THE PATERNITY ACT
Act 205 of 1956
722.715 Mother and alleged father competent to testify; cross-examination; exclusion of public; continuance until birth of child.
Sec. 5.
(1) Both the mother and the alleged father of the child shall be competent to testify, and if either gives evidence he or she shall be subject to cross-examination. The court may exclude the general public from the room where proceedings are held, pursuant to this act, admitting only persons directly interested in the case, including the officers of the court, officers or public welfare agents presenting the case, and witnesses.
(2) If the child is not born at the time set for trial, the case, unless the defendant mother or defendant father consents to trial, shall be continued until the child is born.
History: 1956, Act 205, Eff. Aug. 11, 1956 ;-- Am. 1966, Act 146, Eff. Mar. 10, 1967 ;-- Am. 1986, Act 107, Eff. June 1, 1986 ;-- Am. 1989, Act 258, Imd. Eff. Dec. 26, 1989 ;-- Am. 1998, Act 113, Eff. Aug. 10, 1998
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
16
cases, 1966–2005 · leading case:
People v. Marshall, 266 N.W.2d 678 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
People v. Marshall, 266 N.W.2d 678 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
· cites it 6× “Defendant may demand a jury trial under MCLA 722.715(a); MSA 25.495(a), and may move for a fee waiver or suspension under GCR 1963, 120.”
Bowerman v. MacDonald, 427 N.W.2d 477 (Mich. 1988).
“MCL 722.715(a); MSA 25.495(a). In 1966, the statute was amended so as to fully accord with general civil procedure by stating that "[ejither party may demand a trial by jury.”
Young v. Jangula, 440 N.W.2d 642 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 2× “MCL 722.715; MSA 25.495; People v Sweet, 346 Mich 684, 686 ; 78 NW2d 598 (1956).”
Covington v. Cox, 267 N.W.2d 469 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
· cites it 2× “Defendant argues, however, that the statute, MCLA 722.715; MSA 25.495, and the court rule, GCR 1963, 730.”
Elmore v. Ellis, 321 N.W.2d 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
“” MCL 722.715; MSA 25.495 reads as follows: "Sec.”
Klein v. Franks, 314 N.W.2d 602 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
“We recognized that the statute in question, MCL 722.715; MSA 25.495, placed the plaintiff mother and the defendant putative father *320 in separate classifications and concluded that, since discovery is not a fundamental interest, the traditional equal protection test was the…”
Bowerman v. MacDonald, 403 N.W.2d 140 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
“Defendant’s first argument is that he should be entitled to assert the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination provided in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and art 1, § 17 of the Michigan Constitution or the statutory prohibition against…”
Larrabee v. Sachs, 506 N.W.2d 2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
“However, as a result of 1989 PA 258 , the Legislature deleted the language regarding the right not to be compelled to testify.”
Pridemore v. Williams, 282 N.W.2d 363 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
· cites it 2× “The controlling statute is MCL 722.715; MSA 25.495. It states: "Both the mother and the alleged father shall be competent to testify, but the alleged father shall not be compelled to testify, and if either gives evidence he or she shall be subject to cross examination * * This…”
Romain v. Peters, 155 N.W.2d 700 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967).
“” CLS 1961, § 722.715 (Stat Ann 1957 Rev § 25.495). 3 Also, see G-CR 1963, 730.”
Kenner v. Watha, 323 N.W.2d 8 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
· cites it 2× “Defendant next contends that his rights under § 5(a) of the Paternity Act, MCL 722.715(a); MSA 25.495(a), and the Fifth Amendment were violated when he was called by plaintiff to testify pursuant to the adverse witness statute.”
Numerick v. Krull, 694 N.W.2d 552 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
“” MCL 722.715(2). That would allow a court to determine whether the child was “bom out of wedlock” for purposes of determining whether the action could be maintained.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.715(1) — 1 case
Larrabee v. Sachs, 506 N.W.2d 2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
“However, as a result of 1989 PA 258 , the Legislature deleted the language regarding the right not to be compelled to testify.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.715(2) — 2 cases
Numerick v. Krull, 694 N.W.2d 552 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
“” MCL 722.715(2). That would allow a court to determine whether the child was “bom out of wedlock” for purposes of determining whether the action could be maintained.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.715(a) — 5 cases
People v. Marshall, 266 N.W.2d 678 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
“Defendant may demand a jury trial under MCLA 722.715(a); MSA 25.495(a), and may move for a fee waiver or suspension under GCR 1963, 120.”
Bowerman v. MacDonald, 427 N.W.2d 477 (Mich. 1988).
“MCL 722.715(a); MSA 25.495(a). In 1966, the statute was amended so as to fully accord with general civil procedure by stating that "[ejither party may demand a trial by jury.”
Bowerman v. MacDonald, 403 N.W.2d 140 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
“Defendant’s first argument is that he should be entitled to assert the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination provided in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and art 1, § 17 of the Michigan Constitution or the statutory prohibition against…”
Kenner v. Watha, 323 N.W.2d 8 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
“Defendant next contends that his rights under § 5(a) of the Paternity Act, MCL 722.715(a); MSA 25.495(a), and the Fifth Amendment were violated when he was called by plaintiff to testify pursuant to the adverse witness statute.”
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.