The proceedings to obtain a divorce shall be by complaint in chancery, and shall be conducted as other suits in chancery, except that (1) the defendant shall not be required to answer on oath; (2) no judgment by default may be granted but a divorce may be granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences in termtime or vacation; (3) admissions made in the answer shall not be taken as evidence; (4) the clerk shall not set down on the issue docket any divorce case unless upon the request of one (1) of the parties; (5) the plaintiff may allege only the statutory language as cause for divorce in a separate paragraph in the complaint; provided, however, the defendant shall be entitled to discover any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the issues raised by the claims or defenses of the other; (6) the court shall have full power in its discretion to grant continuances in such cases without the compliance by the parties with any of the requirements of law respecting continuances in other cases; and (7) in all cases, except complaints seeking a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, the complaint must be accompanied with an affidavit of plaintiff that it is not filed by collusion with the defendant for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, but that the cause or causes for divorce stated in the complaint are true as stated.
Codes, Hutchinson's 1848, ch. 34, art. 2 (2); 1857, ch. 40, art. 18; 1871, § 1773; 1880, § 1161; 1892, § 1568; 1906, § 1676; Hemingway's 1917, § 1418; 1930, § 1416; 1942, § 2737; Laws, 1922, ch. 233; Laws, 1924, ch. 151; Laws, 1958, ch. 272, § 2; Laws, 1974, ch. 556; Laws, 1976, ch. 451, § 3; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 129, eff. 7/1/1991.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
23
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1986–2021 · leading case:
Rawson v. Buta, 609 So. 2d 426 (Miss. 1992).
Rawson v. Buta, 609 So. 2d 426 (Miss. 1992).
· cites it 20× “§ 93-5-7 (1972) [3] , in effect at the time of trial, provides: The proceedings to obtain a divorce shall be by bill in chancery, and shall be conducted as other suits in chancery, except that (1) the defendant shall not be required to answer on oath; (2) the bill shall not be…”
Bias v. Bias, 493 So. 2d 342 (Miss. 1986).
· cites it 4× “We find, however, that the quasi-notice pleading concept embodied in the Civil Rules has in divorce cases been authorized by statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-7 (5) (Supp. 1985), wherein a plaintiff's complaint is sufficient thought it "allege only the statutory language".”
Germany v. Germany, 123 So. 3d 423 (Miss. 2013).
· cites it 4× “” Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-7 (Rev. 2004) (emphasis added).”
Luse v. Luse, 992 So. 2d 659 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 4× “Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-7 (Rev.2004); M.R.C.”
Webster v. Webster, 834 So. 2d 26 (Miss. 2002).
· cites it 2× “See Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-7 (1994); Lindsey v.”
Holmes v. Holmes, 628 So. 2d 1361 (Miss. 1993).
· cites it 4× “If sufficient evidence were present in the record to support a finding that a default judgment was sought by Fred Holmes and a default judgment was entered by the trial court (which would bring this case under Rule 55), then the court should reverse because Miss. Code Ann. §…”
Christina Lynn Sullivan Leblanc v. William Clarence Leblanc, III, 271 So. 3d 494 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 2× “Moreover, there are no default judgments in divorce cases, see Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-7 (Rev. 2013), and Christina identifies no way in which she was prejudiced by Billy's untimely answer and counterclaim.”
Lindsey v. Lindsey, 818 So. 2d 1191 (Miss. 2002).
· cites it 2× “According to Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-7 (1994), in a divorce matter, no judgment by default may be granted, and a defendant is not required to answer a complaint.”
Kumar v. Kumar, 976 So. 2d 957 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 2× “The chancellor relied on section 93-5-7 of the Mississippi Code Annotated (Rev.”
Keller v. Keller, 763 So. 2d 902 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 4× “Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-7(7) (Rev.1994). The motion was denied, and the wife's attorney was ordered to file a second amended complaint with the proper affidavit and signatures before trial resumed the next morning.”
Carlisle v. Carlisle, 11 So. 3d 142 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 2× “In Rawson , the supreme court held that Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-7 (Supp.1992) “does not bar a defendant from presenting proof rebutting the plaintiffs proof, although he or she may not have filed an answer.”
Pratt v. Pratt, 977 So. 2d 386 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 2× “They incorporated a property settlement agreement (agreement), pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-7, into the judgment of divorce for the purpose of resolving all property rights between the parties.”
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-7(1): 1 case
Rawson v. Buta, 609 So. 2d 426 (Miss. 1992).
“§ 93-5-7 (1972) [3] , in effect at the time of trial, provides: The proceedings to obtain a divorce shall be by bill in chancery, and shall be conducted as other suits in chancery, except that (1) the defendant shall not be required to answer on oath; (2) the bill shall not be…”
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-7(2): 1 case
Rawson v. Buta, 609 So. 2d 426 (Miss. 1992).
“§ 93-5-7 (1972) [3] , in effect at the time of trial, provides: The proceedings to obtain a divorce shall be by bill in chancery, and shall be conducted as other suits in chancery, except that (1) the defendant shall not be required to answer on oath; (2) the bill shall not be…”
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-7(7): 1 case
Keller v. Keller, 763 So. 2d 902 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
“Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-7(7) (Rev.1994). The motion was denied, and the wife's attorney was ordered to file a second amended complaint with the proper affidavit and signatures before trial resumed the next morning.”
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