Mississippi Code
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (2026)
Divorce on ground of irreconcilable differences
✓ current as of July 2026
- (1) Divorce from the bonds of matrimony may be granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences, but only upon the joint complaint of the husband and wife or a complaint where the defendant has been personally served with process or where the defendant has entered an appearance by written waiver of process.
- (2) If the parties provide by written agreement for the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage and for the settlement of any property rights between the parties and the court finds that such provisions are adequate and sufficient, the agreement may be incorporated in the judgment, and such judgment may be modified as other judgments for divorce.
- (3) If the parties are unable to agree upon adequate and sufficient provisions for the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage or any property rights between them, they may consent to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences and permit the court to decide the issues upon which they cannot agree. Such consent must be in writing, signed by both parties personally, must state that the parties voluntarily consent to permit the court to decide such issues, which shall be specifically set forth in such consent, and that the parties understand that the decision of the court shall be a binding and lawful judgment. Such consent may not be withdrawn by a party without leave of the court after the court has commenced any proceeding, including the hearing of any motion or other matter pertaining thereto. The failure or refusal of either party to agree as to adequate and sufficient provisions for the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage or any property rights between the parties, or any portion of such issues, or the failure or refusal of any party to consent to permit the court to decide such issues, shall not be used as evidence, or in any manner, against such party. No divorce shall be granted pursuant to this subsection until all matters involving custody and maintenance of any child of that marriage and property rights between the parties raised by the pleadings have been either adjudicated by the court or agreed upon by the parties and found to be adequate and sufficient by the court and included in the judgment of divorce. Appeals from any orders and judgments rendered pursuant to this subsection may be had as in other cases in chancery court only insofar as such orders and judgments relate to issues that the parties consented to have decided by the court.
- (4) Complaints for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences must have been on file for sixty (60) days before being heard. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section, a joint complaint of husband and wife or a complaint where the defendant has been personally served with process or where the defendant has entered an appearance by written waiver of process, for divorce solely on the ground of irreconcilable differences, shall be taken as proved and a final judgment entered thereon, as in other cases and without proof or testimony in termtime or vacation, the provisions of Section 93-5-17 to the contrary notwithstanding.
- (5) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section, no divorce shall be granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences where there has been a contest or denial; provided, however, that a divorce may be granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences where there has been a contest or denial, if the contest or denial has been withdrawn or cancelled by the party filing same by leave and order of the court.
- (6) Irreconcilable differences may be asserted as a sole ground for divorce or as an alternate ground for divorce with any other cause for divorce set out in Section 93-5-1.
- (7) For the purposes of orders touching the maintenance and alimony of the wife or husband, "property" and "an asset of a spouse" shall not include any interest a party may have as an heir at law of a living person or any interest under a third-party will, nor shall any such interest be considered as an economic circumstance or other factor.
Laws, 1976, ch. 451, § 1; Laws, 1978, ch. 367, § 1; Laws, 1990, ch. 584, § 1; Laws, 2008, ch. 547, § 1, eff. 7/1/2008.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 214
cases (15 in the last 5 years), 1981–2026 · leading case: Perkins v. Perkins, 787 So. 2d 1256 (Miss. 2001).
Perkins v. Perkins, 787 So. 2d 1256 (Miss. 2001). “Victoria asserts that the proceedings of the divorce did not comply with the statutory requirements of Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (1994); the agreement did not comply with the requirement of a consent judgment; the agreement was not approved and signed by counsel for the parties;…”
Sanford v. Sanford, 124 So. 3d 647 (Miss. 2013). “Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2(2) (Rev.2013). A second option is for the couple to consent to allow a chancellor to decide certain disputed issues.”
Gary Mosher v. Lori Mosher, 192 So. 3d 1118 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). “(citing Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (2) (Rev. 2013)).”
McNeese v. McNeese, 119 So. 3d 264 (Miss. 2013). “Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (3) (Rev.2004). See also McDuffie v.”
Michael T. Gerty v. Joesie R. Gerty, 265 So. 3d 121 (Miss. 2018). “Then the chancellor sua sponte declared the statutory scheme under Mississippi Code Section 93-5-2 (Rev. 2013) unconstitutional and granted an irreconcilable-differences divorce.”
O'Neal v. O'Neal, 17 So. 3d 572 (Miss. 2009). “Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (Rev.2004) (emphasis added).”
Irby v. Est. of Irby Ex Rel. Marshall, 7 So. 3d 223 (Miss. 2009). “Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2. Moreover, assuming the plaintiff is correct in her motion and were the court to grant the plaintiffs motion, such would encourage parties to enter into a consent pursuant to subsection (3), await the decision of the trial court, and then assert that the…”
Johnston v. Johnston, 722 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1998). “Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2 outlines the procedure for obtaining a divorce on the statutory ground of irreconcilable differences.”
