Menjoulet (E.D. Mich. 2023).
“§408.322(g), the Court’s references to “skiing” include “snowboarding” throughout this opinion.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 408.322(h) — 1 case
McGoldrick v. Holiday Amusements, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 98 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
“” MCL 408.322(h); MSA 18.483(2)(h). Plaintiff does not dispute that the metal *294 pole with which plaintiff’s decedent collided was part of a tensioning structure associated with a rope tow that was designed to take slack out of the rope tow.”
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