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Subdivision 1.First degree; dwelling.
Whoever unlawfully by means of fire or explosives, intentionally destroys or damages any building that is used as a dwelling at the time the act is committed, whether the inhabitant is present therein at the time of the act or not, or any building appurtenant to or connected with a dwelling whether the property of the actor or of another, commits arson in the first degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to a fine of not more than $20,000, or both.
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Subd. 2.First degree; other buildings.
Whoever unlawfully by means of fire or explosives, intentionally destroys or damages any building not included in subdivision 1, whether the property of the actor or another commits arson in the first degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to a fine of not more than $35,000, or both if:
(a) another person who is not a participant in the crime is present in the building at the time and the defendant knows that; or
(b) the circumstances are such as to render the presence of such a person therein a reasonable possibility.
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Subd. 3.First degree; flammable material.
(a) Whoever unlawfully by means of fire or explosives, intentionally destroys or damages any building not included in subdivision 1, whether the property of the actor or another, commits arson in the first degree if a flammable material is used to start or accelerate the fire. A person who violates this paragraph may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or a fine of not more than $20,000, or both.
(b) As used in this subdivision:
(1) "combustible liquid" means a liquid having a flash point at or above 100 degrees Fahrenheit;
(2) "flammable gas" means any material which is a gas at 68 degrees Fahrenheit or less and 14.7 psi of pressure and which: (i) is ignitable when in a mixture of 13 percent or less by volume with air at atmospheric pressure; or (ii) has a flammable range with air at atmospheric pressure of at least 12 percent, regardless of the lower flammable limit;
(3) "flammable liquid" means any liquid having a flash point below 100 degrees Fahrenheit and having a vapor pressure not exceeding 40 pounds per square inch (absolute) at 100 degrees Fahrenheit, but does not include intoxicating liquor as defined in section 340A.101;
(4) "flammable material" means a flammable or combustible liquid, a flammable gas, or a flammable solid; and
(5) "flammable solid" means any of the following three types of materials:
(i) wetted explosives;
(ii) self-reactive materials that are liable to undergo heat-producing decomposition; or
(iii) readily combustible solids that may cause a fire through friction or that have a rapid burning rate as determined by specific flammability tests.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
45
cases (
3 in the last 5 years), 1980–2024 · leading case:
Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333 (Minn. 2003).
Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333 (Minn. 2003).
· cites it 4× “185(1) and (3) (2002), and one count of arson, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1 (2002), in connection with the September 5, 1998 deaths of Gene Olson and Michael Mickalich in a house fire in Eveleth, Minnesota.”
State v. Spain, 590 N.W.2d 85 (Minn. 1999).
· cites it 4× “Minn.Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1 (1998). The state argued at trial that appellant started the’fire in Letendre’s bedroom by pouring charcoal lighter fluid on the floor along his bed and then igniting it.”
State v. Weaver, 796 N.W.2d 561 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 6× “Weaver was prosecuted for a violation of section Minn.Stat. § 609.561 (1998 & Supp. *571 2009) (defining first-degree arson): his conviction and sentence for felony-murder are based on the predicate offense of first-degree arson.”
State v. Lewis, 385 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
· cites it 10× “Appellant Wendell Lewis appeals from his convictions of first and second degree arson in violation of Minn.Stat. §§ 609.561, subd. 1, 609.562 (1984).”
State v. Zornes, 831 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 2013).
· cites it 2× “(a)(1); first-degree arson, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1 (2012); and theft of a motor vehicle, in violation of Minn.”
State v. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 1999).
· cites it 2× “Ritt gave birth to a healthy baby boy, J.R., 10 months after Hannah was bom.”
State v. Boettcher, 931 N.W.2d 376 (Minn. 2019).
· cites it 2× “'s cabin, including first-degree arson, Minn. Stat. § 609.561 , subd. 1 (2018), and second-degree burglary, Minn.”
State v. Moyer, 298 N.W.2d 768 (Minn. 1980).
· cites it 4× “Defendant was found guilty by a district court jury of charges of first-degree arson, Minn.Stat. § 609.561 (1978), and attempted second-degree murder, Minn.”
State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777 (Minn. 1986).
· cites it 2× “19(1) and (2) (1984)); and on one count of first degree arson (Minn.Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1 *779 (1984)) 2 .”
State v. Durant, 674 P.2d 638 (Utah 1983).
· cites it 4× “" Minn. Stat. § 609.561 (1) (1982). Subdivision (2) of the statute applies the same penalty to one who burns any other type of structure when a person is actually present in the structure or "[t]he circumstances are such as to render the presence of such a person therein a…”
State v. Davis, 656 N.W.2d 900 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 2× “Minn.Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1 (2000). The standard jury instruction for first-degree arson uses the definition of “dwelling” found in the burglary statutes: “ ‘Dwelling’ means a budding used as a permanent or temporary residence.”
Deshawn Fletcher v. United States, 858 F.3d 501 (8th Cir. 2017).
“1095 (l)(d) (listing Minn. Stat. § 609.561 (arson in the first degree)), but Sanchez-Martinez only characterized arson of an unoccupied building as not involving the use of force against a person.”
— Minn. Stat. § 609.561(1) — 2 cases
State v. Durant, 674 P.2d 638 (Utah 1983).
“" Minn. Stat. § 609.561 (1) (1982). Subdivision (2) of the statute applies the same penalty to one who burns any other type of structure when a person is actually present in the structure or "[t]he circumstances are such as to render the presence of such a person therein a…”
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