Crider v. Crider, 904 So. 2d 142 (Miss. 2005). “[5] As we discuss below, because the statute does not define what is meant by "application of both parents," the wording of this statute is susceptible to varying interpretations, particularly in light of the history and language of § 93-5-2, [6] the ID divorce statute. *146 ¶ 8.”
Patrick Ridgeway v. Louise Ridgeway Hooker, 240 So. 3d 1202 (Miss. 2018). “Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (1) (Rev. 2013).”
Barton v. Barton, 790 So. 2d 169 (Miss. 2001). “" Both the contract itself and Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (2) require the court's approval before the separation agreement could become binding.”
Tedford v. Dempsey, 437 So. 2d 410 (Miss. 1983). “They cited irreconcilable differences and invoked the procedures found in Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (Supp. *415 1982).”
— Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2(1) — 7 cases
Patrick Ridgeway v. Louise Ridgeway Hooker, 240 So. 3d 1202 (Miss. 2018). “Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (1) (Rev. 2013).”
Carlisle v. Allen, 40 So. 3d 1252 (Miss. 2010).
Crider v. Crider, 904 So. 2d 142 (Miss. 2005). “[5] As we discuss below, because the statute does not define what is meant by "application of both parents," the wording of this statute is susceptible to varying interpretations, particularly in light of the history and language of § 93-5-2, [6] the ID divorce statute. *146 ¶ 8.”
Wilson v. Wilson, 53 So. 3d 865 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
Wade v. Wade, 967 So. 2d 682 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
— Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2(2) — 37 cases
Sanford v. Sanford, 124 So. 3d 647 (Miss. 2013). “Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2(2) (Rev.2013). A second option is for the couple to consent to allow a chancellor to decide certain disputed issues.”
Townsend v. Townsend, 859 So. 2d 370 (Miss. 2003).
In Re Dissolution of Marriage of Wood, 35 So. 3d 507 (Miss. 2010).
Barton v. Barton, 790 So. 2d 169 (Miss. 2001). “" Both the contract itself and Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (2) require the court's approval before the separation agreement could become binding.”
Dilling v. Dilling, 734 So. 2d 327 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
— Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2(3) — 55 cases
Gary Mosher v. Lori Mosher, 192 So. 3d 1118 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). “(citing Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (2) (Rev. 2013)).”
Sanford v. Sanford, 124 So. 3d 647 (Miss. 2013). “Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2(2) (Rev.2013). A second option is for the couple to consent to allow a chancellor to decide certain disputed issues.”
Johnston v. Johnston, 722 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1998). “Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2 outlines the procedure for obtaining a divorce on the statutory ground of irreconcilable differences.”
John Kendall Myrick, Jr. v. Dee Bunnell Myrick, 186 So. 3d 429 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
West v. West, 891 So. 2d 203 (Miss. 2004).
— Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2(3)(1994) — 1 case
Louk v. Louk, 761 So. 2d 878 (Miss. 2000).
— Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2(4) — 9 cases
Perkins v. Perkins, 787 So. 2d 1256 (Miss. 2001). “Victoria asserts that the proceedings of the divorce did not comply with the statutory requirements of Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (1994); the agreement did not comply with the requirement of a consent judgment; the agreement was not approved and signed by counsel for the parties;…”
Clark v. Clark, 43 So. 3d 496 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Shane Anderson v. James B. Ladner, 198 So. 3d 381 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Peterson v. Peterson, 797 So. 2d 876 (Miss. 2001).
Cobb v. Cobb, 29 So. 3d 145 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
— Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2(5) — 18 cases
Perkins v. Perkins, 787 So. 2d 1256 (Miss. 2001). “Victoria asserts that the proceedings of the divorce did not comply with the statutory requirements of Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (1994); the agreement did not comply with the requirement of a consent judgment; the agreement was not approved and signed by counsel for the parties;…”
O'Neal v. O'Neal, 17 So. 3d 572 (Miss. 2009). “Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (Rev.2004) (emphasis added).”
Irby v. Est. of Irby Ex Rel. Marshall, 7 So. 3d 223 (Miss. 2009). “Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2. Moreover, assuming the plaintiff is correct in her motion and were the court to grant the plaintiffs motion, such would encourage parties to enter into a consent pursuant to subsection (3), await the decision of the trial court, and then assert that the…”
Dissolution of Sanford v. Sanford, 749 So. 2d 353 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
Cossey v. Cossey, 22 So. 3d 353 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
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