THE MICHIGAN PENAL CODE
Act 328 of 1931
750.71 Definitions.
Sec. 71.
Unless the context requires otherwise, the following terms have the following meanings:
(a) "Building" includes any structure regardless of class or character and any building or structure that is within the curtilage of that building or structure or that is appurtenant to or connected to that building or structure.
(b) "Burn" means setting fire to, or doing any act that results in the starting of a fire, or aiding, counseling, inducing, persuading, or procuring another to do such an act.
(c) "Damage", in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes, but is not limited to, charring, melting, scorching, burning, or breaking.
(d) "Dwelling" includes, but is not limited to, any building, structure, vehicle, watercraft, or trailer adapted for human habitation that was actually lived in or reasonably could have been lived in at the time of the fire or explosion and any building or structure that is within the curtilage of that dwelling or that is appurtenant to or connected to that dwelling.
(e) "Individual" means any individual and includes, but is not limited to, a firefighter, law enforcement officer, or other emergency responder, whether paid or volunteer, performing his or her duties in relation to a violation of this chapter, or performing an investigation of a violation of this chapter.
(f) "Personal property" includes any personally owned property regardless of class, character, or value.
(g) "Physical injury" means an injury that includes, but is not limited to, the loss of a limb or use of a limb; loss of a foot, hand, finger, or thumb, or loss of use of a foot, hand, finger, or thumb; loss of an eye or ear or loss of use of an eye or ear; loss or substantial impairment of a bodily function; serious visible disfigurement; a comatose state that lasts for more than 3 days; measurable brain or mental impairment; a skull fracture or other serious bone fracture; subdural hemorrhage or subdural hematoma; loss of an organ; heart attack; heat stroke; heat exhaustion; smoke inhalation; a burn including a chemical burn; or poisoning.
(h) "Prior conviction" means a previous conviction for a violation of this chapter that arises out of a separate transaction, whether under this chapter, a local ordinance substantially corresponding to this chapter, a law of the United States substantially corresponding to this chapter, or a law of another state substantially corresponding to this chapter, but does not include a violation of section 79(1)(a).
History: 1931, Act 328, Eff. Sept. 18, 1931 ;-- CL 1948, 750.71 ;-- Am. 2012, Act 531, Eff. Apr. 3, 2013
FormerLaw Notes:
See section 1 of Act 38 of 1927, being CL 1929, § 16933.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
12
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case:
People v. Smock, 234 N.W.2d 728 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
People v. Smock, 234 N.W.2d 728 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
· cites it 6× “MCLA 750.71; MSA 28.266, MCLA 750.72; MSA 28.”
People v. Orsie, 268 N.W.2d 278 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
· cites it 2× “" The statutory definition of burn is contained in MCL 750.71; MSA 28.266, as follows: "The term `burn' as used in this chapter shall mean setting fire to, or doing any act which results in the starting of a fire, or aiding, counseling, inducing, persuading or procuring another…”
People v. Smock, 249 N.W.2d 59 (Mich. 1976).
· cites it 2× “) MCLA 750.71; MSA 28.266. The significant language is "aiding, counseling, inducing, persuading or procuring another to do such act or acts”.”
People v. Reeves, 528 N.W.2d 160 (Mich. 1995).
“…a dwelling house, other real property or personal property Has been amended but not repealed; currently reflected at MCL 750.71 through MCL 750.75; MSA 28.266 through MSA 28.270. 16 See 1931 PA 328 , §§ 72-74 and 567. 17 Administrative Order No. 1990-6 was effective at the…”
People v. Winhoven, 237 N.W.2d 540 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
“3 MCLA 750.71 et seq.; MSA 28.266 et seq. 4 Vernon’s Ann.”
Sindone (E.D. Mich. 2026).
· cites it 5× “LAWS § 750.71(d), which is applicable to the offenses at issue, defines a “dwelling” as including, but not limited to “any building, structure, vehicle, watercraft, or trailer adapted for human habitation that was actually lived in or reasonably could have been lived in at the…”
People of Michigan v. Christopher Louis Sindone (Mich. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 3× “MCL 750.71(d), which is applicable to the offenses at issue, defines a “dwelling” as including, but not limited to “any building, structure, vehicle, watercraft, or trailer adapted for human habitation that was actually lived in or reasonably could have been lived in at the time…”
People of Michigan v. Scott Rosean Odum (Mich. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 3× “” (Emphasis added.) At first blush, the definition of “dwelling” might seem to be at odds in part with the parameters of the offense, in that the definition requires that a dwelling be lived in or reasonably capable of being lived in, while the offense itself makes it irrelevant…”
People of Michigan v. Yas Yatoma (Mich. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 2× “In addition, MCL 750.71(b) defines “burn” as “setting fire to, or doing any act that results in the starting of a fire, or aiding, counseling, inducing, persuading, or procuring another to do such an act.”
People of Michigan v. Scott Rosean Odum (Mich. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 2× “” MCL 750.71(d). In accordance with the elements of the offense and the definition of dwelling, the trial court instructed the jury that a dwelling house “is a structure that was actually being lived in or that reasonably could have been lived in at the time of the fire.”
People of Michigan v. John Lester Anderson (Mich. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 2× “” MCL 750.71(d). Because it is undisputed that no one was living in the house at the time of the fire, the critical determination was whether someone “reasonably could have” lived in the house.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.71(b) — 2 cases
People of Michigan v. Yas Yatoma (Mich. Ct. App. 2019).
“In addition, MCL 750.71(b) defines “burn” as “setting fire to, or doing any act that results in the starting of a fire, or aiding, counseling, inducing, persuading, or procuring another to do such an act.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.71(d) — 5 cases
Sindone (E.D. Mich. 2026).
“LAWS § 750.71(d), which is applicable to the offenses at issue, defines a “dwelling” as including, but not limited to “any building, structure, vehicle, watercraft, or trailer adapted for human habitation that was actually lived in or reasonably could have been lived in at the…”
People of Michigan v. Christopher Louis Sindone (Mich. Ct. App. 2019).
“MCL 750.71(d), which is applicable to the offenses at issue, defines a “dwelling” as including, but not limited to “any building, structure, vehicle, watercraft, or trailer adapted for human habitation that was actually lived in or reasonably could have been lived in at the time…”
People of Michigan v. Scott Rosean Odum (Mich. Ct. App. 2020).
“” (Emphasis added.) At first blush, the definition of “dwelling” might seem to be at odds in part with the parameters of the offense, in that the definition requires that a dwelling be lived in or reasonably capable of being lived in, while the offense itself makes it irrelevant…”
People of Michigan v. Scott Rosean Odum (Mich. Ct. App. 2020).
“” MCL 750.71(d). In accordance with the elements of the offense and the definition of dwelling, the trial court instructed the jury that a dwelling house “is a structure that was actually being lived in or that reasonably could have been lived in at the time of the fire.”
People of Michigan v. John Lester Anderson (Mich. Ct. App. 2020).
“” MCL 750.71(d). Because it is undisputed that no one was living in the house at the time of the fire, the critical determination was whether someone “reasonably could have” lived in the house.”
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