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Subdivision 1.Definition.
As used in this section:
(1) "sexual abuse" means conduct described in sections 609.342 to 609.3451 and 609.3458; and
(2) "person" includes a natural person, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, organization, association, or other entity.
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Subd. 2.Limitations period.
(a) An action for damages based on sexual abuse: (1) must be commenced within six years of the alleged sexual abuse in the case of alleged sexual abuse of an individual 18 years or older; (2) may be commenced at any time in the case of alleged sexual abuse of an individual under the age of 18, except as provided for in subdivision 4; and (3) must be commenced before the plaintiff is 24 years of age in a claim against a natural person alleged to have sexually abused a minor when that natural person was under 14 years of age.
(b) The plaintiff need not establish which act in a continuous series of sexual abuse acts by the defendant caused the injury.
(c) This section does not affect the suspension of the statute of limitations during a period of disability under section 541.15.
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Subd. 3.Applicability.
This section applies to an action for damages commenced against a person who was a cause of the plaintiff's damages either by (1) committing sexual abuse against the plaintiff, or (2) negligence.
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Subd. 4.Vicarious liability or respondeat superior claims.
A claim for vicarious liability or liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior must be commenced within six years of the alleged sexual abuse, provided that if the plaintiff was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged abuse, the claim must be commenced before the plaintiff is 24 years of age. This subdivision does not limit the availability of these claims under other law.
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Subd. 5.Title.
This section may be cited as the "Child Victims Act."
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
49
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 1990–2025 · leading case:
K.E. v. Hoffman, 452 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
K.E. v. Hoffman, 452 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 72× “This is a remand from the supreme court ordering this court to consider the applicability and constitutionality of Minn.Stat. § 541.073 (Supp.1989). Respondents contend section 541.”
D.M.S. v. Barber, 645 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. 2002).
· cites it 52× “In addition, the complaint alleged that PATH was responsible for Barber's wrongful conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The district court granted PATH's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that D.”
Doe v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 2012).
· cites it 24× “Doe claims that the Dioceses are liable for damages stemming from this alleged sexual abuse on two general theories: first, that the Dioceses negligently allowed the abuse to occur, Minn.Stat. § 541.073, subd. 3, and second, that the Dioceses fraudulently concealed the fact that…”
W.J.L. v. Bugge, 573 N.W.2d 677 (Minn. 1998).
· cites it 42× “'s sexual battery claim, Bugge contended that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations set out in Minn.Stat. § 541.073 (1996). [2] The district court agreed and granted Bugge's summary judgment motion on the sexual battery claim.”
M.L. v. Magnuson, 531 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 34× “Minn. Stat. § 541.073 . Under this statute, a claimant has six years to commence a personal injury action from “the time the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that the injury was caused by the sexual abuse.”
Blackowiak v. Kemp, 546 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996).
· cites it 20× “entered summary judgment of dismissal of the plaintiff Mark Blackowiak's complaint to recover damages for alleged sexual abuse by the defendant Richard Kemp on the basis that the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that he sustained personal injury caused by sexual abuse prior…”
Roe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 518 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 24× “Minn.Stat. § 541.073, subd. 2(a) (1992). This statute applies to all actions pending on, or commenced on or after, May 20, 1989.”
Lickteig v. Kolar, 782 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. 2010).
· cites it 19× “n; and, if so, what are the elements of that cause of action; (2) whether intrafamilial immunity applies between siblings for a sexual abuse tort or battery tort committed when both were unemancipated minors living in the same household, where the lawsuit is not brought until…”
Winkler v. Magnuson, 539 N.W.2d 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 12× “The primary issue on appeal involves the statute of limitations in Minn.Stat. § 541.073, subd. 2(a), which provides: An action for damages based on personal injury caused by sexual abuse must be commenced within six years of the time the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that…”
Bertram v. Poole, 597 N.W.2d 309 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 19× “Minn.Stat. § 541.073, subd. 2 (1996). In W.”
Blackowiak v. Kemp, 528 N.W.2d 247 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 12× “See Minn.Stat. § 541.073, subd. 2(a) (1992). Blackowiak appeals the summary judgment.”
J.J. v. Luckow, 578 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 16× “The seven years includes six years under Minn.Stat. § 541.073, subd. 2(a) (1996) (governing actions for damages due to sexual abuse), and one year under Minn.”
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